

HISTORY OF GREECE

FOR BEGINNERS

BY

J. B. BURY, M.A.

HON. LITT.D. OXON. AND DURHAM; HON. LL.D. EDINBURGH AND GLASGOW;
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
ST. PETERSBURG; FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,
AND OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE; REGIUS
PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

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NOTICE

THIS short history is an abridgment of my *History of Greece* (1900), and few changes have been made except those which were rendered necessary by the excisions. The work of abbreviation and revision was carried out by another hand, and it seems to me to have been skilfully done. The question occurred to us whether the first chapter, which deals with such uncertain matter, might not be omitted altogether, but we decided to retain it in an abridged shape, on the ground that it might interest boys reading Homer.

J. B. B.

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
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CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF GREECE AND THE HEROIC AGE

SECT. I. **Greece and the Aegean.**—The rivers and valleys, the mountains, bays, and islands of Greece will become familiar as our story unfolds itself. But it is useful at the very outset to grasp some general features which went to make the history of the Greeks what it was, and what otherwise it could not have been. The character of their history is so intimately connected with the character of their dwelling-places that we cannot conceive it apart from their land and seas. In a land of capes and deep bays and islands it was determined that waterways should be the ways of their expansion. They were driven as it were into the arms of the sea.

The most striking feature of continental Greece is the deep gulf which has cleft it asunder into two parts. The southern half ought to have been an island,—as its Greek name, “the island of Pelops,” suggests,—but it holds on to the continent by a narrow bridge of land at the eastern extremity of the great cleft. Now this physical feature has the utmost significance for the history of Greece; and its significance may be viewed in three ways, if we consider the existence of the dividing gulf, the existence of the isthmus, and the fact that the isthmus was at the eastern and not at the western end. 1. The double effect of the gulf itself is

clear at once. It let the sea in upon a number of folks who would otherwise have been inland mountaineers, and increased enormously the length of the seaboard of Greece. Further, the gulf constituted southern Greece a world by itself; so that it could be regarded as a separate land from northern Greece. 2. But if the island of Pelops had been in very truth an island—if there had been no isthmus—there would have been from the earliest ages direct and constant intercourse between the coasts which are washed by the Aegean and those which are washed by the Ionian Sea. The eastern and western lands of Greece would have been brought nearer to one another, when the ships of trader or warrior, instead of tediously circumnavigating the Peloponnesus, could sail from the eastern to the western sea through the middle of Greece. The disappearance of the isthmus would have revolutionised the roads of traffic and changed the centres of commerce; and the wars of Grecian history would have been fought out on other lines. How important the isthmus was may perhaps be best illustrated by a modern instance on a far mightier scale. Remove the bridge which joins the southern to the northern continent of America, and contemplate the changes which ensue in the routes of trade and in the conditions of naval warfare in the great oceans of the globe. 3. Again, if the bridge which attached the Peloponnesus to the mainland had been at the western end of the gulf, the lands along either shore of the inlet would have been accessible easily, and sooner, to the commerce of the Aegean and the Orient; the civilisation of north-western Greece might have been more rapid and intense; and the history of Boeotia and Attica, unhooked from the Peloponnesus, would have run a different course.

The character of the Aegean basin was another determining condition of the history of the Greeks. Strewn with countless islands it seems meant to promote the intercourse of folk with folk. The Cyclades pass imperceptibly into

the isles which the Asiatic coast throws out, and there is formed a sort of island bridge, inviting ships to pass from Greece to Asia. The western coast of Lesser Asia belongs, in truth, more naturally to Europe than to its own continent; it soon became part of the Greek world; and the Aegean might be considered then as the true centre of Greece.

The west side of Greece too was well furnished with good harbours. It was no long voyage from Corcyra to the heel of Italy, and the inhabitants of western Greece had a whole world open to their enterprise. But that world was barbarous in early times and had no civilising gifts to offer; whereas the peoples of the eastern seaboard looked towards Asia and were drawn into contact with the immemorial civilisations of the Orient. The backward condition of western as contrasted with eastern Greece in early ages did not depend on the conformation of the coast, but on the fact that it faced away from Asia; and in later days we find the Ionian Sea a busy scene of commerce and lined with prosperous communities which are fully abreast of Greek civilisation.

Greece is a land of mountains and small valleys; it has few plains of even moderate size and no considerable rivers. It is therefore well adapted to be a country of separate communities, each protected against its neighbours by hilly barriers; and the history of the Greeks is a story of small independent states. The political history of all countries is in some measure under the influence of geography; but in Greece geography made itself pre-eminently felt, and fought along with other forces against the accomplishment of national unity. The islands formed states by themselves; but, as seas, while like mountains they sever, may also, unlike mountains, unite, it was less difficult to form a sea than a land empire. In the same way, the hills prevented the development of a brisk land traffic, while, as we have seen,

the broken character of the coast and the multitude of islands facilitated intercourse by water.

There is no barrier to break the winds which sweep over the Euxine towards the Greek shores. Hence the Greek climate has a certain severity and bracing quality, which promoted the vigour and energy of the people. Again, Greece is by no means a rich and fruitful country. It has few well-watered plains of large size; the cultivated valleys do not yield the due crop to be expected from the area; the soil is good for barley, but not rich enough for wheat to grow freely. Thus the tillers of the earth had hard work. And the nature of the land had consequences which tended to promote maritime enterprise. On one hand, richer lands beyond the seas attracted the adventurous, especially when the growth of the population began to press on the means of support. On the other hand, it ultimately became necessary to supplement home-grown corn by wheat imported from abroad. But if Demeter denied her highest favours, the vine and the olive grew abundantly in most parts of the country, and their cultivation was one of the chief features of ancient Greece.

SECT. 2. **Aegean Civilisation (3rd Millennium B.C.).**

—It is in the lands of Thessaly and Epirus that we first dimly descry the Greeks busy at their destined task of creating and shaping the thought and civilisation of Europe. The oldest known sanctuary of Zeus, their supreme god, is the oakwood of Dodona in Epirus. But it was specially in Thessaly, where the first Greek settlers were the Achaeans, that this race, living on the plains of Argos and the mountains round about it, fashioned legends which were to sink deep into the imagination of Europe. Here they peopled Olympus, in whose shadow they dwelled, with divine inhabitants, so that it has become for ever the heavenly hill in the tongues of men. And here also they composed lays in the hexameter verse, that marvellous metre which is

probably of their invention. But the Achaeans were immigrants in Thessaly, having come from another home, in the mountains of Illyria: and their descendants migrated again, before the art of the hexameter was perfected in those lays sung at the banquets of their nobles, which give us in the Homeric literature our earliest picture of those ancient Aryan institutions which are common to ourselves and to the Greeks.

Moreover, when the Greek migrants came to the shores of the Aegean they found there a white race more advanced in civilisation than themselves. This Aegean race, as it may be called, which, like the Ligurians in Italy or the Iberians in Spain, preceded the Aryan conqueror, was a race of traders, having intercourse with many lands. We have lately come to know a good deal of its life, from the remains of its civilisation, discovered at Troy and in the islands of Amorgos and Melos, and in Crete.

At the time when the kings of the Twelfth Dynasty were reigning in Egypt, Crete was a land of flourishing communities, and was about to become, if it had not already become, a considerable sea power. It is probable that Cnossus was one of the strongest and richest settlements in Crete at the beginning of the second millennium. The remains of the palace, which in subsequent ages was transformed into a grander and more luxurious abode, have recently been dug out of the earth; and its stones, on which the emblem of a double axe is inscribed, declare that the kings who dwelled therein were devoted to the worship of a great deity whose symbol was the double axe or *labrys*. It was from this god of the labrys that the Labyrinth of Cretan legend derived its name; and it seems probable that this palace on the hill of Cnossus was the original Labyrinth, afterwards converted by myth into the Daedalean maze which sheltered the Minotaur.

Modern research on the hill of Hissarlik, in the north-

2778-2565,
B.C. ?

west corner of Asia Minor, shows that in the same period a great city flourished on the hill of Troy. It was built of sun-baked brick, and stood on the ruins of an older city built of stone. The brick city had three gates, and towers protected the angles of its walls. Its inhabitants belonged to the stone and copper age; bronze was still a rarity with them. But the palace, which can be traced, shows the same general ground-plan of a house as that which is described perhaps fifteen hundred years later in the poems of Homer. From an outer gate we pass through a courtyard, in which an altar stood, into a square preliminary chamber; and from it we enter the great hall, in the centre of which was the hearth. Long before the Greeks came the Aegean race were building such houses as Homer tells of.

The great brick city was destroyed by fire, probably about 2000 B.C.; and three other cities were reared and perished on that same site. Civilisation progressed; bronze superseded stone tools, as tin was brought in more abundance from the west. We cannot trace the invasions and shiftings of the centres of power, but by about 1500 B.C. we find this material civilisation of the non-Aryan Aegean people existing in the Peloponnesus among Grecian folk. Its monuments of stone survive above ground after more than three thousand years: its objects of daily use and luxury have been unearthed from the houses of the dead. These records have been found specially in the plain of the Peloponnesian Argos—at Tiryns, near the sea, and at Mycenae, which seems to have been the wealthiest and strongest city on the lands bordering on the Aegean, so that Homer calls it "Golden Mycenae," and the name "Mycenaean" has been given to the whole civilisation to which the period of its greatness belongs.

Tiryns stands on a long low rock about a mile and a half from the sea, and the land around it was once a marsh. From north to south the hill rises in height, and was shaped by

man's hand into three platforms, of which the southern and highest was occupied by the palace of the king. But the whole acropolis was strongly walled round by a structure of massive stones, laid in regular layers but rudely dressed, the crevices being filled with a mortar of clay. This fashion of building has been called Cyclopean from the legend that masons called Cyclopes were invited from Lycia to build the walls of Tiryns.

The stronghold of Mycenae, about twelve miles inland, at the north-eastern end of the Argive plain, was built on a hill which rises to 900 feet above the sea-level in a mountain glen. The shape of the citadel is a triangle, and the greater part of the wall is built in the same "Cyclopean" style as the wall of Tiryns, but of smaller stones. Another fashion of architecture, however, also occurs, and points to a later date than Tiryns. The gates and some of the towers are built of even layers of stones carefully hewn into rectangular shape. On the north-east side a vaulted stone passage in the wall led by a downward subterranean path to the foot of the hill, where a cistern was supplied from a perennial spring outside the walls. Thus the garrison was furnished with water in case of a siege. Mycenae had two gates. The lintel of the chief doorway is formed by one huge square block of stone, and the weight of the wall resting on it is lightened by the device of leaving a triangular space. This opening is filled by a sculptured stone relief representing two lionesses standing opposite each other on either side of a pillar, on whose pedestal their forepaws rest. They are, as it were, watchers who ward the castle, and from them the gate is known as the Lion gate.

The ruins on the hill of Tiryns enable us to trace the plan of the palace of its kings. One chief principle of the construction of the palaces of this age seems to have been the separation of the dwelling-house of the women from that of the men,—a principle which continued to prevail

in Greek domestic architecture in historical times. The halls of king and queen alike are built on the same general plan as the palace in the old brick city on the hill of Troy and the palaces which are described in the poems of Homer. An altar stood in the men's courtyard (*αὐλή*), which was enclosed by pillared porticoes; the portico (*αἶθρονα*) which faced the gate being the vestibule of the house. Double-leafed doors opened from the vestibule into a preliminary hall (*πρόδομος*) from which one passed through a curtained doorway over a great stone threshold (*λαῖνος οὐδός*) into the men's hall (*μέγαρον*). In the midst of it was the round hearth—the centre of the house—encircled by four wooden pillars which supported the flat roof. The palace of Mycenæ crowned the highest part of the hill, and its plan was, in general conception and in many details, alike. It was customary to embellish the walls by inlet sculptured friezes and by paintings. A brilliant alabaster frieze, inset with *cyanus* or paste of blue glass, decorated the vestibule of the hall at Tiryns, and the men's halls in both palaces were adorned with mural pictures.

Besides their castle and palace, the burying-places of the kings of Mycenæ are their most striking memorials. Close to the western wall, south of the Lion gate, the royal burial circle has been discovered, within which six tombs cut vertically into the rock had remained untouched by the hand of man since the last corpses were placed in them. Weapons were buried with the men, some of whose faces were covered with gold masks. The heads of the women were decked with gold diadems; rich ornaments and things of household use were placed beside them. But a day came when this simple kind of grave was no longer royal enough for the rich princes of Mycenæ, and they sought more imposing resting-places; or else, as some believe, they were overthrown by lords of another race, who brought with them a new fashion of sepulchre. Nine




FIG. 1.—Lion Gate, Mycenae.

sepulchral domes, hewn in the opposite hillside, have been found not far from the acropolis. The largest of them is generally known as the "Treasury of Atreus," a name which arose from a false idea as to its purpose.

But besides the stately burying-places of the kings, the humbler tombs of the people have been discovered—square chambers cut into the rock. The town of Mycenae below the citadel consisted of a group of villages, each of which preserved its separate identity; each had its own burying-ground. Thus Mycenae, and probably other towns of the age, represented an intermediate stage between the village and the city—a number of little communities gathered together in one place, and dominated by a fortress.

We have seen how in the royal graves on the castle hill treasures of gold, long hidden from the light of day, revealed the wealth of the Mycenaean kingdom. Treasures would perhaps have been found also in some of the great vaulted tombs if they had not been rifled by plunderers in subsequent ages. But for us the works of the potter, and the implements of war and peace fashioned by the bronze-smith, are of more value than the golden ornaments for studying this early civilisation; and things of daily use have been found in the lowlier rock-tombs as well as in the royal sepulchres of hill or plain. From the implements which the people used, and also from the representations which artists wrought, we can win a rough picture of their dress, armour, and ornaments, and form an idea of their capacity in art.

Another memorial of this age, which possesses as great historical interest even as the stronghold of Mycenae, is the palace of Cretan Cnossus, of which the foundations have recently been laid bare. In wealth and luxury the lords of Cnossus must have been at least as distinguished as the lords of Mycenae; but between the Cretan mansion and the Argive fortresses there is one difference which in

a historian's eyes is of great significance. No massive wall, like those of Tiryns and Mycenae, girt the royal residence of Cnossus; it was unfortified except at the gates. This fact shows that the sovereigns of Cnossus were sea-kings; their strength lay in their ships. The royal wealth was secured in a series of storerooms built side by side; stone chests for treasure and large jars for storage have been found in abundance. And the kings kept accurate record and account of their possessions, for the art of writing was perfectly familiar in Crete in the days when she played the greatest part she was ever destined to play in the history of the world. Hundreds of written documents have been found in the Cnossian palace. The writing material was small tablets of clay, which were preserved in wooden boxes secured by seals. The writing, which is of linear character, cannot be read; but it has been made out that about seventy signs were in common use.

The civilisation of the men whose monuments we have been considering belonged to the age of bronze and copper. Even in its later period iron was still so rare and costly that it was used only for ornaments—rings, for instance, and possibly for money. The arms with which the men of Mycenae attacked their foes were sword, spear, and bow. Their defensive armour consisted of huge helmets, probably made of leather; shields of ox-hide reaching from the neck almost to the feet—complete towers of defence, but so clumsy that it was the chief part of a military education to manage them. The princes went forth to war in two-horsed war chariots, which consisted of a board to stand on and a breastwork of wicker. The fragment of a silver vessel (found in one of the rock-tombs of Mycenae) shows us a scene of battle in front of the walls of a mountain city, from whose battlements women, watching the fight, are waving their hands.

Men wore long hair, not, however, flowing freely, but

tied or plaited in tresses. In old times they let the beard grow both on lip and chin ; but the fashion changed, and in the later period, as we see from their pictures, they shaved the upper lip, and razors have been found in the tombs. Their garments were simple, a loin apron and a



FIG. 2.—Siege-scene on a silver vessel ; 8-shaped shield above in left corner (Mycenae).

cloak fastened by a clasp-pin ; in later times, a close-fitting tunic. High-born dames wore tight bodices and wide gown-skirts. Frontlets or bands round the brow were a distinction of their attire, and they wore their hair elaborately curled, or coiled high in rings, letting the ends fall behind. The ornaments which have been found in the royal tombs of

Mycenae show that its queens appeared in glittering gold array.

The remains at Mycenae, Tiryns, and Cnossus are, taken in their entirety, the most impressive of the memorials of a widespread Aegean civilisation. In the Peloponnesus nowhere except at Tiryns and Mycenae have great fortresses or palaces been found; but some large vaulted hill-tombs,



FIG. 3.—Gem showing Female Dress

on the same plan as those of the Argive plain, mark the existence of ancient principalities. The lords of Amyclae, which was the queen of the Laconian vale before the rise of Greek Sparta, hollowed out for themselves a lordly tomb, which, unlike the Treasury of Atreus, was never invaded by robbers. In this vault, among other costly treasures, were found the most precious of all the works of Mycenaean art that have yet been drawn forth from the earth: two golden cups on which a metal-worker of matchless skill has wrought vivid scenes of the snaring and capturing of wild bulls.

In Attica there are many relics. On the Athenian Acropolis there are a few stones supposed to belong to a palace of great antiquity, but we can look with more certainty on some of the ancient foundations of the fortress wall. This wall was called Pelargic or Pelasgic by the Athenians; and it seems likely that the word preserves the name of the ancient inhabitants of the place, the Pelasgoi.

In Boeotia there are striking memorials. On the western shores of the great Copaic marsh a people dwelled, whose wealth was proverbial; and their city Orchomenus shared with Mycenae the attribute of "golden" in the Homeric poems. One of their kings built a great sepulchral vault under the hill of the citadel, and later generations took it

for a treasury. It approached, though it did not quite attain to, the size of the Treasure-house of Atreus itself.

But of all the cities which shared in the later bloom of Aegean culture, none was greater or destined to be more famous than that which arose on the southern side of the Hellespont, on that hill whereon five cities had already risen




FIG. 4.—Troy, Sixth City (view from east tower). Prehistoric wall on the left (Roman foundations on right).

and fallen. The new Troy, through whose glory the name of the spot was to become a household word for ever throughout all European lands, was built on the levelled ruins of the older towns. The circuit of the new city was far wider, and within a great wall of well-wrought stone the citadel rose, terrace upon terrace, to a highest point. On that commanding summit, as at Mycenae, we must presume that the king's palace stood. The houses of which the

foundations have been disclosed within the walls have the same simple plan that we saw in the older brick city and in the palaces of Mycenae and Tiryns. The wall was pierced by three or four gates, the chief gate being on the south-east side, guarded by a flanking tower. The builders were more skilful than the masons of the ruder walls of the fortresses of Argolis; and it is a question whether we are to infer that the foundation of Troy belongs to a later age, or that from the beginning the art of building was more advanced among the Trojans. But if Troy shows superior excellence in military masonry, its civilisation in other ways seems to have been simpler than that of the Argive plain. It imported indeed the glazed Mycenaean wares, and was in contact with Aegean civilisation. But Troy stands, in a measure, apart from the "Mycenaean" world—beside it, in contact with it, yet not quite of it. This was natural; for in speech and race the Trojans stood apart. We know with full certainty who the people of Troy were; we know that they were a Phrygian folk and spoke a tongue akin to our own.

SECT. 3. Inferences from the Relics of Aegean Civilisation.—Having taken a brief survey of the character and range of the "Mycenaean civilisation," we come to inquire whether any evidence exists, amid these chronicles of stone and clay, of gold and bronze, for determining the periods of its rise, bloom, and fall. In the first place, it belongs to the age of bronze; the iron age had not begun. Iron was still a rare and precious metal in the later part of the period; it was used for rings, but not yet for weapons. The iron age can hardly have commenced in Greece long before the tenth century; and if we set the beginning of the bronze age at about 2000 B.C., we get roughly the second millennium as a delimitation of the period within which "Mycenaean" culture flourished and declined.

The art of writing was known to the Cretans, but we can

interpret neither their signs nor their language. But in Egypt, evidence has been discovered which teaches us in what centuries the potters of the Aegean made their wares and shipped them to distant shores. In the sixteenth century men of Aegean type bearing Mycenaean vases were represented on a wall-painting at Egyptian Thebes. At Gurob, a city which was built in the fifteenth century and destroyed two or three hundred years later, a number of "false-necked" jars imported from the Aegean have been found; and they belong not to the earlier but to the later period of Mycenaean pottery.

But Egyptian evidence is found not only on Egyptian soil, but on both sides of the Aegean. Three pieces of porcelain, one inscribed with the name, the two others with the "cartouche," of Amenhotep III. of Egypt (before 1400 B.C.), and a scarab with the name of his wife, have been found in the chamber-tombs of Mycenae; and a scarab of the same Amenhotep was discovered in the burying-place of Ialysus in Rhodes. It would follow that in the fifteenth century at latest the period of the chamber-tombs and the vaulted tombs began.

The joint witness of these and other independent pieces of evidence proves that the civilisation of which Mycenae and Cnossus were principal centres was flourishing from the sixteenth to the thirteenth century.

Such was the world which the Greeks had come to share, and soon to transform, on the borders of the Aegean Sea. It was a world created by folks who belonged to the European race which had been from of old in possession of this corner of the earth. Greek civilisation, it is well to repeat, was simply a continuation and supreme development of that more primitive civilisation of which we caught glimpses before the bronze age began. There is no reason to suppose that these peoples were designated by any common name; there were doubtless many different peoples




FIG. 5.
C

with different names, which are unknown to us. We know that there were Pelasgians in Thessaly and in Attica; tradition suggests that the Arcadians were Pelasgians too. But it is probable that all these peoples, both on the mainland of Greece and in the Aegean islands, belonged to the same non-Aryan race,—a dark-haired stock,—which also included the Mysians, the Lydians, the Carians, perhaps the Leleges, on the coast of Asia Minor.

There seems little doubt that this prehistoric Aegean world was composed of many small states. Of the relation of these states to one another, of the political events of the period, we know almost nothing; but the eminent position of "golden" Mycenae herself seems to be established. Her comparative wealth is indicated by the treasures of her tombs, which exceed all treasures found elsewhere in the Aegean. But her lords were not only rich; their power stretched beyond their immediate territory. This fact may be inferred from the road system which connected Mycenae with Corinth and must have been constructed by one of her kings. Three narrow but stoutly built highways have been traced, the two western joining at Cleonae, the eastern going by Tenea. They rest on substructions of "Cyclopean" masonry; streams are bridged and rocks are hewn through; and as they were not wide enough for waggons, the wares of Mycenae were probably carried to the Isthmus on the backs of mules.

There was an active sea-trade in the Aegean—a sea-trade which reached to the Troad and to Egypt; but there is no proof that Mycenae was a naval power. Everything points to Crete as the queen of the seas in this age, and to Cretan merchants as the carriers of the Aegean world. The predominance of Crete survived in the memories of Minos, whom tradition exalted as a mighty sea-king who cleared the Aegean of pirates and founded a maritime power.

The discoveries made by excavation on the hill of Cnossus

show that this tradition embodied historical fact. The remains of the great palace testify, as we have seen, to a dynasty, lasting for two or three hundred years, of rich seakings. It is another question whether the founder of this Cnossian sea-power actually bore the name of Minos. While we recognise that the Greek tradition which made Minos the son of Zeus does not in any wise exclude his historical reality, we may be more inclined to think that he was originally the deity worshipped by the Cnossian monarchs, and that afterwards, overcome and deposed by Zeus, the god of the Greek invaders, he was conciliated with that great usurper by becoming his son. In any case whether King Minos was man, or god, or both, some incidents in the legend which afterwards enveloped him owe their origins to local facts. The story of the labyrinth, which the wonderful craftsman Daedalus built for Minos, may have originated from the palace of the *labrys* or Double Axe, which Minos or his historical prototype inherited from older potentates. According to Greek tradition the famous Cretan king was not only the lord of a navy, but also a giver of laws. The story was that he went down into the cavern of Dicte, and there received laws from his father Zeus. Dicte lies in the uplands south of Cnossus, and the holy cave, wherein Zeus himself was said to have been reared, has recently been searched, and has given up the votive offerings which have reposed in its deep and dark recesses since they were first placed there in the days of Cnossian greatness, to which the traditions of Minos belong.

That period of Cnossian power had begun by the commencement of the fifteenth, and endured into the thirteenth century, though perhaps hardly beyond. It seems at least probable that the destruction of Cnossus occurred before the destruction of Mycenae.

Of the power and resources of the Aegean states, the

monuments hardly enable us to form an absolute idea. They were small, as we saw ; it was an age

When men might cross a kingdom in a day.

The kings had slaves to toil for them ; the fortresses and the large tombs were assuredly built by the hands of thralls. One fact shows in a striking way how small were these kingdoms, and how slender their means, compared with the powerful realms of Egypt and the Orient. If Babylonian or Egyptian monarchs, with their command of slave-labour, had ruled in Greece, they would assuredly have cut a canal across the Isthmus and promoted facilities for commerce by joining the eastern with the western sea.

SECT. 4. **The Greek Conquest.**—It must not be supposed that the non-Aryan Aegean population was either exterminated or wholly enthralled by the Aryan Greek invaders. In the first place, the invaders were not wholly Aryan, though they had men of Aryan blood among them, from whom they had taken their institutions, some of their gods, and their tongue. The blond type, which existed in historical Greece and was always the rarer and more prized, no doubt came in with the invaders, but probably many of them were dark-haired and dark-skinned. They were all men of Aryan speech, not all of Aryan stock. Secondly, though the older tongues disappeared entirely, that is due to the character of the Greek language, which, as later history shows, was vigorous and masterful. Wherever the Greeks settled it became the language of the land. And so, in Greece itself, sometimes the Greeks came in as conquerors, predominant both in numbers and power, sometimes merely as settlers ; but everywhere the country was Graecised. In Attica and Arcadia, for example, there was little disturbance of the original inhabitants, and tradition preserved the fact in various myths pointing to the antiquity of the two races (*αὐτόχθονες*).

Thus what took place was not a single irruption, but a gradual infiltration of a new stock into an older one, carrying the introduction of a new language. By some cause the Greeks were being pressed southward from their home in the north-west of the Balkan peninsula; while at the same time—perhaps from a kindred reason—the Phrygians and Trojans, who dwelt in western Macedonia and southern Thrace, were moving eastward and across the straits into Asia Minor. And this process, so far as the Greeks were concerned, extended on over centuries. The north-western lands of Epirus, Acarnania, and Aetolia were certainly lands of Greek speech many years before the conquest of the Peloponnesus; and probably about the same time the Macedonian Greeks settled on the lower waters of the Axios (perhaps pushing the Phrygians eastward), while the Achaeans and others found abodes in what was known later as Thessaly. But it need not be supposed that northern Greece was completely overspread by the Greeks before they began to pass into the southern peninsula. The first Greek settlers of the Peloponnesus must have crossed by boat from the north-west shore of the Corinthian Gulf; and the countries afterwards called Achaea, Elis, and Messenia, together with the Arcadian highlands, had at least begun to be hellenized sooner than Laconia and Argolis. The Greeks reached Argolis from the eastern side. From Thessaly the new people spread southward along the eastern coast to Euboea, and the shores of Attica, to the Cyclad islands, and lastly to Argolis. The Dryopes and Phocians found habitation about Mount Oeta and Parnassus. Other settlers penetrated into the fertile mountain-girt country afterwards to be called Boeotia. Some of these were perhaps the Minyae, who inhabited Orchomenus in the heroic age, though again this may have been the name of the natives whom the Greeks hellenized. In Attica some of the settlements seem to have been made by a tribe

called Iāvōnes or Ionians, and these settled in Argolis also.

All this was a long and gradual process. It needed many years for the Greeks to blend with the older inhabitants and hellenize the countries in which they settled. In eastern Greece, where the Aegean civilisation flourished, the influence was reciprocal. While the Greeks gradually imposed their language on the native races, they learned from a civilisation which was more advanced than their own. Things shaped themselves differently in different places, according to the number of the Greek settlers and the power and culture of the native people. In some countries, as seemingly in Attica, a small number of Greek strangers leavened the whole population and spread the Greek tongue; thus Attica became Greek, but the greater part of its inhabitants were sprung, not from Greeks, but from the old people who lived there before the Greeks came. In other countries the invaders came in larger numbers, and the inhabitants were forced to make way for them. In Thessaly it would seem that the Greeks drove the Pelasgians back into one region of the country and spread over the rest themselves. We may say, at all events, that there was a time for most lands in Greece when the Greek strangers and the native people lived side by side, speaking each their own tongue and exercising a mutual influence which was to end in the fusion of blood, out of which the Greeks of history sprang.

1500-1000
B.C.

No reasonable system of chronology can avoid the conclusion that Greeks had already begun to settle in the area of Aegean civilisation, when the Aegean civilisation of the bronze age was at its height. Coming by dribblets, they fell under its influence in a way which could not have been the case if they had swept down in mighty hordes, conquered the land by a few swoops, and destroyed or enslaved its peoples. It is another question how far the process of assimilation had already advanced when the lords of

Mycenae and Orchomenus and the other royal strongholds built their hill-tombs; and it is yet another whether any of these lords belonged to the race of the Greek strangers. To these questions we can give no positive answers; but this much we know: in the twelfth century, if not sooner, the Greeks began to expand in a new direction, eastward beyond the sea; and they bore with them to the coast of Asia the Aegean civilisation. That civilisation is what we find described in pictures of the heroic age of Greece.

SECT. 5. **Expansion of the Greeks to the Eastern Aegean.**—The first Greeks who sailed across the Aegean were the Achaeans and their fellows from the hills and plains of Thessaly and the plain of the Spercheus. Along with the Achaeans there sailed as comrades and allies the Aeolians. It was to the northern part of Asia Minor, the island of Lesbos and the opposite shores, that the Achaean and Aeolian adventurers steered their ships, and here they planted the first Hellenic settlements on Asiatic soil. The coast-lands of western Asia Minor are, like Greece itself, suitable for the habitations of a seafaring people. A series of river-valleys are divided by mountain chains which run out into promontories so as to form deep bays; and the promontories are continued in islands. The valleys of the Hermus and the Caicus are bounded on the north by a chain of hills which runs out into Lesbos; the valley of the Hermus is parted from that of the Cayster by mountains which are prolonged in Chios; and the valley of the Cayster is separated from the valley of the Maeander by a chain which terminates in Samos. The Greek invaders won the coast-lands from the Mysian natives and seized a number of strong places which they could defend,—such as Cyme, Aegae, Old Smyrna. They pressed up the rivers, and on the Hermus they founded Magnesia under Mount Sipylus. All this, needless to say, was not done at once. It must have been a work of many years, and of successive expeditions

from the mother-country. The only event which we can grasp, by a fragment of genuine tradition lurking in a legend, is the capture of the Lesbian town of Brēsa. The story of the fair-cheeked maid of Bresa, of whom Agamemnon robbed Achilles, is the memorial of the Greek conquest of Lesbos.

The Greeks made no settlement in the Troad. But in occupying the country south of the Troad, they came into collision with the great Phrygian town of Troy, or Ilios, as it was called from King Ilos, who perhaps was its founder. There were weary wars. Then the mighty fortress fell; and we need not doubt the truth of the legend which records that it fell through Grecian craft or valour. The Phrygian power and the lofty stronghold of "sacred Ilios" made a deep impression on the souls of the Greek invaders; and the strife, on whatever scale it really was, blended by their imagination with the old legends of their gods, inspired the Achæan minstrels with new songs. Through their minstrelsy the struggle between the Phrygians and the Greek settlers assumed the proportion of a common expedition of all the peoples of Greece against the town of Troy; and the Trojan war established itself in the belief of the Greeks as the first great episode in the everlasting debate between east and west.

It is to be observed that the Greeks and Phrygians in that age do not seem to have felt that they were severed by any great contrast of race or manners. They were conscious perhaps of an affinity in language; and they had the same kind of civilisation. This fact comes out in the Homeric poems, where, though some specially Phrygian features are recognised, the Trojans might be a Greek folk and their heroes have Greek names;¹ and it bears witness to the constant intercourse between the Achæan colonists and their Phrygian neighbours.

¹ Paris (Phrygian) = Alexander (Greek) is an instance of a double name.




FIG. 6.

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The Achæan wave of emigration was succeeded by an Ionian wave, flowing mainly from the coasts of Attica and Argolis, and new settlements were planted, south of the elder Achæan settlements. The two-pronged peninsula between the Hermus and Cayster rivers, with the off-lying isle of Chios, the valleys of the Cayster and Maeander, with Samos and the peninsula south of Mount Latmos, were studded with communities which came to form a group distinct from the older group in the north. Each group of settlements came to be called by a collective name. As the Achæans were the most illustrious of the settlers in the north, one might expect to find the northern group known as Achæan. But by some accident, it befell that the Aeolian and not the Achæan name was selected to designate the northern division of the Greek settlements in Asia; just as our own country came to be called not Saxony but England. The southern and larger group of colonies received the name of *Iāvōnes*—or *Iōnes*, as they called themselves, when they lost the letter *ν*. The Iavones were, as we saw, a people who had settled on the coasts of Argolis and Attica, but there the name fell out of use, and perhaps passed out of memory, until on Asiatic soil it attained celebrity and re-echoed with glory to their old homes.

Of the foundation of the famous colonies of Ionia, of the order in which they were founded, and of the relations of the settlers with the Lydian natives, we know little. Clazomenae and Teos arose on the north and south sides of the neck of the peninsula which runs out to meet Chios; and Chios, on the east coast of her island, faces Erythrae on the mainland—Erythrae, “the crimson,” so called from its purple fisheries, the resort of Tyrian traders. Lebedus and Colophon lie on the coast as it retires eastward from Teos to reach the mouth of the Cayster; and there was founded Ephesus, the city of Artemis. South of

Ephesus and on the northern slope of Mount Mycale was the religious gathering-place of the Ionians, the temple of the Heliconian Poseidon, which, when once the Ionians became conscious of themselves as a sort of nation and learned to glory in their common name, served to foster a sense of unity among all their cities, from Phocæa in the north to Miletus in the south. South of Mycale, the cities of Myus and Priene were planted on the Maeander. Then the coast retires to skirt Mount Latmos and breaks forward again to form the promontory, at the northern point of which was Miletus with its once splendid harbour. There was one great inland city, Magnesia on the Maeander, which must not be confused with the inland Aeolian city, Magnesia on the Hermus.

The Greek settlers brought with them their poetry and their civilisation to the shores of Asia. Their civilisation is revealed to us in their poetry, and we find that it resembles in its main features the civilisation which has been laid bare in the ruins of Mycenæ and other places in elder Greece. The Homeric poems show us, in fact, a later stage of the civilisation of the heroic age. The Homeric palace is built on the same general plan as the palaces that have been found at Mycenæ and Tiryns, at Troy and in the Cyprian lake. The blue inlaid frieze in the vestibule of the hall of Tiryns proves that the poet's frieze of *cyanus* in the hall of Alcinous was not a fancy; and he describes as the cup of Nestor a gold cup with doves perched on the handles, such as one which was found in a royal tomb at Mycenæ. There is indeed one striking difference in custom. The Mycenaean tombs reveal no trace of the habit of burning the dead, which the Homeric Greeks invariably practised; while the poems ignore the practice of burial. In later times both customs existed in Greece side by side.

It follows, first, that by the twelfth century the Greeks had assimilated the civilisation of the Aegean. Secondly,

that whatever fate befell the Mycenaean civilisation in the mother-country, it continued without a break in the new Greece beyond the seas, and developed into that luxurious Ionian civilisation which meets us some centuries later.



FIG. 7.—Gold Cup, with doves (Mycenae).

New elements were added in the meantime ; intercourse with Phrygia and Syria, for example, brought new influences to bear ; but the permanent framework was the heritage from the ancient folks of the Aegean.

SECT. 6. The Later Wave of Greek Invasion.—
The colonisation of the Asiatic coasts and islands extended

over some hundreds of years, and it was doubtless accelerated and promoted at certain stages of its progress by changes and dislocations which were happening in the mother-country. The ultimate cause of these movements, which affected almost the whole of Greece from north to south, was probably the pressure of the Illyrians.

This downward pressure was fatal to Aetolia. In the Homeric poems we see that "Pleuron by the sea and rocky Calydon" and the other strong cities of that region were abreast of the civilisation of the heroic age; and the Aetolian myth of Meleager and the hunting of the Calydonian boar became a part of the heritage of the national legend of Greece. But in the later ages of Greek history we find Aetolia regarded as a half-barbarous country, the abode of men who speak indeed a Greek tongue, but have lagged ages and ages behind the rest of Greece in science and civilisation. We find the neighbouring countries in the same case. Epirus suddenly lapses into comparative barbarism, and the sanctuary of Dodona remains a lonely outpost. The explanation of this falling away is the irruption and conquest of Illyrian invaders, who swamped Greek civilisation instead of assimilating it. The Aetolians and Epirots of history are mainly of Illyrian stock.

This invasion naturally drove some of the Greek inhabitants across the gulf, and Aetolian emigrants made their way to the river Peneus, where they settled, took to themselves the name of Eleans or "Dalesmen," and gradually extended their power to the Alpheus. Their land was a tract of downs with a harbourless coast, and they never became a maritime power.

In Epirus the pressure of the Illyrians led to two movements of great consequence, the Thessalian and the Boeotian migration. There is nothing to show decisively that these two movements happened at the same time or were connected with each other. A folk named Petthāloi,

but called by men of other dialects Thessaloi, crossed the hills and settled in the western corner of the land which is bounded by Pelion and Pindus. They gained the upper hand and spread their sway over northern Argos. They drove the Achaeans southwards into the mountains of Phthia, and henceforward these Achaeans play no part of any note in the history of Greece. The Thessalian name soon spread over the whole country, which is called Thessaly to the present day. Cranon, Pagasae, Larisa, and Pherae became the seats of lords who reared horses and governed the surrounding districts. The conquered people were reduced to serfdom and were known as the Labourers (Penestai); they cultivated the soil, at their own risk, paying a fixed amount to their lords; and they had certain privileges; they could not be sold abroad or arbitrarily put to death. We know almost nothing of the history of the Thessalian kingdoms; in later times we find the whole country divided into four great divisions: Thessaliotis, in the south-west; Phthiotis of the Achaeans in the south; Pelasgiotis, a name which records the survival of the Pelasgians, one of the older peoples; and Histiaeotis, the land of the Histiaeans, who have no separate identity in history. All the lordships of the land were combined in a very loose political organisation, which lay dormant in times of peace; but through which, to meet any emergency of war, they could elect a common captain, with the title of *tāgos*.

But all the folk did not remain to fall under the thralldom imposed by the new lords. A portion of the Achaeans migrated southward to the Peloponnesus, probably accompanied by their neighbours the Hellēnes, who lived on the upper waters of the river Spercheus. The Achaeans and Hellenes together founded settlements along the strip of coast which forms the southern side of the Corinthian Gulf; and the whole country was called Achaea. Thus there were

two Achæan lands, the old Achæa in the north, now shrunk into the mountains of Phthia, and the new Achæa in the south; while in the land which ought to have been the greatest Achæa of all,—the Asiatic land in which the poetry of Europe took shape,—the Achæan name was merged in the less significant title of *Aeolis*.

The lands of *Helicon* and *Cithæron* experienced a similar shock to that which unsettled and changed the lands of *Olympus* and *Othrys*; they were occupied by the *Boeotians*. According to the Greek account, the *Boeotians* lived in *Thessaly* and moved southward in consequence of the *Thessalian* conquest. They first occupied places in the west of the land which they were to make their own. From *Chaeronea* and *Coronea* they won *Thebes*, which was held by an old folk called the *Cadmeans*. Thence they sought to spread their power over the whole land. They spread their name over it, for it was called *Boeotia*, but they did not succeed in winning full domination as rapidly as the *Thessalians* succeeded in *Thessaly*. The rich lords of *Orchomenus* preserved their independence for hundreds of years, and it was not till the sixth century that anything like a *Boeotian* unity was established. The policy of the *Boeotian* conquerors, who were perhaps comparatively few in number, was unlike that of the *Thessalians*; the conquered communities were not reduced to serfdom.

West of *Boeotia*, in the land of the *Phocians* amid the regions of *Mount Parnassus*, there were dislocations of a less simple kind. Hither came the *Dorians*, who probably belonged to the same "north-western" group of the Greek race as the *Thessalians* and *Boeotians*. But the greater part of them soon went forth to seek fairer abodes in distant places. Yet a few remained behind in the small, basin-like district between *Mount Oeta* and *Mount Parnassus*, where they preserved the illustrious *Dorian* name throughout the course of *Grecian* history in which they never played a part.

It would seem that the Dorians also took possession of Delphi, the "rocky threshold" of Apollo, and planted some families there who devoted themselves to the service of the god.

The departure of the Dorians from the regions of Parnassus was probably gradual, and it was accomplished by sea. They built ships—perhaps the name of Naupactus, "the place of the shipbuilding," is a record of their ventures; and they sailed round the Peloponnesus to the south-eastern parts of Greece. The first band of adventurers brought a new element to Crete, the island of many races; others settled in Thera, and in Melos. Others sailed away eastward, beyond the limits of the Aegean, and found a home on the southern coast of Asia Minor, where, surrounded by barbarians and forgotten by the Greek world, they lived a life apart, taking no share in the history of Hellas. But they preserved their Hellenic speech, and their name, the Pamphylians, recorded their Dorian origin, being the name of one of the three tribes by which the Dorians were everywhere recognised.

The next conquests of the Dorians were in the Peloponnesus. There were three distinct conquests—the conquest of Laconia, the conquest of Argolis, the conquest of Corinth. The Dorians took possession of the rich vale of the Eurotas, overthrew the lords of Amyclae, and, keeping their own Dorian stock pure from the mixture of alien blood, reduced all the inhabitants to the condition of subjects. It seems probable that the Dorian invaders who subdued Laconia were more numerous than the Dorian invaders elsewhere. The eminent quality which distinguished the Dorian from other branches of the Greek race was that which we call "character"; and it was in Laconia that this quality most fully displayed and developed itself, for here the Dorian seems to have remained more purely Dorian.

In Argolis the course of things ran otherwise. The in-

vaders; who landed under a king named Temenos, had doubtless a hard fight; but their conquest took the shape not of subjection but of amalgamation. The Argive state was indeed organised on the Dorian system, with the three Dorian tribes—the Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes; but otherwise few traces of the conquest remained. It is to the time of this conquest that the overthrow of Mycenae may best be referred; and here, as in the case of Amyclae, it seems probable that the old native dynasty had already given place to Greek lords. Certain is it that both Mycenae and Tiryns were destroyed suddenly and set on fire. Henceforward Argos under her lofty citadel was to be queen of the Argive plain.

Dorian ships were also rowed up the Saronic Gulf. It was the adventure of a prince whom the legend calls Errant, the son of Rider (Ἀλήτης, son of Ἰππότης). He landed in the Isthmus and seized the high hill of Acrocorinth, the key of the peninsula. This was the making of Corinth. Here, as in Argolis, there was no subjection, no distinction between the conquerors and the conquered. The geographical position of Corinth between her seas determined for her people a career of commerce, and her history shows that the Dorians had the qualities of bold and skilful traders. For a time Corinth seems to have been dependent on Argos, whose power was predominant in the eastern Peloponnesus for more than three hundred years.

From Argos the Dorians made two important settlements in the north, on the river Asopus.—Sicyon on its lower, and Phlius on its upper, banks. And beyond Mount Geraneia, another Dorian city arose, called Megara, “the Palace,” on the commanding hill which looks down upon the western shore of Salamis.

The island, whose conical mountain in the midst of the Saronic waters is visible to all the coasts around, also

- c. 8. became a Dorian land. Aegina was conquered by Dorian settlers from Epidaurus.

The conquest of the eastern Peloponnesus was followed by a second Dorian colonisation of the Asiatic coast. The bold promontories below Miletus, the islands of Cos and Rhodes, were occupied by colonists from Argolis, Laconia, Corinth, and Crete. On the mainland Halicarnassus was the most important Dorian settlement, but it was formed in concert with the Carian natives, and was half Carian.

The Greek fringe of western Asia Minor was complete. It was impossible for Doris to creep round the corner and join hands with Pamphylia; for the Lycians presented an insuperable barrier. The Lycians were not a folk of Aryan speech; their language is related to the Carian. But, though Lycia was not colonised, the Aegean was now entirely within the Greek sphere, excepting only its northern margin, where Greek enterprise in the future was to find a difficult field.

Before the completion of the Greek occupation of the western coast of Asia Minor, another migration left the shores of the Peloponnesus to seek a more distant home in Cyprus. Much about the same time the Phoenicians also began to plant settlements in the island, and some places seem to have been colonised jointly by Phoenicians and Greeks, just as on the coast of Asia Minor Greeks and Carians mingled. The Greeks brought their Aegean civilisation, now in a decadent stage, with them, and abundant relics of it have been found. But a new Cypriot culture arose out of the intermingling of the two races; and the Greeks, under Phoenician influence, became so zealous in the worship of Aphrodite that she was universally known as the Cyprian goddess.

As for the chronology of all these movements which went to the making of historical Greece, we must be content with approximate limits:—

Achaean colonisation	}	13th-10th centuries.
Fall of Cnossus		
Fall of Troy		
Beginnings of Ionian colonisation		
Thessalian conquest		
Boeotian conquest		
Dorian conquest of Crete and islands	}	11th century.
Dorian conquest of eastern Peloponnesus		
Colonisation of Cyprus		
Continuation of Ionian colonisation		
Dorian colonisation of Asia Minor		10th century.

SECT. 7. **Homer.**—No Greek folk has laid Europe under a greater debt of gratitude than the Achaeans, for the Achaeans originated epic poetry, and the beginning of European literature goes back to them. But their European epic was created on Asiatic soil. They brought with them to Asia old poetic tales which figured the strife of night and day, of winter and summer, and all nature's great processes. And, stimulated by the toils and adventures of settling in a new land, they began to re-tell these old tales, changing them into historical myths. Achilles may be a sea-god, Agamemnon (who was worshipped as Zeus Agamemnon at Sparta) a god of the sky. Achilles is his foe, as he is also foe of Memnon, the sun-god, whom he slays. But an event of actual history is introduced as the motive of the wrath of Achilles. He is wroth for the sake of Briseis, a Lesbian captain, and the taking of Bresa was an actual event.

When legend and history began to be blended, the element of history triumphed, and the nature-myth dropped out of sight. In the early days the Trojan story seems to have ended with the death of Hector. The original conception was not the tale of a siege which found its consummation in the fall of the fortress; the siege was rather the setting for the strife between Agamemnon and Achilles, between Achilles and Hector. The story of Troy's fall and the wooden horse is a later invention.

It was, perhaps, in the eleventh century, at Smyrna or some other Aeolian town, that the nucleus of the *Iliad* was composed, on the basis of those older lays, by a poet whom we may call the first Homer, though it is not probable that he was the poet who truly bore that name. He sang in the Achæan, or as it came to be called the Aeolian, tongue. His poem was the wrath of Achilles and the Death of Hector, and it forms only the smaller part of the *Iliad*. It was not till the ninth century that the *Iliad* really came into being. Then a poet of supreme genius arose, and it may be that he was the singer whose name was actually Homer. He composed his poetry in rugged Chios, and he gives us a local touch when he describes the sun as rising over the sea. He took in hand the older poem of the wrath of Achilles and expanded it into the shape and compass of the greater part of the *Iliad*. He is the poet who created one of the noblest episodes in the whole epic, Priam's ransoming of Hector. Tradition made Homer the author of both the great epics, the *Odyssey* as well as the *Iliad*. This is not probable. It can hardly have been before the eighth century that the old lays of the wandering of Odysseus and the slaying of the suitors were taken in hand and wrought into a large poem.

We may suppose, then, that Homer lived at Chios in the ninth century, and was the true author of the *Iliad*. He did not give it the exact shape in which it was ultimately transmitted; for it received from his successors in the art additions and extensions which were not entirely to its advantage. But it was he, to all seeming, who first conceived and wrought out the idea of a mighty epic. He was no mere stringer together of ancient lays. He took the motives, he caught the spirit, of the older poems; he wove them into the fabric of his own composition; but he was himself as divinely inspired as any of the elder minstrels, and he was the father of epic poetry, in the sense in which

we distinguish an epic poem with a large argument from a short lay. He and his successors sang in Ionia, and rewrote the poems in Ionian dialect, though sometimes for the sake of metre they were obliged to keep the Aeolian form. But in rewriting they sought to reproduce not the atmosphere of their own age but that which was familiar to the original writers of the lays. For example, the weapons and gear described are those of the bronze age; but now and then a slip betrays the later hand. Unwittingly the poet of the *Odyssey* allows it to escape that he lived in the iron age, for such a proverb as "the mere gleam of iron lures a man to strife" could not have arisen until iron weapons had been long in use.

In the course of time the Trojan war began to assume the shape of a great national enterprise. All the Greeks looked back to it with pride; all desired to have some share in its glory. Consequently, a great many stories were invented in various communities for the purpose of bringing their ancestors into connexion with the Trojan expedition. And the *Iliad* was regarded as something of far greater significance than an Ionian poem; it was accepted as a national epic, and was, from the first, a powerful influence in promoting among the Greeks community of feeling and tendencies towards national unity. For two hundred years after its birth the *Iliad* went on gathering additions; and the bards were not unready to make insertions in order to satisfy the pride of the princely and noble families at whose courts they sang. Finally, in the seventh century, the Catalogue of the Greek host was composed, formulating explicitly the Panhellenic character of the expedition against Troy.

The *Odyssey*, affiliated as it was to the Trojan legend, became a national epic too. And the interest awakened in Greece by the idea of the Trojan war was displayed by the composition of a series of epic poems, dealing with

those events of the siege which happened both before and after the events described in the *Iliad*, and with the subsequent history of some of the Greek heroes. These poems were anonymous for the most part and passed under the name of Homer. Along with the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, they formed a chronological series which came to be known as the Epic Cycle.

SECT. 8. **Political and Social Organisation of the Early Greeks.**—The Homeric poems give us our earliest glimpse of the working of those political institutions which lie at the base of all the constitutions of Europe. They show us the King at the head. But he does not govern wholly of his own will; he is guided by a Council of the chief men of the community whom he consults; and the decisions of the council and king deliberating together are brought before the Assembly of the whole people. Out of these three elements—King, Council, and Assembly—the constitutions of Europe have grown; here are the germs of all the various forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.

But in the most ancient times this political organisation was weak and loose. The true power in primitive society was the family. When we first meet the Greeks they live together in family communities. Their villages are habitations of a *genos*—that is, of a clan, or family in a wide sense; all the members being descended from a common ancestor and bound together by the tie of blood. Originally the chief of the family had the power of life and death over all who belonged to the family; and it was only as the authority of the state grew and asserted itself against the comparative independence of the family, that this power gradually passed away. But the village communities are not isolated and independent; they are part of a larger community which is called the *phylē* or tribe. The tribe is the whole people of the kingdom, in the kingdom's

simplest form; and the territory which the tribe inhabited was called its deme (*δῆμος*). When a king became powerful and won sway over the demes of neighbouring kings, a community consisting of more than one tribe would arise.

It was usual for several families to group themselves together into a society called a *phratra* or brotherhood, which had certain common religious usages. The significance of the brotherhood is illustrated by Homer's description of an outcast, as one who has no "brothers" and no hearth.

The importance of the family is most vividly shown in the manner in which the Greeks possessed the lands which they conquered. The soil did not become the private property of individual freemen, nor yet the public property of the whole community. The king of the tribe or tribes marked out the whole territory into parcels, according to the number of families in the community; and the families cast lots for the estates. Each family then possessed its own estate; the land belonged to the whole kin, but not to any particular member. The right of property in land seems to have been based, not on the right of conquest, but on a religious sentiment. Each family buried their dead within their own domain; and it was held that the dead possessed for ever and ever the soil where they lay, and that the land round about a sepulchre belonged rightfully to their living kinsfolk, one of whose highest duties was to protect and tend the tombs of their fathers.

The king was at once the chief priest, the chief judge, and the supreme leader of the tribe. He belonged to a family which claimed descent from the gods themselves. His relation to his people was conceived as that of a protecting deity; "he was revered as a god in the deme." The kingship passed from sire to son, but it is probable that the people might refuse to accept a degenerate son who was unequal to the tasks that his father had fulfilled. The sceptred king had various privileges—the seat of honour at

feasts, a large and choice share of booty taken in war and of food offered at sacrifices. A special close of land was marked out and set apart for him as a royal domain, distinct from that which his family owned.

A king had no power to enforce his will, if it did not meet the approval of the heads of the people. He must always look for the consent and seek the opinion of the deliberative Council of the Elders. Certain families had come to hold a privileged position above the others—had, in fact, been marked out as noble, and claimed descent from Zeus; and the Council was composed of this nobility. In the puissant authority of this Council of Elders lay the germ of future aristocracy.

More important than either King or Council for the future growth of Greece was the Gathering of the people, out of which democracy was to spring. All the freemen of the tribe—all the freemen of the nation, when more tribes had been united—met together, not at stated times, but whenever the king summoned them, to hear and acclaim what he and his councillors proposed,—to hear and acclaim, but not to debate or propose themselves. As yet, the Gathering of the folk for purposes of policy had not been differentiated from the Gathering for the purpose of war. The Assembly was not yet distinguished as an institution from the army; and if Agamemnon summons his host to declare his resolutions in the plain of Troy, such a gathering is the Agora in no figurative sense: it is in the fullest sense the Assembly of the people—the fellow institution of the Roman *comitia*, our own *gemot*.

Though the monarchy of this primitive form, as we find it reflected in the Homeric lays, generally passed away, and was already passing away when the latest lays were written, it survived in a few outlying regions which lagged behind the rest of the Hellenic world in political development. Thus the Macedonian Greeks in the lower valley of the

Axius retained a constitution of the old Homeric type till the latest times—the royal power continually growing.

The constitutional fabric of the Greek states was thus simple and loose in the days of Homer. In the later part of the royal period a new movement is setting in, which is to decide the future of Greek history. The city begins to emerge and take form and shape out of the loose aggregate of villages. The inhabitants of a plain or valley are induced to leave their scattered villages and make their dwellings side by side in one place, which would generally be under the shadow of the king's fortress. Sometimes the group of villages would be girt by a wall; sometimes the protection of the castle above would be deemed enough. The movement was promoted by the kings: and it is probable that strong kings often brought it about by compulsion. But in promoting it they were unwittingly undermining the monarchical constitution, and paving the way for their own abolition. A city-state naturally tends to be a republic.

In the heroic age, then, and even in the later days when the Homeric poems were composed, the state had not fully emerged from the society. No laws were enacted and maintained by the state. Those ordinances and usages (*θέμωτες*) which guided the individual man in his conduct, and which are necessary for the preservation of any society, were maintained by the sanction of religion. There were certain crimes which the gods punished. But it was for the family, not for the whole community, to deal with the shedder of blood. The justice which the king administered was really arbitration. A stranger had no right of protection, and might be slain in a foreign community, unless he was bound by the bond of guest friendship with a member of that community, and then he came under the protection of Zeus the Hospitable (*Xenios*). Wealth in these ages consisted of herds and flocks; the value of a suit of armour, for instance, or a slave was expressed in oxen. Piracy was a common

trade, as was inevitable in a period when there was no organised maritime power strong enough to put it down. So many practised this means of livelihood that it bore no reproach; and when seamen landed on a strange strand, the natural question to ask them was: "Outlanders, whence come ye? are ye robbers that rove the seas?"

SECT. 9. Fall of Greek Monarchies and rise of the Republics.—Under their kings the Greeks had conquered the coasts and islands of the Aegean, and had created the city-state. These were the two great contributions of monarchy to Grecian history. Throughout the greater part of Greece in the eighth century the monarchies were declining and disappearing, and republics were taking their place. It is a transformation of which we can only guess at probable causes; but we may be sure that the deepest cause of all was the change to city-life. In some cases gross misrule may have led to the violent deposition of a king; in other cases, if the succession to the sceptre devolved upon an infant or a paltry man, the nobles may have taken it upon themselves to abolish the monarchy. In some cases, the rights of the king might be strictly limited, in consequence of his seeking to usurp undue authority; and the imposition of limitations might go on until the office of king, although maintained in name, became in fact a mere magistracy in a state wherein the real power had passed elsewhere. Of the survival of monarchy in a limited form we have an example at Sparta; of its survival as a mere magistracy, in the *Archon Basileus* at Athens.

Where the monarchy was abolished, the government passed into the hands of those who had done away with it—the noble families of the state. When the nobles assume the government and become the rulers, an aristocratic republic arises. Sometimes the power is won, not by the whole body of the noble clans, but by the clan to which the king belonged. This was the case at Corinth, where the

royal family of the Bacchiads became an oligarchy of the narrowest form.

At this stage of society, birth was the best general test of excellence that could be found, and the rule of the nobles was a true aristocracy, the government of the most excellent. They practised the craft of ruling ; they were trained in it, they handed it down from father to son ; and though no great men arose—great men are dangerous in an aristocracy—the government was conducted with knowledge and skill. Close aristocracies, like the Corinthian, were apt to become oppressive. But on the whole the Greek republics flourished in the aristocratic stage, and were guided with eminent ability.

The two great achievements of the aristocratic age are the planting of Greek cities in lands far beyond the limits of the Aegean sea, and the elaboration of political machinery. The first of these is simply the continuation of the expansion of the Greeks around the Aegean itself ; it was systematically promoted by the aristocracies, and it took a systematic shape. The creation of political machinery carried on the work of consolidation which the kings had begun when they gathered together into cities the loose elements of their states. When royalty was abolished or put, as we say, "into commission," the ruling families of the republic had to substitute magistracies tenable for limited periods, and had to determine how the magistrates were to be appointed, how their functions were to be circumscribed, how the provinces of authority were to be assigned. New machinery had to be created, to replace that one of the three parts of the constitution which had disappeared.

SECT. 10. Phœnician Intercourse with Greece.—

The Greeks were destined to become a great seafaring people : but sea-trade was a business which it took them many ages to learn. Their occupation of the islands was accompanied by a decline of the maritime supremacy which

the Aegean islanders and especially the Cretans enjoyed; and there was a long interval during which the trade of the Aegean with the east was partly carried on by strangers. The men who took advantage of this opening were the Phoenicians of the city-states of Sidon and Tyre on the Syrian coast, men of that Semitic stock to which Jew, Arab, and Assyrian alike belonged. The Phoenicians doubtless had marts here and there on coast or island; they certainly had a station at Abdēra in Thrace. Their ships were ever winding in and out of the Aegean isles from south to north, bearing fair naperies from Syria, fine-wrought bowls and cups from the workshops of Sidonian and Cypriot silver-smiths, and all manner of luxuries and ornaments; and this constant commercial intercourse lasting for two centuries is amply sufficient to account for all the influence that Phoenicia exerted upon Greece.

One inestimable service the Phoenicians are said to have rendered to Hellas and thereby to Europe. It is generally supposed that they gave the Greeks the most useful instrument of civilisation, the art of writing. If this theory is true, it was perhaps at the beginning of the ninth century, hardly later, that the Phoenician alphabet was moulded to the needs of the Greek language. In this adaptation the Greeks showed their genius. The alphabet of the Phoenicians and their Semitic brethren is an alphabet of consonants; the Greeks added the vowels. They took some of the consonantal symbols for which their own language had no corresponding sounds, and used these superfluous signs to represent the vowels. We may suppose that the original idea was worked out in Ionia. In Ionia, at all events, writing was introduced at an early period and was perhaps used by poets of the ninth century. Certain it is that the earliest reference to writing is in the *Iliad*, in the story of Bellerophon, who carries from Argos to Lycia "deadly symbols (*σήματα λυγρὰ*) in a folded tablet." It

seems simpler to suppose that the poet had in his mind a letter written in the Greek alphabet, than that he was thinking of the old pictorial forms of writing which were employed in ancient times.

SECT. II. Greek Reconstruction of Early Greek History.—We must now see what the Greeks thought of their own early history. Their construction of it has considerable importance, since their ideas about the past affected their views of the present. Mythic events were often the basis of diplomatic transactions; claims to territory might be founded on the supposed conquests or dominions of ancient heroes of divine birth.

At first, before the growth of historical curiosity, the chief motive for investigating the past was the desire of noble families to derive their origin from a god. For this purpose they sought to connect their pedigrees with heroic ancestors, especially with Heracles or with the warriors who had fought at Troy. For just as the Trojan war came to be regarded as a national enterprise, so Heracles was looked on as a national hero. The consequence was that the Greeks framed their history on genealogies and determined their chronology by generations, reckoning three generations to a hundred years. It was the poets of the school of Hesiod in the seventh century who did most to reduce to a historical system the legends of the heroic age. Their poems are lost, but they were worked up into still more complete and elaborate schemes by the prose logographers or "story-writers" of the sixth and fifth centuries, of whom perhaps the most influential were Hecataeus of Miletus and Acusilaus of Argos. The original works of the logographers have also perished, but their teaching has come down to us in the works of later compilers.

In the first place, it had to be determined how the various branches of the Greek race were related. As soon as the Greeks came to be called by the common name of

Hellenes, they derived their whole stock from an eponymous ancestor, Hellen, who lived in Thessaly. They had then to account for its distribution into a number of different branches. On the farther side of the Aegean, they saw, as it were, a reflection of themselves, their own children divided into three homogeneous groups—Aeolians, Ionians, and Dorians. This gave a simple classification: three families sprung from Aeolus, Ion, and Dorus, who must evidently have been the sons of Hellen. But there was one difficulty. Homer's Achaeans had still to be accounted for; they could not be affiliated to Aeolians, or Ionians, or Dorians, none of whom play a part in the *Iliad*. Accordingly it was arranged that Hellen had three sons, Aeolus, Dorus, and Xuthus; and Ion and Achaeus were the sons of Xuthus. It was easy enough then, by the help of tradition and language, to fit the ethnography of Greece under these labels; and the manifold dialects were forced under three artificial divisions, Aeolian, Ionian, and Dorian.

The two great events on which everything turned and to which all other events were related were the Trojan war and the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnesus. A most curious version of the Dorian conquest was invented in Argos and won its way into general belief. The Temenids, the royal family of Argos, derived themselves from Aegimius, to whom the foundation of the Dorian institutions was ascribed. But as the fame and glory of Heracles waxed great, the Temenids desired to connect themselves to him. The problem was solved with wonderful skill. The eponymous ancestors of the three Dorian tribes, Hyllus, Pamphylus, and Dyman, were naturally regarded as the sons of Aegimius. According to the new story Hyllus was really the son of Heracles. It was said that Heracles fought against the Lapiths for Aegimius who was the Dorian king in Thessaly, and that he received a third of the kingdom as a reward for his valiant service. On his death, his children were protected by

Aegimius, who adopted Hyllus, and confirmed him in the possession of his father's third. The sons of Hyllus failed in their attempts to recover the possessions of Heracles in the Peloponnesus; the achievement was reserved for his great-grandchildren, Temenus, Cresphontes, and Aristodemus. With a Dorian host, they crossed from Naupactus, under the guidance of a one-eyed Aetolian man named Oxylus, and conquered all the Peloponnesus except Arcadia. They gave Elis to Oxylus for his pains. Those of the Achæan inhabitants of the peninsula, who did not migrate beyond the sea, retreated to the northern coastland—the historical Achæa. The other three parts of the Peloponnesus fell by lot to the three brothers: Messenia to Cresphontes, Laconia to Aristodemus, and Argos to Temenus. An explanation was added how there were two royal houses at Sparta. Aristodemus died prematurely, and Laconia was divided between his twin sons Eurysthenes and Procles.¹

The details of the famous legends—the labours of Heracles, the Trojan war, the voyage of the Argonauts, the tale of Cadmus, the life of Oedipus, the two sieges of Thebes by the Argive Adrastus, and all the other familiar stories—belong to mythology and lie beyond our present scope. But we have to realise that the later Greeks believed them and discussed them as sober history. Two powerful generating forces of these historic myths had been the custom of families and cities to trace their origin to a god, and the instinct of the Greeks to personify places, especially towns, rivers, and springs. Then, when men began both to become keenly conscious of a community of race and language, and to speculate upon the past, attempts were naturally made to bring the various myths of Greece into

¹ Agis and Eurypon, the ancestors of the royal families, the Agids and Eurypontids, were made by tradition sons of Eurysthenes and Procles.

harmony; since they were true, they must be reconciled.¹ Ultimately they were reduced into chronological systems, which were based upon genealogical reckonings by generations. According to the scheme which finally won the widest acceptance,² Troy was taken in 1184 B.C., and the Dorians invaded the Peloponnesus under the leadership of the Heraclids in 1104 B.C., and both these dates accord more closely than one might expect, considering the method by which they were obtained, with the general probabilities of the case.

¹ Yet in many cases inconsistent stories remained. Cadmus founded Thebes, according to current legend; but in the *Odyssey* Thebes is built by Amphion and Zethus. Corinth was traced in one tale to Ephyre, daughter of Ocean; in another, to Sisyphus, son of Aeolus.

² The system of Eratosthenes (c. 220 B.C.). It included the following dates:—

Cadmus,	B.C.	1313	Seven against Thebes,	B.C.	1213
Pelops,	"	1283	Fall of Troy	"	1184
Heracles,	"	1261-1209	Thessalian conquest,	"	1124
Argonatus,	"	1225	Boeotian,	"	
			Aeolic migration,	"	
			Return of Heraclidae,	B.C.	1104
			Death of Codrus,	"	1044
			Ionic migration,	"	1044
			Lycurgus at Sparta,	"	885




FIG. 8.—Gem showing Female Dress (Mycenaean).

CHAPTER II

THE EXPANSION OF GREECE

SECT. I. Causes and Character of Greek Colonisation.—The expansion of the Greeks beyond Greece proper and the coasts of the Aegean, the plantation of Greek colonies on the shores of Thrace and the Black Sea, in Italy and Sicily, even in Spain and Gaul, began in the eighth and reached its completion in the sixth century. It was the continuation of the earlier expansion over the Aegean islands and the coast of Asia Minor, the details of which are unknown to us. The great difference between Greek and Phoenician colonisation is that, while the Phoenicians aimed solely at promoting their commerce, and only a few of their settlements, notably Carthage, became more than mere trading-stations or factories, Greek colonisation satisfied other needs than desire of commercial profit. It was the expression of the adventurous spirit which has been poetically reflected in the legends of the "Sailing of the Argo" and the "Home-coming of Odysseus"—the same spirit, not to be expressed in any commercial formula, which prompted English colonisation.

Trade, of course, sometimes paved the way. The merchants of Miletus, who adventured themselves in the dangerous waters of the Euxine, observed natural harbours and inviting sites for cities, and when they returned home organised parties of settlers. The adventurous, the dis-



contented, and the needy were always to be found. But in the case of the early colonies at least, it was not overpopulation of the land, so much as the nature of the land system, that drove men to emigrate. In various ways, under the family system, which was ill-suited to independent and adventurous spirits, it would come about that individual members were excluded from a share in the common estate, and separated from their kin. Such lacklands were ripe for colonial enterprise. Again, the political circumstances of most Greek states in the eighth and seventh centuries favoured emigration. We have seen that at this time the aristocratic form of government generally prevailed. There were strong inducements for men to leave their native city, where they were of little account, and to join in the foundation of a new *polis* where they might themselves rule. In fact, political discontent was an immediate cause of Greek colonisation.

Wherever the Greek went, he retained his customs and language, and made a Greek "polis." It was as if a bit of Greece were set down on the remote shores of the Euxine or in the far west on the wild coasts of Gaul or Iberia. The colony was a private enterprise, but the bond of kinship with the "mother-city" was carefully fostered. Intercourse between colonies and the mother-country was specially kept up at the great religious festivals of the year, and various marks of filial respect were shown by the daughter to the mother. When, as frequently befell, the colony determined herself in turn to throw off a new shoot, it was the recognised custom that she should seek the *oecist* or leader of the colonists from the mother-city. Thus the Megarian colony, Byzantium, when it founded its own colony, Mesembria, must have sought an *oecist* from Megara. The political importance of colonisation was sanctified by religion, and it was a necessary formality, whenever a settlement was to be made, to ask the approbation of the Delphic god. The

most ancient oracular god of Greece was Zeus of Dodona. But the oak-shrine in the highlands of Epirus was too remote to become the chief oracle of Greece, and the central position of Delphi enabled the astute priests of the Pythian Apollo to exalt the authority of their god as a true prophet to the supreme place in the Greek world.

Colonisation tended in two ways to promote a feeling of unity among the Greek peoples. By the wide diffusion of their race on the fringe of barbarous lands, it brought home to them more fully the contrast between Greek and barbarian, and, by consequence, the community of the Greeks. The Greek dwellers in Asia Minor were naturally impressed with their own unity in a way which was strange to dwellers in Boeotia or Attica, who were surrounded on all sides by Greeks, and were therefore alive chiefly to local differences. In the second place, colonisation led to the association of Greeks of different cities. An oecist who decided to organise a party of colonists could not always find in his own city a sufficient number of men willing to take part in the enterprise. He therefore enlisted comrades from other cities; and thus many colonies were joint undertakings and contained a mixture of citizens of various nationality.

SECT. 2. Colonies on the Coasts of the Euxine, Propontis, and North Aegean.—A mist of obscurity hangs about the beginnings of the first Greek cities which arose on the Pontic shores. Here Miletus was the pioneer. Merchants carrying the stuffs which were manufactured from the wool of Milesian sheep may have established trading-stations along the southern coast. But the work of colonisation beyond the gate of the Bosphorus can hardly have fully begun until the gate itself was secured by the enterprise of Megara, which sent out men, in the first part of the seventh century, to found the towns of Chalcedon and Byzantium. This is the first appearance of the little state of Megara in

677 B.C.

Greek history; and none of her contemporaries took a step that was destined to lead to greater things than the settlement on the Bosphorus. Westward from Byzantium they also founded Selymbria, on the north coast of the Propontis; eastward they established "Heraclea in Pontus," on the coast of Bithynia.

553 B.C. The enterprise of the Megarians stimulated Miletus. At the most northerly point of the southern coast a strait-necked cape forms two natural harbours, an attractive site for settlers, and here the Milesians planted the city Sinope. Farther east arose another Milesian colony, Trapezus. At the Bosphorus the Milesians had been anticipated by Megara, but they partly made up for this by planting Abydos on the Hellespont opposite Sestus, and they also seized a jutting promontory on the south coast of the Propontis, where a narrow neck, as at Sinope, forms two harbours. The town was named Cyzicus; the tunny-fish on her coins shows what was one of the chief articles of her trade. Lampsacus, at the northern end of the Hellespont, once a Phoenician factory, was colonised by another Ionian city, Phocaea, about the same time.

645 B.C. In the more remote parts of the Euxine, Dioscurias and Phasis were founded in the fabled land of Colchis. On the Tauric Chersonesus or "peninsula" (now the Crimea), Panticapaeum was founded, and Heraclea, or Chersonesus, on the western side of the peninsula.

If Miletus and Megara took the most prominent part in extending the borders of the Greek world eastward of the Hellespont, the north-western corner of the Aegean was the special domain of Euboea. The coast of Macedonia, between the rivers Axios and Strymon, runs out into a huge three-pronged promontory. Here Chalcis planted so many towns that the whole promontory was named Chalcidice. Some of the chief cities, however, were founded by other states, notably Corinthian Potidaea on the most

Greek city founded in Italy may possibly be true. Chalcis, Eretria, and Cyme, a town on the eastern coast of Euboea, joined together, and succeeded in establishing their colony Cyme on a rocky height which rises above the sea where the Italian coast is about to turn sharply eastward to encircle the bay of Naples. Subsequently they occupied the harbour, which was inside the promontory, and established there the town of Dicaearchia, which afterwards became Puteoli; farther east they founded Naples, "the new city."

The solitary position of Cyme in these regions—for no Greek settlement could be made northward on account of the great Etruscan power, and there was no rival southward until the later plantation of Posidonia—made her influence both wide and noiseless. There are no striking wars or struggles to record; but the work she did holds an important and definite place in the history of European civilisation. To the Euboeans of Cyme we may say that we owe the alphabet which we use to-day, for it was from them that the Latins learned to write. Again, the Cymaeans introduced the neighbouring Italian peoples to a knowledge of the Greek gods and Greek religion. Heracles, Apollo, Castor, and Polydeuces became such familiar names in Italy that they came to be regarded as original Italian deities. The oracles of the Cymaeian Sibyl, prophetess of Apollo, were believed to contain the destinies of Rome.

The next settlement of the Euboean Greeks was on Sicilian, not Italian, ground. The island of Sicily is the centre of the Mediterranean; it parts the eastern from the western waters. It has been thus marked out by nature as a meeting-place of nations; and the struggle between European and Asiatic peoples, which has been called the "Eternal Question," has been partly fought out on Sicilian soil. There has been in historical times no native Sicilian power. The greatness of the island was due to colonisation

—not migration—from other lands. Lying as a connecting link between Europe and Africa, it attracted settlers from both sides.

The earliest inhabitants of the island were the Sicans. From them the island was called Sicania. The next comers were the Sicels, and as we find Sicels in the toe of Italy, we know that tradition correctly described the Sicilian Sicels as settlers from the Italian peninsula. The likeness of the names Sicel and Sican has naturally led to the view that these two folks were akin in race and language. But likeness of names is deceptive; and the Greeks always carefully distinguished the Sican from the Sicel as ethnically different. The Sicels, at all events, wrested from the Sicans the eastern half of the island, which was thus cut up into two countries—Sicania in the west, Sicelia in the east. At a very early time Sicania was invaded by a mysterious people named Elymians, probably of Iberian race. They occupied a small territory in the north-west of the island. Of these three peoples who inhabited this miniature continent, soon about to become the battlefield of Greek and Phoenician, the Sicels were the most numerous and most important.

At an early age merchants from Phoenicia planted factories on the coasts of the island. At first they did not make any settlements of a permanent kind—any that could be called cities. For Sicily was to them only a house to call at, lying directly on their way to the land of the farthest west, when they went forth to win the golden treasures of Tarshish and planted their earliest colony, Gades, outside the straits which divide Europe from Africa. Their next colonies were on the coast of Africa over against Sicily, and this settlement had a decisive influence on the destinies of the island. The settlements of Hippo and Utica, older than Carthage, were probably the parents of the more abiding Phoenician settlements in Sicily. In the east of the island the Phoenicians had no secure foothold;

they appeared purely in the guise of traders. Hence when the Greeks came and seriously set to work to plant true cities, the Phoenicians disappeared.

Sicilian, like Italian history, really opens with the coming of the Greeks. They came under the guidance of Chalcis and the auspices of Apollo. It was naturally on the east coast, which faces Greece, that the first Greek settlement was made, and it is to be noticed that of the coasts of Sicily the east is that which most resembles in character the coast-line of Greece. The site, which was chosen by the Chalcidians, and the Ionians of Naxos who accompanied them, was not a striking one. A little tongue of land, north of Mount

- 735 B.C. Aetna, was selected for the foundation of Naxos. Here, as in the case of Cyme, the Chalcidians who led the enterprise surrendered the honour of naming the new city to their less prominent fellow-founders. A sort of consecration was always attached to Naxos as the first homestead of the Hellenes in the island. To Apollo Archēgētes an altar was erected on the spot where the Greeks first landed,—driven, as the legend told, by contrary winds, under Apollo's dispensation, to the Sicilian shores. It was the habit of ambassadors from old Greece, as soon as they arrived in Sicily, to offer sacrifice on this altar. In the fertile plain south of Aetna the Chalcidians soon afterwards founded
- 728 B.C. Catane, close to the sea, and inland Leontini. These sites were wrested from the Sicels. The Chalcidians also won possession of the north-east corner, and thus obtained command of the straits between the island and the mainland. Here Cymaeans and Chalcidians planted Zancle
- 715 B.C. (ζάγκλον), and gave the place its name. The haven is formed by the curving blade; and when Zancle came in after-days to mint money she engraved on her coins a sickle representing her harbour and a dolphin floating within it. A hundred years later the city was transformed by the




FIG. 12.

Welker & Boutall sc.

immigration of a company of Messenians, and ultimately the old local name was ousted in favour of Messana. From Zancle the Euboeans founded Himera, the only Greek city 648 B.C. on the northern coast. It was important for Zancle that the land over against her, the extreme point of the Italian



FIG. 13.—Coin of Zancle, early (obverse). Harbour of Zancle, with a dolphin [legend: ΔΑΝΚ (Λαϊον)].



FIG. 14.—Coin of Himera, early (obverse). Cock.

peninsula, should be in friendly hands, and therefore the men of Zancle incited their mother-city to found Rhegion; and in this foundation Messenians took part.

While this group of Chalcidian colonies was being formed in north-eastern Sicily, Dorian Greeks began to obtain a footing in south-eastern Sicily. The earliest of the Dorian cities was also the greatest. Syracuse, destined to be the head of Greek Sicily, was founded by Corinthian emigrants under the leadership of Archias before the end of the eighth century. Somewhere about the same



FIG. 15.—Coin of Syracuse, early (obverse). Head of Arethusa; dolphins [legend: ΣΥΡΑΨΟΣΙΟΝ].

time Corinth also colonised Corcyra; the Ionian islands were half-way stations to the west. Tradition placed both foundations in the same year. But in both cases Corinth had to dispossess previous Greek settlers, and in both cases the previous settlers were Euboeans. Her colonists had to drive Eretrians from Corcyra and Chalcidians from Syracuse.

734 B.C.

The great Haven of Syracuse, with its island and its hill, formed the most striking site on the east coast, and could not fail to invite the earliest colonists. Chalcidians occupied the island of Ortygia (Isle of quails), and it is possible that the Corinthians did not supersede the Chalcidians till many years later.

At an early date Megarians also sailed into the west to find a new home. After various unsuccessful attempts to establish themselves, they finally built their city on the coast north of Syracuse, beside the hills of Hybla, and perhaps Sicel natives joined in founding the Sicilian *Megara*. But, like her mother, the Hyblæan Megara was destined to found a colony more famous than herself. This settlement, which was to be the westernmost outpost of Greek Sicily, was Selinus, a town named of wild celery (*σέλινον*), situated on a low hill on the coast. In the meantime the south-eastern corner was being studded gradually with Dorian cities. At the beginning of the seventh century, Gela was planted by Rhodian colonists with Cretans in their train. At a later time Camarina was planted from Syracuse.

728 B. C.

628 B. C.

688 B. C.

595 B. C.

The latest Dorian colony of Sicily was only less conspicuous than the first. The Geloans sought an oecist from their Rhodian metropolis, and founded, half-way between their own city and Selinus, the lofty town of Acragas, which soon took the second place in Greek Sicily and became the rival of Syracuse. It was perched on a high hill near the sea-shore. The small poor haven was at some distance from the town; "flock-feeding Acragas" never became a maritime power.

581 B. C.

In planting their colonies and founding their dominion in Sicily, the Greeks had mainly to reckon with the Sicels. In their few foundations in the farther west they had to deal with the Sicans. These older inhabitants were forced to retire from the coasts, but they lived on in their fortresses

on the inland hills. The island was too large and its character too continental to invite the newcomers to attempt to conquer the whole of it. With the Phoenicians the Greeks had no trouble. Their factories and temples had not taken root in the soil, and on the landing of a stranger who was resolved to take root they vanished. But they did not abandon the western corner of the island, where the Greeks made no attempt to settle. There they maintained three places which now assumed the character of cities. These were Panormus, Solus, and Motya. The Elymian country lay between Motya and Panormus. The chief town of the Elymians, Segesta (which in Greek mouths became Egesta), was essentially a city, while Eryx, farther west, high above the sea but not actually on it, was their outpost of defence. On Eryx they worshipped some goddess of nature, soon to be identified with the Greek Aphrodite. The Elymians were on good terms with the Phoenicians, and western Sicily became a Phoenician corner. While the inland country was left to Sicel and Sican, the coasts were to be the scene of struggles between Phoenician and Greek.

The name by which we know the central of the three great peninsulas of the Mediterranean did not extend as far north as the Po in the time of Julius Caesar, and originally it covered a very small area indeed. In the fifth century Thucydides applies the name Italy to the modern Calabria—the western of the two extremities into which the peninsula divides. This extremity was inhabited, when the Greeks first visited it, by Sicels and Oenotrians, on whose seaboard the Achaeans of the Peloponnesus, probably towards the close of the eighth century, found a field for colonisation. The first colonies which they planted in Italy were perhaps Sybaris and Croton, famous for their wealth and their rivalry. Sybaris, on the river Crathis, in an unhealthy but most fruitful plain, soon extended her

dominion across the narrow peninsula, and, founding the settlements of Laos and Scidros on the western coast, commanded two seas. Thus, having in her hands an overland route to the western Mediterranean, she could forward to her ports on the Tyrrhenian sea the valuable merchandise of the Milesians, whom Chalcidian jealousy excluded from the straits between Italy and Sicily. Thus both agriculture and traffic formed the basis of the remarkable wealth of Sybaris, and the result was an elaboration of luxury which caused the Sybarite name to pass into a proverb. Posidonia, famous for its temples and its roses, was another colony on the western sea, founded from Sybaris.

A good way to the south of Sybaris you come to Croton. 703 B.C. Like Sybaris, Croton widened its territory and planted colonies of its own. Caulonia, perhaps also a Crotoniate settlement, was the most southerly Achaean colony and was the neighbour of the western Locri.

The Achaeans and Locrians had more in common with each other than either had with the Dorians, and we may conveniently include Locri in the Achaean group. Thus the southern coast of Italy would have been almost a homogeneous circle if a Dorian colony had not been established in a small sheltered bay at the extreme north point of the gulf, to which it gave the name it still bears—Taras or Tarentum. Taras was remarkable as the only foreign settlement ever made by the greatest of all the Dorian peoples. Laconian settlers occupied the place at some unknown date and made of it a Dorian city. The prosperity of the Tarentines depended partly on the cultivation of a fruitful territory, but mainly on their manufacturing industry. Their fabrics and dyed wools became



707 B.C.

FIG. 16.—Coin of Taras, fifth century (reverse). Taras on a dolphin; shell [legend: TAPAΣ].

renowned, and their pottery was widely diffused. Taras in fact must be regarded as an industrial rather than as an agricultural state.

Thus the western coast of the Tarentine gulf was beset with a line of Achaean cities, flanked at one extremity by Western Locri, on the other by Dorian Taras. The common feature, which distinguished them from the cities settled by the men of Chalcis and Corinth, was that their wealth depended on the mainland, not on the sea. Their rich men were landowners, not merchants; it was not traffic but rich soil that had originally lured them to the far west. These cities, with their dependencies beyond the hills, on the shores of the Tyrrhenian sea, came to be regarded as a group, and the country came to be called Great Hellas (Magna Graecia).

SECT. 4. Growth of Trade and Maritime Enterprise.—While the colonies were politically independent of their mother-states, they reacted in many ways on the mother-country. We have seen how the system of family property was favourable to colonial enterprise. But the colonists, who had suffered under that system, were not likely to introduce it in their new settlements, and thus the institution of personal landownership was probably first established and regulated in the colonies. Their example reacted on the mother-country, where other natural causes were also gradually undermining the family system. In the first place, as the power of the state grew greater the power of the family grew less; and the prestige of the head of the family, overshadowed by the power of the state, became insensibly weaker. In the second place, it was common to assign a portion of an estate to one member of the family, to manage and enjoy the undivided use of it; and the natural tendency must have been to allow it on his death to pass to his son on the same conditions. It is clear that such a practice tended to the ultimate

establishment of personal proprietorship of the soil. Again, side by side of the undivided family estate, personal properties were actually acquired. At this period there was much wild unallotted land, "which wild beasts haunt," especially on the hill-slopes, and when a man of energy reclaimed a portion of this land for tillage, the new fields became his own, for they had belonged to no man. We can thus see generally how inevitable it was that the old system should disappear and the large family estates break up into private domains.

The Boeotian poet Hesiod has given us a picture of rural life in Greece at this period. He was a husbandman c. 700 B.C. himself near Ascra, where his father, who had come as a stranger from Cyme in Aeolis, had put under cultivation a strip of waste land on the slopes of Helicon. The farm was divided between his two sons, Perses and Hesiod, but in unequal shares; and Hesiod accuses Perses of winning the larger moiety by bribing the lords of the district. But Perses managed his farm badly and did not prosper. Hesiod wrote his poem the *Works* to teach such unthrifty farmers as his brother true principles of agriculture and economy. His view of life is profoundly gloomy, and suggests a condition of grave social distress in Boeotia. This must have been mainly due to the oppression of the nobles, "gift-devouring" princes as he calls them. The poet looks back to the past with regret. The golden age, the silver, and the bronze, have all gone by, and the age of the heroes who fought at Troy; and mankind is now in the iron age, and "will never cease by day or night from weariness and woe." The poem gives minute directions for the routine of the husbandman's work, the times and tides of sowing and reaping, and the other labours of the field, the fashion of the implements of tillage; and all this is accompanied by maxims of proverbial wisdom. Hesiod has a great significance as the first spokesman of the common folk. In the history of Europe, his is

the first voice raised from among the toiling classes and claiming the interest of mankind in their lot. It is a voice indeed of acquiescence, counselling fellow-toilers to make the best of an evil case; the stage of revolt has not yet been reached. But the grievances are aired, and the lords who wield the power are exhorted to deal just judgments, that the land may prosper.

Boeotia was always an unenterprising country of husbandmen, and Hesiod had no sympathy with trade or foreign venture. But the growth of trade was the most important fact of the time, and here too the colonies reacted on the mother-country. By enlarging the borders of the Greek world they invited and facilitated the extension of Greek trade and promoted the growth of industries. Hitherto the Greeks had been mainly an agricultural and pastoral people; many of them were now becoming industrial. They had to supply their western colonies with oil and wool, with metal and pottery, and they began to enter into serious competition with the Phoenician trader.

Greek trade moved chiefly along water-ways, and this is illustrated by the neglect of road-making in Greece. There were no paved roads, even in later times, except the Sacred Ways to frequented sanctuaries, like that from Athens to Eleusis and Delphi, or that from the sea-coast to Olympia. Yet the Greeks were still timorous navigators, and it was deemed hazardous to sail even in the most familiar waters, except in the late summer. Hesiod expresses the general fear of the sea: "For fifty days after the solstice, till the end of the harvest, is the tide for sailing; then you will not wreck your ship, nor will the sea wash down your crew, unless Poseidon or Zeus wills their destruction."

Seafaring states found it needful to build warships for protection against pirates. The usual type of the early Greek warship was the penteconter or "fifty-oar," a long, narrow galley with twenty-five benches, on each of which

two oarsmen sat. The penteconter hardly came into use in Greece before the eighth century. The Homeric Greeks had only smaller vessels of twenty oars. But before the end of the eighth century a new idea revolutionised shipbuilding in Phoenicia. Vessels were built with two rows of benches, one above the other, so that the number of oarsmen and the speed were increased without adding to the length of the ship. The "bireme," however, never became common in Greece, for the Phoenicians had soon improved it into the "trireme," by the superposition of another bank of oars.¹ The trireme, propelled by 170 rowers, was ultimately to come into universal use as the regular Greek warship, though for a long time after its first introduction by the Corinthians the old penteconters were still generally used. But penteconters and triremes alike were affected by the new invention of the bronze ram on the prow—a weapon of attack which determined the future character of Greek naval warfare.

The Greeks believed that the first regular sea-fight between two Greek powers was fought before the middle of the seventh century between Corinth and her daughter-city 664 B.C. Corcyra. If the tradition is true, we may be sure that the event was an incident in the struggle for the trade with Italy and Sicily and along the Adriatic coasts. The chief competitors, however, with Corinth in the west were the Euboean cities, Chalcis and Eretria. In the traffic in eastern seas the island city of Aegina, though she had no colonies of her own, took an active part, and became one of the richest mercantile states of Greece.

SECT. 5. Influence of Lydia on Greece.—The Greeks of the Asiatic coast were largely dependent, for good or evil, on the adjacent inland countries. The inland trade added to their prosperity, but at any moment if a strong barbarian

¹ The secret of building this kind of galley has been lost. Modern shipwrights cannot reproduce a trireme. In later times the Greeks built ships of many banks—five, ten, even forty.

power arose their independence might be gravely menaced. At the beginning of the seventh century active intercourse was maintained between the Greeks and the kingdoms of Phrygia and Lydia. The Phrygian king Midas was said in later times to have dedicated a throne to the god of Delphi.

A considerable Phrygian element had won its way into Lydia, and had gained the upper hand. But the Phrygian rulers had become degenerate, and Gyges, a native Lydian, succeeded in slaying the king Candaules and seizing the crown. This revolution ushered in a new period for the Lydian kingdom. Gyges extended his power northward to the shores of the Propontis. But he also designed to make the Aegean his western boundary and bring the Greek cities under his lordship. He pressed down the valley of the Hermus against Smyrna; down the valley of the Cayster against Colophon; down the valley of the Maeander against Miletus and Magnesia. It may be that Colophon was actually captured, and perhaps Magnesia; but the other cities beat back the enemy. The poet Minnermus sings how a warrior, perhaps his own grandfather, wrought havoc in the ranks of the Lydian horsemen in the plain of the Hermus.

But the plans of Gyges were suddenly interrupted by an invasion of barbarians. The Cimmerians, driven out by Scythians from their original home about Lake Maeotis (where the Crimea still keeps their name) came to the southern shore of the Black Sea and defeated the Milesian colonists of Sinope. Starting from Sinope, they attacked Lydia, and Gyges was driven to seek help and protection from Assurbanipal of Assyria. The invasion was repelled, and Gyges sent their chief in chains to Nineveh. But the Cimmerians renewed their attack; Gyges was slain in battle, and Sardis his capital was taken. Then the barbarians swooped down on the Greek cities. Ephesus repelled them,

but the temple of Artemis outside the walls was burnt down. Magnesia on the Maeander was destroyed.

But the danger passed away. Ardys succeeded Gyges on the Lydian throne, and he not only finally drove out the Cimmerians from the land, but perhaps succeeded in extending his power into Cappadocia, as far as the Halys.

In the meantime Lydia had made an invention which revolutionised commerce. It is to Lydia that Europe owes the invention of coinage. The Babylonians, Phoenicians, and Egyptians made use of weighed gold and silver as a medium of exchange, a certain ratio being fixed between the two metals. A piece of weighed metal becomes a coin




FIG. 17.—Coin of Halicarnassus, sixth century.
Obverse : stag [legend : ΦΑΝΟΣ ΕΜΙ ΣΕΜΑ].
Reverse : incuse.

when it is stamped by the state, and is thereby warranted to have its professed weight and purity. This step was first taken in Lydia, where the earliest money was coined somewhere about the beginning of the seventh century, probably by Gyges. Miletus and Samos soon adopted the new invention, which then spread to other Asiatic towns. Then Aegina and the two great cities of Euboea instituted monetary systems, and by degrees all the states of Greece gave up the primitive custom of estimating value in heads of cattle, and most of them had their own mints. As gold was very rare in Greece, not being found except in the islands of Siphnos and Thasos, the Greeks coined in silver. This invention, coming at the very moment when the Greeks were entering upon a period of great commercial activity, was of immense importance, not only in facilitating trade, but in rendering possible the accumulation of capital.

SECT. 6. The Opening of Egypt and Foundation of Cyrene.—Thus the merchants of Miletus and her

fellows grew rich. They were the intermediaries between Lydia and the Mediterranean; while the Lydians carried Greek wares to the interior parts of Asia Minor and the far east. Their argosies sailed to the far west, as well as to the coasts of the Euxine. But a new field for winning wealth was opened to them, much about the same time as the invention of coinage revealed a new prospect to the world of commerce. The jealously guarded gates of Egypt were unbarred to Greek trade.

- c. 672 B.C. The greatest exploit of the Assyrian monarch Assarhadon was the conquest of Egypt. The land had been split up into an endless number of small kingdoms, and the kings continued to govern as vassals of Assyria. But one of the kings, Psammetichus of Sais, in Lower Egypt, probably of
- c. 645 B.C. Libyan stock, revolted against Assurbanipal, and, with the help of Ionian and Carian mercenaries, brought the whole of Egypt under his sway. Psammetichus and his successors completely departed from the narrow Egyptian policy of the Pharaohs. They opened Egypt to the trade of the world and allowed Greeks to settle permanently in the country.

The Milesians founded a factory on the western or Canobic channel of the Nile, not very far from Sais; and around it a Greek city grew up, which received the name of Naucratis, "sea-queen." This colony became the haven of all Greek traders. At Naucratis the Milesians, the Samians, and the Aeginetans had each their own separate quarter and their own sanctuaries: all the other Greek settlers had one common enclosure called the Hellenion, girt by a thick brick wall and capable of holding 50,000 men. Here were their market-place and their temples. All the colonists of Naucratis were Greeks of the Asiatic coast, excepting alone the Aeginetans.

Egypt, as we see, offered a field not only for traders but for adventurous soldiers. At Abusimbel in Upper Egypt we have a relic of the Greek mercenaries, who accompanied

King Psammetichus II. in an expedition against Ethiopia. 594-589
Some of them scratched their names on the colossal statues of the temple; and the very triviality of this relic, at such a distance of time, perhaps makes it the more interesting. B.C.

Not long after Egypt was thrown open to Greek trade, there arose to the west of Egypt a new Greek city. Civil dissension in the island of Thera led to an emigration; and the exiles, having increased their band by Cretan adventurers, sailed for the shores of Barca. They founded their abiding settlement about eight miles from the sea near an abundant spring of water, on two white hills, which commanded the encompassing plain. The city was named Cyrene, and it was the only Greek colony on the coast of Africa which attained to eminence and wealth. The man who led the island folk to their new home became their king; his name seems to have been Aristoteles, but he took the strange name of Battus, which is said to mean "king" in the Libyan language, while its resemblance to the Greek word for "stammer" gave rise to the legend that Battus I. stammered in his speech. His son was Arcesilas; and in the line of the Cyrenaean kings Battus and Arcesilas succeeded each other in alternation. c. 630 B.C.

SECT. 7. **Popular Discontent in Greece.** — The advance of the Greeks in trade and industry produced many consequences of moment for their political and social development. The manufactures required labour, and a sufficient number of free labourers was not to be had. Slaves were therefore indispensable, and they were imported in large numbers from Asia Minor and Thrace and the coasts of the Euxine. The slave-trade became a profitable enterprise, and the men of Chios made it their chief pursuit. The existence of household slaves, generally war-captives, such as we meet in Homer, was an innocent institution which would never have had serious results; but the new organised slave system which began in the seventh century

was destined to prove one of the most fatal causes of disease and decay to the states of Greece.

At first the privileged classes of the aristocratic republics benefited by the increase of commerce ; for the nobles were themselves the chief speculators. But the wealth which they acquired by trade undermined their political position. For, in the first place, their influence depended largely on their domains of land ; and when industries arose to compete with agriculture, the importance of land necessarily declined. In the second place, wealth introduced a new political standard ; and aristocracies resting on birth tended to transform themselves into aristocracies resting on wealth. As nobility by birth cannot be acquired, whereas wealth can, such a change is always a step in the direction of democracy.

The poorer freemen at first suffered. Their distress and discontent drove them into striving for full political equality, and in many cases they strove with success. The second half of the seventh century is marked in many parts of Greece by struggles between the classes ; and the wiser and better of the nobles began themselves to see the necessity of extending political privileges to their fellow-citizens. The centralisation in towns, owing to the growth of industries and the declining importance of agriculture, created a new town population, and doubtless helped on the democratic movement.

In this agitated period lived a poet of great genius, Archilochus of Paros. It has been truly said that Archilochus is the first Greek "of flesh and blood" whom we can grasp through the mists of antiquity. Son of a noble by a slave mother, he tried his luck among the adventurers who went forth to colonise Siris in Italy, but he returned having won an experience of seafaring which taught him to sing of the "bitter gifts of Poseidon" and the mariner's prayers for "sweet home." Then he took part in a Parian

colonisation of Thasos, and was involved in party struggles which rent the island. It must have been at Thasos that he witnessed an eclipse of the sun at noontide, which he describes; and this gives us, as a date in the Thasian period of his life, the 6th of April 648 B.C.—the first exact date we have bearing on the history of Greece. He announces that he is "the servant of the lord of battle, and skilled in the delicious gift of the Muses." But when he fought in a war which the islanders waged with the Thracians of the opposite coast, he ran for his life and dropped his shield; "Never mind," he said, "I will get me another as good." Poor, with a stain on his birth, tossed about the world, soured by adversity, Archilochus in his poetry gave full expression to his feelings, and used it to utter his passionate hatred against his enemies, such as the Parian Lycambes, for instance, who refused him his daughter Neobule.



FIG. 18.—Early coin of Caulonia. Obverse: Apollo with bough, small figure on his arm; stag [legend: KAYAO]. Reverse: incuse back of these figures.



FIG. 19.—Electron coin of Lydia (beginning of seventh century). Obverse: striated surface. Reverse: oblong and two square sinkings.




FIG. 20.—Early coin of Phocaenae (obverse). Seal (phoca).

CHAPTER III

GROWTH OF SPARTA. FALL OF THE ARISTOCRACIES

SECT. I. Sparta and her Constitution.—The Dorian settlers from the north, who took possession of the valley of the Eurotas, established themselves in a number of village communities throughout the land, and bore the name of Lacedaemonians. In the course of time, a city-state grew up in their midst and won dominion over the rest. The city was called Sparta, and took the dominant place in Laconia which had been formerly held by Amyclae. The other Lacedaemonian communities were called the *perioeci*, or "dwellers round about" the ruling city, and, though they were free and managed their local affairs, they had no political rights in the Spartan state. The chief burdens which fell on them were military service and the farming of the royal domains.

The Spartans were always noted for their conservative spirit. Hence we find in their constitution survivals of an old order of things which existed in the days of Homeric poetry. The most striking of these survivals was royalty; Sparta was nominally ruled by kings.

This conservative spirit of the Spartans rendered them anxious to believe that their constitution had existed from very ancient times in just the same shape and feature which it displayed in the days of recorded history. There can be little doubt, however, that the Spartan state, like most

other states, passed through the stages of royalty and aristocracy; and that the final form of the constitution was the result of a struggle between the nobles and the people. The remarkable thing was that throughout these changes hereditary kingship survived.

The machine of the Spartan constitution had four parts: the Kings, the Council, the Assembly, and the Ephors. The first three are the original institutions, common to the whole Greek race; the Ephors were a later institution, and were peculiar to Sparta.

We saw that towards the end of the Homeric period the powers of the king were limited, and that this limited monarchy then died out, sometimes leaving a trace behind it, perhaps in the name of a magistracy—like the king-archon at Athens. In a few places it survived, and Sparta was one of them. But, if it survived here, its powers were limited in a twofold way. It was limited not only by the other institutions of the state, but by its own dual character. For there were two kings at Sparta, and had been since the memory of men. The kingship passed from father to son in the two royal houses of the Agids and Eurypontids. Of the religious, military, and judicial functions, which belonged to them and to all other Greek kings, the Spartan kings lost some and retained others.

They were privileged to hold certain priesthoods; they offered solemn sacrifices for the city every month to Apollo; they prepared the necessary sacrifices before warlike expeditions and battles; they were priests, though not the sole priests, of the community.

They were the supreme commanders of the army. It is recorded that they had originally the right of making war upon whatever country they chose, though in historical times war and peace were decided not by the kings, but by the Assembly. But in the field they were sovereign; they had unlimited right of life and death; and they

had a bodyguard of a hundred men. It is clear that these large powers were always limited by the double nature of the kingship. But at a date shortly before 500 B.C. it was defined by law that only one of the kings, to be chosen on each occasion by the people, should lead the army in time of war, and moreover they were made responsible to the community for their conduct in their campaigns.

But while they enjoyed this supreme position as high-priests and leaders of the host, they could hardly be considered judges any longer. The right of dealing out dooms like the Homeric Agamemnon had passed away from them; only in special cases had they still judicial or legal powers.

There were royal domains in the territory of the *perioeci* from which the kings derived their revenue. But they also had perquisites at public sacrifices; on such occasions they were (like Homeric kings) given the first seat at the banquet, were served first, and received a double portion of everything, and the hides of the slaughtered beasts. The king was succeeded by his son; if there were no children, the succession fell to the nearest male kinsman, who was likewise the regent in the case of a minority.

The *gerontes* or elders whom we find in Homer advising the king and also acting as judges have developed at Sparta into the *gerusia*. This Council consisted of thirty members, including the two kings, who belonged to it by virtue of their kingship. The other twenty-eight must be over sixty years of age, so that the Council was a body of elders in the strict sense of the word. They held their office for life and were chosen by acclamation in the general assembly of citizens, whose choice was supposed to fall on him whose moral merits were greatest; membership of the Council was described as a "prize for virtue." The Council prepared matters which were to come before the Assembly; it exercised, as an advising body, a great

influence on political affairs; and it formed a court of justice for criminal cases.

But though the Councillors were elected by the people, they were not elected from the people. Only men of the noble families could be chosen members of the Council. And thus the Council formed an oligarchical element in the Lacedaemonian constitution.

Every Spartan who had passed his thirtieth year was a member of the *Apella*, or Assembly of Citizens, which met every month. In old days, no doubt, it was summoned by the kings, but in historical times we find that this right has passed to the ephors. The assembly did not debate, but having heard the proposals of kings or ephors, signified its will by acclamation. If it seemed doubtful to which opinion the majority of the voices inclined, recourse was had to a division. The people elected the members of the Gerusia, the ephors and other magistrates; determined questions of war and peace and foreign politics; and decided disputed successions to the kingly office. Thus, theoretically, the Spartan constitution was a democracy. No Spartan was excluded from the *apella* of the people; and the will of the people expressed at their *apella* was supreme. "To the people," runs an old statute, "shall belong the decision and the power." But the same statute granted to the executive authorities—"the elders and magistrates"—a power which restricted this apparent supremacy of the people. It allowed them "to be seceders, if the people make a crooked decree." It seems that the will of the people, declared by their acclamations, did not receive the force of law, unless it were then formally proclaimed before the assembly was formally dissolved. If the elders and magistrates did not approve of the decision of the majority of the assembly, they could annul the proceedings by refusing to proclaim it—"seceding" and dissolving the meeting, without waiting for the regular dissolution by king or ephor.

The five ephors were the most characteristic part of the political constitution of Sparta. The origin of the office is veiled in obscurity; it was supposed to have been instituted in the first half of the eighth century. But it cannot have been till the seventh century that the ephors won their great political power. They must have won that power in a conflict between the nobility, who governed in conjunction with the kings, and the people, who had no share in the government. In that struggle the kings represented the cause of the nobility, while the ephors were the representatives of the people. This is clear from the oaths which were every month exchanged between the kings and the ephors. The king swore that he would observe the laws of the state in discharging his royal functions; the ephor that he would maintain the royal power undiminished, so long as the king was true to his oath. In this ceremony we have the record of an acute conflict between the government and people. The democratic character of the ephorate appears from the fact that any Spartan might be elected. The mode of election was practically equivalent to an election by lot.

The ephors entered upon their office at the beginning of the Laconian year. As chosen guardians of the rights of the people, they were called upon to watch jealously the conduct of the kings. With this object two ephors always accompanied the king on warlike expeditions. They had the power of indicting the king and summoning him to appear before them. The judicial functions which the kings lost passed partly to the ephors, partly to the Council. The ephors were the supreme civil court; the Council, as we have seen, formed the supreme criminal court. But in the case of the *Perioeci* the ephors were criminal judges also. They were moreover responsible for the strict maintenance of the order and discipline of the Spartan state, and, when they entered upon office, they issued a proclamation to the citizens to "shave their upper lips and obey the laws."

SECT. 2. **Spartan Conquest of Messenia.**—In the growth of Sparta the first and most decisive step was the conquest of Messenia. The southern portion of the Peloponnesus is divided into two parts by Mount Taygetus. Of these, the eastern part is again severed by Mount Parnon into two regions: the vale of the river Eurotas, and the rugged strip of coast between Parnon and the sea. The western country is less mountainous, more fruitful, and blessed by a milder climate. Its natural fortress was the lofty rock of Ithome.

Of the First Messenian War, which must be assigned to the eighth century, all that we know with certainty is that the Spartan king, under whose auspices it was waged, was named Theopompus; that it was decided by the capture of the great fortress of Ithome; and that the eastern part of the land became Laconian.

As the object of the Spartans was to increase the number of the lots of land for their citizens, many of the conquered Messenians were reduced to the condition of Helots. For some generations they submitted patiently, but at length, when victorious Sparta felt secure, a rebellion was organised. The rebels were supported by their neighbours in Arcadia and Pisatis, and they are said to have found an able and ardent leader in Aristomenes, sprung from an old Messenian family. The revolt was at first successful. The Spartans fared ill, and their young men experienced the disgrace of defeat. The hopes of the serfs rose, and Sparta despaired of recovering the land. But a leader and a poet arose amongst them. The lame Tyrtaeus is recorded to have inspired his countrymen with such martial vigour that the tide of fortune turned, and Sparta began to retrieve her losses and recover her reputation. The warriors advanced to battle singing his "marches" to the sound of flutes, while his elegies are said to have been recited in the tents after the evening meal. But we learn from himself that his strategy

End of 7th century.

was as effective as his poetry, and the Messenians were presently defeated in the Battle of the Great Foss. They then retired to the northern stronghold of Eira on the river Nedon, which plays the same part in the second war that Ithome played in the first. But Eira fell; legend says that it was beleaguered for eleven years. Aristomenes was the soul of the defence, and his wonderful escapes became the argument of a stirring tale. On one occasion he was thrown, with fifty fellow-countrymen, captured by the Spartans, into a deep pit. His comrades perished, and Aristomenes awaited certain death. But by following the track of a fox he found a passage in the rocky wall of his prison and appeared on the following day at Eira. When the Spartans surprised that fortress, he made his escape wounded to Arcadia.

Those Messenians who were left in the land were mostly reduced again to the condition of Helots, but the maritime communities and even a few in the interior remained free, as *perioeci*, in the possession of their estates.

At this time Sparta, like most Greek states, suffered from domestic discontent. The pressing land question was partly solved by the conquest of the whole land of Messenia; and doubtless the foundation of the colony of Taras in southern Italy was undertaken for the purpose of relieving an excessive population.

The Messenian war, as recorded by Tyrtaeus, shows us that the power of the privileged classes had already been undermined by a great change in the method of warfare. The fighting is done, and the victory won, by regiments of mailed foot-lancers, who march and fight together in close ranks. The secret had been discovered that such *hoplites* (as they were called) were superior to cavalry; but it was in Sparta first that their value was fully appreciated. There they became the main part of the military establishment. The city no longer depended chiefly on her nobles in time

of war; she depended on her whole people. The progress of metal-smiths in their trade, which accompanied the general industrial advance of Greece, rendered possible this transformation in the art of war. Every well-to-do citizen could now provide himself with an outfit of armour and go forth to battle in panoply.¹ The transformation was distinctly levelling and democratic; for it placed the noble and the ordinary citizen on an equality in the field.

SECT. 3. Internal Development of Sparta and her Institutions.—When Sparta emerges into the full light of history we find her under an iron discipline, which invades every part of a man's life and controls all his actions from his cradle to his deathbed. Everything is subordinated to the art of war, and the sole aim of the state is to create invincible warriors.

The whole Spartan people formed a military caste; the life of a Spartan citizen was devoted to the service of the state. In order to carry out this ideal it was necessary that every citizen should be freed from the care of providing for himself and his family. The nobles owned family domains of their own; but the Spartan community also came into possession of common land, which was divided into a number of lots. Each Spartan obtained a lot, which passed from father to son, but could not be either sold or divided; thus a citizen could never be reduced to poverty. The original inhabitants, whom the Lacedaemonians dispossessed and reduced to the state of serfs, cultivated the land for their lords. Every year the owner of a lot was entitled to receive seventy medimni of corn for himself, twelve for his wife, and a stated portion of wine and fruit. All that the land produced beyond this, the Helot was allowed to retain for his own use. Though the Helots were not driven by task-

¹ The metal breastplate had been introduced; metal greaves were worn, and thigh-pieces. The round shield borne on the arm had superseded the clumsy shoulder-swung shield of the heroic period.

masters, and had the right of acquiring private property, their condition seems to have been hard; at all events they were always bitterly dissatisfied and ready to rebel, whenever an occasion presented itself. The system of Helotry was a source of danger from the earliest times, but especially after the conquest of Messenia; and the state of constant military preparation in which the Spartans lived may have been partly due to the consciousness of this peril perpetually at their doors. The *Krypteia* or secret police was instituted—it is uncertain at what date—to deal with this danger. Young Spartans were sent into the country and empowered to kill every Helot whom they had reason to regard with suspicion. By this device, the youths could slay dangerous Helots without any scruple or fear of the guilt of manslaughter. But notwithstanding these precautions serious revolts broke out again and again.

Thus relieved from the necessity of gaining a livelihood, the Spartans devoted themselves to the good of the state, and the aim of the state was the cultivation of the art of war. Sparta was a large military school. Education, marriage, the details of daily life were all strictly regulated with a view to the maintenance of a perfectly efficient army. Every citizen was to be a soldier, and the discipline began from birth. When a child was born it was submitted to the inspection of the heads of the tribe, and if they judged it to be unhealthy or weak, it was exposed to die on the wild slopes of Mount Taygetus. At the age of seven years the boy was consigned to the care of a state-officer, and the course of his education was entirely determined by the purpose of inuring him to bear hardships, training him to endure an exacting discipline, and instilling into his heart a sentiment of devotion to the state. The boys, up to the age of twenty, were marshalled in a huge school formed on the model of an army.

At the age of twenty the Spartan entered upon military

service and was permitted to marry. But he could not yet enjoy home-life; he had to live in "barracks" with his companions, and could only pay stolen and fugitive visits to his wife. In his thirtieth year, having completed his training, he became a "man," and obtained the full rights of citizenship. The *Homoioi* or peers, as the Spartan citizens were called, dined together in tents in the Hyacinthian Street. Each member of a common tent made a fixed monthly contribution, derived from the produce of his lot, consisting of barley, cheese, wine, and figs, and the members of the same mess-tent shared the same tent in the field in time of war. Three hundred "horsemen," chosen from the Spartan youths, formed the king's bodyguard; but though, as their name shows, they were originally mounted, in later times they fought on foot. The light infantry was supplied by the Perioeci and Helots.

Thus Sparta was a camp in which the highest object of every man's life was to be ready at any moment to fight with the utmost efficiency for his city. The aim of every law, the end of the whole social order, was to fashion good soldiers. Private luxury was strictly forbidden; Spartan simplicity became proverbial. The individual man, entirely lost in the state, had no life of his own; he had no problems of human existence to solve for himself. Sparta was not a place for thinkers or theorists; the whole duty of man and the highest ideal of life were contained for a Spartan in the laws of his city.

It was inevitable that, as time went on, there should be many fallings away, and that some of the harder laws should, by tacit agreement, be ignored. From an early period it seems to have been a permitted thing for a citizen to acquire land in addition to his original lot. As such lands were not, like the original lot, inalienable, but could be sold or divided, inequalities in wealth necessarily arose, and the "communism" which we observed in the life of

the citizens was only superficial. But it was specially provided by law that no Spartan should possess wealth in the form of gold or silver. This law was at first eluded by the device of depositing money in foreign temples, and it ultimately became a dead letter; Spartans even gained throughout Greece an evil reputation for avarice.

There is no doubt that the Spartan system of discipline grew up by degrees; yet the whole fabric shows an artistic unity which might be thought to argue the work of a single mind. And until lately this was generally believed to be the case; some still maintain the belief. A certain Lycurgus was said to have framed the Spartan institutions and enacted the Spartan laws about the beginning of the ninth century.

But the grounds for believing that a Spartan lawgiver named Lycurgus ever existed are of the slenderest kind. Herodotus states that the Spartans declared Lycurgus to have been the guardian of one of their early kings, and to have introduced from Crete their laws and institutions. But the divergent accounts of this historian's contemporaries, who ignore Lycurgus altogether, prove that it was simply one of many guesses and not a generally accepted tradition.

The guess was natural, for in Crete, which island was by its geographical situation withdrawn from the main course of Greek history, there existed very similar institutions among men of Dorian stock. There was a population divided into warriors and serfs. There was a board of ten annual magistrates (*κόσμοι*) corresponding to the Ephors; and a council answering to the Gerusia. But for the council and the magistracy only nobles were eligible, and there were no kings. The real likeness lies in the discipline of the youth, which was, like that of Sparta,



FIG. 22.—Coin of Chios, early (obverse). Minotaur [legend: ΚΝΟΣ].

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FIG. 22.—Coin of Chossus, early (obverse). Minotaur [legend: ΚΝΟΣ].

designed solely for making good warriors, and which enforced on all a similar form of barrack life with common meals, with the same strict state regulation of existence and a more complete communism.

SECT. 4. **The Supremacy and Decline of Argos. The Olympian Games.**—During the seventh century Argos was the leading state in the Peloponnesus. As Sparta gradually crushed out the Messenian resistance, Argos weakened, and, fifty years after Messenia was finally subdued, Argos had sunk to the level of a second-rate power, always able to maintain her independence, always a thorn in Sparta's side, but never leading. The various stages in this struggle for ascendancy are marked by a varying presidency of the famous Olympian festival.

The state of Pisa, on the river Alpheus, which helped the Messenians in their revolt, was the enemy of Sparta. Now the *allis* or sacred grove of Olympia lay under the wooded mount of Cronus, where the river Cladeus flows into the Alpheus, in the angle between the two streams within the territory of Pisa. Games were the chief feature of the festival, which was held in honour of Zeus every fourth year, at the time of the second full moon after midsummer's day. The games at first included foot-races, boxing, and wrestling; chariot-races and horse-races were added later. Such contests were an ancient institution in Greece. The funeral games of Patroclus, described in the *Iliad*, permit us to infer that they were a feature of Ionian life in the ninth century. The control of the Olympian sanctuary, which must originally have belonged to Pisa, was coveted by the Eleans, Pisa's northern neighbours; and they usurped the conduct of the festival, as it seems, with Sparta's approval. But in the middle of the seventh century, Pheidon, king of Argos, the last ruler under whom she played a leading part, marched west to Olympia, took the management of the games from Elis, and restored it to




FIG. 23.—Temple of Hera and Zeus at Olympia (trad. date 10th cent. B.C.).

Pisa. He himself presided at the games on this occasion, the first when they are mentioned in history. But when
572 B.C. Sparta had conquered Messenia, her influence after a certain period restored the management to Elis.

The mythical institution of the games was ascribed to Pelops or to Heracles; and, when the Eleans usurped the presidency, the story gradually took shape that the celebration had been revived by the Spartan Lysurgus and the Elean Iphitus in the year 776 B.C., and this year was reckoned as the first Olympiad. From that year until the visit of Pheidon, the Eleans professed to have presided over the feast; and their account of the matter won its way into general belief.

By the beginning of the sixth century the festival was no longer an event of merely Peloponnesian interest. It had become famous wherever the Greek tongue was spoken, and, when the feast-tide came round in each cycle of four years, there thronged to the banks of the Alpheus, from all quarters of the Greek world, athletes and horses to compete in the contests, and spectators to behold them. During the celebration of the festival a sacred truce was observed, and the men of Elis claimed that in those days their territory was inviolable. The prize for victory in the games was a wreath of wild olive; but rich rewards always awaited the victor when he returned home in triumph and laid the Olympian crown in the chief temple of his city. The Olympian festival furnished a centre where Greeks of all parts met and exchanged their ideas and experiences; it was one of the institutions which expressed and quickened the consciousness of fellowship among the scattered folks of the Greek race; and it became a model, as we shall see, for other festivals of the same kind, which concurred in promoting a feeling of national unity.

SECT. 5. Democratic Movements. Lawgivers and Tyrants.—It is clear that there is no security that

equal justice will be meted out to all, so long as the laws by which the judge is supposed to act are not accessible to all. Naturally, therefore, one of the first demands which the people in Greek cities pressed upon their aristocratic governments was for a written law. It must be borne in mind that in old days deeds which injured only the individual and did not touch the gods or the state, were left to the injured person to deal with as he chose or could. The state did not interfere. Even in the case of bloodshedding, it devolved upon the kinsfolk of the slain man to wreak punishment upon the slayer. Then, as social order developed, the state took justice partly into its own hands; and the injured man, before he could punish the wrongdoer, was obliged to charge him before a judge, who decided the punishment. But no crime could come before a judge, unless the injured person came forward as accuser, except in a case of bloodshedding. It was felt that the shedder of blood was not only impure himself, but had also defiled the gods of the community; so that manslaughter of every form came under the class of crimes against the religion of the state.

The work of writing down the laws, and fixing customs in legal shape, was probably in most cases combined with the work of reforming; and thus the great codifiers of the seventh century were also lawgivers. Of these the most famous were the Athenians, Dracon and Solon the Wise.

In many cases the legislation was accompanied by political concessions to the people, and it was part of the lawgiver's task to modify the constitution. But for the most part this was only the beginning of a long political conflict. Social distress was the sharp spur which drove the people on in this effort towards popular government. The struggle was in some cases to end in the establishment of a democracy; in many cases, the oligarchy succeeded in maintaining itself and keeping the people down; in most

cases, perhaps, the result was a perpetual oscillation between oligarchy and democracy—an endless series of revolutions, too often sullied by violence. But though democracy was not everywhere victorious—though even the states in which it was most firmly established were exposed to the danger of oligarchical conspiracies—yet everywhere the people aspired to it ; and we may say that the chief feature of the domestic history of most Greek cities, from the end of the seventh century forward, is an endeavour to establish or maintain popular government.

As happens usually, or at least frequently, in such circumstances, the popular movement received help from within the camp of the adversary. Discontented nobles came forward to be the leaders of the discontented masses. But when the government was overthrown, the revolution generally resulted in a temporary return to monarchy. The mass of the people were not yet ripe for taking the power into their own hands ; and they were generally glad to entrust it to the man who had helped them to overthrow the hated government of the nobles. This new kind of monarchy did not rest on hereditary right but on physical force.

Such illegitimate monarchs were called tyrants, to distinguish them from the hereditary kings, and this form of monarchy was called a *tyrannis*. The word in itself did not imply that the monarch was bad or cruel ; there was nothing self-contradictory in a good tyrant, and many tyrants were beneficent. But the isolation of these rulers, who, being without the support of legitimacy, depended on armed force, so often urged them to be suspicious and cruel, that “tyrant” inclined to the evil sense in which modern languages have adopted it. Yet the Greek dislike of the *tyrannis* was not mainly due to the fact that many tyrants were oppressors. Arbitrary control was repugnant to the Greek love of freedom.

The period which saw the fall of the aristocracies is often

called the age of the tyrants. The tyrannis first came into existence at this period; there was a large crop of tyrants much about the same time in different parts of Greece; they all performed the same function of overthrowing aristocracies, and in many cases they paved the way for democracies. But there is no age in the subsequent history of Greece which did not see the rise of tyrants here and there. Tyranny was always with the Greeks. It, as well as oligarchy, was a danger by which their democracies were threatened at all periods.

Ionia seems to have been the original home of the tyrannis, and this may have been partly due to the seductive example of the rich court of the Lydian "tyrants" at Sardis. The most famous of Ionian tyrants was Thrasybulus of Miletus, under whose rule that city held a more brilliant position than ever. In Lesbian Mytilene we see the tyrannis and also a method by which it might be avoided. Tyrants rose and fell in rapid succession; the echoes of hatred and jubilation still ring to us from relics of the lyric poems of Alcaeus. "Let us drink and reel, for Myrsilus is dead." The poet was a noble and a fighter; but in a war with the Athenians on the coast of the Hellespont he threw away his shield, like Archilochus, and it hung as a trophy at Sigeum. Pittacus, however, who distinguished himself for bravery in the same war with Athens, was to be the saviour of the state. He gained the trust of the people and was elected ruler for a period of ten years in order to heal the sores of the city. Such a governor, possessing supreme power but for a limited time, was called an *aesymnêtes*. Pittacus gained the reputation of a wise lawgiver and a firm, moderate ruler. He banished the nobles who opposed him—among others the two most famous of all Lesbians, the poets Alcaeus and Sappho. At the end of ten years he laid down his office, to be enrolled after his death in the number of the Seven Wise Men.

c. 610 B.C.

c. 600-570
B.C.

SECT. 6. The Tyrannies of Central Greece. —

About the middle of the seventh century, three tyrannies arose in central Greece in the neighbourhood of the Isthmus: at Corinth, at Sicyon, and at Megara. In each case the development was different, and is in each case instructive. In Sicyon the tyranny was brilliant and beneficent, in Corinth brilliant and oppressive, in Megara short-lived and followed by long intestine struggles.

657 B.C. The ruling clan of the Bacchiads at Corinth was overthrown by Cypselus, who had put himself at the head of the people. The Bacchiads were banished and their property confiscated; dangerous persons were executed, and Cypselus took the reins of government into his own hands. Of the rule of Cypselus himself we know little; he is variously represented as harsh and mild. His son Periander succeeded, and of him more is recorded. The general features of the Cypselid tyrannis were a vigorous colonial and commercial policy, and the encouragement of art.

One of the earliest triumphs of Cypselus was probably the reduction of Corcyra, which had formed a fleet of its own and had grown to be a rival of its mother in the Ionian seas. It has already been mentioned that the earliest battle of ships between two Greek states was supposed to have been fought between Corinth and Corcyra. The attempt of Corinth to form a colonial empire was an interesting experiment. The idea of Cypselus corresponded to our modern colonial system, in which the colonies are in a relation of dependence to the mother-country, and not to that of the Greeks, in which the colony was an independent sovereign state. Geographical conditions alone rendered it out of the question to apply the new principle to Syracuse, but the success at Corcyra was followed up by a development of Corinthian influence in the north-west of Greece. The Acarnanian peninsula of Leucas was occupied and made into an island by piercing a channel through the

narrow isthmus. Anactorion was founded on the south side of the Ambracian Gulf, and inland, on the north side, Ambracia. Apollonia was planted on the coast of Epirus; and, farther north, Corcyra, under the auspices of her mother-city, colonised Epidamnus. In another quarter of the Greek world, a son of Periander founded Potidaea in the Chalcidic peninsula.

Cypselus and Periander did their utmost to promote the commercial activity of their city. In the middle of the seventh century the rival Euboean cities, Chalcis and Eretria, were the most important merchant states of Greece. But fifty years later they had somewhat declined; Corinth and Aegina were taking their place. Their decline was brought about by their rivalry, which led to an exhausting war for the Lelantine plain.

While the most successful of the tyrants, like Periander, furthered material civilisation, they often manifested an interest in intellectual pursuits, and did something for the promotion of art. A new form of poetry called the *dithyramb* was developed at Corinth during this period, the rude strains which were sung at vintage-feasts in honour of Dionysus being moulded into an artistic shape. The discovery was attributed to Arion, a mythical minstrel, who was said to have leaped into the sea under the compulsion of mariners who robbed him, and to have been carried to Corinth on the back of a dolphin, the fish of Dionysus.

In architecture, Corinthian skill had made an important contribution to the development of the temple. In the course of the seventh century men began to translate into stone the old shrine of brick and wood; and stone temples arose in all parts of the Greek world—the lighter “Ionic” form in Ionia, the heavier “Doric” in the elder Greece. By the invention of roof-tiles, Corinthian workmen rendered it practicable to give a considerable inclination to the roof; and thus in each gable of the temple a large triangular space

was left, inviting the sculptor to fill it with a story in marble. The pediment, as we name it, was called by the Greeks the "eagle"; and thus it was said that Corinth had discovered the eagle (*âerós*).

c. 586 B.C. The great tyrant died and was succeeded by his nephew Psammetichus, who having ruled for a few years was slain.




FIG. 24.—Pillars of an old temple at Corinth.

With him the tyranny of the Cypselids came to an end, and an aristocracy of merchants was firmly established. At the same time the Cypselid colonial system partly broke down, for Corcyra became independent and hostile, while the Ambraciots set up a democracy. But over her other colonies Corinth retained her influence, and was on friendly terms with all of them.

Some time after the inauguration of the Cypselid tyranny,

a similar constitutional change occurred at Megara, and a friendship sprang up between the two cities. The mercantile development of Megara, famous for her weavers, had enriched the nobles, who held the political power and oppressed the peasants with a grinding despotism. Then Theagenes arose as a deliverer and made himself tyrant. c. 640 B.C. Having obtained a bodyguard, he surprised and massacred the aristocrats. His term of tyranny was marked by one solid work, the construction of an aqueduct. He was overthrown, and then followed a political struggle between the aristocracy, which had regained its power, and the people. Concessions were wrung from the government. The capitalists were forced to pay back the interest which they had extorted, while the political disabilities were relieved by extending citizenship to the country population and admitting the tillers of the soil to the Assembly. These conflicts and social changes are reflected in the poems of Theognis, who meditated and lamented them. He judges severely the short-sighted, greedy policy of his own caste, and sees that it is likely to lead to another tyranny. On the other hand, his sympathies are with an aristocratic form of government, and he discerns with dismay the growth of democratic tendencies. He cries :

Unchanged the walls, but, ah, how changed the folk !

The base, who knew erstwhile nor law nor right,

But dwelled like deer, with goatskin for a cloak,

Are now ennobled ; and, O sorry plight !

The nobles are made base in all men's sight.

The rise of a tyranny in agricultural Sicyon seems to have occurred much about the same time as at mercantile Corinth. The first of the house of whom we have any historical record is Cleisthenes, who ruled in the first c. 590 B.C. quarter of the sixth century. He was engaged in a war with Argos, which claimed lordship over Sicyon. He would not

permit rhapsodists to recite the Homeric poems at Sicyon, because there was so much in them about Argos and Argives.

Cleisthenes married his daughter Agarista to an Athenian noble, Megacles, of the famous family of the Alcmaeonids. A legend is told of the wooing of Agarista, which illustrates the tyrant's wealth and hospitality and the social ideas of the age. On the occasion of an Olympian festival at which he had himself won in the chariot-race, Cleisthenes made proclamation to the Greeks that all who aspired to the hand of his daughter should assemble at Sicyon, sixty days hence, and be entertained at his court for a year. At the end of the year he would decide who was most worthy of his daughter. Then there came to Sicyon all the Greeks who had a high opinion of themselves or of their families. Cleisthenes tested their accomplishments for a year. He tried them in gymnastic exercises, but laid most stress on their social qualities. The two Athenians, Hippocleides and Megacles, pleased him best, but to Hippocleides of these two he most inclined. The day appointed for the choice of the husband came, and Cleisthenes sacrificed a hundred oxen and feasted all the suitors and all the folk of Sicyon. After the dinner, the wooers competed in music and general conversation. Hippocleides was the most brilliant, and, as his success seemed assured, he bade the flute-player strike up and began to dance. Cleisthenes was surprised and disconcerted at this behaviour, and his surprise became disgust when Hippocleides, who thought he was making a decisive impression, called for a table and danced Spartan and Athenian figures on it. The host controlled his feelings, but, when Hippocleides proceeded to dance on his head, he could no longer resist, and called out, "O son of Tisander, you have danced away your bride!" But the Athenian only replied, "Hippocleides careth not," and danced on.

Megacles was chosen for Agarista, and rich presents were given to the disappointed suitors.

SECT. 7. **The Sacred War. The Panhellenic Games.**—The most important achievement of Cleisthenes, and that which won him most fame in the Greek world, was his championship of the Delphic oracle.

The temple of Delphi, or Pytho, lay in the territory of the Phocian town of Crisa. The sanctuary of "rocky Pytho" was terraced on a steep slope, hard under the bare sheer cliffs of Parnassus, looking down upon the deep glen of the Pleistus,—an austere and majestic scene, supremely fitted for the utterance of the oracles of God. The men of Crisa claimed control over the Delphians and the oracle, and levied dues on the visitors who came to consult the deity. The Delphians desired to free themselves from the control of the Crisaeans, and they naturally looked for help to the great league of the north, in which the Thessalians, the ancient foes of the Phocians, were now the dominant member. The folks who belonged to this religious union were the "dwellers around" the shrine of Demeter at Anthela, close to the pass of Thermopylae; and hence they were called the *Amphictiones* of Anthela or Pylae. The league included the Locrians, Phocians, Boeotians, and Athenians, as well as the Dorians, Malians, Dolopians, Enianes, Thessalians, Perrhaebians, and Magnetes.

The Amphictions espoused warmly the cause of Apollo c. 590 B. C. and his Delphian servants, and declared a holy war against the men of Crisa who had violated the sacred territory. And Delphi found a champion in the south as well as in the north. The tyrant of Sicyon across the gulf went forth against the impious city. As Crisa was situated in such a strong position, commanding the road from the sea to the sanctuary, it was plain that the utter destruction of the city was the only conclusion of the war which could lead to the assured independence of the oracle. The Amphic-

tions and Sicyonians took the city after a sore struggle, rased it to the ground, and slew the indwellers. The Crisæan plain was dedicated to the god; solemn and heavy curses were pronounced against whosoever should till it.

One of the consequences of this war was the establishment of a close connexion between Delphi and the Amphictiony of Anthela. The Delphic shrine became a second place of meeting, and the league was often called the Delphic Amphictiony. The temple was taken under the protection of the league; the administration of the property of the god was placed in the hands of the Hieromnemones or sacred councillors, who met twice a year in spring and autumn, both at Anthela and at Delphi. Two Hieromnemones were sent as its representatives by each member of the league. The oracle and the priestly nobles of Delphi thus won a position of independence; their great career of prosperity and power began. The Pythian games
582 B.C. were now reorganised on a more splendid scale, and the ordering of them was one of the duties of the Amphictions. The festival became, like the Olympian, a four-yearly celebration, being held in the middle of each Olympiad.

Much about the same time two other Panhellenic festivals were instituted at Isthmus and at Nemea. Both the Isthmian and the Nemean festivals were two-yearly. Thus from the beginning of the sixth century four Panhellenic festivals are celebrated, two in the Peloponnesus, one on the isthmus, one in the north; and throughout the course of Grecian history the prestige of these gatherings never wanes.

These four Panhellenic festivals helped to maintain a feeling of fellowship among all the Greeks, and Delphi, the meeting-place for pilgrims and envoys from all quarters of the Greek world, helped to keep distant cities in touch with one another. These two forces promoted the conception of a common Hellenic race with common interests.

About the middle of the seventh century the name "Pan-Hellenes" was used in a poem by Archilochus, and the Homeric Catalogue of the ships, a work of the seventh century, gives to almost every state in Greece a share in the great Hellenic enterprise against Troy.

We saw that the Boeotians were a member of the northern Amphictiony. The unity of Boeotia itself had taken the form of a federation, in which Thebes was the dominant power. This unity had its weak points; its maintenance depended upon the power of Thebes; some of the cities were reluctant members. Orchomenus held out for independence till forced to join about the end of the seventh century. Above all, Plataea chafed; she had kept herself pure from mixture with the Boeotian settlers, and her whole history—of which some remarkable episodes will pass before us—may be regarded as an isolated continuation of the ancient struggle between the elder Greek inhabitants of the land and the Boeotian conquerors.



FIG. 25.—Dipylon Vase, with ship (British Museum).



FIG. 26.—Coin of Athens, early (obverse). Head of Pallas.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNION OF ATTICA AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY

SECT. I. The Union of Attica.—Attica, like its neighbour Boeotia and other countries of Greece, was once occupied by a number of independent states. But of all the lordships between Mount Cithaeron and Cape Sunium the two most important were those of Eleusis and Athens, the stronghold in the midst of the Cephisian plain, five miles from the sea. This Cephisian plain, on the south side open to the Saronic gulf, is enclosed by hills, on the west by Aegaleos, on the north-west by Parnes, on the east by Hymettus, while the gap in the north-east, between Parnes and Hymettus, is filled by the gable-shaped mass of Pentelicus. The river Cephissus flows not far from Athens to westward, but the Acropolis was girt by two smaller streams, the Ilissus and the Eridānus. In the bronze age it was one of the strong places of Greece. There still remain pieces of the wall of grey-blue limestone with which the Pelasgian lords of the castle secured the edge of their precipitous hill. The Acropolis is joined to the Areopagus by a high saddle, which forms its natural approach, and on this side walls were so constructed that the main western entrance to the citadel lay through nine successive gates.

The first Greeks who won the Pelasgic acropolis were





FIG. 27

Trad. date
1581.

probably the Cecropes, and, the later Athenians were always ready to describe themselves as the sons of Cecrops. This Cecrops was numbered among the imaginary prehistoric kings of Athens; he was nothing more than the fabulous ancestor of the Cecropes. But the time came when other Greek dwellers in Attica won the upper hand over the Cecropes, and brought with them the worship of Athena. The Acropolis became Athēnai; the folks—whether Cecropes or Pelasgians—who dwelled in the villages around it, on the banks of the Ilisus and Eridānus, became Athenians. They became Athenians in the full sense only after another great step in their history—the *συνουκισμός* or union of the small yet separate communities, which was annually commemorated by the feast of the *συνολία*. Athens was no longer the head of a league like Thebes in Boeotia, nor the mistress of subject communities. The man of Marathon or any village in Attica was precisely on a level with a dweller in Athens herself. We do not know when this step was achieved, nor by whom. In after-times the Athenians thought that the hero Theseus, whom they had enrolled in the list of their early kings,¹ was the author of the union of their country.

SECT. 2. Foundation of the Athenian Commonwealth.—At Athens, as in the other Greek states, there existed in early days a royalty, which passed into an aristocracy and then into a republic. The first step in the limitation of kingly power was the institution of a *polemarch* or commander of the army, elected by the nobles. The next was the establishment of an *archon* or regent, who usurped most of the kingly functions. Acastus was the first regent, created by his kinsmen the Medontids; and he held office for life. All archons after him swore that they would be true to their oath even as Acastus. Next came the limita-

¹ Old Attic tradition (preserved by Herodotus) counted only four kings before Theseus, viz. Cecrops, Erechtheus, Pandion, and Aegeus.



Longitude East 24° of Greenwich

FIG. 28.

tion of the archonship to a period of ten years, though for some time still the archon must be a Medontid. This restriction of choice was abolished, but the first certain date which we have is 683-2 B.C., when the archonship or regency became a yearly office.

The kings were not formally abolished, but continued to hold office for ceremonial purposes, and to the last the title was retained in that of the archon basileus.

In the period of these changes took place the union or synoecism of Attica. The united people of all the separate districts and villages were divided up among four tribes—Geleontes, Argadeis, Aigicoreis and Hoplètes—whose names were borrowed from Miletus, and seem to have reference to the worship of special deities, *e.g.* Zeus Geleon. At the head of each tribe was a phylo-basileus. The Brotherhoods or phratries were rearranged under the tribes, three to each, making twelve phratries in all.

SECT. 3. The Aristocracy in the Seventh Century.

—Early in the seventh century, then, the Athenian republic was an aristocracy, and the executive was in the hands of three annually elected officers, the archon, the king, and the polemarch. The archon was the supreme judge in all civil suits. He held the chief place among the magistrates, and his name appeared at the head of official lists, whence he was called *epōnymus*. The polemarch had judicial duties, besides being commander-in-chief of the army; he judged all cases in which non-citizens were involved. The king's functions were confined to the management of the state-religion, and the conduct of certain judicial cases connected with religion, which came before the Council of which he was president.

The Bulê or Council of Elders came afterwards to be called at Athens the Council of the Areopagus, to distinguish it from other councils of later growth. This name was derived from its place of meeting for a certain purpose

According to early custom, murder and manslaughter were not regarded as crimes against the state, but the family of the slain man might either slay the slayer or accept a compensation. But gradually, the belief gained ground that he who shed blood was impure and needed cleansing. Accordingly when a murderer satisfied the kinsfolk of the murdered by paying a fine, he had also to submit to a process of purification, and satisfy the Chthonian gods and the Erinyes or Furies, who were, in the original conception, the souls of the dead clamouring for vengeance. And when a member of a community was impure, the stain drew down the anger of the gods upon the whole community, if the unclean were not driven out. Hence it came about that the state undertook the conduct of criminal justice. The Council itself formed the court, and the proceedings were closely associated with the worship of the *Semnai*. These Chthonian goddesses had a sanctuary, which served as a refuge for him whose hand was stained with bloodshed, on the north-east side of the Areopagus, outside the city wall. On this rugged spot the Council held its sittings to deal with cases of murder, violence with murderous intent, poisoning, and incendiarism.

Under the rule of the kings and the aristocracies, the free population fell into three classes: the *Eupatridæ* or nobles; the *Georgi* or peasants who cultivated their own farms; and the *Demiurgi* (public workers)—those who lived by trade or commerce. But besides these classes of citizens, who had the right of attending the Assembly, there was a mass of freemen who were not citizens, such as the agricultural labourers, who, having no land of their own, cultivated the estates of the nobles.

Although Attica seems to have taken no part in the colonising movements of the eighth and seventh centuries, the Athenians shared in the trading activities of that period. The cultivation of the olive was becoming a feature of Attica, and its oil a profitable article of exportation. At the same

time Attic potters were actively developing their industry on lines of their own. It is easy to see how participation in trade began to undermine the foundations of the aristocracy of birth. The nobles engaged in mercantile ventures with various success, some becoming richer, and others poorer; and the industrial folk increased in wealth and importance. The result would ultimately be that wealth would assert itself as well as birth, both socially and politically; and in the second half of the seventh century we find that the aristocracy had changed into a *timocracy*, or constitution, in which political rights depend entirely on wealth. For we find the people divided into three classes according to their wealth. The principle of division was the annual yield of landed property, in corn, oil, or wine. The highest class was the *Pentacosiomedimni*, including those whose land produced at least so many measures (medimni) of corn and so many measures (metrētae) of oil or wine as *together* amounted to five hundred measures. The second class included those whose property produced more than three hundred but less than five hundred such measures. These were called *Knights*, and so represented roughly those who could maintain a horse and take their part in war as mounted soldiers. The minimum income of the third class was two hundred measures, and their name, *Zeugitai* or *Teamsters*, shows that they were well-to-do peasants who could till their land with a pair of oxen. The chief magistracies of archon, king, and polemarch were confined to the first class, but the principle was admitted that a successful man, although not a Eupatrid, was eligible for the highest offices. It c. 640 B.C. is probable that the institution of the *Thesmothetae* also marks a step in the self-assertion of the lower classes. The Thesmothetae were a college of six judges elected annually, who managed the whole judicial system of Athens. They were soon associated with the three chief magistrates, the archon, basileus, and polemarch; and the nine

came to form a sort of college and were called the Nine Archons.

Outside these classes were the smaller peasants who had land of their own, of which, however, the produce did not amount to two hundred measures of corn or oil, and the humbler handicraftsmen. These were called *Thêtes*, the name being perverted from its proper meaning of "labourers." The *Thêtes* were citizens, but had no political rights. Yet as the conditions of a growing maritime trade led to the development of a navy, and as the duty of serving as marines in the penteconters mainly devolved upon the *Thêtes*, this gave them a new significance in the state. The democracy of Athens was always closely connected with her sea power. And though the economic changes, caused in the seventh century by the invention of money, led to much hardship and social discontent, still an event happened about thirty years before the end of the century which shows that the peasants were still loyal to the existing constitution.

A certain Cylon, of noble family, married the daughter c. 632 B.C. of Theagenes, tyrant of Megara; and, with Megarian help, he tried to make himself master of the city. Cylon enlisted in his enterprise a number of noble youths, and a band of Megarian soldiers were sent by Theagenes; he had no support among the people. He succeeded in seizing the Acropolis, but the sight of foreign soldiers effectually quenched any lurking sympathy that any of the Athenians might have felt for an effort to overthrow the government. Cylon was blockaded in the citadel, and, after a long siege, he escaped with his brother from the fortress. The rest were soon constrained to capitulate. They sought refuge in the temple of Athena Polias, and left it when the archons promised to spare their lives. But Megacles, of the Alcmaeonid family, was archon this year; and at his instigation the conspirators were put to death. Such a

violation of a solemn pledge to the suppliants who had trusted in the protection of the gods was an insult to the gods themselves; and the city was under a curse till the pollution should be removed. This view was urged by the secret friends of Cylon and those who hated the Alcmaeonids. And so it came to pass that while Cylon, his brother, and their descendants were condemned to perpetual banishment, the Alcmaeonids and those who had acted with them were also tried on the charge of sacrilege and condemned to a perpetual exile, with confiscation of their property. The banishment of the Alcmaeonids had consequences in the practical politics of Athens two hundred years later.

The outbreak of a war with Megara, in consequence of the plot of Cylon, aggravated the distress of the rural population; for the Attic coasts suffered from the depredations of the enemy, and the Megarian market was closed to the oil-trade. And, probably to prevent an outbreak, it was decided that a code of law should be drawn up and written down. Dracon was appointed an extraordinary legislator (*thesmothetes*), and empowered to codify and rectify the existing law. We know only the provisions of that part of his criminal law which dealt with the shedding of blood; and his name became proverbial for a severe lawgiver. An Athenian orator won credit for his epigram that Dracon's laws were written not in ink but in blood. This idea arose from the fact that certain small offences, such as stealing cabbage, were punished by death. A broader view, however, of Dracon's code will modify this estimate. He drew careful distinctions between murder and various kinds of accidental or justifiable manslaughter; and though, being appointed by the aristocracy, he was bound to provide for the interests of the rich power-holding class, it was at all events an enormous gain for the poor that those interests should be defined in writing.

SECT. 4. **The Legislation of Solon and the Foundation of Democracy.**—Dracon's code was something, but it did not touch the root of the evil. Every year the oppressiveness of the rich few and the impoverishment of the small farmer were increasing. Without capital, and obliged to borrow money, which was still very scarce,¹ the small proprietors mortgaged their lands, which fell into the hands of capitalists, who lent money at ruinous interest. The condition of the free labourers or *hektemōri* was even more deplorable. The sixth part of the produce, which was their wage, no longer sufficed, under the new economical conditions, to support life, and they were forced into borrowing from their masters. The interest was high, and the person of the borrower was forfeited to the lender in case of inability to pay. Thus while the wealthy few were becoming wealthier and greedier, the small proprietors were becoming landless, and the landless freemen were becoming slaves. And the evil was aggravated by unjust judgments, and the perversion of law in favour of the rich and powerful. The people were bitter against their remorseless oppressors, and only wanted a leader to rebel.

The catastrophe, however, was averted by the mediation of an eminent citizen—Solon, the son of Excecestides, a noble connected with the house of the Medontids. He was a merchant, and belonged to the wealthiest class in the state. He had imbued himself with Ionic literature, and had mastered the art of writing verse in the Ionic idiom. We are fortunate enough to possess portions of poems—political pamphlets—which he published for the purpose of guiding public opinion; and thus we have his view of the situation in his own words. The more

¹ The value of silver at this time may be judged from the fact that a sheep cost a drachma, a bushel of barley a drachma, an ox five drachmae. (A drachma=about 10d.)

moderate of the nobles seem to have seen the danger and the urgent need of a new order of things; and thus it came to pass that Solon was solicited to undertake the work of reform. He was elected archon, with extraordinary legislative powers; and instead of making the usual declaration of the chief magistrate, that he would protect the property of all men undiminished, he proclaimed that all mortgages and debts by which the debtor's person or land was pledged were annulled, and that all those who had become slaves for debt were free. By this proclamation the Athenians "shook off their burdens," and this first act of Solon's social reform was called the *Seisachtheia*. The great deliverance was celebrated by a public feast.

The character of the remedial measures of Solon is imperfectly known. After the cancelling of old debts he passed a law which forbade debtors to be enslaved; and he fixed a limit for the measure of land which could be owned by a single person, so as to prevent the growth of dangerously large estates. These measures hit the rich hard, and created discontent with the reformer; while, on the other hand, he was far from satisfying the desires and hopes of the masses. He would not confiscate and redistribute the estates of the wealthy, as many wished. And, though he rescued the free labourer from bondage, he made no change in the Sixth-part system, so that the condition of these landless freemen was improved only in so far as they could not be enslaved.

But Solon's title to fame as one of the great statesmen of Europe rests upon his reform of the constitution. The Athenian commonwealth did not actually become a democracy till many years later; but Solon not only laid the foundations—he shaped the framework. At first sight, indeed, the state as he reformed it might seem little more than an aristocracy of wealth—a timocracy—with certain democratic tendencies. He retained the old graduation of

the people in classes according to property. But he added the Thêtes as a fourth class, and gave it certain political rights. On the three higher classes devolved the public burdens, and they served as cavalry or as hoplites. The Thetes were employed as light-armed troops or as marines. It is probable that Solon made little or no change in regard to the offices which were open to each class. The Thetes were not eligible to any of the offices of state, but they were admitted to take part in the meetings of the Ecclesia, and this gave them a voice in the election of the magistrates.

But the radical measure of Solon was his constitution of the courts of justice. He composed a court out of all the citizens, including the Thetes; and as the panels of judges were enrolled by lot, the poorest burgher might have his turn. Any magistrate on laying down his office could be accused before the people in these courts; and thus the institution of popular courts invested the people with a supreme control over the administration. The people, sitting in sections as sworn judges, were called the *Heliaea*,—as distinguished from the Ecclesia, in which they gathered to pass laws or choose magistrates, but were required to take no oath. At first the archons were not deprived of their judicial powers, and the heliaea acted as a court of appeal; but by degrees only the proceedings preliminary to a trial were left to the archons, and the heliaea became both the first and the final court.

The constitution of the judicial courts out of the whole people was the secret of democracy which Solon discovered. We can hardly hesitate to regard Solon as the founder of the Athenian democracy. He deprived the Council of the Areopagus of its deliberative functions, so that it could no longer take any direct part in administration and legislation. But on the other hand he gave it wide and undefined powers of control over the magistrates, and a censorial authority over the citizens. Its judicial and

religious functions it retained. Henceforward the nine archons at the end of their year of office became life-members of the Council of the Areopagus; and this was the manner in which the Council was recruited. Thus the Areopagites were virtually appointed by the people in the Assembly, which elected the archons.

Having removed the Council of the Areopagus to this place of dignity, above and almost outside the constitution, Solon was obliged to create a new body to prepare the business for the Assembly. This new Council which Solon instituted consisted of four hundred members; a hundred being taken from each of the four tribes, either chosen by the tribe itself or, more probably, picked by lot. All citizens of the three higher classes were eligible; the Thetes alone were excluded.

The use of lot for the purpose of appointing public officers was a feature of Solon's reforms. According to men's ideas in those days, lot committed the decision to the gods. It was doubtless as a security against the undue influence of clans and parties that Solon used it. He applied it to the appointment of the chief magistrates themselves. But, religious though he was, he could not be blind to the danger of taking no human precautions against the falling of the lot upon an incompetent candidate, and he therefore mixed the two methods of lot and election. Forty candidates were elected, ten from each tribe, by the voice of their tribesmen; and out of these the nine archons were picked by lot.

Solon sought to keep the political balance steady by securing that each of the four tribes should have an equal share in the government. Yet the gravest danger ahead was in truth not the strife of poor and rich, but the deep-rooted and bitter jealousies which existed between many of the clans. While the clan had the tribe behind it and the tribe possessed political weight, such feuds might at any

moment cause a civil war or a revolution. But it was reserved for a future lawgiver to grapple with this problem.

One of Solon's first acts was to repeal all the legislation of Dracon, except the laws relating to manslaughter. His own laws were inscribed on wooden tables and kept in the Public hall.

Solon had done his work boldly, but he had done it constitutionally. He had not made himself a tyrant, as he might easily have done, and as many expected him to do. On the contrary, one purpose of his reform was to forestall the necessity, and prevent the possibility, of a tyranny. To a superficial observer, caution seemed the note of his reforms, and men were surprised, and many disgusted, by his cautiousness. When he laid down his office he was assailed by complaints; but he refused to entertain the idea of any modifications in his measures. Thinking that the reforms would work better in the absence of the reformer, he left Athens soon after his archonship and travelled for ten years. Though the remnants of his poems are fragmentary, though the recorded events of his life are meagre, and though the details of his legislation are dimly known and variously interpreted, the personality of Solon leaves a distinct impression on our minds. We know enough to see in him an embodiment of the ideal of intellectual and moral excellence of the early Greeks, and the greatest of their wise men.

Solon's social reforms inaugurated a permanent improvement. But his political measures, which he intended as a compromise, displeased many. Party strife broke out again bitterly soon after his archonship, and only to end, after thirty years, in the tyranny which it had been his dearest object to prevent. The two great parties were those who were in the main satisfied with the new constitution of Solon, and those who disliked its democratic side and desired to return to the aristocratic government which he had subverted. The latter consisted chiefly of Eupatrids

and were known as the men of the Plain. The opposite party of the Coast included the bulk of the middle classes, the peasants as well as the Demiurgi, who were bettered by the changes of Solon. They were led by Megacles, son of Alcmaeon, the same Megacles who married Agarista. For one of Solon's measures was an Act which permitted the return of the Alcmaeonidae.



FIG. 29.—Athena and Poseidon on a vase painted by Amasis.

CHAPTER V

GROWTH OF ATHENS IN THE SIXTH CENTURY

SECT. I. **The Conquest of Salamis.**—Almost equally distant from Athens and Megara, parted by a narrow water from both, Salamis in the hands of either must be a constant menace to the other. The possession of Salamis must decide the future history of both Megara and Athens. At this period Megara, with her growing colonial connexions and her expanding trade, was a strong state and a formidable neighbour. The Cylonian conspiracy, as we saw, furnished 629 B.C. an occasion of war. Theagenes sent his ships to harry the Attic coasts. The Athenians sought to occupy Salamis, but all their efforts to gain a permanent footing failed, and they abandoned the attempt in despair. Years passed away. At length Solon saw that the favourable hour had come. He composed a stirring poem which began: "I came myself as a herald from lovely Salamis, but with song on my lips instead of common speech." He blamed the peace policy of the "men who let slip Salamis," as dishonourable; and cried, "Arise and come to Salamis, to win that fair island and undo our shame." His appeal moved the hearts of his countrymen to a national effort, and an Athenian army went forth to lay the first stone of their country's greatness.

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tion to a successful issue. Not only was the disputed island wrested from Megara, but he captured the port of Nisaea over against the island. And though Nisaea was subsequently restored when peace was made, Salamis became c. 570 B.C. permanently annexed to Attica as her first transmarine possession. The island was afterwards divided in lots among Athenian citizens, who were called *kleruchs* or "lot-holders."

The conquest of Salamis was a decisive event for Athens. Her territory was now rounded off; she had complete command of the landlocked Eleusinian bay; it was she who now threatened Megara.

SECT. 2. Athens under Pisistratus.—The conqueror of Nisaea was the hero of the day. By practising popular arts, he ingratiated himself with those extreme democrats who were outside both the Plain and the Coast. Pisistratus thus organised a new party which was called the Hill, as it largely consisted of the poor Hillsmen of the highlands of Attica. With this party at his back, Pisistratus aimed at grasping the supreme power. One day he appeared in the agora, wounded, he said, by a foul attack of his political foes; and he showed wounds which he bore. In the Assembly, packed by the Hillsmen, a bodyguard of fifty clubsmen was 561-0 B.C. voted to him. Having secured his bodyguard—the first step in a tyrant's progress—Pisistratus seized the Acropolis, and made himself master of the state.

It was the fate of Solon to live just long enough to see the establishment of the tyranny which he dreaded. He survived but a short time under Pisistratus, who at least treated the old man with respect.

556-5 B.C. At the end of about five years the other two parties united against Pisistratus and succeeded in driving him out. But new disunion followed, and Megacles, the leader of the Coast, seems to have quarrelled not only with the Plain but with his own party. At all events, he sought a reconciliation

with Pisistratus and undertook to help him back to the tyranny on condition that the tyrant wedded his daughter. The legend is that the partisans of Pisistratus found in an Attic village a woman of loftier than common stature, whom they arrayed in the guise of the goddess Athena. Her name was Phye. Then heralds, on a certain day, entered Athens, crying that Pallas herself was leading back Pisistratus. Presently a car arrived bearing the tyrant and Phye; and the trick deceived all the common folk. 550-49 B.C.

But the coalition of Pisistratus with Megacles was not abiding. By a former wife Pisistratus had two sons—Hippias and Hipparchus; and he feared that, if he had offspring by a second wife, the interests of his older sons might be injured and family dissensions ensue. So, though he went through the form of marriage with the daughter of Megacles, he did not treat her as his wife. Megacles was enraged when the tyrant's neglect reached his ears; he made common cause with the enemies of Pisistratus and succeeded in driving him out for the second time. 549 B.C.

The second exile lasted for about ten years, and Pisistratus spent it in forming new connexions in Macedonia. He exploited the gold mines of Mount Pangaeus near the Strymon, and formed a force of mercenary soldiers, thus providing himself with money and men to recover his position at Athens. When he landed at Marathon, his adherents flocked to his standard. The citizens who were loyal to the constitutional government marched forth, and were defeated in battle at Pallene. Resistance was at an end, and once more Pisistratus had the power in his hands. This time he kept it. 540-39 B.C.

The rule of Pisistratus may be described as a constitutional tyranny. The constitution of Solon seems to have been preserved in its essential features, but various measures of policy were adopted by him to protect his position, while he preserved the old forms of government. He managed

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to exert an influence on the appointment of the archons, so as to secure personal adherents, and one of his own family generally held some office. The tyrant kept up a standing force of paid soldiers—among them, perhaps, Scythian archers, whom we see portrayed on Attic vases of the time. He confiscated the estates of his leading opponents, most of whom, including the Alcmaeonidae, had left Attica, and he divided the land among his landless supporters, the "sixth-part" labourers, and they had only to pay a land-tax



FIG. 30.—Troops at Athens (vase of age of Pisistratus).

of one-tenth. This tax, together with his possessions on the Strymon, gave Pisistratus a large revenue. Attica was tranquil under him, and the people thrived, while he founded the foreign power of the state and beautified the city.

About forty years before Pisistratus became tyrant, Athens had made her first venture in distant seas, and seized the Lesbian fortress Sigeum, at the entrance to the Hellespont. But the conquest was lost during the party-strife which followed. Pisistratus recaptured Sigeum, and made one of his sons governor of the place. At the same period a much greater acquisition was made in the same region, under the auspices of Pisistratus, but by one of his opponents.

Miltiades, of the noble family of the Philaids, a leader of the Plain, went out with a band of settlers to found a colony in the Thracian Chersonese.

Pisistratus strongly asserted the claim of Athens to be the mother and leader of the Ionian branch of the Greek race. The temple of Apollo in Delos, the island of his mythical birth, had long been a religious centre of the Ionians on both sides of the Aegean. Pisistratus "purified" the sacred spot by digging up all the tombs that were within sight of the sanctuary and removing the bones of the dead to another part of the island.

Pisistratus was indeed scrupulous and zealous in all matters concerned with religion. But no act of his was more fruitful in results than what he did for the worship of Dionysus. He built for the bacchic god a new house at the foot of the Acropolis, and its ruins have not yet wholly disappeared. In connexion with this temple Pisistratus instituted a new festival, called the Great Dionysia of the City, and it completely overshadowed the older feast of the Winepress (Lenaea), which still continued to be held in the first days of spring at the old sanctuary of the Marshes. The chief feature of Dionysiac feasts was the choir of satyrs, the god's attendants, who danced around the altar clothed in goat-skins, and sang their "goat song." But it became usual for the leader of the dancers, who was also the composer of the song, to separate himself from his fellows and hold speech with them, assuming the character of some person connected with the events which the song celebrated, and wearing an appropriate dress. Such performances, which at the rural feasts had been arranged by private enterprise, were made an official part of the Great Dionysia, and thus taken under state protection, in the form of a "tragic" contest, two or more choruses competing for a prize. Legends not connected with Dionysus were chosen for representation, and the dancers

appeared, not in the bacchic goat-dress, but in the costume suitable for their part in the story. This performance was divided into three acts; the dancers changed their costumes for each act; and only at the end did they come forward in their true goat-guise and perform a piece which preserved the original satyric character of "tragedy." Then their preponderant importance was by degrees diminished, and a second actor was introduced; and so the goat-song of the days of Pisistratus grew into the tragedy of Aeschylus.

The great festival in honour of Athena, known as the *Panathenaea*, had been remodelled, if not founded, shortly before Pisistratus seized the tyranny, and was held every fourth year. It was celebrated with athletic and musical contests, but the centre and motive of the feast was the great procession which went up to the house of Athena on her hill, to offer her a robe woven by the hands of Athenian maidens. The temple of Athena and Erechtheus was situated near the northern cliff; and to the south of it a new house had been reared for the goddess of the city to inhabit. It had been built before the days of Pisistratus, but it was probably he who encompassed it with a Doric colonnade. From its length this temple was known as the House of the Hundred Feet, and many of the lowest stones of the walls, still lying in their places, show us its site and shape. The triangular gables displayed what Attic sculptors of the day could achieve. Hitherto the favourite material of these sculptors had been the soft marly limestone of the Piræus. But now—in the second half of the sixth century—Greek sculptors have begun to work in a nobler and harder material; and on one of the pediments of the renovated temple of Athena Polias the battle of the Gods and Giants was wrought in Parian marble. Athena herself in the centre of the composition, slaying Enceladus with her spear, may still be seen and admired.

South-eastward from the citadel, on the banks of the

Ilisus, Pisistratus began the building of a great Doric temple for the Olympian Zeus. He began, but so immense was the scale of his plan that the work had to wait for Rome and the Emperor Hadrian to complete it.




FIG. 31.—Athena slaying a Giant (from a pediment of the old temple of Athena on the Athenian acropolis).

SECT. 3. Growth of Sparta, and the Peloponnesian League.—While a tyrant was moulding the destinies of Athens, Sparta had become the predominant power in the Peloponnesus.

c. 556-50
B.C.

Eastern Arcadia is marked by a large plain, high above the sea-level; the villages in the north of this plain had coalesced into the town of Mantinea, those in the south had been united in Tegea. Sparta had gradually pressed up to the borders of the Tegean territory, and a long war was the result. This war is associated with an interesting legend. When the Spartans asked the Delphic oracle whether they might hope to achieve the conquest of Arcadia, they received a promise that the god would give them Tegea. Then, on account of this answer, they went forth against Tegea with fetters, but were defeated; and, bound in the fetters which they had brought, they were compelled to till the Tegean plain. War went on, and the Spartans, invariably defeated, at last consulted the oracle again. The god bade them bring back the bones of Orestes, but they could find no trace of the hero's burying-place, and they asked the god once more. This time they received an oracle couched in obscure enigmatic words:

Among Arcadian hills a level space
Holds Tegea, where blow two blasts perforce
And woe is laid on woe and face to face
Striker and counter-striker; there the corse
Thou seekest lies, even Agamemnon's son;
Convey him home and victory is won.

This did not help them much. But it befell that, during a truce with the Tegeates, a certain Lichas, a Spartan man, was in Tegea and entering a smith's shop saw the process of beating out iron. The smith in conversation told him that, wishing to dig a well in his courtyard, he had found a coffin seven cubits long and within it a corpse of the same length, which he replaced. Lichas guessed at once that he had solved the oracle, and told the story at Sparta. The courtyard was hired from the smith, the coffin was found, and the bones brought home to Laconia. Then Tegea was conquered, and here we return from fable to fact. The

territory of the Arcadian city was not treated like Messenia; it was not incorporated in the territory of Lacedaemon. It became a dependent state, contributing a military contingent to the army of its conqueror.

Much about the same time, Sparta at length succeeded in rounding off the frontier of Laconia on the north-eastern side by wresting the disputed territory of Thyreatis from Argos. The armies of the two states met in the marchland, but the Spartan kings and the Argive chiefs agreed to decide the dispute by a combat between three hundred chosen champions on either side. The story is that all the six hundred were slain except three, one Spartan and two Argives; and that while the Argives hurried home to announce their victory, the Spartan—Othryades was his name—remained on the field and erected a trophy. In any case, both parties claimed the victory, and a battle was fought in which the Argives were utterly defeated.

The defeat of Argos placed Sparta at the head of the peninsula. All the Peloponnesian states, except Argos and Achaea, were enrolled in a loose confederacy, engaging themselves to supply military contingents in the common interest, Lacedaemon being the leader. The meetings of the confederacy were held at Sparta, and each member sent representatives. Corinth readily joined; for Corinth was naturally ranged against Argos, while her commercial rival, the island state of Aegina, was a friend of Argos. The other Isthmian state, Megara, in which the rule of the nobles had been restored, was also enrolled. Everywhere Sparta exerted her influence to maintain oligarchy—everywhere she discountenanced democracy, except in one notable instance.

SECT. 4. Fall of the Pisistratids and Intervention of Sparta.—When Pisistratus died, his eldest son Hippias 528-7 B.C. took his place, and Hipparchus helped him in the government. Hippias, who was a learned student of oracles, and

Hipparchus were abreast of the most modern culture. The eminent poets of the day came to their court, such as Simonides of Ceos, and Anacreon of Teos.

The first serious blow aimed at the power of the tyrants was due to a personal grudge. Hipparchus gave offence to a comely young man named Harmodius and his lover Aristogiton. Harmodius and Aristogiton then formed the plan of slaying the tyrants, and chose the day of that procession, because they could then, without raising suspicion, appear publicly with arms. But, as the hour approached, it was observed that one of the conspirators was engaged in speech with Hippias in the outer Ceramicus.

514 B.C. His fellows leapt hastily to the conclusion that their plot was betrayed, and, giving up the idea of attacking Hippias, rushed to the market-place and slew Hipparchus. Harmodius was cut down by the mercenaries, and Aristogiton, escaping for the moment, was afterwards captured, tortured, and put to death.

At the time no sympathy was manifested for the conspirators. But their act led to a complete change in the government of Hippias. Not knowing what dangers might still lurk about his feet, he became a hard and suspicious despot. Then many Athenians came to hate him, and they began to cherish the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton as tyrant-slayers.


The overthrow of the tyranny was chiefly brought about by the Alcmaeonids, who desired to return to Athens, and could not win their desire so long as the Pisistratids were in power. They used their influence with the Delphic oracle to put pressure on Sparta. Accordingly, whenever the Spartans sent to consult the god in any matter, the response always was: "First free Athens." The diplomacy of the Alcmaeonids, of whose clan Cleisthenes, son of Megacles, was at this time head, supported as it was by the influence of Delphi, finally prevailed, and the Spartans consented to

force freedom upon Athens. They sent an expedition under King Cleomenes, and Hippias was blockaded in the Acropolis. When his children, whom he was sending secretly into safety abroad, fell into the hands of his enemies, he capitulated, and, on condition that they were given back, ^{510 B.C.} undertook to leave Attica within five days. He and all his house departed to Sigeum.

Thus the tyrants had fallen, and with the aid of Sparta Athens was free. It was not surprising that when she came to value her liberty she loved to turn away from the circumstances in which it was actually won and linger over the romantic attempt of the two friends who slew the tyrant; Harmodius and Aristogiton became household words.

As soon as Hippias had been driven out and the Spartans had departed, the strife of factions broke out; and the Coast and Plain seem to have risen again in the parties of the Alcmaeonid Cleisthenes¹ and his rival Isagoras, who was supported by the secret adherents of the tyrant's house. Cleisthenes won the upper hand by enlisting on his side superior numbers. He rallied to his cause a host of poor

¹ Tree showing the relationships of eminent Alcmaeonids in the sixth and fifth centuries:



Hipparchus were abreast of the most modern culture. The eminent poets of the day came to their court, such as Simonides of Ceos, and Anacreon of Teos.

The first serious blow aimed at the power of the tyrants was due to a personal grudge. Hipparchus gave offence to a comely young man named Harmodius and his lover Aristogiton. Harmodius and Aristogiton then formed the plan of slaying the tyrants, and chose the day of that procession, because they could then, without raising suspicion, appear publicly with arms. But, as the hour approached, it was observed that one of the conspirators was engaged in speech with Hippias in the outer Ceramicus.

514 B.C. His fellows leapt hastily to the conclusion that their plot was betrayed, and, giving up the idea of attacking Hippias, rushed to the market-place and slew Hipparchus. Harmodius was cut down by the mercenaries, and Aristogiton, escaping for the moment, was afterwards captured, tortured, and put to death.

At the time no sympathy was manifested for the conspirators. But their act led to a complete change in the government of Hippias. Not knowing what dangers might still lurk about his feet, he became a hard and suspicious despot. Then many Athenians came to hate him, and they began to cherish the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton as tyrant-slayers.


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men who were outside the pale of citizenship, by promising to make them citizens; and in the year of his rival's
508 B.C. archonship he introduced new democratic measures of law. Isagoras was so far outnumbered that he had no resource but appeal to Sparta. At his instance the Lacedaemonians, who looked with disfavour on democracy, demanded that the Alcmaeonids, as a clan under a curse, should be expelled from Attica; and Cleisthenes, without attempting resistance, left the country. But this was not enough. King Cleomenes entered Attica for the second time; he expelled 700 families pointed out by Isagoras, and attempted to dissolve the new constitution and to set up an oligarchy. But the whole people rose in arms; Cleomenes, who had only a small band of soldiers with him, was blockaded with Isagoras in the Acropolis, and was forced to capitulate on the third day. Cleisthenes could now return with all the other exiles and complete his work.

SECT. 5. **Reform of Cleisthenes.**—The machinery of Athenian democracy devised by Solon would not act. Clan interests and local interests occasioned factions. Clans were embodied in their entirety in one or other of the four tribes, and the groups of phratries possessed undue political influence. Thus the tribe was apt to direct its efforts to secure the advantage of a powerful clan, or of the dwellers in one region, such as the coast. The memorable achievement of Cleisthenes was that he invented a new organisation which split up these local or family combinations, and secured that citizens should act in the interest of the whole state, and not of a particular region.

Taking the map of Attica as he found it, consisting of between one and two hundred demes or small districts, Cleisthenes distinguished three regions: the region of the city, the region of the coast, and the inland. In each of these regions he divided the demes into ten groups called *trittyes*, so that there were thirty such trittyes in all. Out




FIG. 32.—Harmodius and Aristogiton (copy of group by Critias and Nesiotes).

of the thirty trittyes he then formed ten groups of three, in such a way that no group contained two trittyes from the same region. Each of these groups constituted a tribe. Thus Kydathenaeon, a trittys of the city region, was combined with Paeania, a trittys of the inland, and Myrrhinus, a trittys of the coast, to form the tribe of Pandionis. The ten new tribes thus obtained were called after eponymous heroes.¹

Each Athenian citizen was therefore a member of a deme, a trittys, and a tribe. The tribe had another use apart from its political function, for each tribe contributed to the army a regiment of hoplites and a squadron of horse. Every citizen, therefore, not only voted with his tribe, but fought in his tribal regiment under his tribe's officers. The deme again was a corporation, with a demarch or president, who kept the burgess-roll, on which every citizen was inscribed at the age of seventeen. But the trittys had no independent corporate existence; it was only a link between the demes and the tribes. It was the means of bringing together a number of groups or demes of people without any common local interest to act together at Athens. The old parties of Hill, Plain, and Coast were thus done away with. The stability of the new order lay in the fact that the demes on which it ultimately rested were natural and real divisions. In official documents henceforward men were described by their deme, not by their father's name. A man might change his residence and live in another deme, but he belonged always to that in which he was originally enrolled.

As the existing Council of Four Hundred had been based on the four Ionic tribes, Cleisthenes devised a Council of Five Hundred based on his ten new tribes. Each tribe contributed fifty members; of which each deme

¹ Names of the ten tribes: Erechtheis, Aegeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Acamantis, Oeneis, Cecropis, Hippothontis, Aeantis, Antiochis.

returned a fixed number, according to its size. Councillors were appointed by lot; but the outgoing Council had the right of rejecting the unfit. They took an oath when they entered upon office that they would "advise what is best for the city"; and they were responsible for their acts, when they laid it down.

This Council, in which every part of Attica was represented, was the supreme administrative authority in the state. The archons and other magistrates were obliged to present reports to the Council and receive the Council's orders. All the finances of the state were practically in its hands, and ten new finance officers called *apodektai* (one from each tribe) acted under its direction. Further, the Council acted as a ministry of public works, and even as a ministry of war. It may also be regarded as the ministry of foreign affairs, for it conducted negotiations with foreign states, and received their envoys. It had no powers of declaring war or concluding a treaty; these powers resided solely in the sovereign Assembly. But the Council was not only an administrative body: it was a deliberative assembly, and had the initiative in all lawmaking. No proposal could come before the Ecclesia unless it had already been proposed and considered in the Council. Every law passed in the Ecclesia was first sent down from the Council in the form of a *probuleuma*, and, on receiving a majority of votes in the Ecclesia, became a *psephisma*. Again, the Council had some judicial functions. It formed a court before which impeachments could be brought, as well as before the Assembly.

It is obvious that the administrative duties could not conveniently be conducted by a body of five hundred constantly sitting. Accordingly the year of 360 days was divided into ten parts, and the councillors of each tribe took it in turn to act as a committee for carrying on public business during a tenth of the year. In this capacity, as

members of the acting committee of fifty, the councillors were called *Prytaneis* or presidents, the tribe to which they belonged was said to be the *presiding*, and the divisions of this artificial year were called *prytanies*.

The new tribes led to a change in the military organisation. Each was required to supply a regiment of hoplites and a squadron of horsemen; and the hoplites were commanded by ten generals whom the people elected from each tribe. The office of general was destined hereafter to become the most important in the state; but at first he was merely the commander of the tribal regiment.

The Athenian Council instituted by Cleisthenes shows that Greek statesmen understood the principle of representative government. That Council is an excellent example of representation with a careful distribution of seats according to the size of the electorates; and it was practically the governing body of the state. But though Greek statesmen understood the principle, they always hesitated to entrust to a representative assembly sovereign powers of legislation. Owing to the small size of the city-state, an Assembly which every citizen who chose could attend was a practicable institution; and the fundamental principle that supreme legislative power is exercised by the people itself could be literally applied. But while the Council could not legislate, although its co-operation was indispensable to the making of laws, it was a popular representative assembly, and from it were taken (though on a totally different principle) committees which performed in part the administrative functions of our "Government." It had a decisive influence on legislation; and the ratification given by the Assembly to the proposals sent down by the Council was often as purely formal as the ratification by the Crown of Bills passed in Parliament.

SECT. 6. **First Victories of the Democracy.**—Athens, now become a democracy, was at once subjected

to a critical ordeal. King Cleomenes, who had pulled down one tyrant, now proposed to set up another, and in support of Isagoras, now an aspirant to the tyrannis, he leagued Sparta with Boeotia and Chalcis. Attica was to be assailed on three sides at once. But when the Peloponnesian host under the two kings, Cleomenes and Demaratus, had crossed the isthmus and occupied Eleusis, they were 506 B.C. deserted by the Corinthians, who condemned the expedition and returned home. Quarrels between Cleomenes and Demaratus further disorganised the army, till finally it broke up. Thus Cleomenes was again thwarted, and Athens a second time saved from Spartan coercion.

Meanwhile the Thebans as leaders of Boeotia had gladly joined the enterprise. Plataea, a town on the Boeotian slope of Mount Cithaeron, held aloof from the Boeotian league 510 B.C. and sought the help and protection of Athens. This was the beginning of a long friendship. When the retreat of Cleomenes left the Athenian army free to check the Boeotians, who had come in over the pass of Cithaeron, and the Chalcidians, who had crossed the Euripus, the Boeotians moved to join the Chalcidian force. But they were intercepted and thoroughly defeated by the Athenians, who then followed the Chalcidians across the strait, and won another victory so crushing that Chalcis was forced to cede the Lelantine plain. The richest part of this plain was divided into lots among two thousand Athenian citizens who migrated to Euboea. Thus the democracy had not only defended itself 506 B.C. but won new territory.



FIG. 33.—Gold coin of Sardis (middle of sixth cent.). Obverse: foreparts of lion and bull. Reverse: two incuse squares.

CHAPTER VI

THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE AEGEAN

SECT. I. The Rise of Persia and the Fall of the Lydian Kingdom.—While the Greeks were sailing their own seas, and working out in their city-states the institutions of law and freedom, great despotic kingdoms were waxing and waning in the east. In the seventh century the mighty empire of Assyria was verging to its end; the power destined to overthrow it had arisen. Those who destroyed the Assyrian empire, the Medes and Persians, folks of Aryan speech like the Greeks, were marked out by destiny to be the adversaries of the Greeks throughout the two chief centuries of Grecian history.

c. 700 B.C. It was towards the end of the eighth century that the Medes rebelled against the yoke of Assyria. They were led by Deioces, and after a struggle Media gained her independence, and the deliverer was elected king by the free vote of his people. He set the seal on the union of Media by building the great city of Ecbatana. Phraortes, one of his successors, conquered the hilly land of Persia in the south; and thus a large Aryan realm was formed stretching from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf, east of Assyria and Babylonia. The next step was to conquer Assyria itself; and Cyaxares, the successor of Phraortes, leagued with Babylonia. The conquerors divided the empire. The south-western portion up to the borders of

c. 650-25
B.C.

Egypt went to Babylonia; Assyria itself and the lands stretching westward into Asia Minor were annexed to Media. 606 B.C.

The conquest of Lydia was the next aim in the expansion of the Median power, and a pretext was found for declaring war. In the sixth year of the war a battle was fought, but in the midst of the combat the day was turned suddenly to night; and the darkening of the sun made such a deep impression on the minds of the combatants that they laid down their arms and a peace was concluded. It was the May 28, first eclipse of which European science foretold when it should betide. 585 B.C. Thales of Miletus, the father of Greek, and thereby of European, philosophy and science, had studied astronomy in Egypt; and he was able to warn the Ionians that before such a year had passed the sun would be darkened.

The Lydian king Alyattes wedded his daughter to Astyages, who succeeded to the throne of Media, and the kingdom of Lydia was saved for a generation, to enjoy the most brilliant period of its history. When Lydia recovered from the Cimmerian invasion, King Ardys renewed the efforts of Gyges to reduce the Greek cities of the coast. His successors, Sadyattes and Alyattes, carried on a weary war against Miletus. But it was reserved for Croesus, the son of Alyattes, to carry out fully the design of subjugating the Asiatic Greeks. He attacked and subdued the cities, Ionian and Aeolian, one after another, all except Miletus, whose treaty with his father he respected, while Miletus on her part saved her freedom by withholding all help from her sister cities. The Dorian states of Caria were also forced to submit, and the empire of Croesus extended from the Halys to the Aegean. The Greek language spread in Lydia; the Greek gods were revered; the Greek oracles were appealed to. Hence the Greeks never regarded the Lydians as utter barbarians; and they



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always cherished a curious indulgence and sympathy for Croesus, though he had enslaved and ruled as despot the cities of Asiatic Hellas. The Ionians had marvelled at the treasures of golden Gyges, but the untold wealth of Croesus became proverbial. There is no more striking proof of the political importance of the oracle of Delphi at this period than the golden offerings dedicated by Croesus—offerings richer than even the priestly avarice of the Delphians could have dared to hope for.

Having extended his sway to the coast, Croesus conceived the idea of making Lydia a sea-power and conquering the islands. But he was diverted from his design by an event of great moment. His brother-in-law Astyages was hurled from the throne of Media by a hero, who was to become one of the world's mightiest conquerors. The usurper was Cyrus the Great, of the Persian family of the Achaemenids.

The fall of Astyages was an opportunity for the ambitious Lydian to turn his arms to the east. Desirous of probing the hidden event of the future, he consulted the Delphic oracle. It is said that the answer was that if he crossed the Halys he would destroy a mighty empire. Croesus, at the head of an army which included a force of Ionian Greeks, crossed the fateful Halys and invaded Cappadocia. But the host of Cyrus seems to have been far superior in numbers, and Croesus retired before him into Lydia. Under the walls of the capital the invader won a decisive victory, and after a short siege Sardis was stormed and plundered. The life of Croesus was spared.

The overthrow of Croesus was the most illustrious example that the Greeks had ever witnessed of their favourite doctrine that the gods visit with jealousy men who enjoy too great prosperity. And never more than for the memory of Croesus did Greece put forth the power which she possessed in such full measure, of weaving round an event of history tales

which have a deep and touching import as lessons for the life of men.

Cyrus built a great pyre—so the story is told by



FIG. 34.—Croesus on the pyre (Attic vase).

Herodotus—and placed thereon Croesus bound in chains, with fourteen Lydian boys. And as Croesus was standing on the pile, in this extreme pass, there came into his mind a word which Solon had said to him, that no man could be called happy so long as he was alive. For the Athenian

statesman had visited the court of Sardis in his travels,—the art of the tale-weaver had no precise regard for the facts of time,—and when he had seen the royal treasures and the greatness of the kingdom Croesus asked him whom he deemed the happiest of men. Solon named some obscure Greeks who were dead ; and when the king, unable to hide his wonder and vexation, exclaimed, “Is our royal fortune so poor, O Athenian stranger, that you set private men before me?” the wise Greek had discoursed on the uncertainty of life and the jealousy of the gods. And so Croesus, remembering this, groaned aloud and called thrice on the name of Solon. But Cyrus heard him call, and bade the interpreters ask him on whom he was calling. For a while Croesus would not speak, then he said : “One whom I would that all tyrants might meet and converse with.” Pressed further he named Solon the Athenian, and repeated the wise man’s words. The pyre was already alight, but when Cyrus heard the answer of his prisoner he reflected that he too was a man, and commanded that the fire should be quenched and the victims set free. The flames were already blazing so strong and high that the men could not quench them. Then Croesus cried to Apollo for help, and the god sent clouds into the clear sky, and a tempestuous shower of rain extinguished the fire.

Such is the tale as we read it in the history of Herodotus. The moral of the tale clearly was, Bring gifts to Delphi ; and we can hardly doubt that it originated under Delphic influence.

SECT. 2. **The Persian Conquest of Asiatic Greece.**
Polycrates of Samos.—When the barrier of Lydia is swept away, a new period is opened in Grecian history. The Asiatic Greeks are now to exchange subjection to a lord of Sardis for subjection to a potentate who holds his court in Susa, a city so distant that the length of the journey is told by months. The king was obliged to leave his

conquests in Asia Minor to the government of his satraps ; and the Greeks were unable to exercise any influence upon him, as they might have done if he had ruled from Sardis or some nearer capital. They were an easy prey. Harpagus, the general of Cyrus, reduced them one after another ; tribute was imposed upon them and the burden of serving in the Persian armies, when such service was required ; but no restrictions were placed upon the freedom of their commerce.

The conqueror of Lydia returned to the east to subdue the mightier power of Babylon. But his conquests lie outside our history. His last enterprise was the subjugation of the Massagetæ, a Scythian folk near the Aral lake, and one story says that he was slain in battle against them, c. 530 B.C. and that the savage queen placed his head in a basin of blood.

While Cyrus far outpassed the utmost limits of Assyria in some directions, he left unconquered the great kingdom of the south, which had once been part of the Assyrian empire. But his son Cambyses repaired the omission. The conquest of Egypt, which became a Persian satrapy, led to the submission of Greek Cyrene.

Amasis, king of Egypt, and his son might have hoped, when the Persian danger threatened, that they could depend on the support of a powerful Greek friend, the lord of Samos. In that island, not long after the Persian conquest of Ionia, a certain Polycrates had established a tyranny. He organised a fleet of a hundred penteconters and made Samos a strong power ; as the Ionian mainland had fallen under Persian dominion, he had perhaps the strongest Greek sea-power in the Aegean. His luxurious court was brightened by the presence of the Bacchic poet Anacreon. In all that he put his hand to, Polycrates prospered ; he



FIG. 35.—Early Coin of Samos (obverse). Part of a bull.

defied the power of Persia; he extended his influence over some of the Ionian cities under Persian sway; he hoped perhaps to become the lord of all Ionia. It was natural that he and Amasis of Egypt should form a close alliance, based on the common interest of antagonism to Persia. But when Cambyses moved upon Egypt, the Samian tyrant felt that his navy was unequal to coping with the joint armaments of Phoenicia and Cyprus, and, instead of coming to aid Amasis, he sent forty ships to increase the fleet of the invader. These ships, however, never reached Egypt. The tyrant had manned them with those Samians whom he most suspected of hating himself and his tyranny; but his trick recoiled. The crew took the resolve of sailing back to Samos and overthrowing the despot. Defeated in a battle, they sought the aid of Sparta. The Lacedaemonians sent an armament to besiege Samos; it was their first expedition to the east, and it was a failure. Despairing of taking the city, and repulsed in a conflict, they returned home.

Of this tyrant a famous story is told: how Amasis, hearing of his friend's unbroken prosperity, wrote bidding him to avoid the envy of heaven, and "cast away utterly out of the world" whatever he deemed most precious. Polycrates took ship and threw overboard an emerald ring engraved by a famous artist. A few days later a fisherman brought, as a present to the tyrant, a huge fish: when it came to be dressed, the ring was found in its belly. Polycrates wrote the story to Amasis, and Amasis, convinced that his friend was ordained to evil, broke off the tie of guesthood. And in truth not long after he had repulsed the Lacedaemonians, Polycrates was entrapped by the satrap of Sardis, seized and crucified.

SECT. 3. **The First Years of Darius. Conquest of Thrace.**—King Cambyses, returning from Egypt to put down a usurper, "found death by his own hand," as

is related in a great writing on the rock of Behistun. The next heir to the Persian throne was a certain Hystaspes, who had a son named Darius. Hystaspes made no attempt to secure his right, but Darius had different thoughts from his father; and conspiring with six nobles he killed the usurper and became king himself. Having established his power firmly and crushed all resistance, Darius recorded for future ages the successes of his first years, in an inscription on the lofty rock of Behistun, on the upper course of the river Choaspes.

Darius divided his whole realm into twenty satrapies. West of the Halys, the old kingdom of Lydia consisted of three provinces, but subject to two satraps: the Ionian and the Lydian under one governor who resided at Sardis; the Phrygian, which included the Greek cities of the Propontis, under a governor whose seat was at Dascylyon. These satraps did not interfere in the local affairs of the Greek cities, which were ruled by despots; and the despots might do much as they pleased, so long as they paid tribute duly and furnished military contingents when required. Commerce was furthered by the monetary reforms of Darius, and the chief piece of Persian gold money was always known in Greece by the name *daric*.

Cyrus had conquered the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean; Cambyses had completed and secured that conquest on the south side by the subjection of Egypt; it remained for Darius to complete and secure his empire on the north side by the reduction of Thrace. The Thracian race was warlike and the country is mountainous, so that the Persian enterprise demanded large forces and careful precautions. The skill of a Samian architect was employed to throw a bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, north of Byzantium, by which the Persian host passed over. A large fleet was furnished by the Greek subjects of Persia, to sail along the Thracian coast of the Black Sea as far as

c. 511 B.C.

the mouths of the Danube, and to support and co-operate with the army. The contingents of the various Greek cities were commanded by their despots, prominent among whom were Histiaeus of Miletus, and Miltiades of the Thracian Chersonesus.

No details of the warfare in Thrace are preserved. North of the Danube, in the lands which are now called Walachia and Moldavia, lived tribes which the Greeks included under the general name of Scythian, applied by them to the whole series of peoples who dwelled between the Carpathians and the Caucasus. The Greek fleet sailed up the mouth of the Danube and a bridge of boats was thrown across. Darius and his army marched over into Scythia. But both the king's purpose and what he did, in this remote corner of the world, are hidden in a cloud of legend. It appears that his communications with the fleet which awaited his return were for some time cut off, and the Greek commanders were tempted to sail away and leave him in the lurch. But the fact is that it would have been entirely contrary to their own interests to inflict a blow on the power which maintained despotism in the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Darius returned across the Hellespont, but left behind him an army under Megabazus. Megabazus established Persian dominion actually as far as the Strymon, and nominally even farther west; for the Paeonians, between the Strymon and the Axios, were conquered, and Macedonia acknowledged allegiance to the Great King.

The European expedition of Darius had thus been a distinct success. But it has come down to us in a totally fabulous shape. It is represented by Herodotus as not primarily an expedition against Thrace, but as an attempt to execute the mad project of incorporating the Scythians of the steppes of southern Russia in the Persian empire. Darius, whose purpose is said to have been to take

vengeance on the Scythians for their invasion of Media a hundred years before, intended to break down the bridge when he had passed over the Danube and send the ships home; but by the advice of a prudent Greek he changed his plan. He took a cord, in which he tied sixty knots, and said to the Greek captains: "Untie one of these knots every day, and remain here and guard the bridge till they are all untied. If I have not returned at the end of that time, sail home." The Ionians waited at the river beyond the ordained time, and presently a band of Scythians arrived urging them to destroy the bridge, so that they might ensure the destruction of Darius and gain their own freedom. Miltiades the tyrant of the Chersonese strongly advocated the proposal of the Scythians, but the counter-arguments of Histiaeus of Miletus prevailed, for he pointed out that the power of the despots in the cities depended on the Persian domination. Thus Darius, after an ignominious retreat, was saved by the good offices of Histiaeus; whereas, if the advice of Miltiades had been adopted, the subsequent Persian invasion of Greece might never have taken place.

Thus Greek imagination, inspired by Greek prejudice, changed a reasonable and successful enterprise into an insane and disastrous expedition.

SECT. 4. The Ionic Revolt against Persia.—For twelve years after the return of Darius from Thrace, nothing happened to bring on the struggle between Asia and Europe. Then political strife in the island of Naxos led indirectly to a revolt of the Ionian Greeks from Persia, in which Athens and other cities played a part, and so brought on an expedition against Greece.

Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, was detained by Darius at Susa, ostensibly because the king could not do without him—really because he was dangerous. Aristagoras, his son-in-law, governed at Miletus. To the latter came oligarchs

from Naxos, exiled by a democratic rising, and asking to be restored. Aristagoras went to Sardis, and suggested to the satrap Artaphernes that, under pretext of restoring these men, first Naxos, and then all the Cyclades, might be conquered for Persia. Artaphernes obtained the consent
499 B.C. of Darius, and an expedition of 200 ships was sent out under Aristagoras and the Persian admiral Megabates. The commanders quarrelled, Megabates warned Naxos, and the islanders were able to defend themselves. Thus the plan of Aristagoras failed, and finding himself in disfavour with the Persians, he decided to head a rebellion of Ionia. It is said that a secret message from Histiaeus, branded on a slave's head and covered by the hair, incited him. But this is doubtful. And a revolt could not be led by him as tyrant, for the moving force of rebellion must be the natural Greek hatred of the despotic constitutions which Persia upheld in Ionia as elsewhere. Aristagoras therefore resigned his position as tyrant in Miletus, and in the other cities also the tyrants were removed—mostly without bloodshed.

The next step was to obtain help from free Greece against the Persian power. Aristagoras undertook the mission. He went first to Sparta, and in later days a delightful story was told of his visit. He went to King Cleomenes and showed him a map of the earth, graven on bronze, displaying the countries of the known world, the seas, and the rivers. Cleomenes had never seen a map before, and the plausible Ionian tried to convince him that Sparta ought to aspire to the conquest of the Persian empire. Cleomenes was impressed, but deferred his reply till the third day, and then asked Aristagoras the distance from Ionia to Susa. "Three months," said Aristagoras off his guard, and he would have described the road, but the king cut him short with the command, "Begone from Sparta, Milesian stranger, before the sun sets."

The Milesian stranger fared better at Athens and Eretria. Both these cities sent succour; Athens twenty ships—ships, says Herodotus, “which were the beginning of ills between Greeks and barbarians.”

The Persians had already laid siege to Miletus, when Aristagoras, with his Athenian and Eretrian allies, marched up to Sardis. His object was to force the enemy to raise the siege of Miletus. The Greeks took Sardis, but they did not take the citadel. While they were there, a fire broke out and the town was burned to the ground. The Greeks left the smoking ruins and marched back to the coast; but near Ephesus they were met by a Persian force and defeated. The Athenians straightway returned home; and with this battle the part played by Athens in the Ionic revolt comes to an end. The burning of Sardis was important only for its consequences. The story is that Darius, being told that Athenians had helped to burn Sardis, asked, “The Athenians—who are they?” He then called for a bow, and shooting an arrow into the air, invoked heaven that it might be given to him to punish the Athenians. Moreover he bade one of his slaves to say to him three times at dinner, “Sire, remember the Athenians.”

The revolt extended southwards to Caria and to Cyprus, northwards to the Propontis. In Cyprus most of the cities threw off the Persian yoke, and a Phoenician fleet was occupied with the recovery of the island. The Hellespontine towns were also subdued. In Caria the insurgents, after suffering two serious defeats, succeeded in destroying a Persian army.

But Aristagoras was a man of slight spirit, not meant by nature to be the leader of such a movement. Seeing that Persia prospered in dealing with the rebellion, he despaired of his cause and fled to Myrcinus in Thrace, where he was killed while besieging a town. His death affected the course of the rebellion no more than that of Histiaeus, who suc-

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ceeded in inducing Darius to send him down to suppress the revolt, but fled to Chios and took to piracy. In the end he was taken prisoner and crucified by Artaphernes.

The main and decisive event of the war was the siege of Miletus, on which the Persians at length concentrated all their efforts. The town was blockaded by the squadron of 600 ships which had just reduced Cyprus. The Greek fleet was stationed off the island of Lade. It is said to have numbered 353 ships, but they were ill-organised. In the
494 B.C. battle which ensued, the Lesbians and Samians deserted; the men of Chios fought splendidly, but they were too few. Miletus was then taken by storm. The temple of Apollo at Didyma, one of the chief oracular sanctuaries of the Greek world, was burnt down.

The tidings of the fall of Miletus produced at Athens a deep feeling, which found expression when Phrynichus, a tragic poet, made the catastrophe of Miletus the theme of a drama. The Athenians fined him for having recalled to their minds *their own* misfortunes. But in the meantime there had been won for them, from the Persian, what was destined to become afterwards a lasting possession. Miltiades, the tyrant of the Chersonese, seized the isles of Lemnos and Imbros. When the revolt failed, feeling himself unsafe in the Chersonese, he fled to Athens, and professed that he had conquered Lemnos and Imbros for her. Though these islands seem to have been occupied by the Persians for a time, they passed back under Athenian dominion.

SECT. 5. Second and Third European Expeditions of Darius. Battle of Marathon.—Having suppressed the rebellion, Darius caused the territories of the Ionian cities to be measured and surveyed, and the tributes regulated accordingly. The revolt had taught Persia that the system of tyrannies did not answer; and it was now resolved to make an experiment of the opposite policy. The despots were abolished and democratic governments were set up. It

was a concession to the spirit of the Greeks which reflects credit on the wisdom of Darius.

The king's son-in-law, Mardonius, was sent to reassert Persian supremacy in Thrace and Macedonia; and through Macedonia he proposed to advance into Greece, in order to punish the two cities which had helped the Ionian rebels. A fleet sailed along the coast and subdued the island of Thasos on its way. Thrace was reduced, and Macedonia, ^{492 B.C.} then under King Alexander, submitted. But the Greek expedition could not be carried out, since the fleet was partly wrecked in a storm off the perilous promontory of Athos.

But Darius was sternly resolved that Athens and Eretria should not escape without chastisement. Their connexion with the burning of Sardis had deeply incensed him. Moreover Hippias, the banished tyrant, was at the court of Susa, urging an expedition against the city which had cast him out. It was decided that the new expedition should move straight across the Aegean sea. Herald's were sent to the chief cities of free Greece that were not at war with Persia, requiring the tokens of submission, earth and water. In most cases the tokens were given; and among others by Aegina, the enemy of Athens. The command of the army was entrusted to Datis and Artaphernes, a nephew of Darius; and they were accompanied by the aged tyrant Hippias, who hoped to rule once more over his native country. The armament—^{490 B.C.} 600 galleys strong, according to Herodotus—having sailed from isle to isle, subduing the Cyclades, went up the channel between Euboea and Attica, and, reducing Carystus by the way, reached the territory of Eretria. Within seven days the city was delivered over to the invaders by the treachery of some leading burghers. The inhabitants were enslaved. It now remained to deal with the other city which had defied the King. Crossing over the strait the Persian generals landed their army in the bay of Marathon.

The soul of the resistance which Athens offered to the invader was Miltiades. He had indeed been a tyrant himself, and the successor of tyrants, and had been accused before the assembly of oppressive rule in the Chersonese. But he had given Lemnos and Imbros to Athens, he was the hereditary foe of the Pisistratids, who had killed his father Cimon, and he probably knew more of the Persians than any man at Athens. He was therefore chosen as the strategos of his tribe. Yet, as Herodotus tells the story, few preparations seem to have been made till the Persians were almost landing. A fast runner was dispatched in hot haste to Lacedaemon to bear the news of the fall of Eretria and the jeopardy of Athens. The Lacedaemonians said that they would help Athens—they were bound to help a member of their league—but religious scruples forbade them to come at once; they must wait till the full moon had passed. But when the full moon had passed, it was too late.

The whole army of the Athenians may have numbered about 9000. The commander-in-chief was Callimachus, the polemarch of the year; and the grave duty of organising the defence rested upon him and the ten generals of the tribal regiments, who formed a Council of War. Fortunately for Athens, Callimachus seems to have been willing to hearken to the counsels of Miltiades. The enemy had landed near Marathon and clearly intended to advance on unwall'd Athens by land and sea. The question was whether the Athenian army should await their approach and give them battle within sight and reach of the Acropolis, or should more boldly go forth to find them. Miltiades proposed in the Assembly to march to Marathon, and meet the Persians there. To have proposed and carried this decree is probably the greatest title of Miltiades to his immortal fame.

The plain of Marathon, stretching along a sickle-shaped line of coast, is girt on all other sides by the hills which drop down from Pentelicus and Parnes. In the northern part,

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and on the extreme south, the soil is marshy, and the plain is cleft into two halves by the path of a torrent coming down from the hills through the northern valley, in which the village of Marathon is situated. Two roads lead from Athens to Marathon. The main road enters the plain of Marathon from the south. The other road, which is somewhat shorter




FIG. 36.

but more difficult, continues northward, and, running into the hills north of Pentelicus, finds two issues in the Marathonian plain. It divides into two paths which encircle the hill of Kotroni: the northern path goes on to Marathon; the other, passing by a sanctuary of Heracles, and descending the valley of Avlona, issues in the plain close to the village which is now called Vraná.

Callimachus took the northern road, and encamped in the valley of Avlona, not far from the shrine of Heracles. The choice of this admirable position was more than half the victory. The Athenians were themselves unassailable, in the lower valley, except at a great disadvantage; and they commanded not only the mountain road by which they had come, but also the main road and the southern gate of the plain; for the Persians in attempting to reach that gate would be exposed to their flank attack. The Persians had encamped on the north side of the torrent-bed, and their ships were riding at anchor beside them. It was to their interest to bring on a pitched battle in the plain as soon as possible. On the other hand, the Athenians had everything to gain by waiting in their impregnable position; if they waited long enough they might hope for help from Sparta. Help from another quarter had already come. When they reached the sanctuary of Heracles they were joined by a band of 1000 Plataeans, who, in gratitude for the protection of Athens against the Theban yoke, now came to help her in the hour of jeopardy.

Some days passed, and then, as the Greeks remained immovable, the Persians would wait no longer. Having embarked a part of the army, including the whole body of their cavalry, they made ready to move upon Athens by land and sea. The land force must follow the main road, and was therefore prepared for battle, in case the Greeks should attack them before they defiled from the plain. Another critical moment had come for the Athenians, but the polemarch decided to attack the enemy as they marched southward.

Callimachus showed now a skill in tactics as consummate as the skill in strategy which we have already witnessed. Outnumbered by the foe, if the Athenian line had formed itself in equal depth throughout, it would have swept the Persian centre into the sea, but then it would have been

caught in a trap, between the sea and ships on one side and the Persian wings, which would have closed in, on the other. Accordingly Callimachus made his own centre long and shallow, so that it would cover the whole Persian centre, while his wings of the normal depth would be opposed to the wings of the enemy.

The long Persian line crossed the bed of the torrent and advanced along the shore. A large portion was detached towards the Greek position, in order either to prevent or to repel a flank attack. With these troops to cover them, the rest of the host might march securely past. The Greek army had perhaps already appeared in the recess of the hills at the mouth of the valley of Avlona. Callimachus himself led the right wing; the Plataean allies were posted on the extreme left. When the Greeks drew near to the line of the enemy, they were met by volleys of arrows from the eastern archers, and to escape this danger they advanced at a run into close quarters. All fell out as had been foreseen. The Athenian centre was driven back towards the hills by the enemy's centre, where the best troops, including the Persians themselves, were stationed; but the Athenian wings completely routed the wings of their foe. Then, closing in, they turned upon the victorious Persians, who were following the retreating Greek centre. Here again they were utterly victorious, breaking up the array of the enemy and pursuing them in confusion to the shore, where all who escaped the sword were picked up by the ships. Only a portion of the Persian army had been engaged; the main body doubtless embarked as soon as they saw the first signs of the disruption of the force on which they had relied to cover them from the enemy.

Aug. or
Sep. 490
B.C.

It was not a long battle. The Athenian loss was small—192 slain; and the Persian loss was reckoned at about 6400. Datis and Artaphernes had still an immense host, which might retrieve the fortune of the campaign; Athens

was not yet out of danger. The Persian squadron sailed down the straits and rounded Cape Sunium, while the victorious army, leaving one regiment on the field of their triumph to guard the slain and the spoils, marched back to defend Athens. They halted outside the city on the banks of the Ilisus, and they beheld the fleet of the enemy riding off Phaleron. But it did not put into shore, and presently the whole squadron began to draw out to sea. Datis had abandoned his enterprise. Perhaps when he saw that the army was there, he shrank from another conflict with the hoplites. But a Spartan army had set out on the day after the full moon, and it reached Athens soon after the battle. We may guess that tidings of the approach of the Spartans, if not their actual presence, had something to do with the sudden departure of the invaders, who, though they had received an unlooked-for check, had not endured an overwhelming defeat.

The Spartans arrived too late for the battle. They visited the field, desiring to gaze upon the Persian corpses, and departed home praising the exploit of the Athenians. The scene of the battle is still marked by the mound which the Athenians raised over their own dead; Callimachus was buried there, and Cynegirus (a brother of the poet Aeschylus), who was said to have seized a Persian galley and held it until his arm was severed by an axe. Legend grew up quickly round the battle. Gods and heroes fought for Athens, ghostly warriors moved among the ranks. The panic terror of the Persians at the Greek charge was ascribed to Pan, and the worship of this god was revived in a cave consecrated to him under the north-west slope of the Acropolis.

In the holiest place of Greece, in the sanctuary of Delphi itself, have been found in recent years remains of the noblest monument of the victory of Marathon. Out of the Persian spoils, the Athenians built a little Doric treasure-house of

marble from their own Pentelic quarries. It seems to have been a gem of architecture, worthy of the severe grace of the sculptured reliefs which ran round the inside of the building and have been safely preserved under its ruins.

The enormous prestige which Athens won by the single-handed victory over the host of the Great King gave her new self-confidence and ambition; history seemed to have set a splendid seal on her democracy; she felt that she could trust her constitution and that she might lift her head as high as any state in Hellas. The Athenians always looked back to Marathon as marking an epoch. It was as if on that day the gods had said to them, Go on and prosper.

The great battle immortalised Miltiades; but his latter end was not good. His fellow-citizens granted him, on his own proposal, a commission to attack the island of Paros, which had furnished a trireme to the armament of Datis. Miltiades besieged the city of Paros for twenty-six days, but without success, and then returned home wounded. The failure was imputed to criminal conduct of the general; and he was fined fifty talents, a heavy fine. It is not known what his alleged wrong-doing was; but afterwards, when the legend grew, it was foolishly said that he persuaded the Athenians to entrust the fleet to him, promising to take them to a land of gold, and that he deceived them by assailing Paros to gratify a private revenge. He died soon after his condemnation.

SECT. 6. Struggle of Athens and Aegina.—At this time Aegina was the strongest naval power in the Aegean, and the Athenians had some reason to fear that she would give the Persians not only her goodwill but her active help. Accordingly, the Athenians sought the intervention of Sparta, complaining that Aegina was medizing and betraying Greece out of enmity to Athens. Sparta's prestige had at this time been increased by a victory over

494 B.C. her old rival Argos, whom Cleomenes entirely defeated at Sêpeia, near Tiryns, crippling the power of Argos for more than twenty years. But Athens appealed to her officially as head of the Peloponnesian league, in which both Athens and Aegina were included. Sparta listened to the complaint, and Cleomenes went to Aegina, seized ten hostages, and left them at Athens. Thus Aegina was prevented from helping the Persians or hindering the Athenians.

But from this episode trouble arose at Sparta. The two kings had long been enemies, and Demaratus now sided with the Aeginetans. Accordingly Cleomenes incited Leotychidas, next heir of the Proclid line, to challenge the birth of Demaratus, and an oracle was procured from Delphi declaring Demaratus illegitimate. Leotychidas became king, and Demaratus fled to the court of Darius. But it was afterwards discovered that Cleomenes had tampered with the Pythian priestess at Delphi to procure his enemy's dethronement, and he in turn fled, first to Thessaly, then to Arcadia, where he conspired against his country. Invited by the government to return, he did so, but his mind had become unhinged. He went mad, and ultimately killed himself.

After his death, Aegina demanded the restoration of her hostages, and Leotychidas tried to effect it by negotiation; 487 B.C. but the Athenians refused, and hostilities broke out again. The necessity of protecting Attica from Aeginetan raids, and the hope of reducing Aegina to subjection or insignificance helped to convert Athens into a naval power.

SECT. 7. Growth of the Athenian Democracy.—Under the scheme of Cleisthenes great power was left to the archons, whom the people elected for their social position or their ability. But the tendency was to weaken the magistrates and strengthen the Bulé; and some years 487 B.C. after Marathon a change was made in the manner of appointment. Five hundred men were elected by the

demes, and out of this body the nine archons were chosen by lot. It was therefore five hundred to one against any prominent citizen becoming chief archon, and obviously the importance of the chief archonship disappears. Obviously also a commander-in-chief could not be elected by such means, and the powers of the polemarch were therefore transferred to the ten strategi who had been hitherto elected, each by his own tribe: but a reform was made by which the whole people elected the Generals.

A new institution—that of ostracism—transferred the duty of protecting the state against the danger of a tyranny from the paternal council of the Areopagus to the sovereign people. The ordinance of the *Ostrakismos* was that in the sixth prytany of each civil year the question should be laid before the Assembly of the people whether they willed that an ostracism should be held or not. If they voted in the affirmative, then an extraordinary Assembly was summoned in the market-place in the eighth prytany. The citizens were grouped in tribes, and each citizen placed in an urn a potsherd (*ostrakon*) inscribed with the name of the person whom he desired to be “ostracized.” The voting was not valid unless 6000 votes at least were given, and whoever had most ostraka against him was condemned to leave Attica within ten days and not set foot in it again for ten years. He was allowed, however, to retain his property, and remained an Athenian citizen.

It is said that Cleisthenes devised the ostracism, and devised it specially to banish a Pisistratid, Hipparchus, son of Charmus. And this Hipparchus was the first man ostracised, though not till fifteen years later. In the next 487 B.C. year Megacles, an Alcmaeonid who had espoused the 486 B.C. Pisistratid cause, suffered the same fate. These decrees were probably brought about by the then leading democratic statesmen, Xanthippus, Aristides, and Themistocles. But when Xanthippus in 484, and Aristides in 482 B.C, were

also ostracised, it is clear that the motive was not fear of a tyranny, but to remove the opposition of a statesman to some popular measure—possibly the bold naval policy of Themistocles.

An excellent anecdote is told of the ostracism of Aristides "the Just," as he was called. On the day of the voting an illiterate citizen chanced to be close to Aristides who was unknown to him by sight, and requested him to write down the name "Aristides" on the ostrakon. "Why," said Aristides, doing as he was asked, "do you wish to ostracise him?" "Because," said the fellow, "I am tired of hearing him called the Just."

SECT. 8. **Athens to be a Sea-Power.**—But the greatest statesman of this critical period in the history of Athens was Themistocles. It may be said that he contributed more than any other single man to the making of Athens into a great state. In the sixth century the Athenians were a considerable naval power; but the fleet was regarded as subsidiary to the army. The idea of Themistocles was to sacrifice the army to the navy and make Athens a sea-state—the strongest sea-state in Greece.

493 B.C. He began the work when he was archon, some two or three years before the battle of Marathon, by carrying a measure through the Assembly for the fortification of the peninsula of Piræus. Hitherto the wide exposed strand of Phaleron was the harbour where the Athenians kept their triremes, hauled up on the beach, unprotected against the surprise of an enemy. It seems strange that they had not before made use of "the Piræus," the large harbour on the west side of the peninsula of Munychia, which could be supplemented by the two smaller harbours on the east side, Munychia and Zea. But the Piræus was somewhat farther from the city, and was not within sight of the Acropolis like Phaleron. So long, therefore, as there was no fortified harbour, Phaleron was safer. The plan of Themistocles

was to fortify the whole circuit of the peninsula by a wall, and prepare docks in the three harbours for the reception of the warships. The work was begun, but it was interrupted by the Persian invasion. Then a war with Aegina, combined with the fear of another Persian invasion, helped Themistocles to carry to completion another part of his great scheme—the increase of the fleet. A rich bed of silver had been recently discovered in the old mining district of Laurion, and had suddenly brought into the public treasury a large sum, perhaps a hundred talents. It was proposed to distribute this among the citizens, but Themistocles persuaded the Assembly to apply it to the purpose of building new ships. Two years later we find Athens with nearly 200 triremes at her command. The completion of the Piraeus wall was not attempted at this period. ^{483 B.C.}

CHAPTER VII

THE PERILS OF GREECE. THE PERSIAN AND PUNIC INVASIONS

SECT. I. **The Preparations and March of Xerxes.**

—After the unexpected repulse of his forces at Marathon, Darius had determined to send another expedition. But
485 B.C. he died before he could execute his resolve, and Xerxes, his son by Atossa, succeeded to the throne. The question then arose whether the design should be carried out. It is related that Xerxes was himself undecided, but was over-persuaded by the impetuous counsels of his cousin Mardonius.

It was resolved that the expedition should consist of a joint attack by sea and land. Preparations were begun by the
483 B.C. difficult enterprise of digging a canal (about a mile and a half long) across the isthmus of Mount Athos. A large part of the fleet, under Mardonius, had been wrecked in rounding that dangerous headland, and it was a fundamental principle of Persian strategy in these expeditions that the army and navy should co-operate and never lose touch. The canal of Athos was intended to ensure that the ships should safely accompany the land forces along the coasts of Thrace. When it was finished, the workmen proceeded to lay a bridge over the Strymon for the passage of the army, and preparations were made all along the line of route for the feeding of a vast host. It is impossible

to suppose that the whole army wintered in Sardis with the king; it is probable that the place of mustering was at the Hellespont, across which two bridges had been constructed by Phoenician and Egyptian engineers. But a tempest destroyed the bridges, and the wrath of Xerxes at this catastrophe was violent. He not only beheaded the engineers, but commanded that 300 lashes should be inflicted on the waters of the Hellespont. Those who carried out this strange order addressed the sea as they scourged it in these "un-Greek and impious" words: "O bitter water, our lord lays this punishment upon thee, for having done him wrong, who never did wrong to thee. Xerxes will cross thee, whether thou wilt or not." New bridges were constructed of two lines of ships, moored across the strait by anchors at prow and stern. The line nearer to the Propontis consisted of 360, the other of 314. Over each of these lines of ships six huge cables were stretched; and in three places gaps were left between the ships and under the cables for small trading craft to pass between the Euxine and the Aegean. Planks were laid across the cables and kept in their places by a second layer of cables above. On this foundation a road was made with wood and earth, and at each side palisades were set, high enough to prevent the animals which passed over from seeing the water. On a marble throne erected on the shore Xerxes is said to have witnessed the passage of his army, which began at the first moment of sunrise. The troops crossed under the lash, and the crossing was accomplished in two days.

The army was joined by the fleet at Doriscus in Thrace. Fleet and army were henceforward to act together. In the plain of Doriscus Xerxes reviewed and numbered his forces. "What nation of Asia," asks Herodotus, "did not Xerxes lead against Hellas?" The Persians themselves, who were under the command of Otanes, wore coats of mail and

CHAPTER VII

THE PERILS OF GREECE. THE PERSIAN AND PUNIC INVASIONS

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trowsers; they had wicker shields, large bows, and short spears. Then there were Assyrians with brazen helmets, linen cuirasses, clubs, lances, and short swords; Bactrians with cane bows; trowsered Sacae with pointed hats, and carrying axes; Indians clad in cotton, Caspians in goat-skin; Sarangians wearing dyed garments and high boots; Ethiopians clad in lion skins or leopard skins and armed with arrows whose stone points transport us to a primitive age; Sagartians with dagger and lasso; Thracians with fox-skin caps; Colchians with cowskin shields. The fleet was furnished by the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Cypriotes, Cilicians, Pamphylians, Lycians, Carians, and subject Greeks. It is said to have consisted of 1207 warships, with 3000 smaller vessels. A curious story was told of the numbering of the army. Ten thousand men were packed together in a close space; a line was drawn round them, and a wall built. All the infantry passed successively into this enclosure. It was filled 170 times, so that the whole number of fighting men was 1,700,000. The number of the cavalry was 80,000, and there were some additional troops not included. Adding to these the crews of the ships—counting 200 to each larger and 80 to each smaller vessel—the total was obtained of 2,317,000 men. Besides the fighting men were a vast number of servants, sutlers, camp-followers, whom Herodotus considered to be quite as numerous as the soldiers. The whole host would consequently have reached to upwards of 5,000,000. It is needless to say that these numbers are wholly fabulous. The land forces may have amounted to 300,000—hardly more. The number of the fleet must also be considerably reduced.

From Doriscus, Xerxes proceeded to Therma with his fabulous host, drinking rivers dry in their march, and there he was joined by his fleet, which had been separated from him while it sailed round Sithonia and Pallene. Most of the incidents which Herodotus recounts concerning this

Aug. 480
B.C.

march of Xerxes are pleasing stories, designed to characterise the barbarian and the despot, and to enhance the danger and the glory of Hellas.

SECT. 2. **Preparations of Greece.**—In the meantime Greece was making her counter-preparations. Xerxes is said to have dispatched from Sardis heralds to all the Greek states, except Athens and Sparta, to demand earth and water. These two cities now joined hands to resist the invasion. They were naturally marked out as the leaders of Greece in Greece's greatest crisis: Sparta by virtue of her generally acknowledged headship, Athens by the prestige which she had won at Marathon. They jointly convened an Hellenic congress at the Isthmus to consult on the measures to be taken for common resistance to the threatened invasion. This is the first instance of anything that can be called a deliberate Panhellenic policy. A large number of cities sent delegates to the congress, which met at the Isthmus—a meeting-place marked out by its central position—under the presidency of Sparta. There the states which were represented, thirty-one in number, bound themselves together in a formal confederation by taking a solemn oath that they would “tithe those who uncompelled submitted” to the barbarian, for the benefit of the Delphic god. This was a way of vowing that they would utterly destroy such traitors. A great many states, the Thessalians, most of the Boeotian cities, besides the smaller peoples of northern Greece,—Locrians, Malians, Achaeans, Dolopians, and others,—took no part in this congress. These northern states would be first invaded by the Persian, and it was hopeless for them to think of withstanding him alone. Unless they could absolutely rely on Sparta and her confederates to support them in defending the northern frontier of Thessaly, nothing would be left for them but to submit.

Autumn,
481 B.C.

One of the great hindrances to joint action was the

existence of domestic disputes. The Congress attempted to reconcile such feuds, and Athens and Aegina laid aside their enmity to fight together for Grecian freedom. Another important question concerned the command of the confederate forces. The claim of Sparta to the leadership of the army was at once admitted. The question as to the fleet was not so clear. Athens, which would furnish more ships than any other state, had a fair claim. But the other cities were jealous of Athens; they declared that they would submit only to a Spartan leader. King Leonidas was leader of the confederate army, and Eurybiadas, a Spartan who did not belong to either of the royal families, was chosen commander of the confederate fleet.

Envoys went forth to enlist new confederates—to win over Argos, which had sent no delegates to the Isthmus; and to obtain promises of assistance from Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse. None of these embassies led to anything. Gelon, the great tyrant of Syracuse, was himself absorbed by the prospect of an attack of the Carthaginians, and, even if he had wished, could have sent no aid to the mother-country.

The Greeks had abundance of time for their preparations. Athens probably threw herself with more energy into the work than any other city. She recalled those distinguished
480 B.C. citizens whom the vote of ostracism had driven into banishment during the last ten years. Aristides and Xanthippus returned home; and the city seems to have soon shown its confidence in their patriotism by choosing them as Generals.

SECT. 3. Battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium.

—About the time when Xerxes reached the Hellespont, the Thessalians sent a message to the confederacy, suggesting that the pass of Tempe should be defended against the invading army. Accordingly 10,000 hoplites were sent. But when they arrived at the spot they found that there

were other passes from Macedonia into Thessaly, by which the Persians would be more likely to come. Ten thousand hoplities were not enough to defend all the passes, and it seemed useless and dangerous to occupy this advanced post. Hence the defence of Tempe was abandoned, and the troops left Thessaly. This desertion necessarily drove all the northern Greeks to signify their submission to Xerxes by the offering of earth and water.

The next feasible point of defence was Thermopylae, a narrow pass between the sea and mountain, separating Trachis from Locris. It was the gate to all eastern Greece south of Mount Oeta. At the eastern and at the western end the pass, in those days, was extremely narrow, and in the centre the Phocians had constructed a wall as a barrier against Thessalian incursions. It was possible for an active band of men, if they were debarred from proceeding by Thermopylae, to take a rough and steep way over the mountains and so reach the Locrian road. It was therefore needful for a general who undertook the defence of Thermopylae to secure this path, lest a detachment should be sent round to surprise him in the rear.

The Greeks determined to defend Thermopylae, and Leonidas marched thither at the head of his army. He had about 7000 men, including 4000 from Peloponnesus, 1000 Phocians, 400 Thebans, 700 Thespians, and the Locrians in full force. So far as the Peloponnesians were concerned, this was only a small portion of their forces, and we may suspect that but for Athens they would have abandoned northern Greece entirely and concentrated themselves at once on the defence of the Isthmus. But they were dependent on Athens because her fleet was so strong, and they were therefore obliged to consider her interests. To surrender Thermopylae and retire to the Isthmus meant the surrender of Attica. But the hearts of the Spartans were really set on the ultimate defence of the

Isthmus, and not on the protection of the northern states. They attempted to cover this selfish and short-sighted policy by the plea that they were hindered from marching forth in full force by the celebration of the Carnean festival; they alleged that the soldiers of Leonidas were only an advance guard—the rest would soon follow.




FIG. 37.

As the Persian land and sea forces always operated together, it was certain that the Persians would endeavour to sail between Euboea and the mainland; and therefore, while the Greek hoplites held the pass under Thermopylae, the Greek fleet took up its station at Artemisium, on the northern point of Euboea, to dispute the entrance into the Malian Gulf. It numbered 324 triremes and 9 penteconters—the Athenians contributing 200. Fifty-three Athenian vessels which did not take part in the first fighting were

probably left to guard the southern entrance to the narrows, lest the Persians should send round part of their fleet east of Euboea and, coming up the Euripus, thus cut off the Greek retreat.

Towards the end of August the Persian army reached Thermopylae, and the Persian fleet drew up near Cape Sepias on the Magnesian coast. Owing to their great numbers the harbourage was insufficient, and a great storm arose and destroyed, Herodotus says, 400 of them. Nevertheless the Greeks were still inclined to retreat before them, but the Euboeans, desiring the fleet's protection, gave Themistocles thirty talents to bribe the commanders into remaining. He distributed eight talents, says Herodotus, and kept the rest. Meanwhile, the Persians moved round Cape Sepias and drew up at Aphetae. Determining to cut off the Greek retreat, they secretly sent 200 vessels to sail round Euboea, but news of the movement was brought to the Greeks by a famous diver, Scyllias of Scione, who crossed from Aphetae to Artemisium. The Greeks decided to sail back and meet this detachment, but late in the day they made a preliminary attack on the Persian fleet, as it lay at Aphetae, and captured 30 vessels. The night, when they meant to start, fell stormy, and next day came news that the 200 Persian ships had all been wrecked. At the same time the 53 Athenian vessels arrived from the Euripus, and the Greeks decided to stay at Artemisium, as they were in no danger of being cut off.

Meanwhile Leonidas had taken up his post at Thermopylae. The duty of guarding the bye-road over the mountain was assigned to the Phocians; and 6000 determined men prepared to hold the lower pass, behind the old Phocian wall which had been repaired. Xerxes waited four days, in hope that they would retreat; on the fifth he attacked, and the Hellenic spearmen drove back the Asiatic archers. On the next day the result was the same,

though Xerxes' own bodyguard, "the Immortals," attempted to storm the pass. Herodotus says that Xerxes "sprang thrice from his throne in agony for his army." It was then decided to send the Immortals, under Hydarnes, their commander, to force the mountain road, guided by a Malian Greek named Ephialtes. By a night march they reached the crest of the pass at dawn and surprised the Phocians, who fled up the hills. The Immortals pressed on, but meanwhile Leonidas was informed of the movement. At a council of war it was decided to send the bulk of the little army out of the pass, retaining only the Spartans, Thebans, and Thespians—some 1400 men. The pass runs east and west. Leonidas and his 300 Spartans undertook to hold the Phocian wall against the main army of Xerxes, while the rest were sent to defend the eastern end against the force that had crossed the mountain.

The action of Leonidas must not be considered as a mere throwing away of life. If the part of his army which he sent back had been able to overpower the Immortals when they came down from the mountain, the negligence of the Phocians might have been retrieved. But it was at best a forlorn hope, and the Immortals were victorious, killing, it is said, 4000 Greeks in all, and forcing their way into the eastern entrance over the Thebans and Thespians. The Spartans were the last to fall.

They had fought on this day as men desperate. No longer content with repelling assaults, they rushed out on the enemy from behind their wall, charging into the mass with terrible effect. Leonidas fell, and a Homeric battle raged over his body. Two brothers of Xerxes were slain. But at length the defenders were forced back behind the wall. Then, as the Immortals broke in from behind, they drew together on to a hillock, where they made their last stand, to be surrounded and cut down by overwhelming numbers.

A column was afterwards erected at Sparta with the

names of Leonidas and his 300. Among them was to be read the name of Diēnekes, reputed as the author of a famous *mot*, which displayed the lightheartedness of a Spartan soldier in the hour of peril. When it was observed to him that the Persian host was so enormous that their arrows hid the sun, he replied, "So much the better, we shall fight in the shade."

The news of Thermopylae speedily reached the fleet at Artemisium. The Greeks forthwith weighed anchor and sailed through the Euripus to the shores of Attica.

SECT. 4. **Battle of Salamis.**—Having thus succeeded in breaking through the inner gate of Hellas, and slain the king of the leading state, Xerxes continued his way and passed from Locris into Phocis and thence into Boeotia, meeting with no resistance. The Thebans and most of the other Boeotians now submitted to the Persians.

When the Athenians returned from Artemisium they found that the main body of the Peloponnesian army was gathered at the Isthmus and engaged in building a wall from sea to sea. Thus Boeotia and Attica were unprotected. Themistocles and his Athenian colleagues decided to evacuate Athens. They made a proclamation that all the citizens should embark in the triremes, and that all who could should convey their families and belongings to places of safety. This was done. The women and children were transported to Troezen, Aegina, and Salamis. This bold and wise policy of embarkation was dictated by the circumstances, but it was supposed to have been based on an oracle, which foretold that all Attica would be destroyed "save for a wooden wall," which was held to point to the ships. The story went on that certain of the poorer citizens insisted on taking the oracle literally, and remained in the citadel behind a wooden barricade. Probably the natural strength of the Acropolis led to a hope that it might be held, and the story was invented later.

Meanwhile the allied fleet had stationed itself in the bay of Salamis, and it was reinforced by new contingents, so that it reached the total strength of 378 triremes and seven penteconters.

c. Sep. 9. Xerxes arrived at Athens about the same time that his fleet sailed into the roadstead of Phaleron. He found the town empty, but for the small band which had entrenched itself on the Acropolis. Persian troops occupied the lower height of the Areopagus, which is severed from the Acropolis by a broad saddle, and succeeded in setting the wooden barricade on fire by means of burning arrows. The garrison rolled stones down on them, and such is the natural strength of the Acropolis that the siege lasted two weeks. Then the Persians managed to ascend on the precipitous north side by a secret path. The Greeks were slain, the temples plundered and burnt.

After the fall of the Acropolis the Greek admirals held a council of war, and it was carried by the votes of the majority that they should retreat to the Isthmus, since they would there be in close touch with the land forces and have the Peloponnesus as a retreat in case of defeat; whereas at Salamis they would be entirely cut off. This decision meant the abandonment of Aegina, Salamis, and Megara. Themistocles determined to thwart it. He went privately to Eurybiadas and convinced him that it would be much more advantageous to fight in the narrow waters of the Salaminian channel than in the open bay of the Isthmus, where the superior speed and number of the hostile ships would tell. A new council was summoned at which Themistocles, in order to carry his point, had to threaten that the Athenians, who were half the fleet, would cease to co-operate with their allies and seek new homes in some western land, if a retreat to the Isthmus were decided.

The southern entrance to the narrow sound between Salamis and Attica is blocked by the islet of Psyttalea and

the long promontory which runs out from Salamis to meet the mainland. The Greek fleet was anchored close to the town of Salamis, north of this promontory. Xerxes moved his armament so as to enclose the ingress of the straits, c. Sep. 27. and at the same time occupied Psyttalea. This movement, carried out in the afternoon, alarmed the Greeks; the Peloponnesian commanders brought pressure to bear on Eurybiadas; another council was called, and Themistocles saw that the hard-won result of his previous exertions would now be overthrown. He therefore determined on a bold stroke. Leaving the council, he dispatched a slave named Sicinnus to the Persian camp bearing a message from himself, as a well-wisher to Xerxes, that the Greeks purposed to sail away in the night. If they were prevented from doing so, a Persian victory was certain, owing to the disunion which existed in the Hellenic camp. This message was believed, and Xerxes took his measures at nightfall to hinder the Greek fleet from escaping by the western straits between Salamis and the Megarid. He sent his 200 Egyptian ships to round the southern promontory of Salamis and place themselves so that they could bar the straits if necessary.

The Greek generals meanwhile were engaged in hot discussion. Suddenly Themistocles was called out from the council. It was his rival Aristides who had sailed across from Aegina and brought the news that the fleet was surrounded by the enemy. Themistocles made Aristides inform the generals of what had happened, and the tidings was presently confirmed by a Tenian ship which deserted from the Persians.

Thus Themistocles and the Persians forced the Greeks to fight at Salamis. The poet Aeschylus, who was an eye-witness of the battle, describes the Persian ships as drawn up in three divisions outside the entrance into the sound. The division on the extreme left, probably composed of the

Ionian Greeks, was set to guard the passage between Psyttalea and the shore of Salamis. The second division probably extended from Psyttalea eastward towards the Piraeus, to guard the main ingress. The third, forming the right wing of the armament, was probably stationed somewhat in advance of the second, close to the narrow passage between Psyttalea and the mainland. The right




FIG. 38.

wing was the Phoenician squadron, upon which Xerxes chiefly relied. The Greeks had drawn their fleet up across the passage between the town of Salamis and the temple of Heracles on the Attic shore. The Athenians formed the left wing of their array, and the Aeginetans and Lacedaemonians were on the right. A high throne was erected, under Mount Aegaleos, from which Xerxes could survey the battle and watch the conduct of his men.

At break of day the Greeks began to advance. The c. Sep. 20. Phoenician galleys moved to meet them, in column formation; while the other two divisions of the Persian fleet probably remained as they were. The fighting began on the Greek left, and it was here, upon the Athenians and Phoenicians, that the main stress of the battle fell. The want of space hindered the Persians from overwhelming their foes with superior numbers; the attempts they made to crowd ships into the strait were disastrous to themselves. Meanwhile the object of the Greek right was to force a way out of the sound through the enemy's line, in order to attack in the rear. It was the task of the Aeginetans to round the point of the jutting promontory of Salamis, and assail the left wing of the enemy stationed about Psyttalea. They succeeded in breaking through, and at a later stage we find them cutting off the retreat of fugitive Persian ships. It is probable that, having discomfited the Ionians, they delivered a flank attack on the Phoenician column; but in any case their success rendered the position of the Phoenicians untenable and decided the battle. Their success against the Persian left enabled Aristides, who with a force of Athenian hoplites was watching events on the shore of Salamis, to cross over to Psyttalea and kill the barbarians who had been posted there by Xerxes. The battle lasted from morning till nightfall.

The Persians, under the eyes of their king, fought with great bravery, but they were badly generalled and the place of the combat was unfavourable to them. Their numbers were only an encumbrance.

Among the anecdotes told about this battle the most famous is that which was current at Halicarnassus, of the signal bravery and no less signal good fortune of the Carian queen Artemisia. She saved herself by the stratagem of attacking and sinking another Carian vessel. Those who stood round Xerxes observed the incident, but supposed

the destroyed trireme to be Greek. "Sire," they said, "seest thou how Artemisia has sunk an enemy's ship." And Xerxes exclaimed, "My men have become women, my women men."

SECT. 5. Consequences of Salamis.—The victory of Salamis was a crushing blow to Persia's naval power, and it was followed by the desertion of the Phoenician contingent. But the Greek story, which represented Xerxes as fleeing back to the Hellespont in wild terror, misrepresents the situation. His land army had met with no reverse and was overwhelmingly superior in numbers: it should still be able to subjugate Greece. What Xerxes had to fear was a rising in Ionia, when the news of the naval defeat reached that province. Accordingly the Persian fleet was sent to the Hellespont to guard the bridge, while Xerxes with 60,000 men marched back through Thessaly and Macedonia, thus keeping open the line of communications. The land forces were placed under the command of Mardonius, who, as the season was now advanced, determined to postpone further operations till the spring and to winter in Thessaly.

Meanwhile the Greeks had failed to follow up their victory. Cleombrotus, the Spartan regent, was about to advance from the Isthmus with the purpose of aiming a blow at the retreating columns of the Persian forces before they reached Boeotia. But as he was sacrificing, before setting out, the sun was totally eclipsed, and this ill omen made him desist from his plan and march back to the Peloponnesus.

Oct. 2, 480
B.C., 2 P.M.

Great was the rejoicing in Greece over the brilliant victory which was so little hoped for. The generals met at Isthmus to distribute the booty and adjudge rewards. The Aeginetans received the choice lot of the spoil for bravery; the Athenians were adjudged the second place. In adjudging the prizes for wisdom, each captain wrote down two names in order of merit. The story is that each

wrote his own name first and that of Themistocles second, and that consequently there was no prize, for a second could not be given, unless a first were also awarded.

Aeschylus, who had himself fought against the Mede, made the tragedy of Xerxes the argument of a drama, which still abides the one great historical play, dealing with a contemporary event, that exists in literature. But the Persian war produced, though not so soon, another and a greater work than the *Persians*; it inspired the "father of history" with the theme of his book—the contest of Europe with Asia.

SECT. 6. **Preparations for another Campaign.**—In the following spring Mardonius was joined by Artabazus ^{479 B.C.} and the troops who had conducted Xerxes to the Hellespont. The total number of his forces is unknown; it is said to have been 300,000. Mardonius, well aware of the fatal division of interests between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, sent an honourable ambassador, King Alexander of Macedon himself, to Athens. He undertook to repair all the injuries suffered by her from the Persian occupation, to help her to gain new territory, and asked only for her alliance as an equal and independent power. The offer was tempting, and the Athenians had good reason to distrust their allies. But "Tell Mardonius," they said to Alexander, "that the Athenians say: so long as the sun moves in his present course, we will never come to terms with Xerxes."

The embassy of Alexander enabled Athens to exert stronger pressure on the Peloponnesians, with a view to the defence of northern Greece; and the Spartans promised that an army should march into Boeotia. But soon after the embassy of Alexander they had completed the walling of the Isthmus, and, feeling secure, they took no thought of fulfilling their promise. They alleged in excuse the festival of the Hyacinthia, just as the year before they had

pleaded the Carneæ. And in the meantime Mardonius had set his army in motion and advanced into Boeotia, with the purpose of reoccupying Attica. Once more the Athenians had to leave their land and remove their families and property to the refuge of Salamis. Mardonius still hoped to detach the Athenians from the Greek cause. If they would now accept his former offers he would retreat from their land, leaving it unravaged. But even at this extremity, the Athenians rejected the insidious propositions. Immediately the three northern states which had not yielded to the Mede—Athens, Megara, and Plataea—sent ambassadors to Sparta, to insist upon an army marching at once to oppose Mardonius in Attica, with the threat that otherwise there would be nothing for it but to come to terms with the foe. At last the Lacedaemonian government suddenly changed its policy and dispatched a force of 5000 Spartans, each attended by some Helots, to northern Greece. Never since, never perhaps before, did so large a body of Spartan citizens take the field at once. They were followed by 5000 perioeci, each attended by one Helot. The command was entrusted to Pausanias, who was acting as regent for his child-cousin Pleistarchus, son of the hero of Thermopylae. At the Isthmus, the Lacedaemonian army was joined by the troops of the Peloponnesian allies, and by contingents from Euboea, Aegina, and western Greece; in the Megarid they were reinforced by the Megarians, and at Eleusis by Aristides in command of 8000 Athenians and 600 Plataeans. It was entirely an army of foot soldiers, and the total number, including light-armed troops, may have approached 70,000.

The strong fortress of Thebes, which he had abundantly supplied with provisions, was the base of Mardonius; and once the Greek army was in the field, he could not run the risk of having his communications with his base broken off, and finding himself shut up in Attica, a land exhausted

by the devastation of the preceding autumn. Accordingly he withdrew into Boeotia, and posted himself on the river Asopus, where it is crossed by the road from Athens to Thebes, at the point where that road descends from the heights of Cithaeron. The main purpose of Mardonius in posting himself on the Asopus was that he might fight with Thebes behind him. The Persians had every cause to be sanguine. Not only had they superior, though not overwhelmingly superior, forces, but they had a general who was far abler than any commander on the side of the Greeks. Mardonius was not anxious to bring on a battle. He knew that the longer the army of the Greeks remained in the field, the more would its cohesion be relaxed through the jealousies and dissensions of the various contingents. We need not take too seriously the story which the Greeks were afterwards fain to believe, that at this moment there was a certain dispiritedness and foreboding of disaster in the Persian camp.

SECT. 7. Battle of Plataea.—The field on which the fate of Greece was decided is bounded on the north by the river Asopus, on the south by Mount Cithaeron. The town of Plataea stood in the south-west of this space, on the most westerly of six ridges which connect the lower heights of the mountain with the plain. Three roads descended here into Boeotia: on the extreme east the road from Athens to Thebes; in the centre, that from Athens to Plataea; on the west, that from Megara to Plataea. The Greek army took the most easterly way, which after crossing the pass of the Oak's Heads, descends steeply into the Boeotian land. They found when they reached the other side that the road passed through the Persian camp, and they were forced to take up a position at the foot of the pass. Their right wing, consisting of the Spartans and Tegeates, rested on the high bastion of the mountain which rises above the town of Erythrae; their centre on lower

ground close to the town; and the left wing, where the Athenians and Megarians were posted, was advanced right




FIG. 39.

down to the foot of the descent. The only assailable point was the left wing, and against it Mardonius sent cavalry under the command of Masistius. Sore bestead by the

lies the responsibility of having thrown away this chance. It can only have been due to their delays and hesitations that the river was never crossed. The whole army halted near the eastern limit of the flat land, hard by the spring of Gargaphia, which afforded an abundant supply of fresh water. In this position it was screened by the rising ground from the view of the Persians on the other side of the river. Pausanias was now in an awkward situation. He had failed to accomplish his strategic object; he had exchanged an almost impregnable for a weak position; and he had lost the control of the eastern passes across Mount Cithaeron. The Persian general, as soon as the Greeks had left their first position, promptly occupied the passes, and cut off a provision train which was on its way to supply the Greek army.

It would seem that the Greeks remained about two days inactive in this weak position, harassed by the Persian cavalry, which crossed the river, hovered on the ridges, discharged darts into the camp, and finally succeeded in choking up the waters of the Gargaphia spring. Pausanias held a council of war, and it was determined that the Lacedaemonians and right wing should move eastward to recover command of the eastern pass. This movement was to be carried out at night, and was to be covered and supported by the rest of the army who were to fall back towards the mountain. A little to the south-east of Plataea, a spur of Cithaeron was inclosed by the two branches of a stream which met again at the foot of the ridge, and went by the name of the Island. The centre and the left were instructed to retreat to this ridge, whereon they would be out of the reach of the enemy's cavalry. But the scheme was ill carried out. The troops of the centre, whether they mistook their orders or were deceived by the darkness, did not reach the Island, but took up their post in front of the temple of Hera which was just outside the walls of Plataea.

The Athenians, for some unexplained reason, failed to obey orders, and remained where they were in a dangerous and isolated position. The Lacedaemonians themselves also wasted the precious hours of the short night. Their delay is ascribed to the obstinacy of Amompharētus, the commander of one of the Spartan divisions, who had not been present at the council of war, and refused to obey the order to retreat. At length Pausanias began his march, convinced that his stubborn captain would follow when he found himself deserted. And so it fell out. When they had moved a little more than a mile, the Spartans saw that Amompharetus was coming, and waited for him. But the day had dawned; the Persians had perceived that the Greek position was deserted, and Mardonius decided that now was the moment to attack when the forces of the enemy were divided. His cavalry came up and prevented the Lacedaemonians from proceeding. It was on the slopes under Hysiae that Pausanias was compelled to turn and withstand the Persian horsemen, who were speedily supported by the main body advancing under Mardonius himself. The Persians threw up a light barricade of their wicker shields, from behind which they discharged innumerable arrows. Under this fire the Greeks hesitated; for the victims were unfavourable. At length Pausanias, looking towards the temple of Hera, invoked the goddess; and after his prayer the prophets obtained good omens from the sacrifices. The Lacedaemonians no longer held back. Along with the Tegeates who were with them they carried the barricade and pressed the Persians backward towards the temple of Demeter which stood on a high acclivity above them. In this direction the battle raged hotly; but the discipline of the best spearmen of Greece approved itself brilliantly; and, when Mardonius fell, the battle was decided.

The Lacedaemonians and Tegeates had borne the brunt

of the day. At the first attack, Pausanias had dispatched a hasty messenger to the Athenians. As they marched to the scene they were attacked by the Greeks of the enemy's army, who effectually hindered them from marching farther. Meanwhile the tidings had reached the rest of the Greek army at Plataea that a battle was being fought and that Pausanias was winning it. They hastened to the scene, but the action was practically decided before their arrival. The defeated host fled back across the Asopus to their fortified camp; the Greeks pursued, and stormed it. The tent of Mardonius was plundered by the men of Tegea, who dedicated in the temple of Athena Alea in their city the brass manger of his horses; while his throne with silver feet and his scimitar were kept by the Athenians on the Acropolis, along with the breastplate of Masistius, as memorials of the fateful day. The slain Greek warriors, among whom was the brave Amompharetus, were buried before the gates of Plataea, and the honour of celebrating their memory by annual sacrifice was assigned to the Plataeans. Pausanias called the host together, and in the name of the Spartans and all the confederacy guaranteed to Plataea political independence and the inviolability of her town and territory. The hour of triumph for Plataea was an hour of humiliation for Thebes. Ten days after the battle the army advanced against the chief Boeotian city and demanded the surrender of the leaders of the medizing party. The leaders were given up, by their own wish, for they calculated on escaping punishment by the influence of bribery. But Pausanias caused them to be executed, without trial, at Corinth.

SECT. 8. Battle of Mycale and Capture of Sestos.

—The battle of Cithaeron shares with Salamis the dignity of being decisive battles in the world's history. Pindar links them together as the great triumphs of Sparta and Athens respectively. Notwithstanding the immense dis-

advantage of want of cavalry, the Lacedaemonians had turned at Plataea a retreat into a victory. The remarkable feature of the battle was that it was decided by a small part of either army. Sparta and Tegea were the actual victors; and on the Persian side, Artabazus, at the head of 40,000 men, had not entered into the action at all. On the death of Mardonius, that general immediately faced about and began without delay the long march back to the Hellespont. Never again was Persia to make a serious attempt against the liberty of European Greece. For the following century and a half, the dealings between Greece and Persia will only effect the western fringe of Asia, and then Alexander of Macedon will achieve against the Asiatic monarchy what Xerxes failed to achieve against the free states of Europe.

The achievement of the Hellenic army was followed in a few days by an achievement of the Hellenic fleet which delivered the Asiatic Greeks from their master. The Greek fleet, under King Leotychidas, which had moved to Delos, was drawn into action by a message from the Samians, seeking to join the Greek league, and begging help against the Persian. For the Persian fleet was at Samos, and hard by at Cape Mycale was encamped a large Persian army, including many Ionian troops. The Samian request was granted; Leotychidas sailed to the island, and on his approach the Persian ships withdrew to the shelter of Cape Mycale and their army. The Greeks landed; attacked, carried, and burned the enemy's camp. Their victory was decided by the desertion of the Ionians, who won their freedom on this memorable day. Mycale followed so hard upon Plataea, that the belief easily arose that the two victories were won on the same afternoon. There is more to be said for the tradition that as the Athenians and their comrades were assailing the entrenchments on the shore of Mycale the tidings of Plataea reached them and heartened them in their work.

Aug. 479
B.C.

The Athenians and Ionians, led by the Athenian Xanthippus, followed up the great victory by vigorous action in the Hellespont, while the Peloponnesians with Leotychidas, content with what they had achieved, returned home. The difference between the cautious policy of Sparta and the imperial instinct of Athens is here momentarily expressed. The Lacedaemonians were unwilling to concern themselves further with the Greeks of the eastern and north-eastern Aegean; the Athenians were both capable of taking a Panhellenic point of view, and moved by the impulse to extend their own influence. The strong fortress of Sestus, which stands by the straits of Helle, was beleaguered and taken; and with this event Herodotus closes his history of the Persian wars. The fall of Sestus is the beginning of that Athenian empire, to which Pisistratus and the elder Miltiades had pointed the way.

478 B.C.

SECT. 9. **Gelon Tyrant of Syracuse.**—While the eastern Greeks were securing their future development against the Persian foe, the western Greeks had been called upon to defend themselves against that Asiatic power with which they had to struggle in the western Mediterranean. Greek offshoots from the Phocaean colony of Massalia (Marseilles) clashed with Phoenician trading ports in Corsica, and even on the coast of Spain. But above all in Sicily Greek influence threatened the dominion and trade of Carthage; and when Carthage made her great attempt to secure ascendancy in Sicily, she was acting in concert, though independently, with Xerxes against the common enemy.



FIG. 40.—Coin of Gela, early (obverse). Bull with human head, forepart [legend: ΓΕΛΑΑΣ.]

Between 490 and 480 B.C. Greek Sicily was dominated by four tyrants; two lesser in the north—Anaxilas of

Rhegium and Terillus of Himera; two greater in the south—Theron of Acragas and Gelon of Syracuse. Of the four, the greatest was Gelon, who first made himself lord of Gela, and then of Syracuse. He may be called the second founder of Syracuse, which he made by far the greatest Greek city in the west. The Island of Ortygia had been joined by a mole to the mainland, so that the city was now on a peninsula. Gelon built a wall, enclosing in one circuit Ortygia and the fortified height of Achradina which looked down upon it. He also constructed docks, for Syracuse was to be a naval power, and he brought in half the citizens of Gela, the whole of the burgesses from the neighbouring city of Camarina, and drew population from other subject towns. He allied himself by marriage to Theron of Acragas.

Theron, supported by Gelon, crossed Sicily to the north and drove Terillus out of Himera. Terillus appealed for help to Carthage, which she was glad to grant. And therefore, when messengers from Greece came to Sicily for aid, before the invasion of Xerxes, they found the power of Gelon and the other Greeks fully occupied. Carthage sent a great fleet and army which landed at Panormus and moved along the coast to besiege Himera, which was defended by Theron. Gelon marched with 50,000 foot and 5000 horse to relieve the town.

A great battle was fought outside the walls: the Greek victory was complete; and Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, himself perished. Of his death there are two stories. The Carthaginian tells how he stood all day, while the battle raged, offering sacrifice by the altar of Baal, till at last, seeing his host ready to fly, he flung himself as a supreme burnt-offering into the fire. The day was not retrieved; but hereafter Himera paid dear for the death of Hamilcar.

The common significance of the battles of Salamis and

Himera, or the repulse of Asia from Europe, was appreciated at the time and naïvely expressed in the fanciful tradition that the two battles were fought on the same day. But Himera, unlike Salamis, was immediately followed by a treaty of peace. Carthage paid the lord of Syracuse 2000 talents as a war indemnity, but this was a small treasure compared with the booty taken in the camp. Out of a portion of that spoil a beautiful issue of large silver coins was minted and called "Damaretean," after Gelon's wife;



FIG. 41.—Coin of Syracuse, fifth century. Obverse: head of Victory; dolphins [legend: ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΟΝ]. Reverse: Quadriga crowned by Victory; below, a lion.

and some pieces of this memorial of the great deliverance of Sicily are preserved.

- 478 B.C. **SECT. 10. Syracuse under Hieron.**—When Gelon died, he left the fruits of his enterprise and statesmanship to his brother Hieron. Hieron completed the victory over Carthage by defeating the other power which threatened western Greece. The Etruscans aimed at the possession of Cyme, northernmost of Greek cities on the Italian coast, and were besieging it, when Hiero's Syracusan fleet sailed to the spot and routed them: and the Tuscan power ceased to be a menace. We possess a bronze helmet from the spoil sent by Hiero to Olympia; and the Pythian ode in which Pindar of Thebes immortalised the victory.
- 474 B.C.

It is perhaps from the hymns of Pindar that we win the most lively impressions of the wealth and culture of the courts of Sicily in the fifth century. Pindar, like other illustrious poets of the day, Simonides and Bacchylides, and Aeschylus, visited Sicily, to bask in the smiles, and receive the gifts, of the tyrant. The king of Syracuse sent his race-horses and chariots to contend in the great games at




FIG. 42.—Helmet dedicated by Hiero (in British Museum). [Inscription: *Ἱέρων ὁ Δεινομένηος καὶ τοῖς Συρακόσιοις τῷ Διὶ Τυρ(ρ)ῶν ἀπὸ Κύμας.*]

Olympia and Delphi, and he employed the most gifted lyric poets to celebrate these victories in lordly odes. Pindar and Bacchylides were sometimes set to celebrate the same victory in rival strains. These poets give us an impression of the luxury and magnificence of the royal courts and the generosity of the royal victors.

Yet though the Syracusan cities might seem fair, the despotisms were oppressive. Hieron was famous for his system of spies. Theron slaughtered the men of Himera

who opposed the rule of his son Thrasydaeus. After
472 B.C. Theron's death, Thrasydaeus quarrelled with Hieron, fought,
471 B.C. and was defeated. In the hour of his reverse, Himera
became independent, and Acragas, his greater city, adopted
a free constitution. Hieron likewise was succeeded by a
467 B.C. less able ruler, Thrasybulus, against whom the citizens rose
in mass, and drove him out. The overthrow of tyranny at
Syracuse was followed by a civil war between the old
citizens and the new, whom Gelon had imported from all
quarters. In the end all the strangers were driven out and
the democracy of Syracuse was securely established. The
next half century was a period of prosperity for the Sicilian
republics, especially for the greatest among them, Syracuse
and Acragas, and for Selinus, now freed from the Phoenician
yoke.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

SECT. I. The Position of Sparta and Career of Pausanias.—For the last forty years Sparta had been the predominant power in continental Greece. Her headship in the common resistance to Persia was recognised without murmur or dispute. A great national enterprise, conducted under her auspices to a splendid conclusion, should have enabled her to convert leadership into dominion. But Lacedaemon had not the spirit to carry out an effective imperial policy. For a state which aspired to a truly imperial position in Greece must inevitably be a sea-power. When the world of free Hellenic states once more extended over the Aegean to the skirts of Asia and to Thrace, Sparta might retain her continental position, but her prestige must ultimately be eclipsed and her power menaced by any city which won imperial authority over the islands and coasts of the Aegean. This was what happened.

The Spartans were a people unable to adapt themselves to new conditions. Reforms were unwelcome; a man of exceptional ability was regarded with suspicion. The formation of a navy would have seemed to them as unpractical an idea as an expedition against the capital of Persia. And if we follow their conduct of the recent war, we see that their policy was petty and provincial. They had generally acted at the last moment; their view was so

limited by the smaller interests of the Peloponnesus that again and again they almost betrayed the national cause.

Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, had shown, it must be allowed, remarkable military ability in conducting the campaign of Plataea. But his talents as a politician were not equal to his talents as a general. Sparta sent him out, in command of a squadron of ships supplied by her allies, to continue the work of emancipating the eastern Greeks.

- 478 B.C. He sailed first to Cyprus and was successful in delivering the greater part of the island from Persian rule. He then proceeded to Byzantium and expelled the Persian garrison. But here he behaved more as a tyrant than as a general; and he completely ruined all chances that his country had of remaining at the head of the confederacy which the Persian invasion had called into being. At Sparta the reports of the doings of the general aroused alarm and anxiety. He was recalled to answer the charges. It was said that he wore Persian dress, and was attended by an Asiatic bodyguard in his journey through Thrace. For he had indeed been intriguing with the Persian court. The victor of Plataea offered to enslave his own city and the rest of Hellas to Xerxes, and to seal the compact by marrying his daughter. His overtures were welcomed by the Great King; and Pausanias, being a small man and elated by vanity, was unable to refrain from betraying, in little things, his treacherous designs. The Persian intrigue, however, could not at this time be proved against him; he was punished only for some acts of injury which he had done to particular persons. He was not sent out again; but he subsequently hired a trireme for himself and returned to the scene of his former intrigues. He
- 477 B.C. resumed possession of Byzantium and thus controlled the inner gate of the Euxine; and he succeeded almost immediately in capturing Sestus, which gave him control of the outer gate also. This was too much for the Athenians, and

they sent out a squadron under Cimon, the son of Miltiades, who recovered Sestus and drove Pausanias out of Byzantium. ^{476 B.C.} The Spartan government, hearing that he was intriguing in the Troad, sent a herald commanding him to return home. He obeyed the summons, believing that he could compass an acquittal by bribes. The Ephors threw him into prison; but it was difficult to procure evidence of his guilt. He was released and challenged inquiry. Everybody knew that he had not only negotiated with Persia, but that he had prepared the way for a revolt of the Helots by promising them emancipation. He dreamed of converting the Spartan state into a true monarchy. But there were not clear enough proofs to act upon, until a confidential servant turned informer. Pausanias had entrusted him with a letter to Artabazus, but the man, having noticed that none of the messengers who had been previously dispatched on the same errand, ever returned, broke the seal and read in the letter the order for his death. He showed the letter to the Ephors, and they, wishing to have proof against Pausanias from his own mouth, contrived a stratagem. A hut with a partition was erected at the sanctuary of Taenarus. They concealed themselves in one room and the man remained in the other as a suppliant. Pausanias came to discover why he was there; the man told him of the letter and reproached him. In the conversation, Pausanias admitted the whole truth. But he received a hint of his danger and fled to the temple of Athena of the Brazen House. He took refuge in a small covered building adjoining the shrine. The Ephors had the doors built up ^{471 (?) B.C.} and starved him to death. As he was dying they brought him out, and by the command of the Delphic god he was buried at the entrance to the sacred enclosure. But the starvation within the precincts was an offence against the goddess and brought a curse upon the Spartans.

The career of Pausanias is typical of the Spartan abroad;

and it has a parallel in the result of Sparta's attempt to extend her power on land. She cast her eyes upon
 47 B.C. Thessaly, and sent forth an army under King Leotychidas, who landed in the Pagasæan bay. But, like many a Spartan general, he could not resist silver and gold; and the Thessalian princes saved their power by bribing the invader. His guilt was evident, and when he returned home he was condemned to death. He saved himself by fleeing to Athena's sanctuary at Tegea.

Sparta was soon compelled to fight for her position within the Peloponnesus itself. Argos had now recovered somewhat from the annihilating blow which had been dealt her by King Cleomenes. On the other side, Sparta had to behold the synoecism of the villages of Elis into a city with a democratic constitution. And even in Arcadia she was constrained reluctantly to recognise the new synoecism of the Mantinean villages.



FIG. 43.—Coin of Elis, fifth century (obverse). Flying eagle [legend: FAAEIO.]

Thus the Persian war left Sparta much where she was before. In the meantime another city had been advancing with rapid strides along a new path, compassing large enterprises, and establishing a large empire.

SECT. 2. **The Confederacy of Delos.**—The lukewarmness of Sparta, exhibited in her failure to follow up
 478-77 B.C. the battle of Mycale, had induced the Ionian and other Asiatic Greeks to place themselves under the leadership of Athens. Thus was formed the voluntary confederation out of which an Athenian empire was to rise. The object was not only to protect the rescued cities from reconquest by the barbarian, but also to plunder the country of the Great King. The treasury of the league was established in the sacred Island of Delos, the ancient centre of Ionian worship,

and it was hence called the Confederacy of Delos. The recapture of Sestus was its first achievement.

The league included the Ionian and Aeolian cities of Asia; the islands adjacent to the coast from Lesbos to Rhodes; a large number of towns on the Propontis, and some in Thrace; most of the Cyclades; and Euboea except its southern city Carystus. It was a league of sea-states, and therefore the basis of the contract was that each state should furnish ships to the common fleet. But most of the members were small and poor; many could not equip more than one or two ships; many could do no more than contribute a part of the expense to the furnishing of a single galley. To gather together a number of small and scattered contingents at a fixed time and place was always a matter of difficulty: nor was such a miscellaneous armament easily managed. It was therefore arranged that the smaller states, instead of furnishing ships, should pay a yearly sum of money to a common treasury. The valuation of the wealth of the confederate cities and the determination of the "contribution" of each were devolved upon Aristides, whose discretion, and the respect in which he was held, fitted him eminently for the task. His valuation remained in force for more than fifty years. Thus from the very beginning the Confederacy consisted of two kinds of members: those who furnished ships and those who paid an equivalent in money—a *phoros*, as it was called; and the second class was far the larger. For besides those who could only furnish a ship or two, or even part of a ship, many of the larger cities preferred the system of money payments, which did not oblige their burghers to leave home. The tribute was collected by ten Athenian officers, who bore the title of *Hellenotamiae*, "treasurers of the Greeks." The Council of the Confederates met at Delos, where the treasury was, and each member had an equal voice. As leader of the Confederacy, Athens had the executive entirely in her hands,

and it was of the highest significance that the treasurers were not selected from the whole body of Confederates, but were Athenian citizens. Thus from the first Athens held the means of gradually transforming the naval union into a naval empire.

While the name of Aristides is connected most closely with the foundation of the Confederacy, there is no doubt that it was due to his rival Themistocles that Athens took the tide of fortune at the flood. Themistocles had made his city a sea-power; and this feat approved him the greatest of all her statesmen. He was a man of genius. The most reserved of all historians, Thucydides, turns aside to praise his unusual natural gifts: his power of divining what was likely to happen, and his capacity for dealing with difficult situations. When Athens undertook the leadership and entered upon the new paths which then opened out before her, she was carrying out a policy of which he had been the clearest and earliest interpreter. And, while the fleet was building an empire in the east, there was work for him to do amid the ruins of Athens.

SECT. 3. The Fortification of Athens and the Piræus.—After Plataea, the Athenians brought back their families and goods to their desolate habitation. Little of the old town wall was still standing, and they proceeded to build a new wall. The work was done in haste; the material of older buildings and even gravestones were used. But this wall of Themistocles—for it was by the advice and under the inspiration of Themistocles that the work was wrought—embraced a larger circuit than the old enclosure. The Lacedæmonians, who looked with jealousy at the rise of the Athenian walls, sent an embassy to deprecate fortification, and to invite the Athenians, instead of fortifying their own town, to join Sparta in demolishing all fortifications in Greece. But they were not in a position to do more than remonstrate. However an anecdote was

circulated, to illustrate the resources and wiles of the Attic Odysseus. At his suggestion, the Spartan envoys were sent back with the answer that the Athenians would send an embassy. When they were gone, Themistocles started himself, as one of the ambassadors, but his colleagues were to remain behind till the wall had reached defensible height. In the meantime, the whole population—men, women, and children—were to press on the work. Having arrived at Sparta, he delayed presenting himself before the assembly, and when he was asked why, he said that his colleagues had been detained and that he expected them every day. Meanwhile persons arriving from Athens assured the Spartans that the wall was being built. Themistocles asked them not to be deceived by such rumours, but to send men of their own to discover whether it was true. At the same time he sent a message to Athens, with instructions that the envoys from Sparta should be detained till he and his colleagues had returned. The wall had now reached a sufficient height; and, the other ambassadors having arrived, Themistocles appeared before the assembly, and declared that Athens had walls and could defend her people.

The fortification of Piraeus was likewise taken in hand. A thick wall was built all round the Munychian peninsula, keeping close to the sea, and was continued along the north side of the Harbour, and out to the promontory of Eetionaea. The entrances to this chief Harbour and to the two small havens of Munychia and Zea on the east side of the peninsula were fortified by moles.

In the course of the next twenty years the Athenians came to see the disadvantage of the two towns, which ought to have been one. It was borne in upon their statesmen that in the case of an enemy invading Attica with a powerful army, the communications between Athens and the Piraeus might be completely severed, and the folk

of the city be cut off from their ships. In order to meet this danger—which would have been most simply met by deserting Athens—a new device was imagined. It was resolved to transform the two towns into a double town, girt by a continuous line of fortification. Two diverging
458 B.C. walls were built, to connect Athens with the sea. The northern joined the Piræus wall, near the Harbour, the southern ran down to the roadstead of Phaleron. By these Long Walls, costly to build and costly to defend, Athens sought to adapt her topography to her rôle of mistress of the sea.

Her naval power was based upon the only sure foundation—a growing naval commerce. This, in its turn, depended upon the increase of Attic industries, which may be estimated by the enormous number of resident aliens or metics, who settled in Athens or Piræus for the purpose of manufacture and trade. These metics, who seem to have ultimately approached the number of 10,000, were liable to the same ordinary burdens as the citizens, and, when a property-tax was imposed in time of war, they were taxed at a higher rate.

Themistocles wished to introduce a system by which a certain number of triremes should be added to the fleet every year; but this idea was not adopted; new ships were built from time to time according as they were needed. But a new system of furnishing them was introduced. The state supplied only the hull and some of the rigging; the duty and expense of fitting the galley, launching it complete, and training the oarsmen, were laid upon the most wealthy burghers, each in his turn. This public burden was called the trierarchy. One hundred and seventy oarsmen composed of hired foreigners and slaves, and partly of the poorest class of the citizens, propelled each galley; there was a crew of twenty men (*hypēretai*), to manage the vessel, including the *keleustes*, who set the time to the oarsmen;

and there were, besides, ten soldiers (*epibatai*). The Generals were supreme commanders by land and sea alike.

SECT. 4. Ostracism and death of Themistocles.

--For some years Themistocles divided the guidance of public affairs with Aristides and Xanthippus. But, like most Greek statesmen, he was accessible to bribes, and his vanity betrayed him into committing public indiscretions. He built near his own house a shrine to "Artemis wisest in Council," on the ground that the counsels which he had offered his country had been wiser than all others. Such things gave opponents a handle for attack. The time and the immediate causes of the banishment of Themistocles are uncertain. He succumbed to a coalition of Aristides and Xanthippus, who appealed to the trial of Ostracism. c. 472 B.C. The exiled statesman took up his abode in Argos. When the Persian intrigues of Pausanias were disclosed, the Lacedaemonians discovered that Themistocles was implicated in the scandal. But though Themistocles held communications with Pausanias, it is not in the least likely that he was really guilty of any design to betray Greece to Persia: it is rather to be presumed that those communications were concerned with the schemes of Pausanias against the Spartan constitution. He was accused of high treason 471 B.C. against his country; men were sent to arrest him and bring him to trial; and he fled to Corcyra. The Corcyraeans refused to keep him, and he crossed over to Epirus, pursued by Lacedaemonian and Athenian officers. He was forced to stop at the house of Admetus king of the Molossians, though his previous relations with this king had not been friendly. In these western lands we seem to be translated into a far older time and to visit the homestead of a Homerick king. Admetus was not at home, but Themistocles supplicated the queen, and she directed him to take her child and seat himself by the hearth. When the king returned, Themistocles implored his protection. Admetus

hospitably refused to give him up to the pursuers, and sent the fugitive overland to Pydna in Macedonia. A vessel carried him to the shores of Ionia. When Xerxes died and Artaxerxes came to the throne, he went up to Susa and intrigued at the Persian court. Thus circumstances drove him to follow the example of Pausanias; and, by a curious irony, the two men who might be regarded as the saviours of Greece, the hero of Salamis and the hero of Plataea, were perverted into framing plans for undoing their own work and enslaving the country which they had delivered. It may well have been, however, that Themistocles merely intended to compass his own advantage at the expense of the Great King, and had no serious thought of carrying out any designs against Greece. He won high honour in Persia and was given the government of the district of Magnesia, where Magnesia itself furnished his table with bread, Lampsacus with wine, and Myus with meat. Themistocles died in Magnesia, and the Magnesians gave him outside their walls the resting-place which was denied to him in his own country.

SECT. 5. The Confederacy of Delos becomes an Athenian Empire.—The conduct of the war which the

Confederacy of Delos was waging against Persia had been entrusted to Cimon, the son of Miltiades. We have seen already how he drove Pausanias out of Sestus and Byzantium.

476 B.C. His next exploit was to capture Eion, a town near the mouth of the Strymon, and the most important stronghold of the Persians east of the Hellespont. Then he reduced the

474 B.C. rocky island of Scyrus, a stronghold of pirates, which was colonised by Attic settlers. And here was made a famous discovery. There was a Delphic oracle which bade the Athenians take up the bones of Theseus and keep them in an honourable resting-place; and, whether by chance or after a search, there was found in Scyrus a grave containing a warrior's corpse of heroic size. It was taken to be the

corpse of Theseus; Cimon brought it back to Athens; and perhaps none of his exploits earned him greater popularity.

A few years later, Xerxes had equipped a great armament—his last resistance to the triumph of Greek arms. Cimon, who had been busy in the northern Aegean, now sailed south. He delivered both the Greek and the native coast towns of Caria from Persian rule, and constrained the Lycian communities to enrol themselves in the Confederacy of 468 B.C. Delos. Then at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia he found the Persian army and the Persian fleet, and overcame them in a double battle by land and sea, destroying 200 Phoenician ships. This victory sealed the acquisition of southern Asia Minor, from Caria to Pamphylia, for the Athenian federation, and delivered any Ionian cities that still paid tribute to Persia.

It could not be said that the Confederacy of Delos had failed to do its work. The victory on the Pamphylian river freed Greece from all danger on the side of the Persian empire; and Cimon soon followed up his success by reducing some places on the Thracian Chersonese which were still held by the barbarians. But the confederate fleet had been set to do other work. It had been set to make war upon Greek states, which were unwilling to belong to the league. Carystus, which, unlike the other cities of Euboea, had held aloof from the Confederacy, was subjugated, and made, in spite of herself, a member of the 472 B.C. league. Naxos seceded from the league, and the fleet of the allies reduced her by blockade. Each act was defensible, 469 B.C. but both acts alike seemed to be acts of tyrannical outrage on the independence of free states, and were an offence to public opinion in Greece. The oppression was all the worse, inasmuch as both Naxos and Carystus were deprived of their autonomy. They became in fact subjects of Athens, who was already forging the fetters with which she would bind her allies.

The victory of the Eurymedon left Athens free to pursue this inevitable policy of transforming the Confederacy into an empire. The most powerful confederate state on the Thracian coast was the island city of Thasos. Athens was making new endeavours to plant a settlement on the Strymon, and her interests collided with those of the Thasians, whose prosperity largely depended upon their trade in Thrace. A dispute arose about a gold mine and the islanders revolted.

463 B.C. The fleet of the Thasians was defeated by Cimon, and after a long blockade they capitulated. Their walls were pulled down, their ships were handed over to Athens, they gave up all claim to the mine and the mainland, and agreed to pay whatever tribute was demanded.

The instances of these three island cities, Carystus, Naxos, and Thasos, are typical. There were now three classes of members in the Confederacy of Delos; there were (1) the non-tributary allies which contributed ships; (2) the tributary allies which were independent; and (3) the tributary allies which were subject. It was obviously for the interest of Athens that as many members as possible should contribute money, and as few as possible contribute ships. For the ships which the tribute money furnished out were simply an addition to her own fleet, because they were under her direct control. She consequently aimed at diminishing the members of the first class; and soon it consisted of only the three large and wealthy islands—Lesbos, Chios, and Samos. Again, it was to the interest of Athens to transfer the members of the second class into the third, and win control over the internal affairs of the cities. As a rule, Athens prescribed to her subjects the general form of their constitutions, and it need hardly be said that these constitutions were always democratic.

As the process of turning the Alliance into an Empire advanced, Athens found herself able to discontinue the meetings of the Confederate assembly in the island of

Delos. The formal establishment of her empire may be dated ten years after the war with Thasos, when the treasury of the league was transferred from Delos to Athens. The Confederacy of Delos no longer existed; and, though the term *Alliance* was always officially used, men no longer hesitated to use the word *empire* in ordinary speech. The Athenian empire embraced the Aegean Sea with its northern and eastern fringes, from Methone in the north-west to Lycian Phaselis in the south-east. The number of cities which belonged to it at its height was considerably more than 200.

The Athenian Empire was dissolved half a century after the translation of the treasury from Delos to Athens. We shall see that it began to decline not many years after it had reached the height of its power. The first principles of the political thought and political life of Greece were opposed to such an union. The sovereign city-state was the basis of the civilised Hellenic world, and no city-state was ready, if it could help it, to surrender any part of its sovereignty. In the face of a common danger, cities might be ready to combine together in a league, each parting with some of her sovereign powers to a common federal council, but preserving the right of secession; and this was the idea of the Confederacy of Delos in its initial form. But when the motives which induced a city to join a federation became less strong and pressing, every member was anxious to regain its complete independence. An empire, however disguised, was always considered an injustice.

SECT. 6. Policy and Ostracism of Cimon.—As the Persian War had brought out more vividly the contrast between Greek and barbarian, so the Confederacy of Delos emphasised a division existing within the Greek race itself, the contrast of Dorian and Ionian. The Dorian federation of the Peloponnesus under the headship of Sparta stood over

against the Ionian federation of the Aegean under the leadership of Athens.

For some years the antagonism lay dormant. The danger from Persia had not passed away. But the preservation of peace was also due, in some measure, to Aristides



FIG. 44.—Portrait head, perhaps of Cimon, on a gem, engraved by Dexamenus.

and Cimon. The two guiding principles of Cimon's policy were the prosecution of the war against Persia and the maintenance of good relations with the Lacedaemonians. He upheld the doctrine of dual leadership: Athens should be mistress of the seas, but she should recognise Sparta as the mistress on the continent. But after the death of Aristides

younger statesmen arose and formed a party of opposition against Cimon and the oligarchs who rallied around him. The two chief politicians of this democratic party were Ephialtes, and Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, who now began to play a prominent part in the Assembly.

Meanwhile Sparta herself had dealt a blow to Cimon's policy. The Spartan citizens lived over a perpetual danger—the discontent of their Perioeci and Helots. An earthquake had laid Sparta in ruins, and the moment was chosen by the Messenian serfs to shake off the yoke. They annihilated in battle a company of 300 Spartans, but then they were defeated, and sought refuge in the stronghold of Ithome. On that steep hill they held out for a few years. The Spartans were driven to ask the aid of allies.

The democratic politicians at Athens lifted up their voices against the sending of any aid. But the people listened to

464 B.C.

the counsels of Cimon: "We must not leave Hellas lame; we must not allow Athens to lose her yoke-fellow." Cimon took 4000 hoplites to Messenia, but, though the Athenians ^{462 B.C.} had a reputation for skill in besieging fortresses, their endeavours to take Ithome failed. Then Sparta rounded and smote Athens in the face. She told the Athenians, alone of all the allies who were encamped around the hill, that she required their help no more.

This incident exposed the futility of making sacrifices to court Sparta's friendship. When Cimon returned with his policy discredited, Ephialtes and his party denounced him as a "Philo-Laconian," and felt that they could safely attempt to ostracize him. An ostracism was held, and Cimon was banished. Soon afterwards a mysterious crime ^{461 B.C.} was committed. Cimon's chief antagonist Ephialtes was murdered, and no one ever ascertained with surety who the murderers were.

The Athenians had presently an opportunity of retaliating on Sparta for her contumely. The blockade of Ithome was continued and the rebels at last capitulated. They ^{459 B.C.} were allowed to leave the Peloponnesus unharmed, on the condition that they should never return. The Athenians who had helped to besiege them now found them a shelter. They settled the Messenians in a new home at Naupactus, on the Corinthian Gulf, a place where Athens had recently established a naval station.

CHAPTER IX

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF PERICLES

SECT. I. **The Completion of the Athenian Democracy.**

—The democratic principle of the people's sovereignty was still further developed at Athens under the guidance of Ephialtes (till he was murdered), and of Pericles, for thirty years the most prominent figure in Greece. His father was Xanthippus, the rival of Themistocles and Aristides; his mother, Agariste, was niece of Cleisthenes. He was trained as a soldier, but he owed much to two distinguished thinkers who taught him: the Athenian, Damon, famous as a musician, and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, whose philosophic theory of the universe, its creation and its structure, freed Pericles from the superstitions of the multitude whom it was his task to guide. But his political ideas were his own, as was the lucid and persuasive eloquence by which he achieved his ends. In personal traits he was a striking contrast to Cimon, the loose and genial boon companion. He seldom walked abroad; he was strict in the economy of his household; he avoided convivial parties, and jealously maintained the dignity of his reserve.

The most conservative institution in Athens was the Council of Areopagus, for it was filled up from the archons, who were taken from the two richest classes in the state.

462 B.C. By a measure of Ephialtes the censorial powers which

enabled it to inquire into the lives of private citizens were abolished. Nothing was left to the venerable body but



FIG. 45.—Pericles; copy of the portrait by Cresilas.

its jurisdiction in homicidal cases. All impeachments for crimes which threatened the public weal were henceforward brought before the Council or the Assembly; and the people tried in their own courts defaulting officials.

About the same time another step was taken on the path of democracy by making the archonship a paid office and open to all classes. The two engines of the democratic development were lot and pay. The archons and other lesser officers, and the members of the council, were taken by lot from a select number of candidates; but these candidates were chosen by deliberate election. This preliminary election was done away with; and the Council of Five Hundred, as well as the archons, were appointed by lot from all the eligible citizens. By this means every citizen had an equal chance of holding political office and taking a part in the conduct of public affairs.

It is clear that this system could not work unless the offices were paid; for the poor citizens would have been unable to give up their time to the service of the state. Accordingly pay was introduced not only for the archonship, but for the members of the Council. The payment of state offices was the leading feature of the democratic reforms of Pericles; and at the time of the attack on the Areopagus,

c. 462 B.C. Pericles carried a measure that the judges should receive a remuneration of either one or two obols a day. The amount of judicial business was growing so enormously that it would have been impossible to find a sufficient number of judges ready to attend day after day in the courts without any compensation.

It was now to the interest of every Athenian that there should be as few citizens as possible to participate in the new privileges and profits of citizenship. Accordingly, about ten years later the rolls of the burghers were stringently revised; and a law was passed that the name of no child should be admitted whose father and mother were not Athenian citizens legitimately wedded. This law would have excluded Themistocles and Cleisthenes the lawgiver, whose mothers were foreigners.

A feature of the Athenian democracy, not to be lost sight

of, is that public burdens were laid upon the rich burghers which did not fall upon the poor, and which might fall to a man's lot only once or twice in his life. We have already seen how trierarchs were taken from the richer classes to equip and man triremes, in which they were themselves obliged to sail, and for which they were entirely responsible. Again, when the city sent solemn deputations on some religious errand, a wealthy citizen was chosen to eke out at his cost the money supplied for the purpose by the public treasury, and to conduct the deputation. But none of the liturgies, as these public burdens were called, was more important or more characteristic of Athenian life than that of providing the choruses for the festivals of Dionysus. Every year each tribe named one of its wealthy tribesmen to be a *chorégos*, and his duties were to furnish and array a chorus and provide a skilled trainer to teach it the dances and songs of the drama which it was to perform. He whose chorus was victorious in the tragic or the comic competition was crowned and received a bronze tripod. The state's endowment of religion turned out to be an endowment of brilliant genius; and the rich men who were called upon to spend their time and money in furnishing the dancers did service to the great masters of tragedy and comedy, and thereby served the whole world.

SECT. 2. **War of Athens with the Peloponnesians.**

—The banishment of Cimon was the signal for a complete change in the foreign policy of Athens. She abandoned the alliance with the Lacedaemonians and formed a new alliance with their enemies, Argos and Thessaly. Her naval empire and rapidly growing trade brought her into deadly rivalry with Sparta's allies—the two great trading cities, Corinth and Aegina. And when an Athenian general took Naupactus from the Ozolian Locrians and thus secured a naval station on the Corinthian Gulf, whence Athens could intercept at any time Corinthian argosies

sailing for the west, war was certain, and the occasion soon came.

The Megarians, on account of a frontier dispute with
459 B.C. Corinth, deserted the Peloponnesian league and placed themselves under Athenian protection. Nothing could be more welcome to Athens than the adhesion of Megara. Holding Megara, she had a strong frontier against the Peloponnesus, commanding the isthmus from Pagae on the Corinthian, to Nisaea on the Saronic, bay. Without any delays she set about the building of a double line of wall from the hill of Megara down to the haven of Nisaea, which faces Salamis, and she garrisoned these "Long Walls" with her own troops. Thus the eastern coast-road was under her control, and Attica had a strong bulwark against invasion by land.

War soon broke out, but at first Sparta took no active part. At the little island of Cecryphalea, which lies between Aegina and the Argive shore, the Athenians defeated a Peloponnesian fleet. At this point the Aeginetans enter the struggle. They saw that if Corinth sustained a severe defeat, their own fate was sealed; Athens would become absolute mistress in the Saronic sea. A great naval battle was fought
458 B.C. near Aegina; the allies of both Aegina and Athens were engaged; and the Athenians, having taken seventy ships, landed on the island and blockaded the town. Thereupon the Peloponnesians sent a force of hoplites to help the Aeginetans; while the Corinthians advanced into the Megarid, expecting that the Athenians would find it impossible to protect Megara and blockade Aegina at the same time. But the citizens who were below and above the regular military age were formed into an extraordinary army and marched to the Megarid under the strategos Myronides. A battle was fought; both sides claimed the victory; but, when the Corinthians withdrew, the Athenians raised a trophy. Urged by the taunts of their fellow-citizens,

the Corinthian soldiers returned in twelve days and began to set up a counter-trophy, but as they were at work the Athenians rushed forth from Megara and inflicted a severe defeat.

The year of these successes might fairly be described as an *annus mirabilis* in Athenian history. The victories of Cecryphalea and Aegina were won with only a portion of her fleet. For, in the very hour when she was about to be brought face to face with the armed opposition of rival Greek powers, she had embarked in an expedition to Egypt—one of the most daring ventures she ever undertook.

A fleet of 200 Athenian and Confederate galleys was operating against Persia in Cyprian seas, when it was invited to cross over to Egypt by Inaros, a Libyan potentate, who had stirred up the lands of the lower Nile to revolt against their Persian masters. The invitation was most alluring. It meant that, if Athens delivered Egypt from Persian rule, she would secure the chief control of the foreign trade with the Nile valley and be able to establish a naval station on the coast. The generals of the Aegean fleet accepted the call of the Libyan prince.

The Athenians entered the Nile to find Inaros triumphant, having gained a great victory in the Delta over a Persian army which had been sent to quell him. Sailing up, they won possession of the city of Memphis, except the citadel, the "White Castle," in which the Persian garrison held out. But it was a fatal coincidence that the power of Athens should have been divided at this moment. With her full forces she might have inflicted a crushing blow on the Peloponnesians; with her full forces she might have prospered in Egypt. 459 B.C.

The siege of Aegina was continued, and, within two years after the battle, the Aeginetans capitulated, and agreed to surrender their fleet and pay tribute to Athens. Few successes can have been more welcome or profitable to 457 B.C.

the Athenians than this. Their rival in commerce, the rich Dorian island which offended their eyes and attracted their desires when they looked forth from their hill across the waters of their bay, was at length powerless in their hands.

In the meantime events in another part of Greece had led the Lacedaemonians themselves to take part in the war. The errand which called them out of the Peloponnesus was an errand of piety, to succour their mother people, the Dorians of the north, one of whose three little towns had been taken by the Phocians. To force the aggressors to restore the place was an easy task for an army which consisted of 1500 Lacedaemonian hoplites

and 10,000 troops of the allies. The real work of the expedition lay in Boeotia. It was clearly the policy of Sparta to raise up here a powerful state to hold Athens in check. Accordingly Sparta now set up the power of Thebes again, and forced the Boeotian cities to join her league. When the army had done its work in Boeotia, its return to the Peloponnesus was beset by difficulties.

The Athenians guarded the passes in the Megarid, their ships beset the Corinthian Gulf. In this embarrassment the Spartans seem to have resolved to march straight upon Athens, where the people were now engaged on the building of Long Walls from the city to the harbour. The Peloponnesian army advanced to Tanagra, near the Attic frontier; but before they crossed the borders the Athenians went forth to meet them, 14,000 strong, including 1000 Argives and some Thessalian cavalry. The banished statesman Cimon now came to the Athenian camp, pitched on Boeotian soil, and, being refused leave to defend his country, exhorted his partisans to fight valiantly. This act of Cimon prepared the way for his recall; in the battle



FIG. 46.—Coin of Thebes, fifth century (reverse).
Heracles strangling
snakes [legend:
ΘΕΒΑΙ(ΟΣ)].

which followed, his friends fought so stubbornly that none of them survived. There was great slaughter on both sides; 457 B.C. but the Lacedaemonians gained the victory. But the battle saved Athens, and the victory only enabled the victors to return by the Isthmus.

Athens now desired to make a truce with Sparta in order to gain time. No man was more fitted to compass this than the exile Cimon. The people, at the instance of Pericles, passed a decree recalling him; but when Cimon had negotiated the truce, he withdrew from Athens.

Two months after the battle, the Athenians made an expedition into Boeotia under the command of Myronides. A decisive battle was fought at Oenophyta, and the 457 B.C. Athenians became masters of the whole Boeotian land. The Boeotian cities were not enrolled in the maritime Confederacy of Delos, but were obliged to furnish contingents to the Athenian armies. At the same time the Phocians entered into the alliance of Athens, and the Opuntian Locrians were constrained to acknowledge her supremacy. Such were the consequences of Oenophyta and Tanagra. Athens could now quietly complete the building of her Long Walls.

But in the far south her arms were not so prosperous. Since the capture of Memphis, no success seems to have been gained, and the White Castle still held out. Artaxerxes sent a large army to Egypt under Megabyzus, who was supported by a Phoenician fleet. Having won a battle, he drove the Greeks out of Memphis and shut them up in Prosopitis, an island formed by a canal which intersected two channels of the Nile. Here he blockaded them for eighteen months. At last he drained the canal and turned aside the water, so that the Greek ships were left high and dry, and almost the whole island was reconnected with the banks. Thus the Persians were able to march across to the island. The Greeks having burned their ships retreated to

gave a pledge securing the coasts of the Persian empire from attack.

The first act in the strife of Greece and Persia thus closes. All the cities of Hellas which had come under barbarian sway, except in Cyprus, had been reunited to the world of free Hellenic states.

SECT. 4. **Athenian Reverses. The Thirty Years' Peace.**—

The peace with Persia, however, was not followed by further Athenian expansion; on the contrary, some of the most recent acquisitions began to fall away. Orchomenus and Chaeronea and some other towns in western Boeotia were seized by exiled oligarchs; and it was necessary for Athens to intervene promptly. The general Tolmides went forth with a wholly inadequate number of troops. He took and garrisoned Chaeronea, but did not attempt Orchomenus. On his way home he was set upon by the exiles from Orchomenus and some others, in the neighbourhood of
 447 B.C. Coronea, and defeated. He was himself slain; many of the hoplites were taken prisoners; and the Athenians in order to obtain their release resigned Boeotia. Thus the battle of Coronea undid the work of Oenophyta. The loss of Boeotia was followed by the loss of Phocis and Locris.

Still more serious results ensued. Euboea and Megara revolted at the same moment; here too oligarchical parties were at work. Pericles, who was a General, immediately went to Euboea with the regiments of seven of the tribes, while those of the remaining three marched into the Megarid. But he had no sooner reached the island than he was overtaken by the news that the garrison in the city of Megara had been massacred and that a Peloponnesian army was threatening Attica. He promptly returned, and with difficulty managed to unite his forces with the troops in the Megarid. The return of Pericles disconcerted King Pleistoanax, who commanded the Lacedaemonians, and he withdrew. Pericles was thus set free to carry out the

reduction of Euboea. Histiaea, the city in the north of the island, was most hardly dealt with, probably because her resistance was most obstinate; the people were driven out, their territory annexed to Athens. But peace was felt to be so indispensable that the Athenians resigned themselves to purchasing a durable treaty by considerable concessions. They had lost Megara, but they still held the two ports, Nisaea and Pagae. These, as well as Achaea, they agreed to surrender, and on this basis a peace was concluded for ^{445 B.C.} thirty years between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. All the allies of both sides were enumerated in the treaty, and it was stipulated that neither Athens nor Lacedaemon was to admit into her alliance an ally of the other, while neutral states might join whichever alliance they chose.

It was a humiliating peace for Athens, and perhaps would not have been concluded but for the alarm which had been caused by the inroad of the Peloponnesians into Attic territory. While the loss of Boeotia and the evacuation of Achaea might be lightly endured, the loss of the Megarid was a serious blow. For, while Athens held the long walls from Nisaea and the passes of Geranea, she had complete immunity from Peloponnesian invasions of her soil. Henceforth Attica was always exposed to such aggressions.

SECT. 5. The Imperialism of Pericles, and the Opposition to his Policy.—The cities of the Athenian alliance might have claimed, when the Persian war was ended, that they should resume their original and rightful freedom. The fair answer to this claim would have been, that peace would endure only so long as a power was maintained strong enough to stand up against the might of Persia. But in any case Athens was in the full career of an ambitious "imperialist" state. The tributes which she imposed on her subjects were probably not oppressive, and were constantly revised. But there was much that was

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galling in her empire, to communities in which the love of freedom was strongly developed.

Pericles had been the guide of the Athenian people in their imperial policy. But that policy had not been unchallenged. There was a strong oligarchical party at Athens which not only disliked the democracy of their city, but arraigned her empire; and there was one man at least who may claim the credit of having honestly espoused the cause of the allied cities against the unscrupulous selfishness of his own city. This was Thucydides, the son of Melesias. He maintained that the tribute should be reserved exclusively for the purpose for which it was levied, the defence of Greece against Persia, and that Athens had no right to spend it on other things. It was an injustice that the allies should have to defray any part of the costs of an Athenian campaign in Boeotia or of a new temple in Athens. This was a just view, but justice is never entirely compatible with the growth of a country to political greatness, and Pericles was resolved to make his country great at all hazards.

Among the measures which Pericles initiated to strengthen the empire of his city, none was more important in its results than the system of settling Athenian citizens abroad. The colonies which were thus sent to different parts of the empire, served as garrisons in the lands of subject allies, and they also helped to provide for part of the superfluous population of Athens. The first of these Periclean colonies was established in the Thracian Chersonese, under the personal supervision of Pericles himself. Lands were bought from the allied cities of the peninsula, and a thousand Athenian citizens, chiefly of the poor and unemployed, were allotted farms and assigned to the several cities. The payment for the land was made in the shape of a reduction of the tribute.

The policy was naturally popular at Athens, since it provided for thousands of unemployed who cumbered the

streets. But it was a policy which was highly unpopular among the allies, in whose territories the settlements were made.

The imperialism of Pericles was indeed of a lofty kind. His aim was to make Athens the queen of Hellas; to spread her sway on the mainland as well as beyond the seas; and to make her political influence felt in those states which it would have been unwise and perhaps impossible to draw within the borders of her empire. Shortly before the loss of Boeotia through the defeat of Coronea, Athens addressed to Greece an open declaration of her Panhellenic ambition. She invited the Greek states to send representatives to an Hellenic congress at Athens, for the purpose of discussing certain matters of common interest. To restore the temples which had been burned by the Persians, to pay the votive offerings which were due to the gods for the great deliverance, and to take common measures for clearing the seas of piracy,—this was the programme which Athens proposed to the consideration of Greece. If the congress had taken place it would have inaugurated an amphictiony of all Hellas, and Athens would have been the centre of this vast religious union. It was a sublime project, but it could not be. It was not to be expected that Sparta would fall in with a project which, however noble and pious it sounded, might tempt or help Athens to strike out new and perilous paths of ambition and aggrandisement. The Athenian envoys were rebuffed in the Peloponnesus, and the plan fell through.

SECT. 6. **The Restoration of the Temples.**—It remained then for Athens to carry out that part of the programme which concerned herself. It devolved upon the city, as a religious duty, to make good the injuries which the barbarian had inflicted upon the habitations of her gods, and fully to pay her debt of gratitude to heaven for the defeat of the Mede. In this, above all, was the

greatness of Pericles displayed, that he discerned the importance of performing this duty on a grand scale. He recognised that the city by ennobling the houses of her gods would ennoble herself; and that she could express her own might and her ideals in no worthier way than by the erection of beautiful temples.

450-30 B.C.

Of the monuments which in the course of twenty years changed the appearance of the Acropolis, one of the first was a gigantic statue of Athena, wrought in bronze. The goddess stood near the west brow of her own hill, looking south-westward, and her helmet and the tip of her lance flashing in the sun could be seen far off at sea. The building of the new house of the goddess, which had been begun in the days of Themistocles, was now resumed on the same site, and the same foundations; but it was resumed on an entirely different plan, which was drawn up by the gifted architect Ictinus. Instead of foreign Parian marble, native Attic from the quarries of Pentelicus was employed. This perfect Dorian temple, which came afterwards to be generally known as the Parthenon, contained two rooms, between which there was no communication. The eastern room into which one entered from the pronaos was the temple proper, and contained the statue of the goddess. It was about a hundred feet long, and was hence officially called the *Hecatompedos*. The goddess stood in her dwelling, majestic and smiling, her colossal figure arrayed in a golden robe, a helmet on her head, her right hand holding a golden Victory, and her left resting on her shield, while the snake Erichthonius was coiled at her feet. It was a wooden statue covered with ivory and gold—ivory for the exposed flesh, gold for the raiment—and hence called *chryselephantine*. It was wrought by the Athenian sculptor of genius, Pheidias, the son of Charmides.

To Pheidias too was entrusted the task of designing and carrying out those plastic decorations which were necessary

to the completion of a great temple. In the two pediments and on the frieze which ran round the wall of the temple, within the colonnade, he left monuments of his genius and his skill, for mankind to adore. The triangle above the eastern portal was adorned with the scene of the birth of Athena, who has sprung from the head of Zeus, at the




FIG. 49.—Athena and Hephaestus, on the frieze of the Parthenon (British Museum).

rising of the sun and the setting of the moon ; and Iris the heavenly messenger was shown, going forth to carry the good news to the ends of the world. The pediment of the western end was occupied with the passage in the life of the goddess that specially appertained to Attica—her triumph on the Acropolis in her contest with her rival Poseidon, for the lordship of the land, when the olive

came forth from the earth by her enchantment. The subject of the wonderful frieze which encircled the temple from end to end was the most solemn of all the ceremonies which the Athenians performed in honour of their queen. At the great Panathenaic festival, every fourth year, they went up in long procession to her temple to present her with a new robe. The advance of this procession, starting from the western side, and moving simultaneously along the northern and southern sides, to meet at the eastern entrance, was vividly shown on the frieze of the Parthenon. Walking along the peristyle and looking upwards, the spectator saw the Athenian knights—beautiful young men—on horseback, charioteers, citizens on foot, musicians, kine and sheep led for sacrifice, stately maidens with sacred vessels, the nine archons of the city, all advancing to the house of Athena, where she entertains the celestials on her feast-day. The high gods are seated on thrones, Zeus on one side of Athena, Hephaestus on the other; and near the goddess is a peplos in the hands of a priest. The western side of the frieze is still in its place, but the rest has been removed—the greater part to our own island.

These and other splendid buildings required a large outlay of money, and thus gave the political opponents of Pericles a welcome handle against him. Thucydides accused Pericles not merely of squandering the resources of the state which ought to be kept as a reserve for war, but of misappropriating the money of the Confederacy for purely Athenian purposes. It is certainly true that some money was taken from the treasury of the Hellenotamiae for the new buildings, but this was only a very small part of the cost, which was mainly defrayed by the treasury of Athena and by the public treasury of Athens. But Pericles, with bold sophistry, argued that the allies had no reason to complain, so long as Athens defended them efficiently.

Three years after the Thirty Years' Peace, Thucydides asked the people to adjudicate by the sherd. But the
442 B.C. people voted for the ostracism of Thucydides, and henceforward Pericles had no opponent of influence to thwart his policy or cross his way.

In the field of art Athens partly fulfilled the ambition of Pericles, who, when he could not make her the queen, desired that she should be the instructress, of Hellas. When Pheidias had completed the great statue of Athena in gold and ivory, and had seen it set up in the new temple, he went forth, invited by the men of Elis, to make the image for the temple of Zeus at Olympia. For five years in his workshop in the Altis the Athenian sculptor wrought at the "great chryselephantine god," and the colossal image which came from his hands was probably the highest creation ever achieved by the plastic art of Greece. The Panhellenic god, seated on a lofty throne, and clad in a golden robe, held a Victory in his right hand, a sceptre in his left. He was bearded, and his hair was wreathed with a branch of olive. Many have borne witness to the impression which the serene aspect of this manifest divinity always produced upon the heart of the beholder. "Let a man sick and weary in his soul, who has passed through many distresses and sorrows, whose pillow is unvisited by kindly sleep, stand in front of this image; he will, I deem, forget all the terrors and troubles of human life." An Athenian had wrought, for one of the two great centres of Hellenic religion, the most sublime expression of the Greek ideal of godhead.

SECT. 7. The Piræus. Athenian Commercial Policy.—The Piræus had grown to be one of the great ports of Greece, and its defences were improved by the construction of a new long wall, running parallel and close to the northern wall. The southern or Phaleron wall was now allowed to fall into disrepair. Dry docks, new store-

houses, and various buildings for the convenience of shipping were constructed round the three harbours. Athens and her harbour increased in population; the total of the inhabitants of Attica seems to have been at this time about 250,000 (twice as large as the Corinthian state). But nearly half of this number were slaves.

Attic fame and commerce was spreading in the west. Her standard of coinage was adopted for the currency of Greek cities in Sicily; Rome sent envoys to her to obtain a copy of Solon's code. Yet the more vital interests of Athens were in the East, connected especially with imports of grain from the Euxine. The price of corn fluctuated with every disturbance in these regions, and it was essential to secure this trade route. Her possession of the Chersonese, which Pericles had strengthened, controlled the Hellespont; Byzantium and Chalcedon, members of her league, held the Bosphorus. And Pericles himself sailed with an imposing squadron into the Pontus to impress the barbarians of those regions with the power of Athens.

The Thracian tribes became united under a powerful c. 450 B.C. king, Teres, and his son Sitalces, and Athens needed to keep a watchful eye on this new power. An important port was the Athenian fortress of Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, near a bridge over which ran all the trade between Thrace and Macedonia, and to which came down the produce of the gold mines in the "hinterland." A new city, founded here at the bridge on the Strymon, was called Amphipolis, 436 B.C. and became quickly the most important place on the coast.

SECT. 8. The Revolt of Samos.—After the ostracism of Thucydides, Pericles for nearly fifteen years ruled as absolutely as a tyrant. But his position was entirely based on his moral influence over the sovereign people. He had the power of persuading them to do whatever he thought good, and every year for fifteen years after his rival's banishment he was elected one of the Generals. Although




Fig. 50.

all the ten Generals nominally possessed equal powers, yet the man who possessed the supreme political influence was practically chief of the ten and had the conduct of foreign affairs in his hands. Pericles was not irresponsible; for at the end of any official year the people could decline to re-elect him, and call him to account for his actions. When he had once gained the undisputed mastery, the only forces which he used to maintain it were wisdom and eloquence. The desire of autocratic authority was doubtless part of his nature; but his spirit was fine enough to feel that it was a greater thing to be leader of freemen whom he must convince by speech than despot of subjects who must obey his nod.

Five years after the 'Thirty Years' Peace he was called upon to display his generalship. Athens was involved in a war with one of the strongest members of her Confederacy, the island of Samos. The occasion of this war was a dispute which Samos had with another member, Miletus, about the possession of Priene. Athens decided in favour of Miletus, and Pericles sailed with forty-four triremes to Samos, where he overthrew the aristocracy and established a democratic constitution, leaving a garrison to protect it. But the nobles who had fled to the mainland returned one night and captured the garrison. Athens received another blow at the same time by the revolt of Byzantium. Pericles sailed speedily back to Samos and invested it with a large fleet. At the end of nine months the city surrendered. 439 B.C. The Samians undertook to pull down their walls, and to surrender their ships, and pay a war indemnity, which amounted to 1500 talents or thereabouts. Byzantium also came back to the confederacy.

SECT. 9. Higher Education. The Sophists.—Since the days of Nestor and Odysseus, the art of persuasive speech was held in honour by the Greeks. With the rise of the democratic commonwealths it became more important. If a man was hauled into a law-court by his enemies, and

knew not how to speak, he was like an unarmed civilian attacked by soldiers in panoply. The power of clearly expressing ideas in such a way as to persuade an audience, was an art to be learned and taught. The demand was met by teachers who travelled about and gave general instruction in the art of speaking and in the art of reasoning, and, out of their encyclopaedic knowledge, lectured on all possible subjects. They received fees for their courses, and were called Sophists, of which name perhaps our best equivalent is "professors." The name acquired a slightly unfavourable colour—partly owing to the distrust felt by the masses towards men who know too much. But this dislike did not imply the idea that the professors were impostors, who deliberately sought to hoodwink the public by arguments in which they did not believe themselves.

The sophists did not confine themselves to teaching. They wrote much; they discussed occasional topics, criticised political affairs, diffused ideas. But the greatest of the professors were much more than either teachers or journalists. They not only diffused but set afloat ideas; they enriched the world with contributions to knowledge. They were all alike rationalists, spreaders of enlightenment; but they were very various in their views and doctrines. Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Socrates of Athens, each had his own strongly marked individuality.



FIG. 51.—Coin of Elis, fifth century (obverse).—Seated Zeus with eagle.



FIG. 52.—Coin of Corcyra, fifth century (obverse).
Head of Hera [legend : KOP].

CHAPTER X

THE WAR OF ATHENS WITH THE PELOPONNESIANS

(431-421 B.C.)

SECT. 1. **The Prelude of the War.**—The incidents which led up to the "Peloponnesian War" are connected with two Corinthian colonies, Corcyra and Potidaea.

(1) Party struggles had taken place in Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra. The people, harassed by the banished nobles and their barbarian allies, asked help from their mother-city. Corcyra refused, and Epidamnus turned to Corinth. The Corinthians sent troops and a number of new colonists. The Corcyraeans demanded their dismissal, and, when the demand was refused, blockaded Epidamnus. Corinth then sent a squadron of seventy-five ships with 2000 hoplites against the Corcyraeans. The powerful navy of Corcyra consisted of 120 ships, of which forty were besieging Epidamnus. With the remaining eighty 435 B.C. they won a complete victory over the Corinthians outside the Ambracian gulf; and on the same day Epidamnus surrendered.

But Corinth began to prepare for a greater effort against her powerful and detested colony. The report of the ships she was building and the navies she was hiring frightened Corcyra, for Corcyra had no allies. It was her obvious policy to seek a connexion with Athens, and she determined to do so. The Corinthians hearing of this

knew not how to speak, he was like an unarmed civilian attacked by soldiers in panoply. The power of clearly expressing ideas in such a way as to persuade an audience, was an art to be learned and taught. The demand was met by teachers who travelled about and gave general instruction in the art of speaking and in the art of reasoning, and, out of their encyclopaedic knowledge, lectured on all possible subjects. They received fees for their courses, and were called Sophists, of which name perhaps our best equivalent is "professors." The name acquired a slightly unfavourable colour—partly owing to the distrust felt by the masses towards men who know too much. But this dislike did not imply the idea that the professors were impostors, who deliberately sought to hoodwink the public by arguments in which they did not believe themselves.

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intention, tried to thwart it, and the envoys of Corcyra and Corinth appeared together before the Assembly of Athens. The arguments which Thucydides has put into their mouths express clearly the bearings of the situation and the importance of the decision for Athens. The main argument for accepting the proffered alliance of Corcyra depends on the assumption that war is imminent. "The Lacedaemonians, fearing the growth of your empire, are eager to take up arms, and the Corinthians, who are your enemies, are all-powerful with them." . . . "If the Corinthians get hold of our fleet, and you allow the two to become one, you will have to fight against the united navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. But if you make us your allies, you will have our navy in addition to your own." The most cogent argument for Corinth was that if Athens allied herself with Corcyra she would take a step which if not in itself violating the Thirty Years' Peace would necessarily involve a violation of it.

After two debates the Assembly agreed to an alliance with Corcyra, but of a defensive kind. Athens was only to give armed help, in case Corcyra itself were threatened. By this decision she avoided a direct violation of the treaty. Ten ships were sent to Corcyra with orders not to fight unless Corcyra or some of the places belonging to it were attacked. A great and tumultuous naval engagement ensued near the islet of Sybota. A Corcyraean fleet of 110 ships was ranged against a Corinthian of 150—the outcome of two years of preparation. The right wing of the Corcyraeans was worsted, and the ten Athenian ships, which had held aloof at first, interfered to prevent its total discomfiture. In the evening the sudden sight of twenty new Athenian ships on the horizon caused the Corinthians to retreat, and the next day they declined battle.

(2) The breach with Corinth forced Athens to look

to the security of her interests in the Chalcidic peninsula. The city of Potidaea, which occupies and guards the isthmus of Pallene, was a tributary ally of Athens, but received its annual magistrates from its mother-city, Corinth. Immediately after the battle of Sybota, Athens required the Potidaeans to rase the city-walls on the south side where they were not needed for protection against Macedonia, and to abandon the system of Corinthian magistrates. The Potidaeans refused; they were supported by the promise of Sparta to invade Attica, in case Potidaea were attacked by Athens. But the situation was complicated by the policy of the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, who organised a general revolt of Chalcidice against Athens; and even persuaded the Chalcidians to pull down their cities on the coast and concentrate themselves in the strong inland town of Olynthus. Thus the revolt of Potidaea forms part of a general movement in that quarter against the Athenian dominion.

The Athenians advanced against Potidaea and gained an advantage over the Corinthian general, Aristeus, who ^{432 B.C.} had arrived with some Peloponnesian forces. They then invested the city. So far the Corinthians had acted alone. Now, seeing the danger of Potidaea, they took active steps to incite the Lacedaemonians to declare war against Athens.

Pericles knew that war was coming, and he promptly struck. Megara had assisted Corinth at the battle of ^{432 B.C.} Sybota; the Athenians passed a measure excluding the Megarians from the markets and ports of their empire. The decree spelt economical ruin to Megara, and Megara was an important member of the Peloponnesian league.

The allies appeared at Sparta and brought formal charges against Athens of having broken the Thirty Years' Peace and committed various acts of injustice. But it was not the Corcyraean incidents, or the siege of Potidaea, or the Megarian decree, that caused the Peloponnesian War, though

jointly they hastened its outbreak ; it was the fear and jealousy of the Athenian power. The only question was whether it was the right hour to engage in that unavoidable struggle. The Spartan king, Archidamus, advised delay. But the ephors were in favour of war. It was decided that the Athenians were in the wrong, and this decision necessarily led to a declaration of war.

Thucydides makes the Corinthian envoys, at the assembly in Sparta, the spokesmen of a famous comparison. "You have never considered, O Lacedaemonians, what manner of men are these Athenians with whom you will have to fight, and how utterly unlike yourselves. They are revolutionary, while you are conservative. They are bold beyond their strength ; whereas it is your nature, though strong to act feebly. They are impetuous and you are dilatory ; they are always abroad, and you are always at home."

On the present occasion, however, the Athenians did not give an example of promptness in action. It was the object of Sparta to gain time ; accordingly she sent embassies to Athens with trivial demands. She required the Athenians to drive out the "curse of the goddess," which rested on the family of the Alcmaeonidae ; the point of this lay in the fact that Pericles, on his mother's side, belonged to the accursed family. Athens replied by equally trivial demands. These amenities were followed by an ultimatum. There was a peace party at Athens, but Pericles carried the day. "We must be aware," he said, "that the war will come ; and the more willing we are to accept the situation, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands upon us."

The peoples of Greece were parted as follows on the sides of the two chief antagonists. *Sparta* commanded the whole Peloponnesus, except her old enemy Argos, and Achaea ; she commanded the Isthmus, for she had

both Corinth and Megara; in northern Greece she had Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris; in western Greece, Ambracia, Anactorion, and the island of Leucas. In western Greece, *Athens* commanded the Acarnanians, Corcyra, and Zacynthus, as well as the Messenians of Naupactus; in northern Greece she had Plataea; and these were her only allies beyond her confederacy. Of that confederacy Lesbos and Chios were now the only two independent states. In addition to the navies of Lesbos, Chios, and Corcyra, Athens had 300 ships of her own.

SECT. 2. **General View of the War.** Thucydides.

—The war on which we are now entering is a resumption, on a somewhat greater scale, of the war which was concluded by the Thirty Years' Peace. This war lasts ten years, and is concluded by the Peace of Nicias. But hostilities begin again, and pass for a time to a new scene of warfare, the island of Sicily. This war ends with the battle of Aegospotami, which decided the fate of the Athenian empire. Thus during fifty-five years Athens was contending for her empire with the Peloponnesians, and this conflict falls into three distinct wars: the first ending ⁴⁶⁰⁻⁴⁵ with the Thirty Years' Peace, the second with the Peace ^{B.C.} of Nicias, the third with the battle of Aegospotami. But while there is a break of thirteen years between the first ^{431-42 B.C.} war and the second, there is hardly any break between the second war and the third. Hence the second and the ⁴²⁰⁻⁴⁰⁴ third, which have been united in the History of Thucydides, ^{B.C.} are generally grouped closely together and called by the common name of the "Peloponnesian War."

The key to the war which now began is the fact that it was waged between a power which was mainly continental and a power which was mainly maritime. The land-power is obliged to direct its attacks chiefly on the continental possessions of the sea-power, while the sea-power has to confine itself to attacking the maritime possessions of the

land-power. Hence the maritime possessions of the maritime power and the inland possessions of the continental power are not generally the scene of warfare. The points at which the Peloponnesians can attack Athens with their land forces are Attica itself and Thrace. Accordingly Attica is invaded almost every year, and there is constant warfare in Thrace. On the other hand the offensive operations of Athens are mainly in the west of Greece, about the islands of the Ionian sea and near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. That was the region where they had the best prospect, by their naval superiority, of detaching members from the Peloponnesian alliance. Thrace, Attica, and the seas of western Greece are therefore the chief and constant scenes of the war.

Pericles returned fully to the policy initiated by Themistocles, of concentrating all the energy of Athens on the development of her naval power. "Let us give up lands and houses," he said, "but keep a watch over the city and the sea." The policy of sacrificing Attica was only part of a well-considered system of strategy. Pericles was determined not to court a great battle, for which the land forces of Athens were manifestly insufficient: on land Boeotia alone was a match for her. His object was to wear out the enemy, not to attempt to subjugate or decisively defeat.

SECT. 3. The Theban Attack on Plataea.—The declaration of war between the two great states of Greece let loose smaller enmities. On a dark moonless night, 431 B.C. in the early spring, a band of 300 Thebans entered Plataea, invited and admitted by a small party in the city. Instead of at once attacking, they took up their post in the agora and made a proclamation, calling upon the Plataeans to join the Boeotian league. The Plataeans were surprised, and acceded to the Theban demand, but in the course of the negotiation discovered how few the enemies were.

Breaking down the party-walls between their houses, so as not to attract notice by moving in the streets, they concerted a plan of action. When all was arranged, they attacked the enemy before dawn. The Thebans were soon dispersed. A few escaped. But the greater number rushed through the door of a large building, mistaking it for one of the town-gates, and were thus captured alive by the Plataeans.

The 300 were only the vanguard of a large Theban force which arrived too late. According to the Theban account, the Plataeans definitely promised to restore the prisoners, if the other troops evacuated their territory. But the Plataeans, as soon as they had conveyed all their property into the city, put their prisoners to death, 180 in number. A message had been immediately sent to Athens. The Athenians seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent a herald to Plataea bidding them not to injure their prisoners; but the herald found the Thebans dead. The Athenians immediately set Plataea ready for a siege, and sent a garrison of eighty Athenians.

The Theban attack on Plataea was a glaring violation of the Thirty Years' Peace, and it hastened the outbreak of the war.

SECT. 4. The Plague.—When the corn was ripe, in the last days of May, King Archidamus with two-thirds of 431 B.C. the Peloponnesian army invaded Attica. The Athenians brought into the city their family and their goods, while their flocks and herds were removed to the island of Euboea. The influx of the population in the city caused terrible crowding. They seized temples and shrines, and even the ancient enclosure of the Pelargicon was occupied, though an oracle forbade its occupation.

Archidamus halted under Parnes in the deme of Acharnae, whence he could see, in the distance, the Acropolis of Athens. The proximity of the invaders caused great excitement in Athens, and roused furious opposition

to Pericles, who would not allow the troops to go forth against them—except a few flying columns of horse in the immediate neighbourhood of the city. The invader presently advanced northward, between Parnes and Pentelicus, to Decelea, and proceeded through the territory of Oropus to Boeotia.

The Athenians meanwhile had sent 100 ships round the Peloponnesus. The important island of Cephallenia was won over, and some towns on the Acarnanian coast were taken. More important was the drastic measure which Athens adopted against her subjects and former rivals, the Dorians of Aegina. She drove out the Aeginetans and settled the island with a *cleruchy* of her own citizens. Aegina thus became, like Salamis, annexed to Attica.

When Archidamus left Attica, Pericles organised a reserve. There had been as much as 9700 talents in the treasury, but the expenses of the buildings on the Acropolis and of the war at Potidaea had reduced this to 6000. It was now decreed that 1000 talents of this amount should be reserved, not to be touched unless the enemy were to attack Athens by sea, and that every year 100 triremes should be set apart with the same object.

430 B.C. Next year the Peloponnesians again invaded Attica. But the Athenians concerned themselves less with this invasion; they had to contend with a more awful enemy within the walls of their city. The Plague had broken out. Thucydides, who was stricken down himself, gives a terrible account of its ravages and the demoralisation which it produced in Athens. The inexperienced physicians were unable to treat the unknown virulent disease, which was aggravated by the overcrowding, in the heat of summer. The dead lay unburied, the temples were full of corpses; and the funeral customs were forgotten or violated. The havoc of the pestilence permanently reduced the population. The total number of Athenian burghers (of both sexes and

all ages) was about 80,000 in the first quarter of the fifth century. Prosperity had raised it to 100,000 by the beginning of the war; but the plague brought it down below the old level, which it never reached again.

As in the year before, an Athenian fleet attacked the Peloponnesus, but it effected nothing. In Thrace meanwhile the siege of Potidaea had been prosecuted throughout the year. The inhabitants had been reduced to such straits that they even tasted human flesh, and in the winter they capitulated. Athens soon afterwards colonised the place.

Meanwhile the Athenians had been cast into such despair by the plague that they made overtures for peace to Sparta. Their overtures were rejected, and they turned the fury of their disappointment upon Pericles. He was suspended from the post of strategos; his accounts were called for and examined by the Council. He was found guilty of "theft" to the trifling amount of five talents; the verdict was a virtual acquittal, though he had to pay a fine of ten times the amount; and he was presently re-elected to the post from which he had been suspended. But Athens was not destined to be guided by him much longer. He had lost his two sons in the plague, and he died about a year later. 429 B.C. In his last years he had been afflicted by the indirect attacks of his enemies. Pheidias was accused of embezzling part of the public money devoted to the works on the Acropolis, in which he was engaged, and it was implied that Pericles was cognisant of the dishonesty. Pheidias was condemned. Then the philosopher Anaxagoras was publicly prosecuted for holding and propagating impious doctrines. Pericles defended his friend, but Anaxagoras was sentenced to pay a fine of five talents, and retired to continue his philosophical studies at Lampsacus. A similar attack was made upon his mistress, Aspasia. The pleading of Pericles procured her acquittal, and in the last year of his life the People passed a decree to legitimise her son. The latest words of Pericles

express what to the student of the history of civilisation is an important feature of his character—his humanity. “No Athenian ever put on black for an act of mine.”

SECT. 5. The Siege and Capture of Plataea.—In 429 B.C. the next summer Archidamus was induced by the Thebans, instead of invading Attica, to march across Cithaeron and lay siege to Plataea. The Plataean land was sacred; and the Spartan king proposed to the Plataeans that they should evacuate their territory until the end of the war; and all should then be restored to them intact. Having consulted Athens, which promised to protect them, the Plataeans refused, and Archidamus began the siege. The Athenians, however, sent no help.

By various means the besiegers attempted to escalade or batter down the walls, but were defeated by the ingenuity and resolution of the besieged. As a last resource they tried to burn out the town. When this device failed the Peloponnesians saw they would have to blockade Plataea. They built a wall of circumvallation, about 100 yards from the city, and dug two fosses, one inside and one outside this wall. Then Archidamus left part of his army to maintain the blockade during the winter. At the end of another year, the Plataeans saw that they had no longer any hope of help from Athens, and their food was running short. They

Dec. 428 determined to make an attempt to escape.

B.C.

The wall of the Peloponnesians consisted of two walls, 16 feet apart. Along the top there were battlements on each side, and at every tenth battlement there was a tower which covered the whole width from wall to wall. There were passages through the middle of the towers but not at the sides. On wet and stormy nights the guard used to leave the battlements and retire under the shelter of the towers. The escape was attended with much risk, and less than half the garrison attempted it. The plan was carefully calculated. They determined the height of the wall by

counting and recounting the number of layers of bricks in a spot which had not been plastered; and then constructed ladders of exactly the right length. On a dark night, amid rain and storm, they stole out, crossed the inner ditch, and reached the wall unnoticed. Twelve men ascended first, near two adjacent towers. They killed the guard in each tower, and secured the passages, which they held until all their companions had mounted and descended on the other side. One of the Plataeans, in climbing up on the roof, knocked a brick from one of the battlements; its fall was heard, and the alarm was given. All the besiegers came out on the wall, but in the blackness they could not discover what it was, and no one dared to move from his own place. Moreover the Plataeans in the city distracted their attention, by sallying out on the side opposite to that on which their friends were escaping. But what the Plataeans had most to fear was an attack from a band of 300 men, whose duty it was to patrol outside the wall. While the last of the Plataeans were descending, the 300 arrived with lights. They were thus illuminated themselves and a good mark for the arrows and darts of the Plataeans, who were standing along the edge of the outer ditch. This ditch was crossed with difficulty; it was swollen with rain and had a coat of ice too thin to bear. But all got over safely except one archer who was captured on the brink.

Two hundred and twelve men reached Athens; a few more had started but had turned back before they crossed the wall. In the following summer want of food forced the rest to capitulate at discretion to the Lacedaemonians. 427 B.C.
Five men were sent from Sparta to decide their fate. But each prisoner was merely asked, "Have you in the present war done any service to the Lacedaemonians or their allies?" and it was in vain that the Plataeans implored the Lacedaemonians to look upon the sepulchres of their own fathers buried in Plataean land and honoured every year

by Plataea with the customary offerings. They were put to death, 200 in number, and twenty-five Athenians; and the city was rased to the ground.

428 B.C. SECT. 6. **Revolt of Mytilene.**—Archidamus had invaded Attica for the third time, and had just quitted it, when the news arrived that Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, with the exception of Methymna, had revolted. The Lesbians had a large fleet; and the Athenians were feeling so severely the effects of the plague and of the war that the rebellion had a good prospect of success if it had been energetically supported by the Peloponnesians. Envoys who were sent to gain their help, pleaded the cause of Lesbos at the Olympic games which were celebrated this year. Lesbos was admitted into the Peloponnesian league, but no assistance was sent.

Meanwhile the Athenians had blockaded the two harbours of Mytilene, and Paches soon arrived with 1000 hoplites, to complete the investment. Towards the end of the winter, the Spartans sent a man—his name was Salaethus—to assure the people of Mytilene that an armament would be dispatched to their relief. He managed to elude the Athenians and get into the city. When summer came forty-two ships were sent under the command of Alcidas, and at the same time the Peloponnesians invaded Attica for the fourth time, hoping to distract the attention of the Athenians from Mytilene. But the ships never came, and the food ran short. Salaethus, in despair, determined to make a sally, and for this purpose armed the mass of the people with shields and spears. But the people, when they got the arms, refused to obey and demanded that the oligarchs should bring forth the corn, and that all should share it fairly; otherwise, they would surrender the city.

427 B.C. This drove the government to capitulate at discretion.

The ringleaders of the revolt of Mytilene were sent to Athens, and along with them the Spartan Salaethus, who

was immediately put to death. The Assembly met to determine the fate of the prisoners, and decided to put to death the whole adult male population, and to enslave the women and children. A trireme was immediately dispatched to Paches with this terrible command.

The fact that the Athenian Assembly was persuaded to press the cruel rights of war so far as to decree the extinction of a whole population shows how deep was the feeling of wrath that prevailed against Mytilene. The revolt had come at a moment when Athens was sore bestead, between the plague and the war; and it was the revolt not of a subject, but of a free ally. Athens could more easily forgive the rebellion of a subject state which tried to throw off her yoke, than repudiation of her leadership by a nominally independent confederate. For the action of Mytilene was in truth an indictment of the whole fabric of the Athenian empire as unjust and undesirable.

The calm sense of Pericles was no longer there to guide and enlighten the Assembly. We now find democratic statesmen of a completely different stamp coming forward to take his place. The Assembly is swayed by men of the people—tradesmen, like Cleon, the leather-merchant, and Hyperbolus, the lamp-maker. These men had not, like Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, family connexions to start and support them; they had no aristocratic traditions as the background of their democratic policy. They were self-made; they won their influence in the state by the sheer force of cleverness, eloquence, industry, and audacity.

It was under the influence of Cleon that the Assembly vented its indignation against Mytilene by dooming the whole people to slaughter. But when the meeting had dispersed, men began, in a cooler moment, to realise the inhumanity of their action and to question its policy. The envoys of Mytilene, who had been permitted to come to Athens to plead her cause, seeing this change of feeling,

induced the Generals to summon an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly for the following morning, to reconsider the decree. Thucydides represents Cleon as openly asserting the principle that a tyrannical city must use tyrannical methods, and rule by fear. The chief speaker on the other side was a certain Diodotus, and he handled the question entirely as a matter of policy. The question for Athens to consider, he said, is not what Mytilene deserves, but what it is expedient for Athens to inflict. If the people of Mytilene, who were compelled to join with their oligarchical government in rebelling, are destroyed, the popular party will everywhere be alienated from Athens.

The reasoning of Diodotus, which was based on sound views of policy, must have confirmed many of the audience who had already been influenced by the emotion of pity. His supporters won their motion by a very small majority. The ship which bore the sentence of doom had a start of about a day and a night; could it be overtaken by the trireme which was now dispatched with the reprieve? The oarsmen continued rowing while they ate barley, kneaded with wine and oil, and slept and rowed by turns. The first trireme, bound on an unpleasant errand, had sailed slowly. It arrived a little before the other. Paches had the decree in his hand and was about to execute it, when the second ship sailed into the harbour, and the city was saved. The wrath of Athens against her rebellious ally was sufficiently gratified by the trial and execution of those Mytilenaeans who had been sent to Athens as especially guilty. They were perhaps about thirty in number.

Having taken away the Lesbian fleet and rased the walls of Mytilene, the Athenians divided the island, excluding Methymna, into 3000 lots, of which 300 were consecrated to the gods. The rest they let to Athenian citizens as cleruchs, and the land was cultivated by the Lesbians, who paid an annual rent.

SECT. 7. **Warfare in Western Greece.—Tragic Events in Corcyra.** While the attention of Greece was directed upon the fortunes of Plataea and Mytilene, in the regions of the west the reputation of the Athenian navy had risen higher. The Ambraciots had persuaded Sparta to send an expedition against Acarnania, and a Peloponnesian fleet ^{429 B.C.} was to sail from Corinth. It consisted of 47 ships, and had to pass the Athenian Phormio, who was guarding the entrance of the Corinthian gulf with only 20. Phormio let them sail into the open sea, preferring to attack them there. By skillful manœuvres he crowded the enemy's ships into a narrow space; a morning breeze helped him by knocking the ships against one another; and when they were in confusion the Athenians dashed in and gained a complete victory. A reorganised Peloponnesian fleet took up a position at Panormus in Achaea, and Phormio was stationed at Rhion on the opposite coast. The object of the Spartan admiral was to lure or drive the enemy into the gulf, where their skill in handling their ships would be less decisive than in the open sea. With this purpose he sailed towards Naupactus, and Phormio in alarm sailed along the coast to protect the place. As the Athenian ships moved near the land in single file, the enemy suddenly swung round and rowed down upon them at their utmost speed. The eleven ships which were nearest Naupactus had time to run round the right Peloponnesian wing and escape; the rest were driven aground. Twenty Peloponnesian vessels on the right were in the meantime pursuing the eleven Athenian, which were making for Naupactus. A Leucadian ship was far in advance of the others, closely pursuing an Athenian which was lagging behind. Near Naupactus a merchant vessel lay in their way, anchored in the deep water. The Athenian trireme rowed round it, struck her pursuer amidships, and sank her. This brilliant exploit startled the Peloponnesians who were coming up singing a paean of

victory; the front ships dropped oars and waited for the rest. The Athenians, who had already reached Naupactus, saw the situation, and immediately bore down and gained another complete victory.

Corcyra presently became the scene of war in consequence of a bloody revolution. The prisoners taken by Corinth in the Epidamnian war were released on a promise to conspire against Athens; and leaguings themselves with the oligarchs, they slew the leaders of the democrats who favoured Athens. Street fighting followed. A Peloponnesian fleet which came up was driven off by the approach of a stronger Athenian armament, and the democratic party now slaughtered the oligarchs wholesale. About 600 escaped, and, establishing themselves on Mount Istone in the north-east of the island, harassed their foes thence for two years, till an Athenian fleet brought help to storm the place. The oligarchs then capitulated on the understanding that Athens was to decide their fate; but, by a trick of the democrats, they were induced to attempt to escape, and were caught, and killed in batches. Thucydides comments on the whole story as a symptom of the terrible rancour which party spirit had generated in the Greek city-states.

SECT. 8. **Nicias and Cleon. Politics at Athens.**—At this time Nicias, the son of Niceratus, held the chief place as a military authority at Athens. A wealthy conservative slave-owner, who speculated in the silver-mines of Laurion, he was one of the mainstays of that party which was bitterly opposed to the new politicians like Cleon. He would have been an excellent subordinate officer, but he had not the qualities of a leader or a statesman. Yet he possessed a solid and abiding influence at Athens, through his impregnable respectability, his superiority to bribes, and his scrupulous superstition, as well as his acquaintance with the details of military affairs. He understood the political value of gratifying in small ways those prejudices of his

fellow-citizens which he shared himself; and he spared no expense in the religious service of the state. He had an opportunity of displaying his religious devotion and his liberality on the occasion of the purification of the island of Delos, which was probably undertaken to induce Apollo to stay the plague. The dead were removed from all the tombs, and it was ordained that henceforth no one should die or give birth to a child on the sacred island. 426 B.C.

An important feature in the political history of Athens in these years was the divorce of the military command from the leadership in the Assembly. The tradesmen who swayed the Assembly had no military training or capacity, and they were always at a disadvantage when opposed by men who spoke with the authority of a strategos on questions of military policy. Until recent years the post of General had been practically confined to men of property and good family. But a change ensued, perhaps soon after the death of Pericles, and men of the people were elected. Cleon was a man of brains and resolution. He was ambitious to rule the state as Pericles had ruled it; and for this purpose he saw clearly that he must gain triumphs in the field as well as in the Assembly. If he was to exercise a permanent influence on the administration, he must be ready, when a good opportunity offered, to undertake the post of strategos; and, supported by the experience of an able colleague, he need not disgrace himself. Such a colleague he might find in Demosthenes, an enterprising commander, who had recently distinguished himself by successful warfare in Ambracia.

SECT. 9. The Athenian Capture of Pylos.—It was doubtless through the influence of Cleon that Demosthenes, 425 B.C. though he received no official command, was sent to accompany a fleet of forty ships which was ready to start for the west, under Eurymedon and Sophocles. We have already seen this fleet at Corcyra assisting the People against

the oligarchical exiles who had established themselves on Mount Istone. Demosthenes had a plan in his head for establishing a military post in the western Peloponnesus; and, arriving off the coast of Messenia, he asked the commanders to put in at Pylos. But they had heard that the Peloponnesian fleet had already reached Corcyra, and demurred to any delay. But chance favoured the design of Demosthenes. Stress of weather drove them into the harbour of Pylos, and then Demosthenes pressed them to fortify the place. The commanders ridiculed the idea. But the stormy weather detained the ships; the soldiers were idle; and at length, for the sake of something to do, they adopted the project of Demosthenes and fell to the work of fortifying Pylos.

The features of the scene, which was now to become illustrious by a striking military episode, must be clearly grasped. The high promontory of Pylos was on three sides encompassed by water. Once it had been an island, like Sphacteria, which lies south of it, but at this time it was connected with the mainland on the north side by a low sand-bar. This north corner of the bay—now a marshy lagoon—was sheltered and afforded harbourage for ships. The length of Pylos is less than a mile. On the sea-side it was hard to land, and the harbour side was strongly protected by steep cliffs. The unprotected parts were roughly fortified with stones picked up and put together as they happened to fit. In six days the work was finished, and the fleet went on its way, leaving Demosthenes with five ships to hold Pylos.

The Lacedaemonian army under Agis, which had invaded Attica earlier than usual, returned to Sparta after a sojourn of only two weeks within the Attic borders. They did not proceed immediately to Pylos, but another body of Spartans was sent on; and the sixty ships at Corcyra were hastily summoned. In the meantime

Demosthenes, beset by the Spartan troops, sent two of




FIG. 53.

his ships to overtake the fleet and beg Eurymedon to return to succour him.

R.

The object of the Lacedaemonians was to blockade the hill of Pylos by land and sea, and to prevent Athenian succours from landing. They were moreover afraid that the Athenians might use the island of Sphacteria as a basis for military operations, and accordingly Eпитadas occupied Sphacteria with 420 Spartans and their attendant Helots. The Lacedaemonians then prepared to attack the place, before help could come to the Athenians. Demosthenes posted the greater part of his force to guard the northern line of defence and the south-eastern corner; while he himself with sixty hoplites and some archers took his stand on the edge of the south-western shore, which though rocky and perilous was the spot where the enemy had the best prospect of effecting a landing. They had forty-three ships, which were brought up in relays. Brasidas, who commanded one of the ships, was the leading spirit; but in trying to disembark he was wounded and lost his shield. The Spartan attack, which was renewed on two subsequent days, was repelled.

The Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, now augmented to fifty ships by some reinforcements, at length arrived. But finding the shores of the bay north of Pylos and the island of Sphacteria occupied, they withdrew. The next morning they returned and rowed in by both entrances; some of the enemy's vessels which were able to come out to meet them were captured; and a tremendous struggle ensued close to the shore: the Athenians tying the empty beached ships to their own and endeavouring to drag them away, the Lacedaemonians dashing into the sea and pulling them back. Most of the empty ships were saved; but the fleet was so far damaged and outnumbered that the Athenians were able to blockade Sphacteria.

Thus the blockade of Pylos has changed into a blockade of Eпитadas and his Spartans in Sphacteria by the Athenians. The tidings of this change in the situation caused grave

alarm at Sparta, and some of the ephors came themselves to see what measures could be taken. They decided that nothing could be done for the relief of the island, and obtained from the Athenian generals a truce for the purpose of sending ambassadors to Athens to ask for peace. The terms of this truce were:—That the Lacedaemonians should deliver their fleet into the hands of the Athenians at Pylos, and should make no assault upon the fort either by sea or land. The Athenians should permit the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send to those on the island a fixed quantity of provisions. The Athenians should guard the island as before, but not attack the Peloponnesian forces. The agreement was to last until the Lacedaemonian ambassadors returned from Athens. On their return, the Athenians were to restore the ships.

In accordance with these terms, sixty ships were handed over and the ambassadors went to Athens. But the Assembly was under the influence of Cleon, and he, as the opponent of Nicias and the peace-party, urged the Athenians to propose terms which could hardly be accepted. Not only Nisaea and Pagae, the harbours of the Megarid, but Achaea and Troezen, were demanded as the purchase of the lives of the Spartans in Sphacteria. The embassy returned to Pylos disappointed, and the truce came to an end. But the Athenians refused to give back the sixty ships, on the pretext of some slight infraction of the truce on the part of the Lacedaemonians.

The blockade proved a more difficult matter than the Athenians had hoped. Reinforced by twenty more triremes from Athens, they lay round the island, both in the bay, and, except when the wind was too high, on the sea-side; and two ships kept continually cruising round in opposite directions. But large sums were offered to any who succeeded in conveying meal, wine, or cheese to the island; and Helots, who did such service, were rewarded with

freedom. When a strong wind from the west or north drove the Athenian ships into the bay, the daring crews of provision-boats beat recklessly into the difficult landing-places on the sea-side. Moreover some skilful divers managed to reach the shores of the island,—drawing skins filled with poppy-seed mixed with honey, and pounded linseed.

At home the Athenians grew impatient. They were sorry that they had declined the overtures of the Lacedaemonians, and there was a reaction of feeling against Cleon. That statesman took the bold course of denying the reports from Pylos, and said—with a pointed allusion to the strategos Nicias—that if the Generals were men they would sail to the island and capture the garrison. “If I were commander,” he added, “I would do it myself.” Thereupon Nicias stood up and offered, on the part of his colleagues, to give Cleon any force he asked for and let him try. Cleon—says Thucydides—at first imagined that the offer of Nicias was only a pretence and was willing to go; but finding that he was in earnest, he tried to back out and said that not he but Nicias was General. But when the multitude pressed him, not knowing how to escape from his own words, he undertook the expedition and, coming forward, gave his word that he would either bring the Lacedaemonians alive or kill them on the spot. The story is almost too good to be true. But whether Cleon desired the command or had it thrust upon him against his will, his words, which moved the Athenians to laughter, were fully approved by the event. He chose Demosthenes as his colleague; and he immediately set sail.

It was difficult to land on Sphacteria, and the island being covered with bush gave the defenders who knew the ground every advantage. But before Cleon arrived a chance fire burnt most of the bush, so that the position and numbers of the Lacedaemonians could be more clearly

seen. There were only 420 Spartan hoplites and perhaps as many more Helots, yet the craggy island was so defensible that when Cleon and Demosthenes landed 14,000 troops one day before dawn, their enterprise was extremely difficult. But the Spartan system of signals was faulty, the outpost was at once overpowered, and the Spartans found themselves beset by a crowd of light-armed troops, archers and targeteers, whom Cleon had made a point of bringing. But they made good their retreat to the high hill at the north of the island, round which ran an old Cyclopean wall, still to be traced: and here they stood at bay. At length a captain of the Messenians from Naupactus said he knew a path by which to come round in the rear. Taking some light-armed troops by boat to the base of the cliff, which rises to the hill which the Spartans were holding, he climbed a narrow and seemingly impracticable gorge to the cliff top, then with his men appeared on the very summit of the hill behind and above the semicircle of Spartans on the slopes. The Athenians, seeing them, asked the Lacedaemonians to capitulate, and, after the commander of the force on the mainland had been consulted, arms were laid down. Two hundred and ninety-four Spartans were brought to Athens, to the astonishment of the Greek world, who had always thought that Spartans would die rather than surrender.

Cleon had performed his promise; he brought back the captives within twenty days. The success was of political rather than military importance. The Athenians could indeed ravage Lacedaemonian territory from Pylos, but it was a greater thing that they had in the prisoners a security against future invasions of Attica and a means of making an advantageous peace when they chose. It was the most important success gained in the war. In the following year Nicias captured the island of Cythera, from which he was able to make descents upon Laconia. The loss of Cythera

was in itself more serious for Sparta than the loss of Pylos; but owing to the attendant circumstances the earlier event made far greater stir.

SECT. 10. **Athenian Expedition to Boeotia.**—In each of the first seven years of the war, Attica was invaded, except twice; on one occasion the attack on Plataea had taken the place of the incursion into Attica, and, on another, the Peloponnesian army was hindered by earthquakes from advancing beyond the isthmus. Every year by way of reply the Athenians invaded the Megarid twice, in spring and in autumn. The capture of Pylos induced them to undertake a bolder enterprise against Megara. This enterprise was organised by the generals, Demosthenes and Hippocrates. They succeeded in capturing the post of Nisaea, and the Long Walls, and they would have taken Megara itself but for the arrival of the Spartan general Brasidas, with whom they feared to risk an engagement.

The recovery of Nisaea, which had been lost by the Thirty Years' Peace, was a solid success, and it seemed to the ambitious hopes of the two generals who had achieved it the first step in the recovery of all the former conquests of their city. Hippocrates and Demosthenes induced Athens to strive to win back Boeotia, which she had lost at Coronea.

Demosthenes, having sailed to Naupactus and gathered a force of Acarnanians, was to go on to secure Siphæe, the port of Thespiæ, on the shore of a promontory beneath Mount Helicon. On the same day, the Athenian army under Hippocrates was to enter Boeotia on the north-east and seize the temple of Apollo at Delium, which stood on the sea-coast over against the Lelantine plain in Euboea. At the same time Chaeronea, the extreme west town of the land, was to be seized by domestic conspirators. Thus on three sides the Boeotian government was to be threatened; and the same day was fixed for the three attacks. But the scheme was betrayed by a Phocian, and frustrated by the

Boeotarchs, who occupied Siphæe and Chaeronea with strong forces, and made a general levy of the Boeotians to oppose the army of Hippocrates.

Hippocrates, however, had time to reach and fortify ^{424 B.C.} Delium. He had a force of 7000 hoplites and over 20,000 light-armed troops. A trench, with a strong rampart and palisade, was drawn round the temple; and the army then left Delium, to return home. But about a mile from Delium, they were suddenly attacked by the Boeotarch Pagondas. His army consisted of 7000 hoplites—the same number as that of the enemy—1000 cavalry, and over 10,000 light-armed men. The Thebans occupied the right wing, in the unique formation of a mass twenty-five shields deep; the other contingents varied in depth. The Athenian line was formed with the uniform and regular depth of eight shields. The extreme parts of the wings never met, for watercourses lay between them. But the rest pushed shield against shield and fought fiercely. On the right the Athenians were victorious, but on the left they could not sustain the enormous pressure of the massed Theban force. But even the victory on the right was made of none effect through the sudden appearance of a squadron of cavalry, which Pagondas, seeing the situation, had sent unobserved round the hill. The Athenians thought it was the vanguard of another army and fled. Hippocrates was slain and the army completely dispersed.

The battle of Delium confirmed the verdict of Coronea. Athens could not hope to be mistress of Boeotia.

SECT. 11. **The War in Thrace. Athens loses Amphipolis.**—The defeat of Delium eclipsed the prestige of Athens, but did not seriously impair her strength. Yet it was a fatal year; and a much greater blow was dealt her in her Thracian dominion.

Perdiccas, the shifty king of Macedonia, played a double game between Athens and Sparta. At one time he helped

the Chalcidians against Athens, at another he sided with Athens against her revolted allies. He and the Chalcidians (of Olynthus) feared that the success of Pylos might be followed by increased activity of the Athenians in Thrace, and they sent an embassy to Sparta, requesting help, and expressing a wish that Brasidas might be the commander of whatever auxiliary force should be sent. No Spartans went, but 700 Helots were armed as hoplites. Having obtained some Peloponnesian recruits, and having incidentally, as we have already seen, saved Megara, Brasidas marched northward.

Brasidas was a Spartan by mistake. He had nothing in common with his fellows, except personal bravery, which was the least of his virtues. He had a restless energy and spirit of enterprise, which received small encouragement from the slow and hesitating authorities of his country. He had an oratorical ability which distinguished him above the Lacedaemonians, who were notoriously unready of speech. He was free from political prejudices, and always showed himself tolerant, just, and moderate in dealing with political questions. Besides this, he was simple and straightforward; men knew that they could trust his word implicitly. But the quality which most effectually contributed to his brilliant career, and perhaps most strikingly belied his Spartan origin, was his power of winning popularity abroad and making himself personally liked by strangers.

His own tact and rapid movements, as well as the influence of Perdiccas, enabled Brasidas to march through Thessaly, which was by no means well disposed to the Lacedaemonians. When he reached Macedonia, Perdiccas required his assistance against the Lyncestians, in Upper Macedonia. Brasidas was impatient to reach Chalcidice, and he contrived to make a separate arrangement with Lyncestis, to the disappointment of Perdiccas. He then marched westward, and, having secured the adhesion of

Acanthus and other Greek towns, advanced to the Strymon in order to make an attempt upon Amphipolis, the most important of all Athenian posts in Thrace, and among the most important in the whole Athenian empire. After a cold wintry night march, Brasidas found the Bridge of the Strymon defended only by a small guard, which he easily overpowered. Amphipolis was completely unprepared, but Brasidas did not venture to attack the city at once; he expected the gates to be opened by conspirators within, and meanwhile he made himself master of the territory.

That a place of such first-rate importance as Amphipolis should be found unprepared at such a time seemed a criminal negligence on the part of the two Strategoi to whom defence of the Thracian interests of Athens was entrusted. These were Thucydides, the son of Olorus, and Eucles. It was inexcusable in Eucles, who was in Amphipolis, to leave the Bridge without an adequate garrison; and it was considered culpable of Thucydides to have removed the Athenian squadron to the island of Thasos, where (it was insinuated) he possessed mines of his own. A message was sent at once to Thucydides; that officer hastened back with seven triremes and reached the mouth of the Strymon in the evening of the same day. But in the meantime Brasidas had offered the inhabitants of Amphipolis such easy terms ^{424 B.C.} that they were accepted. Thucydides arrived just too late. But he preserved Eion, at the mouth of the river, and repelled an attack of Brasidas.

It may be that we are indebted to the fall of Amphipolis for the great history of the war. The Athenians accused the neglect of their Generals, as having cost them one of their most valuable possessions. Thucydides was sentenced to banishment, and it is probable that Cleon, to whom he bore no goodwill, was instrumental in drawing down upon him a punishment which possibly was not deserved. But in his exile the discredited general became the greatest of Greek

historians. "Associating," he says himself, "with both sides, with the Peloponnesians quite as much as with the Athenians, because of my exile, I was thus enabled to watch quietly the course of events."

Having secured the Strymon, Brasidas retraced his steps and subdued the small towns on the high eastern tongue of Chalcidice, and gained possession of Torone, the strongest city of Sithonia.

SECT. 12. Negotiations for Peace.—In the meantime the Athenians had taken no measures to check the victorious winter-campaign of Brasidas. The disaster of Delium had disheartened them, and rendered the citizens unwilling to undertake fresh toil in Thrace; for in Grecian history we must steadfastly keep in view that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers. Further, the peace party, especially represented by the generals Nicias and Laches, took advantage of this depression to work in the direction of peace. The Lacedaemonians, on their part, were more deliberately set on peace than the Athenians. Their anxiety to recover the Sphacterian captives increased, and on the other hand they desired to set a term to the career of Brasidas in Chalcidice. They wished to take advantage of the considerable successes he had already won, to extort favourable conditions from Athens before any defeat should undo or reverse his triumphs. Nor was the news of his exploits received at Sparta with unmixed feelings of pleasure. They were rather regarded with jealousy and distrust. Accordingly the two states agreed on a truce for a year, which would give them time to arrange quietly and at leisure the conditions of a permanent peace.

March, 423
B.C.

But in the meantime the city of Scione on the western prong of the Chalcidian fork revolted from Athens and invited Brasidas. The revolt of Scione was followed by that of the neighbouring town of Mende. Brasidas was

then obliged to join Perdiccas in another expedition against the Lyncestians, because the Macedonian monarch was contributing to the pay of the Peloponnesian army. A reinforcement of Illyrians came to the help of Lyncestis, and the warlike reputation of Illyria was so great that their approach produced a panic among the Macedonians, and the whole army of Perdiccas fled, leaving the small force of Brasidas to retreat as best it could. He was in great jeopardy, but effected his retreat successfully. The incident led to a breach between Brasidas and the Macedonians; Perdiccas changed sides once more, and proved his new friendship to Athens by preventing Lacedaemonian troops, which had been sent to join Brasidas, from crossing Thessaly.

Brasidas returned to Torone and found that an Athenian armament had recovered Mende, and was besieging Scione. Everywhere else the truce was observed, and by tacit consent the hostilities in Thrace were not allowed to affect the rest of Greece. But by the end of the year there was a marked change in public feeling at Athens, and the influence of Cleon was again in the ascendant. He adopted the principle of Pericles that Athens must maintain her empire unimpaired, and he saw that this could not be done without energetic opposition to the progress of Brasidas in Thrace. When the truce expired, Cleon was able to carry a resolution March, 422 that an expedition should be made to reconquer Amphipolis. B. C.

SECT. 13. Battle of Amphipolis and Peace of Nicias.—Cleon set sail with thirty ships, bearing 1200 Athenian hoplites, and 300 Athenian cavalry, as well as allies. He gained a considerable success at the outset by taking Torone and capturing the Lacedaemonian governor; Brasidas arrived too late to relieve it. Cleon went on to the mouth of the Strymon and made Eion his headquarters, intending to wait there until he had augmented his army by reinforcements.

Brasidas meanwhile was encamped on the other side of the Strymon on a hill above Amphipolis. Cleon, whose men grumbled at inaction, moved on a reconnaissance close to the walls of Amphipolis, and only then detected the fact that Brasidas, at sight of his movement, had slipped into the city and was preparing to attack. A retreat was ordered, but carelessly carried out; and Brasidas, suddenly charging at the head of 150 hoplites, threw the whole column into disorder. Cleon fled with his men, and was shot down in flight. But elsewhere there was resistance, and in the *mêlée* Brasidas received his death wound. He only lived long enough to be assured of a victory, which his death had practically converted into a defeat. The people of Amphipolis gave him the honours of a hero. Sacrifices were offered to Brasidas, and yearly games celebrated in his honour.

The death of Brasidas removed the chief obstacle to peace; for no man was competent or disposed to resume his large designs in Thrace. The defeat and death of Cleon gave a free hand to Nicias and the peace party. Negotiations were protracted during autumn and winter, and the
421 B.C. peace was definitely concluded about the end of March. The Peace, of which Nicias and the Spartan king Pleistoanax were the chief authors, was fixed for a term of fifty years. Athens undertook to restore all the posts which she had occupied during the war against the Peloponnesians, including Pylos and Cythera. But she insisted upon retaining Sollion and Anactorion, ports on the Acarnanian seaboard commanding the communications with Corcyra, and the port of Nisaea. The Lacedaemonians engaged to restore Amphipolis, and to relinquish Acanthus and other cities in Thrace. All captives on both sides were to be liberated.

When the terms were considered at Sparta by a meeting of deputies of the Peloponnesian allies, Corinth was indignant at the surrender of Sollion and Anactorion; Megara was furious that Nisaea should be abandoned to the enemy; and

Boeotia was unwilling to hand over Panacton, a fortress in Mount Cithaeron which she had recently occupied. Yet Athens could hardly have demanded less. The consequence was that the Peace was only partial; those allies which were politically of most consequence refused to accept it, and they were joined by Elis; the diplomacy of Nicias was a complete failure, so far as it aimed at compassing an abiding peace.



FIG. 54. -Athena contemplating a stele (Acropolis Museum, Athens).

CHAPTER XI

THE DECLINE AND DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

SECT. I. New Political Combinations with Argos.
—The Peace of Nicias was a complete failure. Not only did the Corinthians and the other chief allies refuse to accede to it, but the signatories found themselves unable to carry out the terms they had agreed upon. The Chalcidians refused to surrender Amphipolis, and the Spartans could not compel them. Athens therefore justly declined to surrender the Sphacterian prisoners. Sparta, impatient at all costs to recover them, conceived the device of entering into a defensive alliance with their old enemy. This proposal, warmly supported by Nicias, was accepted, and the captives were at length restored,—Athens still retaining Pylos and Cythera. The alliance was a mistake for Athens; she gained nothing by it, and surrendered the best security she had for the fulfilment of the terms of the Peace. This approximation between Sparta and Athens led directly to the dissolution of the Peloponnesian League. Corinth, Mantinea, and Elis not only considered themselves deserted by their leader, but apprehended that, secured by her alliance with Athens, she would have a free hand in the Peloponnesus and would exercise her power despotically. Accordingly, at the instigation of Corinth, these Peloponnesian states formed an alliance with Argos, who now enters upon the scene. The Chalcidians of Thrace joined; and thus the two great states

of Greece stood face to face with a league which refused to recognise the Peace of Nicias.

In the following year these unstable political combina- 420 B.C.
tions were upset by the advent of a new force at Athens. Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, joined the democratic party, to which, as kinsman of Pericles, he was hereditarily bound. Young and rich, he united extraordinary beauty and talents to a love of ostentation and an insolence which shocked his fellow-citizens. His bravery he had shown, fighting at Delium, where his life was saved by his friend Socrates the philosopher. This celebrated friendship between men, at every point the opposite of each other, save in talent and courage, was of use to the young statesman as an intellectual training. But Alcibiades was a statesman with no belief in the principles of his party. Only, at present he saw his way to power through war and conquest, and therefore opposed the peace party.

Meanwhile an anti-Athenian war-party had grown at Sparta, and was seeking to bring about an alliance with Argos. To counteract this, Alcibiades conceived the idea of a league among the democracies, and negotiated an alliance with Argos and her allies, Elis and Mantinea, to last for a hundred years. In the following summer, this 420 B.C.
alliance contrived to exclude Lacedaemonians from the Olympian games, on the ground that they had violated the sacred truce by an attack on Lepreon: and Alcibiades won the chariot-race. Thus his power and popularity grew, while Athens and Sparta were estranged, though the Peace of Nicias was not formally broken.

In the following spring, Alcibiades induced the Argives 419 B.C.
to attack the territory of Epidaurus, but he could not induce the Athenians to support her ally in adequate force. Sparta, in retaliation, sent an army under Agis into Argos. The Argive troops confronted Agis in the plain near Nemea, and both generals seem to have been uncertain of the result,

for instead of fighting they made a truce for four months. On both sides there was an outcry, and Alcibiades, arriving at Argos with an army under Laches and Nicostratus, persuaded the allies to disregard the truce. But the men of Elis, when the other commanders refused to move to recover Lepreon, withdrew their contingent, 3000 hoplites, and the army, thus weakened, was obliged to hasten southward to protect Mantinea, against which the Lacedaemonians under Agis, along with the men of Tegea, had meanwhile come forth.

418 B.C. And now, at length, a great battle was fought near Mantinea. The numbers must have approached 10,000 on each side. The Lacedaemonians were victorious, after a moment of uncertainty, when 1000 Argives broke through a gap in the line. Both Laches and Nicostratus fell. The victory did much to restore the prestige of Sparta, which had dwindled since the disaster of Sphacteria. It also transformed the situation in the Peloponnesus. The democracy at Argos was replaced by an oligarchy, and the alliance with Athens was abandoned for an alliance with Sparta. Mantinea, Elis, and the Achaean towns also went over to the victor. Athens was again isolated.

The support given to Argos had not been effective, and, probably owing to discontent with Nicias, an ostracism was held, on the proposal of Hyperbolus, the democratic leader. The friends of Nicias, he thought, would vote against Alcibiades as the more dangerous man. But Alcibiades, feeling himself in danger, made a compact with the other side, and the followers both of Nicias and Alcibiades wrote the name of Hyperbolus on their sherds. The lamp-maker 417 B.C. was banished, and this was the last case of ostracism at Athens. But any man who proposed a measure involving a change in the established laws was liable to be prosecuted under the *Graphê Paranómōn*, which it was death to transgress: and this was held sufficient safeguard of the constitution,

In this year an expedition to Chalcidice under Nicias resulted in failure. But in the following year the island of Melos, which was still outside the empire, was invested and 416 B.C. forced to surrender, without any tolerable protest. All the inhabitants were put to death, or enslaved, and the island was colonised by Athenians.

SECT. 2. **The Sicilian Expedition. First Operations in Sicily.**—During the fifth century the eyes of Athenian statesmen often wandered to western Greece beyond the seas. Alliance was formed with Segesta, and subsequently with Leontini and Rhegium. One general object of Athens was to support the Ionian cities against the Dorian, and especially against Syracuse, the daughter and friend of Corinth. In 427 B.C. Leontini sent an embassy to Athens appealing for help against Syracuse, who threatened her independence. Nearly all the Dorian cities were with Syracuse, while Leontini was supported by Rhegium, Catane, Naxos, and Camarina. Gorgias, the famous professor of eloquence, was among the ambassadors, and his coming made a sensation at Athens, but it did not need his eloquence to make the Athenians take interest in Sicilian affairs. An expedition was sent out under Laches, which induced Messana to join the Athenian league, but effected little else. Another fleet, despatched in 425 B.C. under Eurymedon and Sophocles, was detained by the affairs of Pylos and Corcyra so long that Messana revolted before its arrival. A congress of the Sicilian Greeks then met at Gela to consider the situation, and at this Hermocrates of Syracuse took a leading part in laying down the principle that Sicily should settle its own quarrels and withstand jointly the intervention of Athens or any external power. Shortly afterwards, however, a sedition in Leontini gave an opportunity, and the city was annexed to Syracuse. It became clear that Syracuse merely wanted a free hand for despotism, and Athens was again asked to intervene,

but did not move seriously till after the conquest of Melos.

416 B.C. In that year there arrived at Athens an appeal for help from Segesta, which was at war with Selinus, and from the



FIG. 55.—Coin of Selinus, fifth century (obverse). River Hypsas sacrificing at altar; snake round the altar; lake-bird; leaf of selinon [legend: ΗΥΨΑΣ].

Leontine exiles. Athens sent envoys to Sicily, for the purpose of reporting on the resources of Segesta, which had undertaken to provide the expenses of the war. The ambassadors returned with glowing stories of the untold wealth of the people of Segesta.

Nicias wisely opposed the expedition. The people, however, elated by their recent triumph over Melos, were fascinated by the idea of making new conquests in a distant, unfamiliar world. But having committed the imprudence of not listening to Nicias, the people went on to commit the graver blunder of electing him as a commander of the expedition which he disapproved. He was appointed as General along with Alcibiades and Lamachus.

415 B.C. When the expedition was ready to sail a mysterious event delayed it. One morning in May it was found that the square stone figures which stood at the entrance of temples and private houses in Athens, and were known at Hermae, had been mutilated. The enemies of Alcibiades seized the occasion and tried to implicate him in the outrage. Alcibiades demanded the right of clearing himself from the charge, before the fleet started; but his enemies procured the postponement of his trial till his return. The fleet then set sail. Thucydides says that no armament so magnificent had ever before been sent out by a single Greek state. There were 134 triremes, and an immense number of smaller attendant vessels; there were 5100 hoplites; and the total number of combatants was well over 30,000.

A halt was made at Rhegium, where disappointments awaited them. Rhegium adopted a reserved attitude which the Athenians did not expect. In the next place, the Athenians had relied on the wealth of Segesta for supporting their expedition, and they now learned that the Segestaeans, collecting all the plate they could get from their own and other cities, had passed the same service from house to house and led the envoys to believe that each of the hosts who sumptuously entertained them possessed a magnificent service of his own.

This discovery was a serious blow, but no one, not even Nicias, seems to have thought of giving up the enterprise. A council of war was held at Rhegium. Nicias proposed to sail about, make some demonstrations, secure anything that could be secured without trouble, and give any help to the Leontines that could be given without danger. Alcibiades proposed that active attempts should be made to win over the Sicilian cities by diplomacy, and that then, having so strengthened their position, they should take steps to force Selinus and Syracuse to do right by Segesta and Leontini. But Lamachus regarded the situation from a soldier's point of view. He advised that Syracuse should be attacked at once, while her citizens were still unprepared. Fortunately for Syracuse, Lamachus had no influence or authority except on the field; and, failing to convince his colleagues, he gave his vote to the plan of Alcibiades.

Naxos and Catane were won over; the Athenian fleet made a demonstration in the Great Harbour of Syracuse and captured a ship. But nothing more had been done, when a mandate arrived from Athens recalling Alcibiades, to stand his trial for impiety. The people of Athens had reverted to their state of religious agony over the mutilation of the Hermae, and the investigations led to the exposure of other profanations, especially of travesties of the Eleusinian mysteries, in which Alcibiades was involved. The trireme

"Salaminia" was sent to summon him to return. He went with the Salaminia as far as Thurii, where he made his escape and went into voluntary exile. The Athenians condemned him to death, along with some of his kinsfolk, and confiscated his property.

In Sicily, when Alcibiades had gone, the rest of the year was frittered away in a number of small enterprises, which
415 B.C. led to nothing. At length, when winter came, the Syracusan army was lured to Catane for the purpose of making an attack on the Athenian camp, which they were led to believe they would take unawares; while in the meantime the Athenian host had gone on board the fleet and sailed off to the Great Harbour of Syracuse, where Nicias landed. When the Syracusans returned, a battle was fought, the first battle of war, and the Athenians were victorious. A success had been gained, but on the day ensuing, Nicias ordered the whole army to embark and sail back to Catane. He had numbers of excellent reasons,—the winter season, the want of cavalry, of money, of allies; and in the meantime Syracuse was left to make her preparations.

It seemed, indeed, as if a fatality dogged Athens. Alcibiades and Lamachus, without Nicias, would probably have captured Syracuse. But, not content with the unhappy appointment of Nicias, she must go on to pluck the whole soul out of the enterprise by depriving it of Alcibiades. That active diplomatist now threw as much energy into the work of ruining the expedition as he had given to the work of organising it. He went to Sparta, and was present at the Assembly which received a Syracusan embassy, begging for Spartan help. There he urged the Spartans especially to take two measures: to send at once a Spartan general to Sicily to organise the defence, and to fortify Decelea in Attica, a calamity which the Athenians were always dreading. The speech of this powerful advocate turned the balance at a most critical point in the history of Hellas. The Lacedae-

monians were decided by his advice, and appointed an officer named Gylippus to take command of the Syracusan forces. Corinth too sent ships to the aid of her daughter city.

SECT. 3. **Siege of Syracuse**, 414 B.C.—The Island of Syracuse always remained the heart and centre of the city. But the military importance of *Epipolae*, the long hill which shuts in the north side of the Great Harbour, could not be ignored. The water between the island and the mainland had been filled up; this was an inducement to the settlement to creep up the height; and finally the eastern part of the hill, known as *Achradina*, was fortified by a wall running from north to south. At a later period, the suburb of *Tycha*, north-west of Achradina, was added to the enclosed city. Henceforward the name *Epipolae* was restricted to the rest of the heights.

Hermocrates, who had been elected general, had realised the necessity of guarding these heights, and a force of 600 was to be chosen for the guard of Epipolae. But at the very moment when the muster was being held, the Athenians were close at hand. The fleet had left Catane the night before and steered for the bay on the north side of Epipolae. The soldiers hastened up the ascent, and were masters of Epipolae before the Syracusan host knew what was happening. The Athenians then fortified a place called Labdalon, near the north cliffs.

The plan of the siege was to run a wall right across the hill, from the cliffs on the north to the harbour on the south. This would cut off communications by land, while the fleet which was stationed at Thapsus, ready to enter the Great Harbour, would cut off communications by sea. For this purpose, a point was chosen in the centre of the intended line of wall, and a round fort, "the Circle" (*kyklos*), was built there, from which the wall was to be constructed northward and southward. The Syracusans having made a

vain attempt to stop the building of the wall, set themselves to build a counter-wall, beginning at the Temenites and running westward, with a view to intercept the southern wall of the Athenians and prevent its reaching the harbour. The Athenians did not try to hinder them, and devoted themselves entirely to the building of their own wall north of the Round Fort. But they were really watching for a good opportunity. The carelessness of the Syracusans soon gave the looked-for chance. An attack was made on the counter-wall and it was utterly destroyed. The Generals then began to look to the southern section of their own wall, and began to fortify the southern cliff, near the temple of Heracles, above the marshy ground on the north-west side of the Great Harbour.

The Syracusans then began a second counter-work, not on the hill, but over this low swampy ground, to hinder the Athenians from bringing their wall down from the cliff to the harbour. This work was not a wall, which would not have been suited to the swampy ground, but a trench with a palisade. At the break of day, the Athenians led by Lamachus descended into the swamp and destroyed the Syracusan works. But what was gained was more than undone by what followed. Troops sailed out of Syracuse; a battle was fought; and Lamachus was slain. This was the third great blow to the prospect of Athenian success. Nicias had been appointed; Alcibiades had been recalled; now Lamachus was gone.

The southern Athenian wall advanced southward in a double line, and the fleet had now taken up its station in the Great Harbour. The Syracusans were prepared to make terms. Nicias thought that Syracuse was in his hands, and made the fatal mistake of neglecting the completion of the wall on the north side. But all thought of capitulation was abandoned when a Corinthian captain named Gongylus reached Syracuse with the news that Corin-

thian ships and a Spartan general were on their way. And presently Gylippus, having collected a force at Himera, marched overland to Syracuse. He ascended the hill of Epipolæ by the same path on the north side which had been climbed by the Athenian army when they seized the heights; and without meeting any opposition advanced along the north bend of the hill to Tycha and entered the city. Such was the result of the gross neglect of Nicias. If Euryalus had been fortified, the attempt would probably have failed.

Gylippus immediately undertook the command of the Syracusan army, and inspired the inhabitants with new confidence. He had all the energy and resourcefulness of Brasidas, without that unique soldier's attractive personality. His first exploit was the capture of the fort Labdalon. But the great object was to prevent the Athenians from hemming in the city by completing the northern section of their wall, and this could be done only by building a new counter-wall. The Athenians themselves began to build vigorously, and there was a race in wall-building between the two armies. As the work went on, attacks were made on both sides with varying success. In the end, the Syracusan builders prevailed; the Athenian wall was turned, and never reached the northern coast. This was not enough for Gylippus. His wall was continued to reach Euryalus, and four forts were erected on the western part of the hill, so that Syracuse could now hinder help from reaching the Athenians by the path by which Gylippus had himself ascended. In the meantime Nicias had occupied Plemmyrion, the headland which, facing the Island, forms the lower lip of the mouth of the Great Harbour. Here he built three forts and established a station for his ships, some of which were now dispatched to lie in wait for the expected fleet from Corinth. But, though the Athenians commanded the south part of

Epipolæ and the entrance to the Harbour, the Syracusan wall from Tycha to Euryalus had completely changed the aspect of the situation.

The winter had now come and was occupied with embassies and preparations. Gylippus spent it in raising fresh forces in Sicily. Appeals of help were again sent to the Peloponnesus.

We must go back for a moment to old Greece. The advice of Alcibiades to fortify Decelea was adopted: a fort was built and provided with a garrison under the command of King Agis. Attica could no longer be cultivated.

But while the Peloponnesians were carrying the war once more to the very gates of Athens, that city was called upon to send forth a new expedition to the west on a scale similar to the first. Nicias wrote that, since the coming of Gylippus and the increase of the numbers of the garrison, and the building of the counter-wall, the besiegers had become themselves besieged. One of two things must be done: the enterprise must be abandoned or a new armament, as strong as the first, must be sent out at once. Nicias also begged for his own recall, on the ground of sickness. The Athenian people repeated its previous recklessness by voting a second expedition, and by refusing to supersede Nicias, in whom they had a blind and touching trust. They appointed Eurymedon and Demosthenes as commanders of the new armament.

SECT. 4. The Second Expedition.—The Sicilian war had grown into a gigantic struggle in which the greater part of the Hellenic nation was engaged. For Sicily itself, the struggle was now becoming a question of life and death, such as the Persian invasion had been for Greece. Syracuse, under the guidance of Hermocrates and Gylippus, put forth all her energy to the organisation of a fleet, and in the spring she had a navy numbering eighty triremes. 413 B.C.

Gylippus determined to attack the Athenian station at Plemmyrion by land and sea. By sea the Syracusans were defeated, but while the naval battle was being fought in the harbour, a land force under Gylippus had marched round to Plemmyrion and captured the forts on the headland. The Athenian ships were thus forced back to their station close to their double wall on the north of the Harbour, of which the entrance was now commanded by the Syracusans. The Athenians were thus besieged both by land and sea, and could not venture to send ships out of the Harbour except in a number sufficient to resist an attack.

At length the news came that the great fleet under Eurymedon and Demosthenes was on its way. It consisted of seventy-three triremes; there were 5000 hoplites and immense numbers of light-armed troops. The chance of Syracuse lay in attacking the dispirited forces of Nicias before the help arrived, and they made a simultaneous assault on the walls by land and on the naval station below the walls by sea. The land attack was beaten off, but two days' fighting by sea resulted in a distinct victory for Syracuse. On the next day the fleet of Eurymedon and Demosthenes sailed into the Great Harbour.

Demosthenes perceived at once that all was over, unless the Syracusan cross-wall were captured. But his attempts to carry it were defeated. These failures damped the spirits of the army, and Demosthenes saw that the only wise course was to leave the unhealthy marsh, while they still had command of the sea, and before the winter came. But Nicias could not be persuaded to take the responsibility of retreat. He feared what the Assembly would say. In a few days, however, Gylippus arrived at Syracuse with new contingents which he had collected in the islands; and Peloponnesian and Boeotian succours at length reached the Great Harbour. Nicias gave way and everything was

ready for departure. But on the night on which they were to start, the enemy suspecting nothing, the full moon suffered an eclipse. The superstitious army regarded the phenomenon as a heavenly warning, and cried out for delay. Nicias was not less superstitious than the sailors. The diviners ruled that he must wait either three days or for the next full moon, and Nicias decided to be on the safe side by waiting the longer period. Never was a celestial phenomenon more truly disastrous than that lunar eclipse. With the aid of Nicias, it sealed the doom of the Athenian army.

Meanwhile the Syracusans learned of the Athenian intention to abandon the siege; and they resolved to destroy the host of the enemy before it could escape. So they drew up their fleet, seventy-six ships, in the Great Harbour for battle; and eighty-six Athenian ships moved out to meet them. The Athenians were at a disadvantage as before, having no room for manœuvring; and, centre, right, and left, they were defeated. The general Eurymedon was slain.

The one thought of the Athenians now was to escape,—the eclipse was totally forgotten; but Syracuse was determined that escape should be made impossible. The mouth of the Great Harbour was barricaded by a line of ships and boats of all kinds and sizes bound together by chains and connected by bridges. The fate of the Athenians depended on their success in breaking through that barrier. They abandoned their posts on the hill and went on board their ships. Nicias left nothing undone that could hearten his troops. We are told that, after the usual speech, he went round the fleet in a boat, making a personal appeal to the trierarch of each ship. The pæan sounded, and the Athenian lines sailed forth together across the bay to attack the barrier. When they reached it, Syracusan vessels came out against them on all sides. The Athenians were driven back into the middle of the harbour, and the fighting

resolved itself into an endless number of separate conflicts. The battle was long and wavered. The walls of the Island, the slopes of Achradina above, were crowded with women and old men, the shores below with warriors, watching the course of the struggle. In the end the Athenians gave way. They were driven back to the shelter of their own wall, chased by the foe. The crews of the remnant of the navy—which amounted to sixty ships—rushed on shore as best they could. The land forces were in a panic. The Generals did not even think of asking for the customary truce to bury the dead. Nothing remained but to escape by land; and Hermocrates, by the stratagem of a message from a pretended friend, postponed their instant departure. The Athenians remained the next day, and the Syracusans blocked the roads.

413 B.C. When at last the miserable host set out on 11th September, making away from the entreaties of the sick and wounded, a long agony began. For three days they marched in the direction of Catane, only to find a pass barricaded on the fourth. For three more days they dragged on, now hoping to reach Gela, and on the sixth day Demosthenes with the rearguard lost touch of the advance under Nicias. Next morning a Syracusan herald arrived with the news that Demosthenes and his 6000 had been surrounded and forced to surrender. Nicias offered terms, but they were refused.

For that day the wretched army, worn out with marching and want of food, remained where it was. Next day they set out again, harassed by darts, and, on nearing the river Assinaros, the men rushed forward to assuage their intolerable thirst, careless of the enemy on the ford, who slaughtered them unresisting. The water was fouled with bloodshed and trampling, but still they drank.

At last Nicias surrendered. The slaughter was then stayed and the survivors were made prisoners. It seems that a great many of the captives were appropriated for

their own use by the individual victors; and their lot may have been comparatively light. But the fate of the state-prisoners was cruel. Seven thousand were thrown into the stone-quarries of Achradina—deep, unroofed dungeons, open to the chills of night and the burning heat of the day—on a miserable allowance of food and water. The allies of the Athenians were kept in this misery for seventy days; the Athenians themselves were doomed to endure the torture for six months longer, throughout the whole winter. Such was the vengeance which Syracuse wreaked upon her invaders. The prisoners who survived the ordeal were put to work in the public prison or sold. Some of these slaves who knew speeches and choruses of the plays of Euripides by heart, and could recite them well, found favour in the sight of their masters; and we hear of those who, after many days, returned to their Athenian homes and thanked the poet for their deliverance.

If a man's punishment should be proportionate not to his intentions but to the positive sum of mischief which his conduct has caused, no measure of punishment would have been too great for the deserts of Nicias. His incompetence, his incredible bungling, ruined the expedition and led to the downfall of Athens. But the whole blame rests with the Athenian people, who insisted on his playing a part for which he was utterly unsuited.

SECT. 5. Consequences of the Sicilian Catastrophe.—After the Sicilian disaster Athens felt the need of a change in her administration. The Lacedaemonian post at Decelea stopped cultivation, and forced the closing of the silver mines at Laurion, thus cutting off a main source of revenue. It was perceived that a smaller and more permanent body than the Council of Five Hundred was needed, and accordingly the government was entrusted for the time to a board of Ten, named *Probuli*. At the same time the tribute levied from allies was abolished, and replaced

by a tax of 5 per cent on all sea-borne exports and imports at the harbours of the Confederacy, including Piræus. Thus Athens put herself on a level with her allies in the matter of taxation.

But reforms did not avert danger. All of Greece was eager to spring on Athens, and her subject allies sent to Sparta declaring their willingness to revolt. Thus Sparta was forced into a naval policy and decided to equip a fleet. Athens also spent the winter in shipbuilding. At the same time Persia entered again on the stage of Greek history, with the object of regaining the coast cities of Asia Minor, by playing off one Greek power against another. Tissaphernes, satrap of Sardis, and Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, sent messengers urging action upon Sparta and promising alliance, in order to wrest from Athens her Asiatic dominions. The revolt was begun by Chios, 412 B.C. when a few Spartan ships appeared; Miletus, Teos, Lebedus, Mytilene, and others quickly joined.

This successful beginning led to the Treaty of Miletus between Sparta and Persia. In the hope of humbling to the dust her detested rival, the city of Leonidas now sold to the barbarian the freedom of her fellow-Greeks of Asia. Sparta recognised the right of the Great King to all the dominion which belonged to him and his forefathers, and he undertook to supply the pay for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet operating on the Asiatic coast, while the war with Athens lasted. The Treaty of Miletus opened up a new path in Greek politics, which was to lead the Persian king to the position of arbiter of Hellas.

Meanwhile Athens had sent out a fleet which devastated Chios and won back Lesbos. But Cnidus and Rhodes joined the revolt, and by the beginning of 411 she held on the west coast of Asia little but Lesbos, Samos, Cos, and Halicarnassus. Her empire in Thrace and on the Hellespont was intact, but she was opposed by a strong

Peloponnesian fleet with a reinforcement from Sicily subsidised by Persia. Yet dissension had arisen between Sparta and the Persians. Alcibiades was intriguing—first at Miletus and then at Sardis—with Tissaphernes. King Agis of Sparta was his enemy, his life was unsafe, and his object was to break the alliance between Persia and the enemies of Athens, and so pave the way for his restoration to his own country.

SECT. 6. **The Oligarchic Revolution.**—At Athens in these months there was distress, fear, and discontent. The opportunity for which the oligarchs had waited so long had come at last. There was a fair show of reason for arguing that the foreign policy had been mismanaged by the democracy, and that men of education and knowledge had not a sufficient influence on the conduct of affairs. The chief of those who desired to see the establishment of a moderate polity—neither an extreme democracy nor an oligarchy, but partaking of both—was Theramenes. The extreme oligarchs were ready in the first instance to act in concert with the moderate party for the purpose of upsetting the democracy. The soul of the plot was Antiphon, an eloquent orator. Other active conspirators were Pisander and Phrynichus, who was one of the commanders of the fleet stationed at Samos. The movement was favoured by the Probuli and by most of the officers of the fleet. Moreover Alcibiades had entered into negotiations with the officers at Samos, promising to secure an alliance with Tissaphernes, but representing the abolition of democracy as a necessary condition.

It was voted that Pisander and other envoys should be sent to negotiate a treaty with Tissaphernes and arrange matters with Alcibiades. But it appeared at once that Alcibiades had promised more than he could perform. There had indeed been a serious rupture between Tissaphernes and Sparta. But when it came to a question of

union with Athens, Tissaphernes proposed impossible conditions to the Athenian envoys, and then made a new treaty with the Spartans. But this failure altered nothing. Men were convinced that some change in the constitution was inevitable. The news that Abydus and Lampsacus had revolted may have hastened the final act. A decree was passed that the Probuli and twenty others chosen by the people should form a commission of thirty who should jointly devise proposals for the safety of the state, and lay them before the Assembly on a fixed day. When the day came, the Assembly met at the Temple of Poseidon at Colonus, where a radical change was brought forward and carried. The sovereign Assembly was to consist in future not of the whole people, but of a body of about Five Thousand, those who were strongest physically and financially. Pay for almost all public offices was to be abolished. To these revolutionary measures a saving clause was attached: they were to remain in force "as long as the war lasts."

May, 411
B.C.

When the Five Thousand were elected, they chose a commission of one hundred men to draw up a constitution. The Commission thus chosen devised a constitution, but they also enacted that the state should be administered by a Council of Four Hundred till the Constitution should be established. The Four Hundred were instituted as merely a provisional government, but the entire administration was placed in their hands, the management of the finances, and the appointment of the magistrates. The Five Thousand were to meet only when summoned by the Four Hundred, so that the Assembly ceased to have any significance, and the provisional constitution was an unadulterated oligarchy.

SECT. 7. Fall of the Four Hundred. The Polity. The Democracy Restored.—For more than three months the Four Hundred governed the city with a high hand, and then they were overthrown. The sailors in the

fleet at Samos rose against the oligarchic officers : the chief leaders of this reaction were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The Assembly, which had been abolished at Athens, was called into being at Samos, and the army, representing the Athenian people, deposed the Generals and elected others. They hoped still to obtain the alliance of Persia, through the good offices of Alcibiades, whose recall and pardon were formally voted. Thrasybulus fetched Alcibiades to Samos, and he was elected a General, but the hoped-for alliance with Persia was not effected. Negotiations were begun with the oligarchs at Athens, and Alcibiades expressed himself satisfied with the Assembly of Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be abolished. There was a cleavage in the Four Hundred, the extreme oligarchs on one side, led by Antiphon and Phrynichus, the moderate reformers on the other, led by Theramenes. While the moderates accepted gladly the proposals of the army at Samos, the extreme party looked to the enemy for support and sent envoys to Sparta for the purpose of concluding a peace. In the meantime they fortified Eetionea, the mole which formed the northern side of the entrance to the Great Harbour of Piræus. The object was to command the entrance so as to be able either to admit the Lacedæmonians or to exclude the fleet of Samos.

When the envoys returned from Sparta without having made terms, the movement against the oligarchs took shape. Phrynichus was slain by foreign assassins in the marketplace. The soldiers who were employed in building the fort at Eetionea were instigated by Theramenes to declare against the oligarchy, and, after a great tumult at the Piræus, the walls of the fort were pulled down. When the agitation subsided, peaceable negotiations with the Four Hundred ensued. A day was fixed for an Assembly to discuss a settlement. But on the very day, just as the Assembly was about to meet, a Lacedæmonian squadron

appeared, off the coast of Salamis. Euboea was threatened, and the Athenians depended entirely on Euboea, now that they had lost Attica. The Athenians sent thirty-six ships under Thymochares to Eretria, where they were forced to fight at once and were utterly defeated. Euboea then revolted.

Sept. 411
B.C.

Athens now had no reserve of ships, the army at Samos was hostile; Euboea, from which she derived her supplies, was lost, and there was feud and sedition in the city. But the Lacedaemonians let the opportunity slip. An Assembly in the Pnyx deposed the Four Hundred, and voted that the government should be placed in the hands of a body consisting of all those who could furnish themselves with arms, which body should be called the Five Thousand. Legislators (*nomothetae*) were appointed to draw up the details of the constitution. Most of the oligarchs escaped to Decelea, but Antiphon was executed.

The chief promoter of the new constitution was Theramenes, who, from the very beginning, desired to organise a *polity*, with democracy and oligarchy duly mixed. His acquiescence in a temporary oligarchy was a mere matter of necessity; and the nickname of *Cothurnus*—the loose buskin that fits either foot—given to him by the oligarchs was not deserved.

In the meantime the supine Spartan admiral Astyochus had been superseded by Mindarus, and the Peloponnesian fleet, invited by Pharnabazus, sailed for the Hellespont. The Athenian fleet under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus followed, and defeated it at Cynossema. This victory heartened the Athenians; it was followed immediately by the recovery of Cyzicus, which had revolted.

411 B.C.

The Peloponnesians were now vigorously assisted by Pharnabazus, who was a far more valuable and trustworthy ally than Tissaphernes. In the spring Mindarus laid siege to Cyzicus, and the satrap supported him with an army.

The Athenian fleet of eighty-six ships succeeded in passing the Hellespont unseen, and in three divisions, under Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Thrasybulus, took Mindarus by surprise. After a hard-fought battle both by land and sea, the Athenians were entirely victorious, Mindarus was slain, and about sixty triremes were taken or sunk. A laconic despatch, announcing the defeat to the Spartan ephors, was intercepted by the Athenians: "Our success is over; Mindarus is slain; the men are starving; we know not what to do." Sparta immediately made proposals of peace to Athens, but the overtures were rejected. 410 B.C.

The victory of Cyzicus enabled the democratic party at Athens to upset the polity of Theramenes and restore the old constitution. The years following the victory were marked by operations in the Propontis and its neighbourhood. The Athenians, under the able and strenuous leadership of Alcibiades, slowly gained ground, till Athens once more completely commanded the Bosphorus. Nearer home, Athens lost Nisaea to the Megarians; and Pylus was at length recovered by Sparta. 409 B.C.

But the affairs of the west had begun to engage the attention of the Great King, Darius, who, aware that the jealousy of the two satraps hindered an effective policy, sent down his younger son Cyrus to take the place of Tissaphernes at Sardis, with jurisdiction over Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Lydia. The government of Tissaphernes was confined to Caria. The arrival of Cyrus on the scene marks a new turning-point in the progress of the war. 407 B.C.

SECT 8. Downfall of the Athenian Empire.—Prince Cyrus was zealous: but his zeal might have been of little use, were it not for the simultaneous appointment of a new Spartan admiral. This was Lysander, who was destined to bring the long war to its close. He gained the confidence of his seamen by his care for their interests, and he won much influence over Cyrus by being absolutely proof against

the temptation of bribes,—a quality at which an oriental greatly marvelled. In prosecuting the aims of his ambition Lysander was perfectly unscrupulous, and he was a skilful diplomatist as well as an able general.

While Cyrus and Lysander were negotiating, Alcibiades, after an exile of eight years, had returned to his native city. He had been elected strategos, and had received an enthusiastic welcome. The citizens trusted in his capacity as a general, and they thought that by his diplomatic skill they might still be able to come to terms with Persia. So a decree was passed, giving him full powers for the conduct of the war, and he was solemnly freed from the curse which rested upon him as profaner of the Eleusinian rites. He had an opportunity of making his peace with the divinities of Eleusis. Ever since the occupation of Decelea, which he had done so much to bring about, the annual procession from Athens along the Sacred Way to the Eleusinian shrine had been suspended, and the mystic Iacchus had been conveyed by sea. Under the auspices of Alcibiades, who protected the procession by an escort of troops, the solemnity was once more celebrated in the usual way. But a slight incident completely changed the current of feeling in Athens. An Athenian fleet was at Notion, keeping guard on Ephesus, and Lysander succeeded in defeating it and capturing fifteen ships. Though Alcibiades was not present at the battle, he was responsible, and he lost his prestige at Athens. New generals were appointed immediately, and Alcibiades withdrew to a castle on the Hellespont. Conon succeeded him in the chief command of the navy.

407 B. C.

The Peloponnesians during the following winter organised a fleet of greater strength than they had had for many years—140 ships; but Lysander had to make place for a new admiral, Callicratidas. Conon, who had only seventy ships, was forced into a battle outside Mytilene and lost thirty triremes in the action. The remainder were blockaded

in the harbour of Mytilene. The situation was critical, and Athens did not underrate the danger. The gold and silver dedications in the temples of the Acropolis were melted to defray the costs of a new armament; and at the end of a month Athens and her allies sent a fleet of 150 triremes to relieve Mytilene. Callicratidas, who had now 170 ships, left 50 to maintain the blockade and sailed with the rest to meet the foe. A great battle was fought near the islets of the Arginusae, south of Lesbos, and the Athenians were 406 B.C. victorious. Seventy Spartan ships were sunk or taken, and Callicratidas was slain.

The success had not been won without a certain sacrifice; twenty-five ships had been lost with their crews. It was believed that many of the men, floating about on the wreckage, might have been saved. The Generals were suspended from their office and summoned to render an account of their conduct. They shifted the blame on the trierarchs; and the trierarchs, one of whom was Theramenes, in order to shield themselves, accused the Generals of not having issued the orders for rescue until the high wind made the execution impossible. Probably there had been criminal negligence somewhere, and the natural emotion of indignation which the people felt betrayed them into committing a crime themselves. The question was judged by the Assembly, and not by the ordinary courts. Two sittings were held, and the eight Generals who had been present at Arginusae were condemned to death and confiscation of property. Six, including Thrasyllus and Pericles, son of the great statesman, were executed; the other two had prudently kept out of the way. The worst feature of the proceedings was that the Assembly violated a recognised usage¹ of the city by pronouncing sentence on all the accused together, instead of judging the case of each separately. The philosopher Socrates, who happened on

¹ The principle was formulated in the Psephism of Cannonus.

the fatal day to be one of the prytaneis, objected to putting the motion.

The victory of Arginusae restored to the Athenians the command of the eastern Aegean, and induced the Lacedaemonians to repeat their propositions of peace. Through the influence of the demagogue Cleophon, who is said to have come into the Assembly drunk, the offer was rejected. Nothing was left for the Spartans but to reorganise their fleet. It was generally felt that if further Persian co-operation was to be secured and the Peloponnesian cause to be restored, the command of the fleet must again be entrusted to Lysander. But there was a law at Sparta that no man could be navarch a second time. On this occasion the law was evaded by sending Lysander out as secretary, but on the understanding that the actual command lay with him and not with the nominal admiral. An unlooked-for event gave him still greater power and priestige. King Darius was very ill, his death was expected, and Cyrus was called to his bedside. During his absence, Cyrus entrusted to his friend Lysander the administration of his satrapy, and the tribute. He knew that money was no temptation to this exceptional Spartan, and he feared to trust such power to a Persian noble.

405 B. C.,
end of
Summer.

With these resources behind him, Lysander speedily proved his ability. He sailed to the Hellespont and laid siege to Lampsacus. The Athenian fleet of 180 ships reunited and followed him thither. Lampsacus had been taken before they reached Sestus, but they determined to force him to accept battle, and with this view proceeded along the coast till they reached Aegospotami, "Goat's river," an open beach without harbourage, over against Lampsacus. It was a bad position, as all the provisions had to be fetched from Sestus at a distance of about two miles, while the Peloponnesian fleet was in an excellent harbour with a well-supplied town behind. Sailing across

the strait, the Athenians found the enemy drawn up for battle, but under orders not to move until they were attacked, and in such a strong position that an attack would have been unwise. They were obliged to return to Aegospotami. For four days the same thing happened. Each day the Athenian fleet sailed across the strait and endeavoured to lure Lysander into an engagement; each day its efforts were fruitless. From his castle in the neighbourhood Alcibiades descried the dangerous position of the Athenians, and riding over to Aegospotami earnestly counselled the Generals to move to Sestus. His sound advice was received with coldness, perhaps with insult. When the fleet returned from its daily cruise to Lampsacus, the seamen used to disembark and scatter on the shore. On the fifth day Lysander sent scout ships which, as soon as the Athenian crews had gone ashore for their meal, were to flash a bright shield as a signal. When the signal was given, the whole Peloponnesian squadron, consisting of about 200 galleys, rowed rapidly across the strait and found the Athenian fleet defenceless. There was no battle, no resistance. Twenty ships, which were in a condition to fight, escaped; the remaining 160 were captured at once. It was generally believed that there was treachery among the Generals. All the Athenians who were taken, to the number of three or four thousand, were put to death. The chief commander, Conon, who was not among the unready, succeeded in getting away. It would have been madness for the responsible commander to return to Athens with the tidings of such a terrible disaster; and Conon, sending home twelve of the twenty triremes which had escaped, sailed himself with the rest to the protection of Evagoras, the king of Salamis in Cyprus. Never was a decisive victory gained with such small sacrifice as that which Lysander gained at Aegospotami.

The tidings of ruin reached the Piræus at night, and "on that night not a man slept." They had now to make

preparations for sustaining a siege. But the blockade was deferred by the policy of Lysander. He did not intend to attack Athens but to starve it into surrender, and with this view he drove all the Athenian cleruchs whom he found in the islands to Athens, in order to swell the starving population. Having completed the subjugation of the Athenian empire in the Hellespont and Thrace, and ordered affairs in those regions, Lysander sailed at length into the Saronic Gulf with 150 ships, occupied Aegina, and blockaded the Piraeus. At the same time the Spartan king Pausanias entered Attica, and, joining forces with Agis, encamped in the Academe, west of the city. But the walls were too strong to attack, and at the beginning of winter the army withdrew, while the fleet remained near the Piraeus. As provisions began to fail, the Athenians made a proposal of peace, offering to resign their empire and become allies of Lacedaemon. The ephors refused to receive the envoys unless they brought more acceptable terms, including the demolition of the Long Walls for a length of ten stades. It was folly to resist, yet the Athenians resisted. The demagogue Cleophon, who had twice hindered the conclusion of peace when it might have been made with honour, now hindered it again. An absurd decree was passed that no one should ever propose to accept such terms. But the situation was hopeless. Theramenes undertook to visit Lysander and endeavour to obtain more favourable conditions. His real object was to gain time and let the people come to their senses. He remained three months with Lysander, and when he returned to Athens, he found the citizens prepared to submit on any terms whatever. People were dying of famine, and the reaction of feeling had been marked by the execution of Cleophon. Theramenes was sent to Sparta with full powers. It is interesting to find that during these anxious months a decree was passed recalling to Athens an illustrious citizen—the historian Thucydides.

An assembly of the Peloponnesian allies was called together at Sparta to determine how they should deal with the fallen foe. The general sentiment was that no mercy should be shown; that Athens should be utterly destroyed and the whole people sold into slavery. But Sparta resolutely rejected the barbarous proposal of the Confederacy; she would not blot out a Greek city which had done such noble services to Greece against the Persian invader. The terms of the Peace were: the Long Walls and fortifications of the Piræus were to be destroyed; the Athenians lost all their foreign possessions, but remained independent, confined to Attica and Salamis; their whole fleet was forfeited; all exiles were allowed to return; Athens became the ally of Sparta, pledged to follow her leadership. When the terms were ratified, Lysander sailed into the Piræus. The demolition of the Long Walls immediately began. The Athenians and their conquerors together pulled them down to the music of flute-players; and the jubilant allies thought that freedom had at length dawned for the Greeks.

April, 404
B. C.

It is not to be supposed that all Athenians were dejected and wretched at the terrible humiliation which had befallen their native city. There were numerous exiles who owed their return to her calamity; and the extreme oligarchic party rejoiced in the foreign occupation, regarding it as an opportunity for the subversion of the democracy. Theramenes looked forward to making a new attempt to introduce his favourite *polity*. Of the exiles, the most prominent and determined was Critias, a pupil of Gorgias and a companion of Socrates, an orator, a poet, and a philosopher. A combination was formed between the exiles and the home oligarchs; a common plan of action was organised; and the chief democratic leaders were presently seized and imprisoned. The intervention of Lysander was then invoked for the establishing of a new constitution, and, awed by his presence, the Assembly passed a measure that

a body of Thirty should be nominated, for the purpose of drawing up laws and managing public affairs until the code should be completed. Critias and Theramenes were among the Thirty who were appointed.

SECT. 9. Rule of the Thirty and Restoration of the Democracy.—The first measures of the Thirty were to appoint a Council of Five Hundred, consisting of strong supporters of oligarchy, invested with the judicial functions which had before belonged to the people; and a body of Eleven, under the command of Satyrus, a violent, unscrupulous man, for police duties. The chief democrats, who on the fall of Athens had opposed the establishment of an oligarchy, were then seized, tried by the Council, and condemned to death for conspiracy. So far there was unanimity; but Theramenes and his party were opposed to the reign of terror which followed. The Thirty had announced as part of their programme that they would purge the city of wrong-doers. They put to death a number of men of bad character; but they presently proceeded to execute, with or without trial, even men of oligarchical views. The man whom perhaps they had most reason to fear, Alcibiades, had fled from his Hellespontine castle to the protection of Pharnabazus. The oligarchs passed a decree of banishment against him, and soon afterwards he was murdered, by the order of Pharnabazus, who acted at the suggestion of Lysander, and it was said that Lysander was instigated by the tyrants of Athens.

To the motives of fear and revenge was soon added the appetite for plunder; and some men were executed because they were rich. Many Athenians were required to assist in the revolting service of arresting fellow-citizens, in order that they might thereby become accomplices in the guilt of the government. Thus the philosopher Socrates and four others were commanded with severe threats to arrest an honest citizen, Leon of Salamis. Socrates refused

without hesitation to do the bidding of the tyrants; the others were not so brave. Yet Socrates was not punished for his defiance, owing perhaps to some feeling of piety in the heart of Critias, who had been one of his pupil-companions.

To these judicial murders and this organised system of plundering, Theramenes was unreservedly opposed. The majority of the Council shared his disapprobation; and he would have been able to establish a moderate constitution, but for the ability and strength of Critias. His representations, indeed, induced the Thirty to create a body of 3000 citizens, who had the privilege of bearing arms and the right of being tried by the Council.

In the meantime the exiles whom the oligarchy had driven from Athens were not idle. They had found refuge in those neighbouring states—Corinth, Megara, and Thebes—which had been bitter foes of Athens, but were dissatisfied with the high-handed proceedings of Sparta, who would not give them a share in the spoils of the war. These states were not only ready to grant hospitality to Athenian exiles, but to lend some help towards delivering their city from the oppression of the tyrants. The first step was made from Thebes. Thrasybulus and Anytus, with a band of seventy exiles, seized the Attic fortress of Phyle, in the Parnes range, close to the Boeotian frontier, and put into a state of defence the strong stone walls, whose ruins are still there. The Thirty led out their forces and sat down to blockade the stronghold. But a timely snowstorm broke up the blockade.

The oligarchs were now in a dangerous position, menaced without by an enemy against whom their attack had failed, menaced within by a strong opposition. They saw that the influence of Theramenes would be thrown into the scale against them, and they resolved to get rid of him. Having posted a number of devoted creatures,

c. Jan. 403
B. C.

armed with hidden daggers, near the railing of the council-house, Critias arose in the assembled Council and denounced Theramenes. Then, seeing that he would be acquitted by the Council, he struck the name of Theramenes out of the list of the Three Thousand, and condemned him to death. Theramenes leapt on the sacred Hearth and appealed for protection to the Council; but at the command of Critias the Eleven entered and dragged the suppliant from the altar. He was borne away to prison; the hemlock was immediately administered; and when he had drunk, he tossed out a drop that remained at the bottom of the cup, as banqueters used to do in the game of kottabos, exclaiming, "This drop for the gentle Critias!"

After the death of Theramenes, the Thirty succeeded in disarming, by means of a stratagem, all the citizens who were not enrolled in the list of the Three Thousand, and expelled them from the city. But with a foe on Attic ground, growing in numbers every day, Critias and his fellows felt themselves so insecure, that they took the step of sending an embassy to Sparta, to ask for a Lacedaemonian garrison. The request was granted, and 700 men, under Callibius, were introduced into the Acropolis.

The Thirty had reason to fear that many of their partisans were wavering. Deciding to secure an eventual place of refuge in case Athens should become untenable, they seized Eleusis. This measure had hardly been carried out when Thrasybulus descended from Phyle and seized the Piraeus. He had now about 1000 men, but the Piraeus, without fortifications, was not an easy place to defend. He drew up his forces on the hill of Munychia, at the summit of a steep street; highest of all stood the darters and slingers, ready to shoot over the heads of the hoplites. Thus posted, Thrasybulus awaited the attack of the Thirty. A shower of darts descended on their heads

as they mounted the hill, and, while they wavered for a moment under the missiles, the hoplites rushed down on them, led by a prophet, who had foretold his own death in the battle and was the first to perish. Seventy of the enemy were slain; among them Critias himself.

c. May
403 B.C.

The oligarchic party now tried a change of constitution, and a meeting of the Three Thousand replaced the Thirty by a new board of Ten, representing the moderate oligarchs. But they could not come to terms with Thrasybulus, who daily gained strength in the Piræus, and were forced to apply to Sparta. Lysander led an army to Eleusis; but he was now distrusted at Sparta, and the command was transferred from him to King Pausanias. Under the auspices of Pausanias, a reconciliation was effected. There was to be a general pardon, from which were excepted only the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten who succeeded the Thirty. *Nomothetae* were appointed to revise the constitution, and these lawgivers restored the old democracy of Pericles. Eleusis was still held by the oligarchs as an independent city, but after about two years it was attacked and captured, and Attica was again one state. The amnesty was faithfully observed by the democrats, but for more than three generations no oligarchical party had a chance of success in Athens. The city did not forget the doings of the Thirty.



FIG. 57.—Coin of Eleusis (reverse). Pig on torch; pig's head and ivy leaf below [legend: ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝ].



FIG. 53.—Coin of Trapezus (obverse).
Male head.

CHAPTER XII

THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND THE PERSIAN WAR

SECT. I. **The Spartan Supremacy.**—For thirty years after Aegospotami Sparta was engaged in the attempt to maintain and extend her dominion beyond the Peloponnesus. She failed, because neither the Spartan institutions nor the Spartan character were fit to deal with freemen abroad. In each of the cities which had passed from Athenian into Spartan control, a government of ten members was set up, and its authority was maintained by a Lacedaemonian *harmost* with a Lacedaemonian garrison. The cities were thus given over to a two-fold oppression. The foreign governors were rapacious and were practically free from home control; the native oligarchies were generally tyrannical, and got rid of their political opponents by judicial murders; and both decarchs and harmost played into each other's hands.

Meanwhile Lysander, who had established the Spartan empire, was too powerful and too ostentatious to be endured at Sparta. He was recalled from Samos, where he held a sort of royal court, and a letter from Pharnabazus which he brought, proved to be not an encomium, but an accusation. 403 B.C. He was allowed to escape into banishment under the plea of a pilgrimage to the temple of Zeus Ammon in Libya. But the same influences which had ruined him were at work to ruin Sparta. The empire paid a tribute of a

thousand talents yearly, to maintain the Spartan power, and this influx of money, in defiance of the Lyncæan discipline, brought the corruption which that discipline was designed to avoid.

SECT. 2. The Rebellion of Cyrus and the March of the Ten Thousand.—On the death of Darius, his eldest son Artaxerxes had succeeded to the throne. When Cyrus returned to his satrapy in Asia Minor, he began to form plans for subverting his brother and seizing the kingship. He relied largely on an army of Greek mercenaries which he began to enlist. They were recruited for the prince's service by Clearchus, a Spartan. The army ^{Spring,} which Cyrus mustered when he set forth on his march to ^{401 B.C.} Susa amounted to 100,000 oriental troops, and about 13,000 Greeks, of which 10,600 were hoplites.

The purpose of the march was at first carefully concealed from all except Clearchus. The hill tribes of Pisidia were often troublesome to Persian satraps, and their reduction furnished a convenient pretext. Among those who were induced, by the prospect of high pay under the generous Persian prince, to join this campaign—nominally against the hill tribes of Pisidia—was Xenophon, an Athenian knight, who was one of the pupils and companions of the philosopher Socrates. His famous history of the *Anabasis* or Up-going of the Greeks with Cyrus, and their subsequent retreat, enables us for the first time to follow step by step a journey through the inner parts of Asia Minor, into the heart of the Persian empire beyond the Euphrates and the Tigris.

Setting forth from Sardis, Cyrus marched south-east to Colossæ in Phrygia, where Menon, a Thessalian, met him with Greek troops. Clearchus joined at Celaenæ. So far the route had led towards Pisidia, its nominal destination, but now Cyrus turned north, and then east, to traverse Cilicia. The wife of Syennesis, king of Cilicia, helped

him with pay for the Greeks, and Syennesis, after a display of resistance, allowed the army to steal a march through the Cilician gates, an impregnable pass, whence the way was clear to Tarsus. At Tarsus the Greek troops finally realised that they were being led into the centre of Asia, three months from the coast, and they mutinied. Clearchus, when coercion failed, cajoled them into proceeding, since indeed they could not go back.

The march was now eastward, along the coast to Issus, where Cyrus found his fleet. It brought him 700 hoplites sent by the Lacedaemonians. Owing to the cowardly flight of the Persian general, he passed through the Syrian gates, which are a narrow pass between the end of Mount Amanus and the sea. At Myriandrus the Greeks bade good-bye to the sea. In a twelve days' march they reached Thapsacus and beheld the famous Euphrates. Here Cyrus had at last to own that Babylon was the goal,—that the foe against whom he led the army was the Great King himself. The Euphrates was shallow enough to be forded. The army accordingly crossed on foot, and continued the march along the left bank until they reached the desert of "Arabia." The tramp through the desert lasted thirteen days, and then they reached Pylae, at the edge of the land of Babylonia, fertile then with its artificial irrigation, now mostly a barren wilderness.

It seems to have been hardly conceived at the Persian court that the army of Cyrus would ever succeed in reaching Babylonia. The city of Babylon was protected by a double defence against an enemy approaching from the north. The enemy would first have to pass the Wall of Media, 100 feet high and 20 feet broad, built of bricks with bitumen cement; and they would then have to cross the Royal Canal, before they could reach the gates of Babylon. To these two lines of defence a third was now added, in the form of a trench about forty miles long, joining at one end

the Wall of Media and at the other the Euphrates. To defend a country so abundantly guarded by artificial fortifications, the king was able to muster immediately an army of about 400,000.

But now it was hardly possible for Artaxerxes to let his foes advance further. Two days after passing the trench, which was undefended, the army of Cyrus reached the village of Cunaxa, and suddenly learned that the king's host was approaching. The oriental troops under Ariaeus formed the left wing of Cyrus, who himself occupied the centre with a squadron of cavalry; the Greeks were on the right, resting on the river Euphrates. The Persian left wing was commanded by Tissaphernes, and the king was in the centre with a strong bodyguard of horse. Cyrus knew the oriental character, and he knew that if the king fell or fled, the battle would be decided and his own cause won. He accordingly proposed that the Greeks should shift their position further to the left,—to a considerable distance from the river,—so that they might immediately attack the enemy's centre where the king was stationed. But Clearchus ruined the cause of his master by pedantically adhering to the precepts of Greek drill-sergeants, that it is fatal for the right wing to allow itself to be outflanked. There was, however, another consideration which ought to have occurred to Clearchus. The safety of Cyrus himself was a matter of the first importance to the Greeks,—how important we shall see in the sequel. Cyrus left it to Clearchus to make his own dispositions. The onset of the Greeks struck their enemies with panic before a blow was struck. On the other side, the Persian right, which far outflanked the left wing of Cyrus, was wheeled round, so as to take the troops of Ariaeus in the rear. Then Cyrus dashed forward with his 600 horse against the 6000 who surrounded Artaxerxes. The impetuous charge broke up the guard, and, if the prince had kept command over his passions, he would have been the

Summer,
401 B.C.

Great King within an hour. But unluckily he caught sight of his brother, whom he hated with his whole soul, amid the flying bodyguard, and he galloped forward, with a few followers, to slay Artaxerxes with his own hand. He had the satisfaction of wounding him slightly with a javelin; but, in the mellay which ensued, he was himself wounded in the eye by a Carian soldier, and falling from his horse, was presently slain. The news of his death was the signal for the flight of his Asiatic troops.

The 10,000 Greeks, flushed with the excitement of pursuit, returned to find their camp pillaged, and then to learn on the following morning that Cyrus was dead. The habit of discipline stood them in good stead at this grave crisis. They refused to surrender, at the summons of Artaxerxes. He therefore parleyed with them, and supplied them with provisions. The only desire of the Greeks was to make all the haste they could homeward. By the road they had come it was nearly 1500 miles to Sardis; but they could not traverse the desert again unprovisioned. Without guides, without any geographical knowledge, they had no alternative but to embrace the proposal of Tissaphernes, who undertook to guide them home by another road, on which they would be able to obtain provisions. Following him, the Greeks crossed the Tigris, passed from Babylonia into Media, and, crossing the lesser Zab, reached the banks of the greater Zab without any incident of consequence. But here Tissaphernes, having drawn the Greek generals into his camp on pretence of a conference, seized all five. They were fettered and sent to the Persian court, where they were all put to death.

Tissaphernes imagined that when the Greeks found themselves without any responsible commanders they would immediately surrender. But after the first moments of dismay the Greeks speedily rallied their courage, and resumed their northward march. Xenophon, a man of

ready speech and great presence of mind, did most to infuse new spirit into the army. Though he had no rank, being merely a volunteer, he was elected a general.

It was bold indeed to undertake a march of uncertain length—terribly long—without guides and with inexperienced officers, over unknown rivers and uncouth mountains, through the lands of barbarous folks. The diary of the adventures of their retreat is a chronicle of rare courage, discipline, and reasonableness in the face of perils. Their march to the Carduchian mountains, which form the northern boundary of Media, was harassed by the army of Tissaphernes. When they entered Carduchia, the savage hillsmen were implacably hostile, and it was easy for them to defend the narrow precipitous passes. At the Centrites, a tributary of the Tigris, which divides Carduchia from Armenia, they found the opposite bank lined with the forces of Tiribazus, the Armenian satrap, and it needed a clever stratagem to cross the river safely. It was now the month of December, and the march lay through the snows of wintry Armenia. They had sore struggles with cold and hunger ; but they went unmolested, for they had made a compact with Tiribazus. The direction of the march lay north-westward ; they crossed the two branches of the Euphrates. At length they reached the city of Gymnias, and here they had a friendly welcome, and learned with delight that they were not many days' journey south of Trapezus. 'And on the fifth day they came to Mount Theches, and when the van reached the summit a great cry arose. When Xenophon heard it, he thought that an enemy was attacking in front ; and galloped forward to the front with his cavalry. When he drew near, he heard what the cry was—*The Sea, the Sea !* "

400 B.C.

A few more days brought the army to Trapezus—to Greek soil and to the very shore of the sea. Here they rested for a month, celebrated games, and offered their sacrifices of thanksgiving to Zeus Soter. The last stages of

the retreat, from Trapezus to Chalcedon, were accomplished partly by sea, partly by land. It might be expected that on reaching Chalcedon the army would have dispersed. But they still held together, ready to place their arms at the disposal of any power who would pay them, and took service first under a Spartan general, and then under a Thracian prince, who cheated them. But better times were coming. War broke out—as we shall presently see—between Lacedaemon and Persia, and the Lacedaemonians wanted fighting men. The impoverished army of Cyrus, now reduced to the number of 6000, crossed back into Asia, and received an advance of pay. Xenophon now was at last free to return to Athens with a considerable sum of money. It is probable that his native city, where his master Socrates had recently suffered death, proved uncongenial to him; for he soon went back to Asia to fight with his old comrades against the Persians. When Athens presently became an ally of Persia against Sparta, Xenophon was banished, and more than twenty years of his life were spent at Scillus, not far from Olympia, where the Spartans gave him a home. Here he settled down into a quiet life, with abundant leisure for literature; and composed, among other things of less account, the narrative of that memorable adventure in which Xenophon the Athenian had played such a leading part. The significance of the expedition of Cyrus, and retreat of the Ten Thousand as a victory of Greece over Persia, was immediately understood. A small company of soldiers had marched unopposed to the centre of the Persian empire, where no Greek army had ever won its way before; they had defeated almost without a blow the overwhelming forces of the king within a few miles of his capital; and they had returned safely, having escaped from the hostile multitudes, which did not once dare to withstand their spears in open warfare. The lesson had, as we shall see, its immediate consequences. Only a year or two passed, and it inspired a

Spartan king to attempt to achieve the task which fate reserved for Alexander.

SECT. 3. **War of Sparta with Persia.**—Cyrus, when bidding for Greek support, had instigated the Ionian cities to revolt from their satrap, Tissaphernes. After the defeat of Cyrus at Cunaxa, Tissaphernes returned to the Aegean coast in the place of Cyrus. His first concern was to recover the Greek cities of the coast, and he attacked Cyme. The Asiatic Greeks sent to Sparta an appeal for her protection. The relations of Sparta to Persia were no longer friendly, for Sparta had sent 700 hoplites to Cyrus. The opportunity of plundering the wealthy satrapies of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes was a bait for Spartan cupidity; the prospect of gaining signal successes against Persia appealed to Spartan ambition. These considerations induced Sparta to send an army to Asia, and this army was increased, as already stated, by the remains of the famous Ten Thousand. Taking advantage of a misunderstanding between the two satraps, the general Dercyllidas made a truce with Tissaphernes and marched with all his forces into the province of Pharnabazus. He succeeded in getting into his hands the Troad—or Aeolis, as it was called—which served the Spartans against the satrapy of Pharnabazus somewhat as Decelea had served them in Attica; it was a fortified district in the enemy's country. Sparta, hoping that these successes would induce Persia to make terms and acquiesce in the freedom of the Greek cities, concluded truces with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, and sent up ambassadors to Susa to treat with the Great King. But her overtures were heard unfavourably at Susa, for the king had been persuaded by his able satrap Pharnabazus to prosecute the war by sea. The Athenian admiral Conon, whom we last saw escaping from the surprise of Aegospotami, was burning to avenge the disgrace of that fatal day. By the advice of Pharnabazus, Conon was appointed to command a

399 B. C.

fleet of 300 ships which was prepared in Phoenicia and Cilicia.

Dercyllidas was now superseded by a new and leading personage in Greek affairs—King Agesilaus, who had become king of Sparta under exceptional circumstances. When King Agis died, Lysander, who had returned to Sparta with revolutionary schemes, desired a pliant successor. Leotychidas, son of Agis, was reputed to be illegitimate, and by Lysander's influence Agesilaus, the half-brother of Agis, was made king instead. Agesilaus had always shown himself singularly docile and gentle, and had never put himself forward in any way. Though strong and brave, he was lame, and an oracle bade Sparta "beware of a halt reign." But Lysander explained away the oracle, in his eagerness to see an apt tool on the throne. He was mistaken in his man. Agesilaus, under the mask of Spartan discipline, covered a proud and ambitious character.

It was arranged that Agesilaus should take the place of ^{396 B.C.} Dercyllidas; that he should take with him a force of 2000 Neodamodes, and a military council of thirty Spartans, including Lysander. Lysander expected that the real command in the war would devolve upon himself. But Agesilaus had no intention of being merely a nominal chief; and inflicted deliberate humiliations, till Lysander was sent, at his own request, on a separate mission to the Hellespont, where he did useful work for Sparta. Agesilaus himself made a successful inroad into Phrygia, whence he brought much booty to Ephesus. Having organised a force of cavalry during the winter, he took the field in spring, and gained a victory over Tissaphernes, ^{395 B.C.} who was completely discredited. Tithraustes was sent to the coast to succeed him and put him to death. An offer was now made by Tithraustes to Agesilaus, that the Spartans should leave Asia, on condition that the Greek

cities should enjoy complete autonomy, paying only their original tribute to Persia. Agesilaus could not agree without consulting his government at home, and an armistice of six months was concluded. Meanwhile, turning his arms against Pharnabazus, he invaded Phrygia, till his progress was stopped by an appeal from the satrap himself in an interview at which he and Agesilaus swore friendship.

But in the meantime Conon, with eighty sail, had induced Rhodes to revolt. Agesilaus took measures for the equipment of a fleet of 120 triremes; but he committed the blunder of entrusting the command to Pisander, his brother-in-law, a man of no experience. In the middle of the summer the fleet of Conon and Pharnabazus appeared off



FIG. 60.—Coin of Cnidus (obverse). Head of Aphrodite.

the coast of the Cnidian peninsula, overwhelmingly larger than that of Pisander, who sailed out from Cnidus to oppose it with desperate courage. Pisander's Asiatic contingents deserted him without fighting, and of the rest the greater part were taken or sunk. Pisander fell in the action. The Greek cities of Asia expelled the Spartan garrisons and acknowledged the overlordship of Persia. The maritime power of Sparta was destroyed, and the unstable foundations of her empire undermined.

SECT. 4. Sparta at the Gates of the Peloponnesus (the "Corinthian War").—At the same time Sparta was suffering serious checks nearer home. While Agesilaus was meditating wonderful schemes against Persia, war had broken out in Greece between Sparta and her allies. After the battle of the Goat's River, Sparta had kept for herself all the fruits of victory. She further exhibited her despotic temper by her proceedings within the Peloponnesus. Elis had given her grounds of offence. King Agis invaded and ravaged the country, and imposed severe

conditions on the Eleans. The Spartans indulged another grudge by expelling from Naupactus and Cephallenia the residue of the Messenians, who had settled in those places.

When war broke out between Persia and Sparta, it was the policy of Persia to excite a war in Greece against her enemy. A Rhodian agent, named Timocrates, visited Argos, Corinth, and Thebes, and gained over some of the most influential people. The first aggression, however, came from Lacedaemon herself. A border dispute between Phocis and Opuntian Locris furnished the occasion. The Lacedaemonians rejoiced to have a pretext for attacking Thebes, and a double invasion of Boeotia was arranged, King Pausanias advancing from the south, and Lysander coming down from Heraclea, on the north.

Thus threatened, Thebes turned for aid to her old enemy. Athens had been steadily recovering a measure of her prosperity, and men of all parties alike voted to seize the opportunity for attempting to break free from Spartan rule. Conon was sailing the south-eastern seas, Rhodes had revolted,—the moment must not be lost. So alliance was concluded.

Lysander and Pausanias had arranged to meet near Haliartus. Lysander arrived first and attacked the town. From their battlements the men of Haliartus could descry a band of Thebans coming along the road from Thebes, some time before the danger was visible to their assailants; and they suddenly sallied forth from the gates. Taken by surprise and attacked on both sides, Lysander's men 395 B.C. were driven back, and Lysander was slain. His death was a loss to Sparta, but no loss to Greece.

Pausanias soon arrived, and his first object was to



FIG. 61.—Coin of Elis (obverse). Head of Hera (legend: FA).

recover the corpse of his dead colleague ; but an Athenian army came up at the same moment to their assistance, under the leadership of Thrasybulus, and a burial truce was granted only on condition that the Peloponnesian army should leave Boeotia. Pausanias spent the rest of his life as an exile at Tegea.

The result of this double blow to the Spartans was the conclusion of a league against her by the four most important states. Thebes and Athens were now joined by Corinth and Argos. This alliance was soon increased by the adhesion of other minor states. The allies, when spring came, gathered together their forces at the Isthmus, and it was proposed by one bold Corinthian to march straight on Sparta and "burn out the wasps in their nest." But the Lacedaemonians were already advancing, and a
394 B.C. battle was fought near Corinth, in which the Spartans were victorious. But the Isthmus was left under the control of the Confederates, who were now free to oppose Agesilaus in Boeotia.

For Agesilaus was bearing down on Boeotia. The battle of Haliartus decided the ephors to recall him from Asia, and he was constrained to abandon his dazzling visions of Persian conquest. This Agamemnon had to return to Mycenae without having taken Troy. He marched overland through Thrace and Macedonia. The Confederate army which had fought at Corinth was now in Boeotia, in the district of Coronea. On the field where the Boeotians had thrown off Athenian rule half a century
394 B.C. before, Athenians and Boeotians now joined to throw off the domination of Lacedaemon. Agesilaus advanced from the Cephissus. He commanded his own right wing, and the Argives who were on the Confederate left fled before him without striking a blow. On the other side, the Thebans on the Confederate right routed the Lacedaemonian left. Then the two victorious right wings wheeling

round met each other, and the business of the day began. The encounter of the hoplites is described as incomparably terrible by Xenophon, who was himself engaged in it. Agesilaus was trodden underfoot, and rescued by the bravery of his bodyguard. The pressure of the deep column of the Thebans pushed a way through the Lacedaemonian array. Agesilaus was left master of the field; he erected a trophy; and the Confederates asked for the burial truce. But though the battle of Coronea, like the battle of Corinth, was a technical victory for the Spartans, it was a distinct success for the Confederates. Agesilaus immediately evacuated Boeotia—that was the result of Coronea.

It was round Corinth that the struggle of the next years mainly centred. Sparta was fighting for domination beyond the Peloponnesus; her enemies were fighting to keep her within the Peloponnesus. With this view long walls were built binding Corinth, on the one hand with its western port Lechaeon, and on the other with its eastern port at Cenchreae, thus holding the Isthmus.

The satrap Pharnabazus, who had not forgiven Sparta for the injury which Agesilaus had inflicted on his province, exhibited his wrath by accompanying Conon and the fleet, in the following spring, to the shores of Greece, to ravage the Spartan territory and to encourage and support the 393 B. C. Confederates. His revengefulness stood Athens in good stead. When he returned home, he allowed Conon to retain the fleet and make use of it to rebuild the Long Walls of Athens and fortify the Piraeus. This completely undid the chief result of the Peloponnesian war. The two long parallel walls connecting Athens with the Piraeus were rebuilt; the port was again made defensible; and the Athenians could feel once more that they were a free people. As builder of the walls Conon might claim to be a second Themistocles. But the comparison only

reminds us of the change which had come over Greece in a hundred years. It was through Persian support that Athens now regained in part the position which she had won by her championship of Hellas against Persia.

It was of vital importance to the Lacedaemonians to gain command of the Isthmus; so, establishing their headquarters at Sicyon, they made a series of efforts to break through the lines of Corinth. In this warfare a force of mercenaries, trained and commanded by the Athenian Iphicrates, was especially conspicuous. They were armed as peltasts, with light shield and javelin, and this armour was far better suited for duties of the professional soldier than the armour of a hoplite. This enterprising officer and his peltasts won the chief honours of the "Corinthian war." Agesilaus had been sent out to prosecute the war, and his brother Teleutias co-operated with him by sea; the Long Walls were stormed, and the port of Lechaeon was captured. In the following year he went forth again, and, gaining a series of successes, entirely closed in Corinth, except on the side of Argolis. The situation was rescued by Iphicrates.

390 B.C.

Some Spartans from the garrison, returning to keep a local festival, were escorted past Corinth. As this escort was returning to Lechaeon, Iphicrates and his peltasts issued from the gates of Corinth and attacked them. The heavy spearmen were worn out by the repeated assaults of the light troops with which they were unable to cope, and a large number were destroyed. Leaving another division as a garrison in Lechaeon, Agesilaus returned home, skulking through Sicyon and the Arcadian cities at night, in order to avoid unkind remarks. Most of the ports occupied by Sparta were soon recovered by Iphicrates; and the garrison of Lechaeon seems to have done no more than keep the gates of the Peloponnesus open.

SECT. 5. **The King's Peace.**—We must now turn from the Isthmus of Corinth to the eastern coasts of the Aegean. The most important event of these years was the recovery of Athenian dominion on the Propontis. Thrasybulus, the restorer of the democracy, gained over to the Athenian alliance the islands of Lesbos, Thasos, 389 B. C. and Samothrace, the Chersonesus, and the two cities which commanded the Bosphorus, Byzantium, and Chalcedon. But to act with effect it was necessary to raise money, and the Athenian fleet coasted round Asia Minor, levying contributions. At Aspendus in Pamphylia a riot broke out and Thrasybulus was slain. Conon, the other of the 388 B. C. two men to whom, since Pericles, Athens had owed most, was also lost to her. Sent as an envoy to Tiribazus, he was detained, and died in Cyprus.

To counterbalance the advantage which Athens was gaining in the contest, Sparta now leagued herself with the foes of liberty. She obtained a reinforcement of twenty triremes from Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, and she sent the diplomatist Antalcidas to make proposals at the court of Susa. Athens was in disfavour. Evagoras, prince of Salamis, was the friend of Conon, and had been given the citizenship of Athens. He had revolted from Persia, and Athens, though she owed to Persia the restoration of her Long Walls, could not refrain from sending him help; and therefore Antalcidas was able to persuade Artaxerxes to enforce a peace upon Hellas, which obliged Athens to give up what Thrasybulus had won back. The representatives of the belligerents were summoned to Sardis, and Tiribazus read aloud the edict of his master, showing them the royal seal. It was to this effect :—

“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, shall belong to him. Further, that all the other Greek cities, small and great, shall be autonomous; except Lemnos, Imbros, and

Scyrus, which shall belong to Athens, as aforetime. If any refuse to accept this peace I shall make war on them, along with those who are of the same purpose, both by land and sea, with both ships and money."

387-6 B.C. The King's Peace was inscribed on stone tablets, which were set up in the chief sanctuaries of the Greek states. There was a feeling among many that Greece had suffered a humiliation in having to submit to the arbitration of Persia. Both Spartans and Athenians had alike used Persian help when they could get it, but never before had the domestic conflicts of Hellas been settled by barbarian dictation and under a barbarian sanction. It was Sparta's doing. She constituted herself the minister of the Great King's will in order to save her own position; and the Greeks of Asia were left to endure oriental methods of government.



FIG 62.—Doric (fourth century). Obverse—Kneeling king with bow and spear. Reverse—Incuse.

CHAPTER XIII

THE REVIVAL OF ATHENS AND HER SECOND LEAGUE

SECT. I. **High-handed Policy of Sparta.**—Sparta, having the isthmus open to her, and being allied to Persia, was free to exercise her power tyrannically, and she did so, in various quarters of Greece.

In the north, a Chalcidian league had been formed about the town of Olynthus, comprising the towns of the



FIG. 63.—Coin of Chalcidice. Obverse: head of laureate Apollo. Reverse: lyre bound with filler [legend: ΧΑΛΚΙΔΕΩΝ].

Sithonian promontory. With this league Amyntas, king 385 B.C. of Macedonia, had made an alliance, and, when driven out of his kingdom by the Illyrians, he handed over the lower districts of Macedonia to the league. The Olynthians now conceived the idea of a confederacy which should embrace the whole Chalcidic peninsula and its neighbourhood. They proceeded to coerce those cities which refused to join, and Acanthus and Apollonia, who stood out, sent for help to Sparta. At the same time, Amyntas wished to

recover the cities which he had made over to the league. Sparta, whose aim was to keep Greece disunited, decided to send help to Acanthus and Apollonia.

The expedition against the Chalcidian Confederacy led unexpectedly to an important incident elsewhere. Phœbidas had been ordered to march through Boeotia with troops for Macedonia; and a party in Thebes favourable to Sparta plotted a revolution. Leontiadas, the most prominent member of this party, was then one of the polemarchs. He concerted with Phœbidas a plot to seize the Cadmea—the citadel of Thebes—on the day of the Thesmophoria; for on that day the citadel was given up to the use of the women who celebrated the feast. The
382 B.C. plot succeeded perfectly; the acropolis was occupied without striking a blow; the other polemarch, Ismenias, was arrested, and a government friendly to Sparta was established.

With the fortress of Thebes in her hands, Sparta might regard her supremacy as secured. But her immediate attention was fixed on the necessity of repressing the dangerous league in the north of Greece, and continuing the measures which had been interrupted by the enterprise of Phœbidas in Boeotia. Teleutias, sent to conduct the war, was defeated and slain in front of the walls of Olynthus. Another general, Polybiadas, was more successful. He
379 B.C. forced the Olynthians to sue for peace and dissolve their league.

About the same time, the Lacedaemonians were making their heavy hand felt in the Peloponnesus. They ordered Mantinea to pull down her walls; when the citizens refused, Sparta besieged and took the city, and broke it up into five villages, destroying its corporate civic life. At Phlius they ordered the recall of certain exiles and, when disputes arose, declared war on Phlius, and forced it to receive a Spartan garrison till an oligarchic council, nominated by Agesilaus, should have framed a new constitution.

Thus the Lacedaemonians, in alliance with the tyrant Dionysius and the barbarian Artaxerxes, tyrannised over the Greeks for a space. Even Xenophon, the friend of Sparta's king, the admirer of Sparta's institutions, is roused to regretful indignation at Sparta's conduct, and recognises her fall at the hand of Thebes as a just retribution.

SECT. 2. **Alliance of Athens and Thebes.**—The government of Leontiadas and his party at Thebes, maintained by 1500 Lacedaemonians in the citadel, was despotic and cruel. Fear made the rulers suspicious and oppressive; for they were afraid of the large number of exiles, who had found a refuge at Athens. That city was now showing the same goodwill to the fugitives from Thebes which Thebes, when Athens was in a like plight, had shown to Thrasybulus and his fellows. One of the exiles, named Pelopidas, resolved to take his life in his hands, and found six other associates. There were many in Thebes who were bitter foes of the ruling party, such as Epaminondas, the beloved friend of Pelopidas, but most of them deemed the time unripe. Yet a few were found ready to run the risk; above all, Phyllidas, who was the secretary of the polemarchs and therefore the most useful of confederates. The day was fixed for the enterprise. On the evening before, Pelopidas and his six comrades crossed Cithaeron in the guise of huntsmen, mixed with the peasants who were returning from the fields, and got them safely within the gates. The secretary Phyllidas had made ready a great banquet for the following night, to which he had bidden the polemarchs, tempting them by the promise of introducing them to some high-born and beautiful women, whose love they desired. During the carouse a messenger came with a letter for Archias, and said that it concerned serious affairs. "Business to-morrow," said Archias, placing it under his pillow. On the morrow it was found that this letter disclosed the conspiracy. The polemarchs then

Winter,
379-8 B. C.

called for the women, who were waiting in an adjoining room. Phyllidas said that they declined to appear till all the attendants were dismissed. When no one remained in the dining hall but the polemarchs and a few friends, all flushed with wine, the women entered and sat down beside the lords. They were covered with long veils; and even as they were bidden lift them and reveal their charms, they buried daggers in the bodies of the polemarchs. For they were none other than Pelopidas and his fellows in the guise of women. Then they went and slew in their houses the two other chief leaders of the oligarchs, and set free the political prisoners. When all this was done, Epaminondas and the other patriots, who were unwilling to initiate such deeds themselves, accepted the revolution with joy. When day dawned, an assembly of the people was held in the Agora, and the conspirators were crowned with wreaths. Three of them, including Pelopidas, were appointed polemarchs, and a democratic constitution was established.

The rest of the exiles and a body of Athenian volunteers presently arrived, on the news of the success. The Spartan commander of the Cadmea had sent hastily for reinforcements, but those that came were repelled. Then in the first flush of success the patriots resolved to storm the Cadmea, strong as the place was. But the Lacedaemonian harmosts decided to capitulate at once. Two of these commanders were put to death on their return to Sparta, and the third was banished. King Cleombrotus was immediately sent with an army to Boeotia, but accomplished nothing.

The presence of his army, however, backed the demand for reparation from Athens. Athens and Sparta were formally at peace. But two Athenian strategi had accompanied the volunteers to Thebes, regardless of their official position. They were sentenced, one to death, the other to banishment, and justly. But Sparta did not show the

same spirit in a similar case. Sphodrias, the harmost of Thespieae, conceived the plan of seizing Piraeus, as Phoebidas had seized Thebes. He marched into Attica with a force, but the raid was so ill-planned that daylight found him only half-way, and he retreated, plundering as he went. Athens was furious, but Sparta disowned the raid and promised to punish Sphodrias. But Agesilaus intervened to save him, and, as a consequence, Athens allied herself with Thebes and declared war on Sparta.

378 B.C.

SECT. 3. The Second Athenian League and the Theban Reforms.—Ever since the battle of Cnidus, Athens had been gradually forming bonds of alliance in Thrace, the Aegean, and the coasts of Asia Minor. The breach with Sparta induced her now to gather together these separate connexions into a common league. The league, which was purely defensive, was constituted in two parts—Athens on one side, her allies on the other. The allies had their own synedrion or congress, which met in Athens, but in which Athens had no part. It was necessary for the members of the league to form a federal fund; their payments were called *syntaxeis* ("contributions"), and the word *phoros* ("tribute"), which had odious memories connected with the confederacy of Delos, was avoided. But the administration of the federal fund and the leadership of the federal army were in the hands of Athens. Good fortune has preserved to us the original stone, shattered in about twenty pieces, with the decree which founded the confederacy, and we find the purpose of the league definitely declared: "To force the Lacedaemonians to allow the Greeks to enjoy peace in freedom and independence, with their lands unviolated." The chief cities which first joined the new league were Chios, Byzantium, Mytilene, Methymna, and Rhodes; then most of the towns of Euboea



FIG. 64. — Coin of Euboea (obverse). Head of nymph.

joined, and, what was most important and wonderful, Thebes enrolled her name in the list of the confederates, who amounted to about seventy in all.

At Thebes the attention of the government was chiefly bestowed on military affairs. There was formed a new troop of 300 hoplites, all chosen young men of the noblest families. Each man had his best friend beside him; so that the Sacred Band, as it was called, consisted of 150 pairs of lovers, prepared to fight and fall together. In battle, it was to stand in front of the other hoplites. Opportunely for Thebes there had arisen, to guide her to success when her chance came, a man of rare ability. This was Epaminondas, the friend of Pelopidas, a modest, unambitious man. But the revolution stimulated his patriotism and lured him into the field of public affairs, where his eminent capacity, gradually revealing itself, made him, before eight years had passed, the most influential man in his city. He had devoted as much time to musical as to gymnastic training; and he had a genuine interest in philosophical speculation. Silent by habit, when the need demanded his eloquence was extremely impressive. Exceptional in his indifference to the prizes of ambition, he was also exceptional in his indifference to money, and he died poor. Not less remarkable was his lack of that party spirit which led to so many crimes in Greece. We have already seen that his repugnance to domestic bloodshed kept him from taking a part in the fortunate conspiracy of Pelopidas.

SECT. 4. The Battle of Naxos and the Peace of Callias.—Within four years the Boeotian confederacy was extended over all Boeotia, except Chaeronea and Orchomenus, the harmosts being expelled. Moreover, Pelopidas and the Sacred Band routed in a narrow pass at Tegyra, between Orchomenus and Locris, a force of Lacedaemonian troops double their own number, and slew both the Spartan

generals. This victory over Spartans had, as always, a great moral effect.

In the meantime Sparta had been defeated by sea. A fleet of sixty galleys, under the Spartan Pollis, hindered the corn-ships from bringing grain from the Euxine to Piraeus, and threatened Athens with famine. Eighty triremes, under Chabrias, were dispatched by the Athenians to regain command of the sea, and to reduce Naxos, which had revolted from the league. Pollis, coming to the rescue, was defeated in the sound between Paros and Naxos, and lost all but ^{376 B.C.} eleven ships. Even these would have been disabled, had not Chabrias, remembering Arginusae, abandoned the action to pick up men in danger of drowning.

Next year the fleet was sent to sail round the Peloponnesus, under Timotheus, son of Conon—an assertion of naval supremacy. Timotheus won over to the alliance the Molossi, some of the Acarnanians, Cephallenia, and, above all, Corcyra. Negotiations for a peace with Sparta were then concluded, but the peace was immediately broken, and Sparta immediately sent Mnasippus to recover Corcyra. He blockaded the town and looted the country, till, growing careless, he gave a chance to the besieged, who sallied, slew ^{373 B.C.} him, and defeated his army. The Lacedaemonians then evacuated the island, just before the long-expected Athenian fleet arrived. The delay in its arrival had been caused by an error of the assembly, who ordered Timotheus to take sixty ships to relieve Corcyra, but omitted to vote the men and money. While he was still trying to raise them, appeals came from the besieged town, and Timotheus was superseded in the command. On his return he was impeached and acquitted, but, feeling himself discredited, went to Egypt and entered the service of Artaxerxes.

The discouragement of Sparta was increased by a series of earthquakes, and she was anxious for peace. Athens, too, was feeling the war a burden, and growing jealous of Thebes.

Thebes had attacked the Phocians, allies of Athens; and, because the recently restored town of Plataea was scheming to be annexed to Attica, a Theban force surprised it, and drove all the Plataeans out. Many of them took refuge at Athens. After this Athens took steps for peace, and sent to the congress of Lacedaemonian allies three envoys, of whom the chief were Callistratus and Callias. Thebes also sent ambassadors, one of whom was Epaminondas. A
371 B.C. general peace, called the Peace of Callias, was concluded, which recognised the autonomy of every Hellenic city. The Athenian and Lacedaemonian confederacies were thus rendered invalid. No compulsion could be exercised on any city to fulfil engagements as members of a league, though cities might co-operate freely as far as they chose.

The question immediately arose whether the Boeotian League was condemned by this doctrine of universal autonomy. Sparta and Athens, of course, intended to condemn it. But it might be contended that Boeotia was a geographical unity, like Attica and Laconia, and had a title to political unity too. Her representative was Epaminondas, and when Agesilaus asked him curtly: "Will you leave each of the Boeotian towns independent?" he retorted: "Will *you* leave each of the Laconian towns independent?" The name of Thebes was thereupon struck out of the treaty.

So far as Athens and Sparta were concerned, this bargain—which is often called the "Peace of Callias"—put an end to a war which was contrary to the best interests of both. But, although Athens was financially exhausted, the war had made her once more Sparta's equal. Sparta had lost as much as Athens had gained; the defeat of Naxos, the defeat of Tegyra, the failure at Corcyra, had dimmed her prestige. After the King's Peace, she had begun her second attempt to dominate Greece; her failure is confessed by the Peace of Callias.

SECT. 5. Athens under the Restored Democracy.

—Pericles in a famous speech declared that Athens was the school of Greece ; yet it was hardly till after Athens lost her empire that she began decisively to influence Greek thought. This influence was due largely to the actual schools of Isocrates and Plato, which attracted men from all quarters to Athens ; but also to a change in Athens herself. The city became Hellenic, and almost cosmopolitan, rather than Athenian, as her literature shows. The old Attic comedy of Aristophanes and his fellows, turning mainly on local politics, was replaced by a new comedy which dealt with subjects of general human interest ; and tragedy was dominated by the influence of Euripides, the daring critic of all established institutions and beliefs. Freedom, combined with the Attic genius, had led to philosophic speculation, and the result had been the growth of what is called "individualism." By this is meant that the individual citizen no longer looks at the outside world through the medium of his own city. He is a citizen of the world, not a citizen of Athens. He refuses to hold certain beliefs or perform certain acts of worship merely because the state into which he is born enjoins this religion. And, since his own life has thus become for him something independent of the city, his duty to his country may conflict with his duty to himself as a man. Patriotism ceases to be the highest virtue. Again, the question arises whether the state is made for the individual or the individual for the state. When that question is put, greater demands are made by the citizen for his private welfare. A soldier, for example, will seek service where it is most profitable ; as Conon, Xenophon, Iphicrates, and others took the pay of foreign powers.

In short, under the influence of this principle, a man born into a free state will not content himself with the state's definition of freedom : he chooses to be free after his own fashion. Plato in the *Republic* ridicules such an order

of things, by describing how the very horses and asses assert their liberty, and jostle those who will not leave the road clear. Yet Plato and his fellow philosophers did much to promote these tendencies, and the one man who, next after Euripides, was most responsible for the growth of individualism was Plato's master, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus.

Socrates was the first to insist that a man must order his life by the guidance of his own intellect, without any regard for mandates of external authority or for the impulses of emotion, unless his intellect approves. Socrates was thus a rebel against authority as such; and he shrank from no consequences. He did not hesitate to show his companions that an old man has no title to respect because he is old, unless he is also wise; or that an ignorant parent has no claim to obedience on the mere account of the parental relation. Knowledge and truth were the only masters which he admitted.

But what is knowledge and what is truth? The solution of Socrates is, briefly, this. When we make a judgment, we compare two ideas; and in order to do so correctly, it is obvious that these ideas must be clear and distinct. Definition was thus the essential point in the Socratic method for arriving at truth.

The application of this method to ethics was the chief occupation of Socrates. He was the founder of utilitarianism. He arrived at this doctrine by analysing the notion of "good"; the result of his analysis was that "the good is the useful." Closely connected was the principle that virtue is happiness, and this was the basis of the famous Socratic paradox that no man willingly does wrong, but only through ignorance, for there is no man who would not will his own happiness.

The man who had no respect for authority was not likely to except the gods from the range of his criticism;

and the popular religion could not sustain examination. Socrates doubtless believed in the existence of a God ; but as to the nature of the divine principle he was probably what we call an "agnostic," as he certainly was in regard to the immortality of the soul.




FIG. 65.—Portrait head of Socrates.

Socrates never wrote anything : he only conversed. But he conversed with the ablest young men of the day who were destined afterwards to become immortal themselves as thinkers ; he communicated to them—to Plato, to Aristippus, to Euclides—his own spirit. He never preached : he

only discussed ; that was the Socratic method—dialectic, or the conversational method. He did not teach, for he professed to have no knowledge ; he would only confess that he was exceptional in knowing that he knew nothing : this was the Socratic irony. He went about showing that most popular notions, as soon as they are tested, prove to be inconsistent and untenable. Though no man ever taught more effectually than Socrates, he was not a teacher ; he had no course of lectures to give, and therefore he took no fee. Herein lay his distinction from the sophists, to whom by his speculation, his scepticism, his mastery of argument, his influence over young men, he naturally belongs, and with whom he was generally classed. He soon became a notorious figure in the streets of Athens ; nature had marked him out among other men by his grotesque satyr-like face.

The sacred name of democracy was not more sheltered than anything else from the criticism of Socrates. He railed, for instance, at the system of choosing magistrates by lot, one of the protections of democracy at Athens. Honest democrats of the type of Thrasybulus and Anytus regarded him as a dangerous freethinker. They might point to the ablest of the young men who had kept company with him, and say : "Look at Alcibiades, his favourite companion, who has done more than any other man to ruin his country. Look at Critias, who inaugurated the reign of terror." However unjust any particular instance might seem, it is easy to understand how considerations of this kind would lead many practical un-speculative men to look upon Socrates and his ways with little favour. And from their point of view, they were perfectly right. His spirit, and the ideas that he made current, were an insidious menace to the cohesion of the social fabric, in which there was not a stone or a joint that he did not question. In other words, he was the

active apostle of individualism, which led in its further development to the subversion of that local patriotism which had inspired the cities of Greece in her days of greatness.

And this thinker was singled out by the Delphic priesthood for a distinguished mark of approbation. In the truest oracle that was ever uttered from the Pythian tripod, it was declared that no one in the world was wiser than Socrates. We know not at what period of the philosopher's career this answer was given, but, if it was seriously meant, it showed a strange insight which we should hardly have looked for at the shrine of Delphi.

Socrates died five years after the fall of the Athenian empire, and the manner of his death set a seal upon his life. Anytus, the honest democratic politician who had been prominent in the restoration of the democracy, came forward, with some others, as a champion of the state religion, and accused Socrates of impiety. The accusation ran: "Socrates is guilty of crime, because he does not believe in the gods recognised by the city, but introduces strange supernatural beings; he is also guilty, because he corrupts the youth." The penalty proposed was death; but the accusers had no desire to inflict it; they expected that, when the charge was lodged in the archon's office, Socrates would leave Attica. But Socrates surprised the city by remaining to answer the charge. The trial was heard in a court of 501 judges, the king-archon presiding, and the old philosopher was found guilty by a majority of sixty. According to the practice of Athenian law, it was open to a defendant, when he was condemned, to propose a lighter punishment than that fixed by the accuser, and the judges were required to choose one of the two sentences. Socrates might have saved his life if he had proposed an adequate penalty, but he offered only a small fine, and was consequently condemned, by a much larger

majority, to death. He drank the cup of doom a month later, discoursing with his disciples as eagerly as ever till his last hour.

The actual reply of Socrates at his trial has not been preserved, but his companion Plato, who was present, has reproduced in the *Apology of Socrates*, the general outline of the actual defence, wrought into an artistic form. And we see how utterly impossible it was for Socrates to answer the accusation. He enters into an explanation of his life and motives, and has no difficulty in showing that many things popularly alleged against him are false. But with the actual charge of holding and diffusing heterodox views he deals briefly and unsatisfactorily. He was not condemned unjustly—according to the law. And that is the intensity of the tragedy. There have been no better men than Socrates; and yet his accusers were perfectly right. The execution of Socrates was the protest of the spirit of the old order against the growth of individualism.

Seldom in the course of history have violent blows of this kind failed to recoil upon the striker. His companions never forgave the democracy for putting their master to death; and they spent their lives in carrying on his work.

In this period—during the fifty years after the battle of Aegospotami—the art of writing prose was brought to perfection at Athens. It is to the democratic Athenian law-courts that this development was mainly due. The most illustrious instructor in oratory at this period was Isocrates. But the school of Isocrates had a far wider scope and higher aim than to teach the construction of sentences or the arrangement of topics in a speech. It was a general school of culture,—a discipline intended to fit men for public life. Questions of political science were studied, and Isocrates liked to describe his course of studies as “philosophy.”

But it was to Plato's school in the Academy that the youths of the day went to study "philosophy" in the stricter sense. The discipline of these two rival schools—for there was rivalry between them, though their aims were different—was what corresponded at Athens to our university education. Isocrates discharged also the functions



FIG. 66.—Portrait head of Isocrates.

of a journalist of the best kind. Naturally nervous and endowed with a poor voice, he did not speak in the Assembly; but when any great question moved him, he would issue a pamphlet, in the form of a speech, for the purpose of influencing public opinion.

The form and features of an age are wont to be mirrored in its art; and one effective means of winning a concrete

notion of the spirit of the fourth century is to study the works of Praxiteles and compare them with the sculptures which issued from the workshop of Phidias. In the fifth century, apart from a few colossal statues like those which Phidias wrought for Athens and Olympia, the finest works of the sculptor's chisel went to decorate frieze or pediment. In the fourth century the sculptor developed his art more independently of architecture, and all the great works of Praxiteles were complete in themselves and independent. And, as sculpture was emancipating itself from the old subordination to architecture, so it also emancipated itself from the religious ideal. In the age of Phidias, the artist who fashioned a god sought to express in human shape the majesty and immutability of a divine being. In the fourth century the deities lose their majesty and changelessness; they are conceived as physically perfect men and women, with human feelings though without human sorrows; they are invested with human personalities. Thus sculpture is marked by "individualism" in a double sense. Each artist is freer to work out an individual path of his own; and the tendency of all artists is to portray the individual man or woman rather than the type, and even the individual phase of emotion rather than the entire character.

The general spirit of the Athenians in their political life corresponds to this change. Men came more and more to regard the state as a means for administering to the needs of the individual. We might almost say that they conceived it as a co-operative society for making profits to be divided among the members. They were consequently more disinclined to enter upon foreign undertakings which were not either necessary for the protection and promotion of their commerce or likely to fill their purses. The fourth century was therefore for Athens an age of less ambition and glory, but of greater happiness and freedom, than the fifth.

For while Athens lost her empire, she did not lose her commerce. The population of Attica had declined; plague and war reduced the number of adult male citizens from at least 35,000 to 21,000. But that was not unfortunate, for there were no longer outsettlements to receive the surplus of the population. In the same period began the system of paying citizens to attend the Assembly. The pay, fixed first at a half a drachma, was raised to a drachma and a half for the regular sessions. The rise shows the increase in prices and general prosperity. Another notable feature was the distribution of "spectacle-money." The practice of giving the poor Athenian the price of his theatre ticket had been introduced earlier, perhaps by Pericles. But in the fourth century distributions of "theoric" money, to be spent on religious pageants, became frequent and large. This theoric fund absorbed the state's surplus revenue, and became so important that a special minister of finance was named to manage it. Heavier taxation was thus occasioned, and the comfort of the poorer burghers was provided for at the expense of the wealthier. The theoric fund was an outward embodiment of the principle that the purpose of the state is the comfort and pleasure of its individual members.

To conduct her affairs on these lines, Athens needed men of ability. There was no scope for men of genius. None of her statesmen of this period made a mark in history. The art of war became every year more and more an art, and little could be accomplished except by generals who devoted their life to the military profession. Such were Timotheus, Chabrias, and above all Iphicrates. Timotheus was a rich man, and he could afford to serve his country and his country only. But Chabrias and Iphicrates enriched themselves by taking temporary service under foreign masters; Iphicrates even went so far as to support the Thracian king, whose daughter he had wedded,

against Athens. The attitude of the generals to the city became much more independent when the citizens themselves ceased to serve abroad regularly, and hired mercenaries instead. The hiring of the troops and their organisation devolved upon the general, and he was often expected to provide the means for paying them too. Here we touch on a vice in the constitutional machine. No systematic provision was made that, when the people voted that a certain thing should be done, the adequate moneys should be voted at the same time. Any one might propose a decree, without responsibility for its execution; and at the next meeting of the Assembly the people might refuse to allow the necessary supplies. In the same way, supplies might be cut off in the middle of a campaign. This defect had not made itself seriously felt in the fifth century, when the leading generals were always statesmen too, with influence in the Assembly; but it became serious when the generals were professional soldiers whom the statesmen employed. During the ten years after the Peace of Callias, Athens was actively engaged in a multitude of enterprises of foreign aggrandisement; but she achieved little, and the reason is that her armaments were hardly ever adequate.

CHAPTER XIV

THE HEGEMONY OF THEBES

SECT. I. **Jason of Pherae; and the Battle of Leuctra.**—The balance of power in Greece had been swayed for a hundred years by the two rivals Sparta and Athens. But now new forces had arisen in the north, and two cities had come into dangerous prominence—Thebes and Pherae.

The Thessalian cities, which were usually in a state of feud, had been united, and Thessaly had consequently become one of the great powers of Greece. This was the doing of one man. There had arisen at Pherae a despot whose ambition ranged beyond the domestic politics of Thessaly. Jason had established his dominion by means of a well-trained body of 6000 mercenaries, and also doubtless by able diplomacy, and finally had become *Tagus* of an united Thessaly. The power of the despot extended on one side into Epirus, on the other to Macedonia.

The power of Sparta had evidently declined, but she was still regarded as holding the highest position in Greece; and it was the first object of Jason to weaken her still further and dethrone her from that place. His second immediate object was to gain control of the key of southern Greece—the pass of Thermopylae; and as this was commanded by the Spartan fortress of Heraclea, these two objects were intimately connected. His obvious policy

was to ally himself with Sparta's enemy, Thebes; and Thebes, in her isolated position, leapt at his alliance. According to the terms of the Peace of Callias, all parties were to recall their armaments from foreign countries and their garrisons from foreign towns. Athens promptly recalled Iphicrates from Corcyra, but Sparta on her side failed to fulfil the contract. King Cleombrotus had, shortly before, led an army to Phocis, and now, instead of disbanding it, he was ordered to march against Thebes and compel that state to set free the Boeotian cities.

July, 371
B.C.

Cleombrotus, marching on Thebes itself, found the Theban army in position on the height of Leuctra. Leuctra lies on the hills which form the south limit of a small plain, somewhat more than half a mile broad, traversed by the brook of the upper Asopus. The road from the coast to Thebes crosses it and ascends the hills on the northern side, where the Boeotarchs and their army were now drawn up. The round top of one of these low hills, just east of the road, was levelled and enlarged to form a smooth platform. Here the Theban hoplites of the left wing were posted, and the artificial mound marks their place to this day. The numbers of the two hosts are uncertain; the Lacedæmonians, in any case considerably superior, may have been about eleven, the Theban about six, thousand strong. But the military genius of Epaminondas made up for the deficiency in strength. Instead of drawing out the usual long and shallow line, he made his left wing deep. This wedge, fifty shields deep, of irresistible weight, with the Sacred Band, under the captaincy of Pelopidas, in front, was opposed to the Spartans who, with Cleombrotus himself, were drawn up on the right of the hostile army. It was on his left wing that Epaminondas relied for victory; the shock between the Spartans and Thebans would decide the battle.

The battle began with an engagement of the cavalry.

In this arm the Lacedaemonians were notoriously weak ;
and now their horsemen, easily driven back, carried disorder




FIG. 67.

into the line of foot. Cleombrotus, who was confident of victory, then led his right wing down the slopes—the centre and left being probably impeded in their advance by the

cavalry; and on his side Epaminondas with the Theban left moved down from their hill, deliberately keeping back the rest of the line. The novel tactics of Epaminondas decided the battle. The Spartans, twelve deep, though they fought ever so bravely, could not resist the impact of the Theban wedge led by Pelopidas. King Cleombrotus fell, and after a great carnage on both sides the Thebans drove their enemies up the slopes back to their camp.

A thousand Lacedaemonians had fallen, including four hundred Spartans; and the survivors acknowledged their defeat by demanding the customary truce to take up the dead. But the army remained in its entrenchments on the hill of Leuctra, in the expectation of being reinforced by a new army from Sparta and retrieving the misfortune. The remaining forces of the city were hastily got together, and placed under the command of Archidamus, son of Agesilaus.

Meanwhile Thebes had sent the news to Thessaly. On receiving it Jason marched forthwith to the scene of action, at the head of his cavalry and mercenaries, flying so rapidly through Phocis that the Phocians, his irreconcilable enemies, did not realise his presence until he had passed. He cannot have reached Leuctra until the sixth or seventh day after the battle. The Thebans thought that with the help of his forces they might storm the Lacedaemonian entrenchments. But for the policy of Jason the annihilation of the enemy or any further enhancement of the Theban success would have been too much. He dissuaded the Thebans from the enterprise, and induced them to grant a truce to the Lacedaemonians, with leave to retire unharmed.

Jason returned to Thessaly, dismantling Heraclea on his way. He set himself to make preparation for a great display of his power at the next Pythian festival, when he proposed to usurp the rights of the Amphictyonic board, and preside at the games. But one day as he sat to hear petitions, seven young men approached wrangling, as if to

submit their dispute, and stabbed him where he sat. His brothers, who succeeded, were men of no ability. The death of Jason decided that Boeotia, not Thessaly, should succeed to the supremacy of Sparta.

SECT. 2. Policy of Thebes in Southern Greece, Arcadia, and Messenia.—The defeat of a Lacedæmonian army in the open field by an enemy inferior in numbers was made more impressive by the death of King Cleombrotus; a Spartan king had never fallen in battle since Leonidas. The news agitated every state in the Peloponnesus. The harmosts, whom Sparta had undertaken to withdraw three weeks before, when she signed the Peace, were now expelled from the cities; there was a universal reaction against the local oligarchies. But it was in Arcadia that the most weighty political results followed. A league for defence was advocated by the Mantinean Lycomedes. The fall of Sparta was the signal for the Mantineans to rebuild their walls, desert their villages, and resume city life.

Mantineæ, arisen from her ruins, and the other towns of Arcadia—with the important exceptions of Tegea, Orchomenus, and Heraea—now agreed to form a Pan-Arcadian federal state. Since none of the Arcadian cities was large enough to be federal capital, and the selection of one would have jealousies, it was decided to build a new city, in the western of Arcadia's two large plains, near the sacred mount Lycaeon. Its name, Megalopolis, was justified by the large circuit of its double wall, into which the surrounding village communities were induced to migrate; and its position on the north-west frontier of Laconia made it a bulwark corresponding to Tegea on the south. 370 B.C.

But Tegea had remained constant to Sparta, and it was necessary to bring it within the federation. A revolution in the town was effected with the help of some Mantinean troops, and the Laconian party fled as exiles to Sparta. Action could no longer be avoided, and Agesilaus led an

army to ravage the fields of Mantinea. The Arcadian league, being refused help at Athens, appealed to Boeotia; and Thebes, thinking a united Arcadia the best check upon Sparta, granted the request.

It was already winter when the Theban army, led by Epaminondas, arrived in Arcadia to find that Agesilaus had withdrawn from the field. But, though the purpose of the expedition was thus accomplished, the Arcadians persuaded Epaminondas not to return home without striking a blow at the enemy. To invade Laconia and attack Sparta herself was the daring proposal—daring in idea at least; for within the memory of history no foeman had ever violated Laconian soil—the unwalled city had never repelled an assault. The invaders advanced in four divisions by four roads, converging on Sellasia, and met no serious attempt to block their way. Sellasia was burnt, and the united army descended into the plain on the left bank of the Eurotas. The river, which separated them from Sparta, was swollen with winter rains, and this probably saved the city; for the bridge was too strongly guarded to be safely attacked. Epaminondas marched southward a few miles further, as far as Amyclae, where he crossed the stream by a ford. But Sparta was now saved. On the first alarm of the coming invasion, messages had flown to the Peloponnesian cities which were still friendly; and these had promptly sent auxiliary forces. Their coming added such strength to the defence of Sparta that Epaminondas did not attack it, but contented himself with marching up defiantly to its outskirts. It was indeed a sufficient revenge. The consternation of the Spartans at a calamity which, owing to the immunity of ages, they had never even conceived as possible, can hardly be imagined. The women, disciplined though they were in repressing their feelings when sons or husbands perished in battle, now fell into fits of distress and despair:

for, unlike the women of so many other Greek cities, they had never looked upon the face of an enemy before.

Having ravaged southern Laconia, the allies returned to Arcadia. But, though it was midwinter, their work was not over yet ; a far greater blow was still to be inflicted on Sparta. Epaminondas led them now into another part of the Spartan territory, the ancient Messenia. The serfs, who belonged to the old Messenian race, arose at their coming ; and on the slopes of Mount Ithome the foundations of a new Messene were laid by Epaminondas. ^{370-69 B.C.} The ancient heroes and heroines of the race were invited to return to the restored nation ; the ample circuit of the



FIG. 68.—Coin of Messene. Obverse : head of Demeter, corn-crowned. Reverse : Zeus with thunderbolt and eagle [legend : *MESSANION*].

town was marked out, and the first stones placed, to the sound of flutes. Ithome was the citadel, and formed one side of the town, whose walls of well-wrought masonry descended the slopes and met in the plain below. The Messenian exiles who had been wandering over the Greek world had now a home once more.

Thus not only a new stronghold but a new enemy was erected against Sparta in Sparta's own domain. All western Laconia was subtracted from the Spartan dominion ; all the perioeci and helots became the freemen of a hostile state.

In the meantime Sparta had begged aid from Athens, and a vote was passed to send the entire force of the city under Iphicrates to assist Sparta. He advanced into

Arcadia, but found that the Thebans and their allies had left Laconia, and Sparta was no longer in danger. But the hasty vote to march to the rescue was soon followed by a deliberate treaty of alliance.

Fighting went on in the Peloponnesus between the Arcadians and the allies of Sparta; and a few months later Epaminondas appeared for a second time at the head of the Boeotian army. Opposed by the Spartans and Athenians, he broke through their lines, joined his allies, and won over Sicyon and Pellene. But a new succour for Sparta arrived at this moment from over-seas. Twenty ships bearing 2000 Celtic and Iberian mercenaries came from her old ally, the tyrant of Syracuse. Their coming 369 B.C. seems to have decided Epaminondas to return home, though he had accomplished but little.

To establish her supremacy, Thebes was adopting the same policy as Sparta. She placed a harmost in Sicyon; as the Boeotian cities had formerly been garrisoned by Sparta, the Peloponnesian cities were now to be garrisoned by Thebes. Messenia and Arcadia were to be autonomous, but the Thebans desired to be regarded as both the authors and preservers of that autonomy. As a mistress, distant Thebes might be more tolerable than neighbouring Lacedaemon; but the free federation of Arcadia determined to be free indeed. Heraea and Orchomenus were forced to join the league, which now became in the fullest sense Pan-Arcadian. Some of the northern villages of Laconia were annexed, and the Triphylian towns sought in the league a support against the hated domination of Elis. Against all this activity Sparta felt herself helpless. But a second armament of auxiliaries arrived from her friend, the tyrant of Syracuse, and thus reinforced she marched into the plain of Megalopolis. But the expedition was suddenly interrupted; the Syracusan force, in accordance with its orders, was obliged to return to Sicily. The enemy

tried to cut it off in the mountain defiles. The Spartan commander hastened to the rescue, and dispersed the Arcadians with great loss. Not a single Lacedaemonian was killed, and the victory was called the "tearless battle." The joy displayed in Sparta over this slight success showed how low Sparta had fallen. 368 B.C.

Meanwhile, attempts were being made to bring about a general peace, on the initiative of an agent of Persia. A congress was held at Delphi, but the negotiations fell through, and the various states sent independent embassies to Susa. Pelopidas, representing Thebes, returned with a royal order to Greece, embodying the wishes of Thebes. Messenia's independence was recognised, also that of Amphipolis, which important possession Athens was scheming to recover. But it was decreed that Triphylia should be dependent on Elis, not on Arcadia; and Arcadia refused to abandon her acquisition, and formally protested against the headship of Thebes. In answer to this, Thebes for a third time sent an expedition into the Peloponnesus to strengthen her position, and Epaminondas gained the adhesion of Achaea. 366 B.C.

But the gain of Achaea was soon followed by its loss. Counter to the moderate policy of Epaminondas, the Thebans had insisted on overthrowing the oligarchical constitutions and banishing the oligarchical leaders; these exiles from the various cities banded together, and recovered each city successively, overthrowing the democracies and expelling the harmosts. Henceforward Achaea was an ardent partisan of Sparta.

The expedition of Epaminondas was attended with results which were in the end injurious to Thebes. The relations with Arcadia became more and more strained. But in the same year Oropus was wrested from Athens and occupied by a Theban force. Lycomedes visited Athens and induced the Athenians, smarting with resentment

against their allies, to conclude an alliance with the league. Thus Athens was now in the position of being an ally of both Arcadia and Sparta, which were at war with each other; and Arcadia was the ally of Athens and Thebes, which were also at war with each other. The visit of
366 B.C. Lycomedes incidentally led to a disaster for Arcadia. The ambassador, on his way back, was slain by some exiles into whose hands he fell.

This change in the mutual relations among the Greek states, brought about by the seizure of Oropus, was followed by another change, brought about by an Athenian plot to seize Corinth. The object was to secure permanent control over the passage into the Peloponnesus. But the plot was discovered and foiled. As Sparta could not help her, Corinth was driven to make peace with Thebes. She was joined by her neighbour Phlius and by the cities of the Argolic coast; all these states formally recognised the independence of Messene, but did not enter into any alliance with Thebes, or give any pledge to obey her headship. They became, in fact, neutral.

If we survey the political relations of southern Hellas at this epoch, we see Thebes, supported by Argos, still at war with Sparta, who is supported by Athens; Achaea actively siding with Sparta; Elis hostile to Arcadia; the Arcadian league at war with Sparta, in alliance with Athens, in alliance with, but cool towards, Thebes, and already—having lost its leader Lycomedes—beginning to fall into disunion with itself.

The peace with Corinth and others of the belligerent states marks the time at which Peloponnesian affairs cease to occupy the chief place in the counsels of Thebes. For Sparta is disabled, and the mistress of Boeotia recognises that it is with Athens that the strife for headship will now be.

SECT. 3. Policy and Action of Thebes in Northern

Greece.—The same year which saw the death of Jason of Pherae saw the death of his neighbour and ally, Amyntas of Macedonia. Alexander, succeeding Amyntas, brought Larissa and other cities under Macedonian sway, on pretence of protecting them against Jason's successor, also an Alexander. These cities now appealed to Thebes for protection against both Alexanders alike. The conduct of an expedition was entrusted to Pelopidas, who brought Larissa and other towns in the northern part of Thessaly 369 B.C. under a Theban protectorate.



FIG. 69.—Coin of Amyntas (obverse). Horseman with spear.

Macedonia offered no obstacles to the operations of Pelopidas in Thessaly, for it was involved in a domestic struggle. One of the nobles, Ptolemy of Alorus, rebelled against the young king, and was supported by the king's unnatural mother Eurydice. The two parties called upon Pelopidas to adjudicate between them, and he patched up a temporary arrangement, and concluded a Theban alliance with Macedonia. Hardly had he turned his back when Ptolemy murdered Alexander and married Eurydice. But a pretender to the throne appeared, and Eurydice, to secure the succession for her son Perdiccas, called in the aid of an Athenian fleet under Iphicrates. But Thebes was resolved to oust the Athenian influence. Pelopidas, again dispatched to the north, compelled the regent Ptolemy to 368 B.C. enter into alliance with Thebes, and assure his fidelity by furnishing a number of hostages. Amongst the young Macedonian nobles who were sent as pledges to Thebes was the boy Philip, who was destined to be the maker of Macedonia, and was now to be trained for the work in the military school of Boeotia, under the eye of Epaminondas himself.

Having thus brought Macedonia within the circle of the

Theban supremacy, Pelopidas on his way home visited the camp of Alexander of Pherae. But this despot had become the ally of Athens, and he detained his visitor Pelopidas as a hostage. A Boeotian army marched to rescue the captive; but an armament of 1000 men arrived by sea from Athens, and the invaders were forced to retreat. Epaminondas was serving as a common hoplite in the ranks, and but for his presence the army would have been lost. The soldiers unanimously invited him to take the command, and he skilfully extricated them from a dangerous position and managed their safe retreat. This exploit secured the re-election of Epaminondas as Boeotarch, and he immediately returned to Thessaly at the head of another army to deliver his friend. It was necessary to apply a compulsion severe enough to frighten the tyrant, but not so violent as to transport him with fury, which might be fatal to his prisoner. This was achieved by dexterous military operations, and Pelopidas was released in return for a month's truce.

Meanwhile Athens began to act in the Eastern Aegean. The opportunity was furnished by the revolt of her friend Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia. A fleet of thirty
366 B.C. galleys and 8000 troops was sent under her experienced general Timotheus. He laid siege to Samos, on which Persia had laid hands, contrary to the King's Peace, and took it at the end of ten months. At the same time he lent assistance to Ariobarzanes; and as a reward for these
365 B.C. services Athens obtained the cession of Sestus. Sestus was of special value, from its position on the Hellespont, securing to Athens control at this point over the ships which supplied her with corn from the Euxine coasts. But more than this, she now regained a foothold in the Thracian Chersonese. Thus Athens began to revive her old empire, but in Samos she revealed her designs even more clearly. This island was not treated as a subject ally, but outsettlers

were sent to occupy it, and thus the system of cleruchies, which had been the most unpopular feature of the first Confederacy, and had been expressly guarded against at the formation of the second Confederacy, was renewed.

Timotheus was likewise successful in the north. He compelled Methone and Pydna to join the Athenian confederacy; and in the Chalcidic peninsula he made himself master of Potidaea and Torone. 364-2 B.C.

It was high time for Thebes to interfere. If the successes of Timotheus were allowed to continue, Athens would soon recover Euboea, and the adhesion of that island was, from its geographical position, of the highest importance to Boeotia. But in order to check the advance of her neighbour it would be necessary for Thebes to grapple with her on her own element. By the advice of Epaminondas, it was resolved to create a navy and enter upon the career of a sea-power. A hundred triremes were built and manned and sent to the Propontis under the Boeotarch, Epaminondas. 364 B.C. The sailing of this fleet was a blow to Athens, from the support and encouragement which it gave to those members of the Confederacy which were eager to break their bonds. Byzantium openly rebelled; Rhodes and Chios negotiated with Epaminondas; and even Ceos, close to Attica itself, defied Athens, but was reduced by Chabrias.

Meanwhile a Theban army had marched against the ally of Athens, Alexander of Pherae, whose hand, strengthened by a mercenary force, had been heavy against the Thesalians. Once more, but for the last time, Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army, and advanced against Pherae itself. Alexander came forth to meet him with a large force, and it was a matter of great importance, for the purpose of barring the Theban advance, to occupy the heights known as Cynoscephalae, or the Dog's Heads, on the road from Pharsalus to Pherae. 364 B.C. The armies reached

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the critical spot nearly at the same time, and there was a rush for the crests. Pelopidas, by a combined assault of horse and foot, at length won the summit and forced the enemy to give way. But in the moment of victory the impetuous general espied the hated despot in whose dungeon he had languished, and yielding to a fit of passion, he forgot the duties of a general and rushed against his enemy. Alexander withdrew into the midst of his guards, and Pelopidas, plunging desperately after him, was overwhelmed by numbers. The death of Pelopidas was not fatal to his followers, who routed the enemy with heavy loss; but it was a sore blow both to his own Thebes and to Thessaly. In the following year an army was sent against Pherae, and avenged his death. Alexander was obliged to relinquish all his possessions except his own city and submit to the headship of Thebes.

SECT. 4. **The Battle of Mantinea.**—The Arcadian confederacy was threatened with dissolution. Elis, seeking to recover Triphylia, allied herself with Sparta. Arcadia in revenge determined that the next Olympian games should not be held under the time-honoured presidency of Elis, but revived the ancient claim of Pisa. To support this move, they sent a force which occupied and fortified



FIG. 70.—Coin of Elis (obverse). Eagle tearing a hare.

the Hill of Cronus above Olympia, and when the games came round, the whole army of the confederacy, with contingents from Athens and from Argos, arrived to protect the celebration. The horse-race had been run, and the pentathlon, or contest of five-feats—running, wrestling, hurling the javelin, throwing the disc, and leaping—was in progress,

364 B.C. when the men of Elis marched up and attacked. A battle ensued and they were driven back, but all Greece was outraged by the violence done at the holy time. Sympathy

was on the side of Elis from the first, and far more so when the Arcadians began to use the sacred treasures of Olympia to pay their army.

Jealousies were already rife in the federation, and Mantinea seized the excuse of this scandal to secede. In the league itself there arose a party which favoured alliance with Sparta rather than to endure to be dependent on Thebes. The Boeotians, to maintain their power in the Peloponnesus, sent a fourth invading army under Epaminondas. He advanced to Tegea while his enemies were gathering to Mantinea, Tegea's rival. 362 B.C.

Learning that Agesilaus had already set out, he determined to strike a second blow at Sparta. He would have found the place as unprotected as "a nest of young birds," if his plan had not been thwarted by a Cretan runner who carried the news to Agesilaus. The king immediately returned on his steps; and when Epaminondas after a night's march reached Sparta, he found it prepared and defended. Baffled in this project by an incalculable chance, Epaminondas promptly resolved to attempt another surprise. He foresaw that the army at Mantinea would immediately march to the rescue of Sparta, and that Mantinea would consequently be inadequately guarded. Moving rapidly, he reached Tegea, where he rested his hoplites, but he sent on his cavalry to surprise Mantinea. The army had departed, as he calculated, and the people were out in the fields, busy with the harvest. But in the same hour in which the Theban horse approached from the south, a body of Athenian cavalry had reached the city. They had not yet eaten or drunk, but they rode forth and drove the assailants back.

The allied army, learning that Sparta was no longer in danger, soon returned from its fruitless excursion to its former post, now reinforced by both the Spartan and the Athenian contingents. Foiled in his two projects of

surprise, Epaminondas was obliged to attack the united enemy at Mantinea. The enemy occupied the narrow part of the plain, south of Mantinea, where ridges of the opposite mountains approach each other; the object of Epaminondas was to sweep them out of his way and take the city. But instead of marching straight for the gap, he led his army north-westwards to a point in the hills near the modern Tripolitza, and then moved a short distance along the skirts of the mountain so as to approach the right wing of the foe. He then halted and formed in battle array. The enemy were deceived by the indirect advance. Seeing him march obliquely towards the hills, they concluded that he would not attack that day.

Epaminondas adopted the same tactics by which he had won at Leuctra. On the left he placed the Boeotian hoplites, under his own immediate command, in a deep column, destined to break through the right wing of the enemy before the rest of the armies could come to blows. The oblique advance, besides its chief purpose of deceiving the foe, had the further advantage of assisting the peculiar tactics of the general; for, when he formed his line, there was obviously a far greater distance between his right and the hostile left than that which divided his left from the hostile right. With an extraordinary lack of perception, the Lacedaemonians and their allies witnessed these manœuvres without understanding their drift; and it was not until Epaminondas began to advance in full march against them, that they realised his meaning, and rushed tumultuously to arms. All fell out as he designed. His cavalry routed their cavalry, and the force of his wedge of hoplites, led by himself, broke through the opposing array and put the Lacedaemonians to flight. It is remarkable, indeed, how the tactical lesson of Leuctra seems to have been lost on the Spartans. The men of Achaea and Elis and the rest, when they saw the flight of the right wing,

wavered before they came into collision with their own opponents.

It was a great Theban victory, and yet a chance determined that this victory should be the deathblow to the supremacy of Thebes. As he pursued the retreating foe, at the head of his Thebans, Epaminondas received a mortal thrust from a spear. When the news spread through the field, the pursuit was stayed and the effect of the victory was undone; the troops fell back like beaten men. There was no one to take his place. In his dying moments, before the point of the fatal spear was extracted, Epaminondas asked for Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he destined as his successors. He was told that they were slain. "Then," he said, "make peace with the enemy." Peace was made on condition that things should remain as they were; Megalopolis and Messenia were recognised—the abiding results of Theban policy.

Great as were the genius, character, and achievements of Epaminondas, he did not build to last. He did not create what Boeotia needed—an efficient machinery for the conduct of foreign affairs. He did not seriously grapple with the question whether or no Boeotia should attempt to become a maritime power. Above all he did not succeed in welding Boeotia into a real national unity. His work died with him. Epaminondas was a great general—not a great statesman.

CHAPTER XV

THE SYRACUSAN EMPIRE AND THE STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE

SECT. I. Carthaginian Destruction of Selinus and Himera.—The victories of Salamis and Himera were practically simultaneous. In the west as in the east Greece repulsed the barbarian. But when Persia and Carthage, after long quiescence, saw the greatest city of eastern



FIG. 71.—Coin of Syracuse, engraved by Cimon (obverse). Head of Arethusa [legend: ΑΡΕΘΟΥΣΑ; signature of ΚΙΜΩΝ on headband].



FIG. 72.—Coin of Acragas (obverse). Eagle tearing hare; shell as symbol of the seashore [legend: ΑΚΡΑΓΑΝΤΙΝΩΝ].

Greece in deadly conflict with the greatest city of western Greece, Carthage like Persia again encroached upon the Greek.

At Syracuse, as at Athens, victory over the invader was followed by a democratic movement. Hermocrates, the leading citizen, was indeed an oligarch, but during his

absence with the fleet sent to help Sparta in the Aegean he was banished on the motion of his opponent Diocles. At this juncture a new feud between Segesta and Selinus ^{410 B.C.} was the pretext for a new invasion. Segesta appealed to Carthage, where one of the two shophets or judges was Hannibal, grandson of the Hamilcar who was slain at Himera. At his instance a great expedition was sent ^{409 B.C.} against Selinus, which was inadequately fortified; the place was sacked and the people slaughtered. Hannibal now proceeded to his real purpose, vengeance on Himera. The city had time to prepare, and help came from Syracuse under Diocles. But the Carthaginians by a stratagem drew off Diocles with his fleet for three days, and the town was carried by a desperate assault when the returning ships were actually in sight. Hannibal slaughtered 3000 prisoners to appease the shade of his grandfather, and utterly demolished the town.

SECT. 2. **Rise of Dionysius.**—Carthage, determined to subdue all Greek Sicily, made ready another great expedition and attacked Acragas, then at the height of its ^{406 B.C.} prosperity. The defence was conducted by the Spartan Dexippus, and soon after the beginning of the siege the invaders, under Hannibal and Himilco, were defeated outside the walls by a relieving army from Syracuse. The Punic army, short of supplies, was threatened with disaster; but Hannibal intercepted provision ships coming to the town and reversed the situation. The mercenary troops deserted the defenders, and the citizens abandoned their city by night. Acragas became a Carthaginian town. At Syracuse men felt the great jeopardy in which Sicily now stood; and there was one man who saw in this jeopardy the opportunity of his own ambition,—Dionysius, a man of obscure birth, who had been a clerk in a public office. He had marked himself out by his energy and bravery before the walls of Acragas. He saw the incompetence

of the democratic government of his city, and he determined to overthrow it. An assembly was held to consider the situation. Dionysius arose and in a violent harangue accused the generals of treachery. The generals were deposed, and a new board was appointed, of which Dionysius was one. This was only the first step on the road which was to lead to the *tyrannis*. He soon began to discredit his colleagues; and spread reports that they were disloyal to Syracuse. Presently he openly accused them, and the people elected him sole general with sovereign powers to meet the instant danger. The next step was to procure a bodyguard. The Assembly at Syracuse would certainly not have granted such an instrument of tyranny. But Dionysius ordered the Syracusan army to march to Leontini, which was now a Syracusan dependency. He encamped near the town, and during the night a rumour was spread about that the general's life had been attempted. An assembly was held next day, which, when Dionysius laid bare the designs of his enemies, voted him a bodyguard of 600; and he had won over the mercenaries to his cause.

These were the three steps in the "despot's progress." The democracy of course was not formally overthrown; Dionysius held no office that upset the constitution. Things went on as at Athens under Pisistratus; the Assembly met and passed decrees and elected magistrates.

405 B. C. The justification of the power of Dionysius lay in the need of a champion against Carthage. He set out with a great fleet and army to relieve Gela, which was already beleaguered. But a plan of attack failed, by reason of his half-heartedness, and he ordered the people to evacuate the town. On his way back he also ordered the abandonment of Camarina. Syracuse in disgust rose against him, but he forced his way in. A treaty, probably arranged beforehand, was then concluded with Carthage, confirming

Carthage in her conquests, but recognising Dionysius as ruler of Syracuse. He thus secured Punic aid to build up the town, which he would one day use against Carthage. Under Dionysius Syracuse became the leading European power on the Mediterranean.

His tyranny lasted thirty-eight years, till the end of his life. The forms of the constitution were maintained, and he was nominally elected; but his foreign bodyguard was the prop of his power. Yet he owed his long success also to a wise principle of tyranny. He was cruel and oppressive only for political ends, not for personal desires. No father or lover was tempted to stab him.

His first concern was to establish himself in a stronghold. He made the Island a fortress barred off by a wall from the mainland, and entered only by passing under five successive gates. The Lesser Harbour, which became the chief naval arsenal, was included in these fortifications: its mouth was closed by a mole with a gate through which only one galley passed at a time. Further, he made friends for himself by rewarding adherents and by enfranchising slaves, with confiscations from his opponents. Then he proceeded to a career of conquest. The Ionian cities of Naxos and Catane were taken by treachery, their inhabitants were sold, and Naxos destroyed. Leontini submitted, and its inhabitants were transferred to Syracuse. This was an offence to Carthage, and Dionysius provided against the struggle by fortifying his city on a huge scale. The heights of Epipolae were included in the walls, and a great castle was built at the important point of Euryalos, whose ruins still are a monument of Greek Syracuse at the height of her power.

His military preparations were not less notable and original. He first thought out and taught how the heterogeneous parts of a military armament—the army and the navy, the cavalry and the infantry, the heavy and the light

troops—might be closely and systematically co-ordinated so as to act as if they were a single organic body. He first introduced, his engineers first invented, the catapult, which revolutionised siege-warfare, and introduced a new element into military operations. An engine which hurled a stone of two or three hundredweight for a distance of two or three hundred yards was extremely formidable in close quarters.

398-7 B.C.

SECT. 3. **Punic Wars of Dionysius.**—When his preparations were complete, Dionysius went forth to do what no Greek leader in Sicily had ever done before. He went forth not merely to deliver Greek cities from Phoenician rule, but to conquer Phoenician Sicily itself. At the head of 80,000 foot and 3000 horse he laid siege to Motya. This city was an island town connected by a causeway with the land, and the inhabitants broke down the causeway. Dionysius set to building a much greater mole from which to work his engines. Himilco with his fleet came to attack the Syracusan ships which were drawn up on the shore, but as he advanced volleys of rocks from the catapults disconcerted the Punic sailors, and they left Motya to its fate. Towers of six stories high were brought up to the walls, and the battle was waged in mid-air. The town was defended from street to street, till at last a night assault finished the business.

Carthage now bestirred herself. Himilco gained Eryx by treachery, and recovered Motya. He then turned upon Messana, and rased the place, though the inhabitants escaped into the neighbouring hills. The Syracusan fleet under Leptines, brother of Dionysius, came against the Carthaginians, but was routed at Catane; and soon Himilco with his victorious fleet sailed into the Great Harbour at Syracuse, while the army encamped along the banks of the Anapus. But the siege was protracted, and the Carthaginian camp, pitched in a swamp in the burning heat was ravaged

by pestilence ; and suddenly Dionysius made a joint attack on the fleet and camp. It was wholly successful : the fleet was destroyed, the forts which protected the camp were taken. The whole armament might have been annihilated like that of Athens, had not Dionysius accepted 300 talents from Himilco to connive at the escape of all Carthaginian 397 B.C. citizens. The tyrant felt that if the Carthaginians vanished from Sicily, his autocracy would be endangered ; and he made no effort to drive them from their old station in the western corner of the island. Another Punic war broke out five years later, in which Dionysius won possession of Solus, the most easterly Carthaginian city. The peace which concluded it placed all the Greek cities in Sicily, and 392 B.C. also the Sicels, under the power of Syracuse.

SECT. 4. **The Empire of Dionysius. His Death.**

—Having made himself master of all Greek Sicily, the lord of Syracuse began to plan the conquest of Greek Italy. Here, as in other things, Dionysius was an innovator ; he set the example of enterprises of conquest beyond the sea.

He had rebuilt and resettled Messina, and now he 391 B.C. attacked Rhegium, opposite it on the strait. But the confederate cities of the Italian coast came to the rescue, and defeated Dionysius, who declared war on the federation. He besieged Caulonia, and the federal army came out 389 B.C. from Croton to oppose him. Dionysius was victorious, and 10,000 fugitives cut off on a high hill without water were forced to surrender at discretion, and Dionysius told them off with a wand as they passed him, each man expecting bondage, if not death. They were let go without even a ransom. This act of mercy produced a great sensation, and its wisdom was soon approved. The communities to which the captives belonged voted him golden crowns and made separate treaties with him. Only Rhegium, Caulonia, and Hipponion stood out ; the two smaller towns were taken, and their people transplanted to Syracuse.

Rhegium stood a siege of ten months, but was at last reduced, and all its inhabitants who could not find ransoms were sold into slavery. He was now master of both sides of the strait, and held the fortress which was the bulwark of Greek Italy. Eight years later he captured Croton, and his power in Italy reached its greatest height.

In the meantime Dionysius was pushing even further afield, and planting colonies on both shores of the Adriatic, at Ancona, at Issa, and as far north as Hadria at the mouth of the Po. The Syracusan empire now included the greater portion of Sicily and the southern peninsula of Italy, perhaps as far north as the river Crathis. It had remoter dependencies, ally rather than subject, in Thurii and other Italiot cities north of the Crathis; in Iapygia, on the heel of Italy; in the kingdom of Molossia, on the Epirot coast, and in some seaboard parts of Illyria. But the maintenance of this empire forced Dionysius to lay upon the Syracusans a most burdensome taxation. It is little wonder that the tyrant had an evil repute in the mother-country.

It was only for a moment that the dominion of the Syracusan despot reached its extreme limits. He had hardly won the city and lands of Croton, when his borders
383 B.C. fell back in the west of his own island. A new war with Carthage had broken out, and a battle was fought at Cronion, near Panormus, and Dionysius was defeated with terrible
378 B.C. loss, and compelled to make a disadvantageous peace. The boundary of Greek against Punic Sicily was withdrawn from the river Mazarus to the river Halycus. This meant that the deliverer of Selinus and Thermae gave back those cities to the mercies of the barbarian.

Ten years later Dionysius made war once more upon Carthage, and for the second time he invaded Punic Sicily. He delivered Selinus, and captured Eryx along with its haven Drepanon. But he failed in an attempt upon Lilybaeum, which the Carthaginians had founded to take the




FIG. 73.

place of Motya, and he lost large part of his fleet. This was the last undertaking of the great "ruler of Sicily." He died before peace was concluded, of a strange cause. He was a dramatic poet, and had frequently competed with his tragedies at Athens, but had never won first prize. Now, to console him for his failures, came the news that his *Ransom of Hector* had gained first place at the Lenaeon festival. In his joy he drank indiscreetly, fever followed, and a narcotic 367 B.C. administered to him brought on the sleep of death.

SECT. 5. **Dionysius the Younger and Dion.** The empire of Dionysius descended to his son, Dionysius, a youth not without amiable qualities, but of the nature that is easily swayed to good or evil. At first he was under the influence of Dion, who had been the most trusted minister of the elder Dionysius in the latter part of his reign, and who might easily have made himself tyrant. But Dion desired to get rid of tyranny. He was the friend of Plato, and his hope was to establish at Syracuse an ideal constitution such as Plato had sketched. This could not be done by democratic revolution, but only by influence on the ruler himself. "Give me," says Plato, "a city governed by a tyranny, and let the tyrant be young, with good brains, brave, and generous, and let fortune bring in his way a good lawgiver"—then a state has a chance of being well governed. Dion saw in young Dionysius a nature which might be moulded as he wished, and he set himself to interest the young ruler in philosophy and make him take a serious view of his duties. But his chief hope lay in bringing Plato to Syracuse.

No welcome could have been more honourable and flattering than that which Plato received. He engaged the respect and admiration of Dionysius, and the young tyrant was easily brought to regard tyranny as a vile thing and to cherish the plan of building up a new constitution. But Plato insisted on imparting to his pupil a systematic course

of philosophical training, and began with the science of geometry. The tyrant took up the study with eagerness; his court was absorbed in geometry; but he presently wearied of it. And then influences which were opposed to the scheme of Dion and Plato began to tell.

Those who were entirely adverse to the proposed reforms insinuated that the true object of Dion was to secure the tyranny for one of his own nephews, and at last an indiscreet letter of Dion gave them the means of success. Syracuse and Carthage were negotiating peace, and Dion wrote to the Carthaginian Judges not to act without first consulting him. The letter was intercepted, and was interpreted as treason. Dion was banished from Sicily. Plato remained for a while in the island; but he yearned to get back to Athens, and at length Dionysius let him go. So ended the notable scheme of founding an ideal state, the realisation of which would have involved the disbandment of the mercenary troops and thereby the collapse of the Syracusan empire.

Dion also betook himself to Old Greece and made Athens his headquarters. Presently the tyrant committed a needless act of tyranny; he compelled Dion's wife Arete to marry another man. At length Dion deemed that the time ^{357 B.C.} for action had come. With a small force he landed at Heraclea Minoa, a Carthaginian port, in south-western Sicily. Learning that Dionysius had departed for Italy with eighty ships, he lost no time in marching to Syracuse, picking up reinforcements, both Greek and Sicel, on his way. The Campanian mercenaries who were guarding Epipolae were lured away by a trick: Dion and his party entered Syracuse amid general rejoicings. The Assembly placed the government in the hands of twenty generals, Dion among them. The fortress of Epipolae was secured; no part of Syracuse remained in possession of Dionysius except the Island, and against this Dion built a wall of defence from the Greater

to the Lesser Harbour. Seven days later Dionysius returned.

Dion was not a man who could hold the affections of the people, for he repelled men by his exceeding haughtiness. And a rival appeared on the scene who possessed more popular manners than Dion. This was a certain Heraclides, whom the tyrant had banished, and who now returned with an armament of ships and soldiers. The Assembly elected him admiral, and he won an important sea-fight over the squadron of Dionysius, who presently escaped from the Island, taking his triremes with him, but leaving a garrison of mercenaries under his young son Apollocrates.

Soon after this the influence of Dion waned so much that the Syracusans deposed him from the post of general. They also refused to grant any pay to the Peloponnesian deliverers who had come with Dion. The Peloponnesians would gladly have turned against the Syracusans if Dion had given the signal; but Dion, though self-willed, was too
356 B.C. genuine a patriot to attack his own city, and he retired to Leontini with 3000 devoted men.

The Syracusans then went on with the siege of the island fortress, and the garrison was about to surrender when reinforcements arrived, brought by a Campanian of Naples, by name Nysius. Negotiations were immediately broken off. At first fortune favoured the Syracusans. Heraclides put out to sea, and won a second sea-fight. At this success the city went wild with joy and spent the night in carousing. Before the dawn of day Nysius and his troops issued from the gates of the island, and surmounting the cross wall of Dion by scaling-ladders, slew the guards and took possession of Lower Achradina and the Agora. All this part of the city was sacked; full leave was given to the mercenaries to do as they listed; they carried off women and children and all the property they could lay hands on. Next day the

citizens who had taken refuge in Epipolæ and the Upper Achradina voted to call Dion to the rescue. Messengers riding as swiftly as they could reached Leontini towards evening. Dion made a moving speech; he would in any case go, and, if he could not save his city, he would bury himself in her ruins; but the Peloponnesians might well refuse to stir for a people which had entreated them so ill. A shout went up that Syracuse must be rescued; and for the second time Dion led the Peloponnesians to her deliverance. After a fierce struggle Dion's men carried the cross wall, and the foe was driven back into the fortress of Ortygia.

It was not long before the son of Dionysius, weary of the long siege, made up his mind to surrender the Island to Dion. Dion professed to have come to give Syracuse freedom. The Syracusan citizens wanted the restoration of their democracy; but he desired to establish an aristocracy, with some democratic limitations, and with a king, or kings, as in Sparta. The Syracusans longed to see the fortress of the tyrant demolished; Dion allowed it to remain, and its existence seemed a standing invitation to tyranny. His authority was only limited by the joint command of Heracles, and at last he was brought to consent that his rival should be secretly assassinated. After this he was to all purposes tyrant, though he might repudiate tyranny with his lips. And finally he was murdered by the agents of 354 B.C. one of those who had come with him from elder Greece to liberate Syracuse, a pupil of Plato named Callippus, who then seized the power himself.

The tyranny of Callippus lasted for about a year. Then, when he was engaged in an attack upon Catane, the two sons of the elder Dionysius by his second wife, Hipparinus and Nysæus, came to Syracuse and won the possession of Ortygia. Hipparinus held the island for about two years; 353-1 B.C. then he was murdered in a fit of drunkenness, and was

succeeded by Nysaeus, who ruled Ortygia five years longer,
346 B.C. till Dionysius, who had been tyrannising at Locri, saw his
chance, sailed to Ortygia, and drove him out.

SECT. 6. **Timoleon.**—The Sicilian Greeks, bent with
a plague of tyrannies, and threatened with a new Cartha-
ginian armament, appealed to Corinth. Corinth sent them
344 B.C. Timoleon, a man who had first saved his brother's life in
battle and then slain that brother for plotting a tyranny.
Timoleon arrived with ten ships, and established himself at
the Sicel town of Hadranum. City after city joined him,
and presently Dionysius proposed to surrender the Island
and retire with his private property to Corinth. This
was agreed to, and the tyrant ended his life at Corinth
in obscurity. The rest of Syracuse was held by Hiketas,
tyrant of Leontini, and to help Hiketas came a Punic fleet
under Mago. But Mago, suspecting treachery among his
Greek mercenaries, withdrew, Hiketas was driven out, and
Syracuse was free. The fortress of Dionysius was pulled
down, and proclamation made recalling banished citizens
and inviting settlers. Timoleon went on to do the same
work in other Sicilian towns.

339 B.C. But Carthage was preparing a great effort. An arma-
ment landed at Lilybaeum, having in the host the
"Sacred Band" of 2500 Carthaginian citizens. They
decided to march across Sicily, and Timoleon went to meet
them with an army of 9000 in all. The armies met at the
Crimisus, the Greeks being on a hill above the river. The
Punic war chariots crossed first, and after them the Sacred
Band. Timoleon attacked while the host was divided by
the river; his cavalry was driven back by the chariots, but
the infantry reached the Sacred Band, and failing to break
the shield wall with spears, took to their swords, when skill
and quickness told. The Sacred Band was routed; and in
the face of the rest of the host came down a tempest of
wind-driven rain and hail. In the muddy ground the

lighter-armed Greeks had an advantage, and the storm swelled the Crimisus to a furious torrent behind the beaten army. Fifteen thousand prisoners were secured; 10,000 killed in the fight; rich spoils of gold and silver taken. Timoleon had gained a victory which may be set beside Gelon's at Himera.

Having now delivered Sicily both from despots and from foreign powers, he laid down the power entrusted to him, a man unique in Greek history. The Syracusans gave him a property near Syracuse, and there he dwelt till his death, two years after his crowning victory. Occasionally he visited the city when the folk wished to ask for his counsel, but he had become blind and these visits were rare. He was lamented by all Greek Sicily, and at Syracuse his memory was preserved by a group of public buildings called after him.



FIG. 74.—Alliance coin (hemidrachm, enlarged) of Leontini and Catane. Obverse: head of Apollo wreathed with bay; bay leaf and berry [legend: AEON (ἄεον)]. Reverse: bull (river Simaethos); fish below [legend: KATANAION].

CHAPTER XVI

THE RISE OF MACEDONIA

362 B.C. SECT. I. **Philip II. of Macedonia.**—The death of Epaminondas and collapse of Thebes left Athens the leading state in Greece, and she would doubtless have formed a new empire but for the growth of two outlying semi-Hellenic powers, Macedon and Caria. She recovered the Chersonese with the command of the Propontis, and
357 B.C. won back Euboea to her league; it seemed even likely that she would regain Amphipolis, but this project, bringing her into collision with Macedon, opens a new chapter in Greek history.

In their fortress of Aegae the Macedonian kings had ruled for ages with absolute sway over the lands on the northern and north-western coasts of the Thermaic Gulf, which formed Macedonia in the strictest sense. The Macedonian people and their kings were of Greek stock, as their traditions and the scanty remains of their language combine to testify. They were a military people, and they extended their power westward and northward over the peoples of the hills, so that Macedonia in the wide sense of the name reached to the borders of the Illyrians in the west and of the Paeonians in the north. In fact the Macedonian kingdom consisted of two heterogeneous parts, and the Macedonian kings had two different characters. Over the Greek Macedonians of the coast the king ruled immedi-

ately; they were his own people, his own "Companions." Over the Illyric folks of the hills he was only overlord; they were each subject to their own chieftain, and the chieftains were his unruly vassals. Macedonia could never become a great power until these vassal peoples had been brought under the direct rule of the kings, and until the Illyrian and Paeonian neighbours had been taught a severe lesson.

The kings had made some efforts to introduce Greek civilisation into their land. Archelaus had succeeded in making his court at Pella a centre for famous artists and poets, such as Zeuxis the painter, and Euripides. But no law bound the Macedonian monarch; his subjects had only one solitary right against him. In the case of a capital charge, the king could not put a Macedonian to death without the authority of a general Assembly. Fighting and hunting were the chief occupations of this vigorous people. A Macedonian who had not killed his man wore a cord round his waist; and until he had slain a wild boar he could not sit at table with the men.

The usurping regent Ptolemy had been slain by his ward, the young King Perdiccas. Six years later the Illyrians swooped down upon Macedonia, and Perdiccas was slain in battle. It was a critical moment for the kingdom; the Paeonians menaced it in the north, and from the east a Thracian army was advancing to set a pretender on the throne. The rightful heir, Amyntas, the son of the slain king, was a child. But there was one man in the land who was equal to the situation—this child's uncle, Philip; and he took the government and the guardianship of the boy into his own hands. Philip, as one of the hostages carried off to Thebes, had lived there for a few years, and



FIG. 75.—Coin of Archelaus I. (obverse). Horseman with two spears.

had drunk in the military and political wisdom of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. He was now twenty-four years old. His first step was to buy off the Paeonians by a large sum of money, his next to get rid of the pretenders. One of these, Argaeus, was assisted by a strong fleet. Philip defeated him, and did all in his power to come to terms with Athens. He released without ransom the Athenians whom he had made prisoners in the battle; and he renounced all claim to the possession of Amphipolis.

But the Paeonians were quieted only for the moment, and the Illyrians were still in the land, besetting Macedonian towns. It was necessary to assert decisively the



FIG. 76.—Coin of Philip II. Obverse : head of laureate Zeus. Reverse : horse and jockey ; thunderbolt below.

358 B.C. military power of Macedon. Philip spent the winter in remodelling and training his army. When the springtide came round, he marched against the Paeonians and quelled them in a single battle. He then turned against the Illyrians, and killed 7000 in one fight. When he had thus established his power over his dependencies and cleared the land of foes, Philip lost little time in pushing eastward, on the side of Thrace. In Mount Pangaeus on his eastern frontier there were rich sources of gold; and, incited by him, a number of miners from Thasos had formed a settlement on that mountain. But in order to control the new mines it was indispensable to become master of the great fortress on the Strymon, the much-coveted Amphipolis. The interests of Philip thus came into direct

collision with the interests of Athens. Here Philip revealed his skill in diplomacy. When he released the Athenian prisoners, a secret article was agreed upon, by which Philip undertook to conquer Amphipolis for Athens, and Athens undertook to surrender to him the free town of Pydna. When Amphipolis, attacked by him, appealed for help, the Athenians, failing to grasp the situation, trusted the promises of Philip. He broke his word, and they cried out; but their own part of the agreement was a shameful act of treachery to Pydna, their ally. 357 B.C.

When Philip had taken Amphipolis, he converted the Thasian settlement of Crenides into a great fortress, which he called after his own name, Philippi. The yield of the gold-mines amounted at least to 1000 talents a year. No Greek state was so rich. The old capital, Aegae, was now definitely abandoned, and the seat of government was established at Pella.

Not long afterwards Philip captured Pydna. He then took Potidaea, but instead of keeping it for himself, handed it over to the Olynthians, to whom he also ceded Anthemus. Thus he dexterously propitiated the Olynthians—intending to devour them on some future day. With the exception of Methone, the Athenians had no foothold now on the coasts of the Thermaic Gulf. 356 B.C.

Having established his mining town, Philip assumed the royal title, setting his nephew aside, and devoted himself during the next few years to the consolidation of his kingdom, and the creation of a national army. It was in these years that he made Macedonia. His task was to unite the hill tribes, along with his own Macedonians of the coast, into one nation. The means by which he accomplished this was by military organisation. He made the highlanders into professional soldiers, and kept them always under arms. Both infantry and cavalry were indeed organised in territorial regiments; but common interests

tended to obliterate these distinctions, and they were done away with under Philip's son. The heavy cavalry were called "Companions" of the king. Among the infantry there was one body of "Royal" guards, the silver-shielded *Hypaspistae*.

The famous Macedonian phalanx, which Philip drilled, was merely a modified form of the usual battle-line of Greek spearmen. The men in the phalanx stood freer, in a more open array, and used a longer spear; so that the whole line was more easily wielded, and the effect was produced not merely by sheer pressure but by the skilful manipulation of weapons. Nor was the phalanx intended to decide a battle, like the deep columns of Epaminondas; its function was to keep the front of the foe in play, while the cavalry, in wedge-like squadrons, rode into the flanks.

c. Oct. 336
B.C. But Greece paid little heed to the things which Philip was doing. When Philip married Olympias, the daughter of an Epirot prince, the event could cause no sensation; the birth of Alexander a year later stirred no man's heart in Greece; for who, in his wildest dreams, could have foreseen in the Macedonian infant the greatest conqueror who had yet been born into the world? If it had been revealed to men that a new power had started up, they would have turned their eyes not to Pella but to Halicarnassus.

SECT. 2. **Mausolus of Caria.**—Caria, like Macedonia, was peopled by a double race, the native Carians and the Greek settlers on the coast. The native Carians were further removed than the Illyrians from the Greeks. Yet the Carians were in closer touch with Greece than the Greeks of Macedonia. Tralles and Mylasa were to all appearance Greek towns. The Carian cities had nominally free assemblies, like Athens under Pisistratus; but they were all subject to one ruler, the "dynast," who was officially recognised as satrap of Persia. Mausolus, second of these native satraps, annexed Lycia, and, aiming at a naval power,

changed his capital from inland Mylasa to Halicarnassus on the sea. His special object was to win the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Chios, discontented members of the Athenian league; and at his instigation they revolted jointly, and were joined by Byzantium.

Athens immediately sent naval forces to Chios under Chabrias and Chares. But in trying to enter the harbour, Chabrias, who led the way, was assailed on all sides and 357 B.C.

fell fighting; and thus the Athenians lost the most gallant of their soldiers.

The attack on Chios was abandoned, and the Chians, much elated, blockaded Samos with a fleet of 100 ships.

With only sixty ships Chares could do nothing; and as many more were

hastily sent under the command of Timotheus and Iphicrates, who relieved Samos.

Then they sailed to Chios,

and concerted a plan of attack. But the day proved stormy, and the two veteran admirals, Iphicrates and

Timotheus, deemed that it would be rash to fight.

Chares, however, against their judgment, attacked the enemy, and being unsupported was repulsed with loss.

Furious at the behaviour of his colleagues, he formally accused them of deliberate treachery. Iphicrates was

acquitted, but Timotheus, always haughty and unpopular, was fined 100 talents.

Rich as he was, he was unable to pay this enormous sum, and he withdrew to Chalcis, where he died soon afterwards.

Soon afterwards negotiations were opened with the revolted allies, and a peace was made. Athens recognised the independence of the three islands, Chios, Cos, and 354 B.C.

Rhodes, and of the city of Byzantium. It was not long before Lesbos also severed itself from the Athenian alliance, which thus lost all its important members in the eastern



FIG. 77.—Coin of Mausolus (reverse). Zeus labrandeus with thyrsus; wreath [legend: MAYΣΣΩΛΛΑΟ].

Aegean ; and in the west Corcyra fell away about the same time.

All happened as Mausolus foresaw. He helped the oligarchies to overthrow the popular governments, and then gave them the protection of Carian garrisons. But soon after the success of his policy against Athens, he died, leaving his power to his widow Artemisia. The expansion of the Carian power, which seemed probable under the active administration of Mausolus, was never fulfilled. A statue of the prince, now in the British Museum, stood, along with that of Artemisia, within the tomb which he probably began, and which she certainly completed. It rose above the harbour at Halicarnassus, adorned with friezes wrought by four of the most illustrious sculptors of the day, of whom Scopas himself was one. From it is derived the word Mausoleum.

353 B.C.
SECT. 3. **Phocis and the Sacred War.**—In the meantime, another of the states of northern Greece seemed likely to win the position of supremacy. Phocis came forward in her turn. The Phocians had never been zealous adherents of the Boeotian alliance, which they were forced to join after the battle of Leuctra, and they cut themselves loose from it after the death of Epaminondas. Thebes decided to strike at her neighbours through the old Amphictionic league in which Epaminondas had won her an influence ; at an Amphictionic assembly, a number of rich and prominent Phocians were condemned to pay large fines for some act of sacrilege. When these sums were not paid within the prescribed time, the Amphictions decreed that the lands of the defaulters should be taken from them and consecrated to the Delphian god.

The accused determined to resist, and the man who took the lead in organising the resistance was Philomelus. He discerned clearly that mercenaries would be required to defend Phocis against her enemies,—Boeotians, Locrians,

and Thessalians,—and made the bold and practical proposal that Delphi should be seized, since the treasures of Delphi would supply at need the sinews of war. The proposals of Philomelus were adopted, and he was appointed general of the Phocian forces, with full powers. Having hired 356 B.C. some mercenaries, with their help he seized Delphi. The Locrians of neighbouring Amphissa, whom the Delphians had summoned to their aid, arrived too late and were repulsed.

The first object of Philomelus was to enlist Hellenic opinion in his favour. He sent envoys to Sparta, to Athens, to Thebes itself, to say that in seizing Delphi the



FIG. 78.—Coin of Delphic Amphictiony (fourth century). Obverse: Demeter, with veil and crown of corn. Reverse: Apollo, sitting on omphalos, leaning on lyre [legend: AMΦIKTIONΩΝ].

Phocians were simply resuming their rights over the temple, and to declare that they were ready to allow all the treasures to be weighed and numbered, and to be responsible to Greece for their safety. In consequence of these embassies Sparta allied herself with Phocis, while Athens and some smaller states promised their support. The Thebans and their Amphictionic friends resolved to make war.

In the meantime, Philomelus had fortified the Delphic sanctuary by a wall, and had collected an army of 5000 men, with which he easily repelled an attack of the Locrians. This victory forced the Thebans to activity. The Amphictionic assembly met at Thermopylae, and it

was decided that an Amphictionic army should rescue Delphi. As neither Athens nor Sparta showed willingness to give any immediate assistance, nothing remained for Phocis but to raise mercenaries by making use of the treasures of the temple. At first Philomelus was scrupulous; he only *borrowed* from the god. But, as habitude blunted the first feelings of scrupulousness, the Phocians dealt as freely with the sacred vessels and the precious dedications as if they were their own. By offering large pay Philomelus assembled an army of 10,000 men, who cared little whence the money came. An indecisive war with the Thebans and Locrians was waged for some time, till at length the Phocians underwent a severe defeat on the north side of Mount Parnassus. The general fought desperately, and, covered with wounds, he was driven to the verge of a precipice where he had to choose between capture and self-destruction. He hurled himself from the cliff and perished.

354 B.C.

But in Onomarchus of Elatea, who had been associated with him in the command of the army, he had a successor as able as himself. The retreat of the enemy gave Onomarchus time to reorganise the troops and collect reinforcements; and he not only coined the gold and silver ornaments of the temple, but beat the bronze and iron donatives into arms for the soldiers. He then entered upon a short career of signal successes. He forced Locrian Amphissa to submit, reduced Doris, and made himself master of Thermopylae.

Among the most important uses to which Onomarchus applied the gold of Delphi was the purchase of the alliance of the tyrants of Pherae. By this policy Thessaly was divided; and the Thessalian league, beset by the hostility of Pherae, turned for help to their northern neighbour, Philip of Macedon. His intervention south of Mount Olympus marks a new stage in the course of the Sacred War.

Philip had lately deprived Athens of her last ally on the Thermaic Gulf by the capture of Methone. He readily seized this new occasion to begin the push southward, and lay the foundation of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. But Onomarchus defeated the Macedonian army in two battles with serious loss, and Philip was compelled to withdraw into Macedonia. 353 B.C.

At this moment, the power of the Phocians was at its height. Their supremacy reached from the shores of the Corinthian Gulf to the slopes of Olympus. They were masters of the pass of Thermopylae, and they had two important posts in western Boeotia, for, in addition to Orchomenus, they won Coronea immediately after the Thessalian expedition. But Philip of Macedon speedily retrieved the humiliation which he had suffered at the hands of his Phocian foes. In the following year he descended again into Thessaly, and the decisive battle was fought near the Pagasaeon Gulf. More than a third of the Phocian army was slain or made prisoners, and Onomarchus was killed. Pherae was then captured; and Philip, having thus become master of Thessaly, prepared to march southward for the purpose of delivering the shrine of Apollo from the possession of the Phocians, whom he professed to regard as sacrilegious usurpers.

Phocis was now in great need, and her allies—Sparta, Achaea, and Athens—at length determined to give her active help. The Macedonian must not be permitted to pass Thermopylae. The statesman Eubulus, now predominant at Athens, acted promptly on this occasion, and sent a large force to defend the pass. Philip at once recognised that it would be extremely hazardous to attempt to force the position, and he retired. Thus Phocis was rescued for the time. 352 B.C.

The death of Onomarchus devolved the leadership of the Phocian league upon his brother Phayllus, who main-

tained the power of Phocis for about two years ; then he was carried off by disease, and was succeeded by his nephew, Phalaecus, son of Onomarchus. Under Phalaecus the war dragged on for a few more years.

SECT. 4. **The Advance of Macedonia.**—No sooner had Philip returned from Thessaly than he moved against Thrace, and forced the king, Cersobleptes, to submit. His movements were so rapid that Athens had no time to come to the rescue. When the news arrived there was a panic, and an armament was voted to save the Chersonese. But a new message came that Philip had fallen ill ; then he was reported dead ; and the sending of the armament was postponed. Philip's illness was a fact ; it compelled him to desist from further operations, and the Chersonesus was saved.

Eight years had not elapsed since Philip had mounted the throne of Macedon ; and he had altered the whole prospect of the Greek world. He had created an army, and a thoroughly adequate revenue ; he had made himself lord of almost the whole sea-board of the northern Aegean from the defile of Thermopylae to the shores of the Propontis. The only lands which were still excepted from his direct or indirect sway were the Chersonesus and the territory of the Chalcidian league. He was ambitious to secure a recognised hegemony in Greece ; to form, in fact, a confederation of allies, which should hold some such dependent relation towards him as the confederates of Delos had held towards Athens. Rumours were already floating about that his ultimate design was to lead a Panhellenic expedition against the Persian king. Though the Greek states regarded Philip as in a certain sense an outsider, it must never be forgotten that Philip desired to identify Macedonia with Greece, and to bring his own country up to the level of the kindred peoples which had so far outstripped it in civilisation. Through-

out his whole career he regarded Athens with respect, and would have given much for her friendship. He was himself imbued with Greek culture; and if the robust Macedonian enjoyed the society of the somewhat rude boon companions of his own land with whom he could drink deep, he knew how to make himself agreeable to Attic men of letters. He chose Aristotle of Stagira, who had been educated at Athens, to be the instructor of his son Alexander.

In these years Athens was under the guidance of a cautious statesman, Eubulus. He pursued a peace policy; yet it was he who struck the one effective blow that Athens ever struck at Philip, when she hindered him from passing Thermopylae. The news of Philip's campaign in Thrace may have temporarily weakened his influence; and his opponents had a fair opportunity to inveigh against an inactive policy. The most prominent among these opponents was Demosthenes. His father was an Athenian manufacturer, who died when Demosthenes was still a child; his guardians dealt fraudulently with the considerable fortune left him; and when he came of age he resolved to recover it. For this purpose he sat at the feet of the orator Isaeus, and was trained in law and rhetoric. Demosthenes used himself to tell how he struggled to overcome his natural defects of speech and manner, how he practised gesticulation before a mirror, and declaimed verses with pebbles in his mouth. The advance of Philip to the Propontis now gave him occasion for the harangue, 351 B.C. which is known as the First Philippic, one of his most brilliant and effective speeches, calling upon the Athenians to brace themselves vigorously to oppose Philip "our enemy." He draws a lively picture of the indifference of his countrymen and contrasts it with the energy of Philip, "who is not the man to rest content with that he has subdued, but is always adding to his conquests,

and casts his snare around us while we sit at home postponing."

Demosthenes proposed a scheme for increasing the




FIG. 79.—Portrait head of Demosthenes.

military forces of the city; and the most essential part of the scheme was that a force should be sent to Thrace of which a quarter should consist of citizens, and the officers should be citizens. The orator was applauded, but nothing was done. His ideal was the Athens of Pericles; but he

lived in the Athens of Eubulus. The Athenians were quite capable of holding their own among their old friends and enemies, the Spartans and Thebans and the islanders of the Aegean; with paid soldiers and generals like Iphicrates and Chares they could maintain their position as a first-rate power. Athens was still the great sea-power of the Aegean, well able to protect her commerce. But against a large, vigorous land-power, with a formidable army her chances were hopeless; for, since the fall of their empire, the whole spirit of the people had tended to peace and not to war.

The next stage in the development of Macedonia was the incorporation of Chalcidice. Philip sent a requisition to the Olynthians, demanding the surrender of his half-brother, a pretender to the Macedonian throne, to whom they had given shelter. The demand was refused, and Philip marched against Chalcidice. One after another the cities of the Olynthian confederacy opened their gates to him; or if they refused, they were captured.

In her jeopardy Olynthus sought an alliance with Athens, and it was during the debates on this question that Demosthenes pronounced his Olynthiac orations, 349 B. C. which were in fact Philippics. At this juncture the Athenians seem to have been awakened to the necessity of action sufficiently to embolden Demosthenes to throw out the unpopular suggestion that the Theoric Fund should be devoted to military purposes; and he repeated his old plea for citizen-soldiers. An alliance was concluded, and mercenaries were dispatched to the Chalcidian peninsula. Philip might have been placed in some embarrassment, especially as Cersobleptes, King of Thrace, had rebelled; but he diverted the concern of Athens in another direction. He had long been engaged in intrigues in Euboea, and now Euboea revolted. The division of forces was fatal. Phocion was sent to Euboea and won a battle, but returned

to Athens without having recovered any of the rebellious cities. The enemy had taken a number of prisoners, for whose ransom Athens had to pay fifty talents; and the independence of Euboea was acknowledged.

Meanwhile Philip was pressing Olynthus hard, and urgent appeals were sent to Athens. This time Demosthenes had his way, and 2000 citizen-soldiers sailed for the north. But Olynthus was captured before they reached it. 348 B.C. The place was destroyed and the inhabitants scattered in various parts of Macedonia. The other cities of the confederacy were practically incorporated in Macedonia.

SECT. 5. The Peace of Philocrates.—These military efforts had left Athens without money to pay the judges their daily wage. Peace was a necessity; but the fall of Olynthus, where many Athenians had been captured, stung Athens, and an embassy was dispatched to the Peloponnesus to organise a national resistance of the Greeks to the destroyer of Olynthus. The emissary chosen was the orator Aeschines, famous as the antagonist of Demosthenes. He had been first an usher in a school kept by his father, then a tragic actor, and finally a public clerk.

Philip on his part desired two things—to make peace with Athens and to become a member of the Amphictionic Council. Thebes now invoked his aid to crush the Phocians; and the Phocians, hearing this, sent to Athens and Sparta for help to keep Philip out of Greece. It was granted. But there had been dissension in Phocis; Phalaecus had been deposed, and now held Thermopylae with his own partisans. He refused to admit either Spartans or Athenians into the pass; and it was feared that he might surrender it to Philip, and the necessity for making peace with Philip grew more imperative. Ten Athenian envoys, and one representative of the Athenian allies, were sent to Pella to negotiate terms of peace with the Macedonian king. Among the envoys were Aeschines and

Demosthenes. The terms to which Philip agreed were that Athens and Macedon should each retain the territories of which they were actually in possession at the time the peace was concluded; the peace would be concluded when both sides had sworn to it. Both the allies of Macedonia and those of Athens were to be included, except the Phocians. By these terms, which were perfectly explicit, Athens would surrender her old claim to Amphipolis, and on the other hand Philip would recognise Athens as mistress of the Chersonese. The exception which Philip made was inevitable; it was an essential part of the Macedonian policy to proceed against Phocis.

There were a few Thracian forts, belonging to Cersobleptes, which Philip was anxious to capture before the Peace was made; and, when the envoys left Pella, he set out for Thrace, having given them an undertaking to respect the Chersonese. The envoys were followed in a few days by three Macedonian delegates, appointed to receive the oaths from the Athenians and their allies. On the motion of Philocrates, the Peace was accepted by Athens on the terms which Philip offered. The Peace was now concluded on one side, and it remained for the envoys of Athens to administer the oath to Philip and his allies. It was to the interest of Athens that this act should be accomplished as speedily as possible, for Philip was entitled to make new conquests until he swore to the Peace. The ambassadors who had visited Macedonia to arrange the terms of a treaty now set forth a second time.

Meanwhile Philip had taken the Thracian fortresses which he had gone to take, and had reduced Cersobleptes to be a vassal. When he returned to Pella, so far as the formal conclusion of the Peace went, there was no difficulty. But the Athenian ambassadors had received general powers to negotiate further with Philip on the settlement of the Phocian question and northern Greece. If Philip could

March, 346
B.C.

have had his way, the alliance would have become a bond of close friendship and co-operation. Athens might have taken her position now as joint arbitrator with Philip in the settlement of the Amphictionic states. To treat the Phocians with clemency and to force Thebes to acknowledge the independence of the Boeotian cities would have been the basis of common action. Philip promised to secure the restitution to Athens of Euboea and Oropus, while Athens would have supported the admission of Macedonia into the Amphictionic Council. Aeschines was the chief mouthpiece of this policy favoured by Eubulus. But the policy of Demosthenes was to abandon the Phocians to their fate and to draw closer to Thebes; so that, when his city had recovered from her financial exhaustion, Thebes and Athens together might form a joint resistance to the aggrandisement of Macedonia. In consequence of this irreconcilable division, which broke out in most unseemly quarrels among the ambassadors, nothing more was done than the administration of the oath.

It was a calamity for Athens that at this critical moment there was no strong man at the helm of the state. The Assembly was swayed between the opposite counsels of Demosthenes and of Eubulus. When the ambassadors returned, Demosthenes lost no time in denouncing his colleagues. The usual vote of thanks to the embassy was withheld, but Aeschines and his colleagues defended their policy triumphantly. The Assembly decreed that the treaty of peace and alliance should be extended to the posterity of Philip. It further decreed that Athens should formally call upon the Phocians to surrender Delphi to the Amphictionians.

Philip in the meantime advanced southward. The pass of Thermopylae was opened to him by Phalaecus. Before he reached Thermopylae, Philip had addressed two friendly letters to Athens, inviting her to send an army to arrange the

July, 346
B.C.

affairs of Phocis and Boeotia. But the Athenians listened to the suggestion of Demosthenes that Philip would detain their army as hostages. Accordingly they contented themselves with sending an embassy to convey to Philip an announcement of the decree which they had passed against the Phocians. Thus swayed between Eubulus and Demosthenes, the Athenians had done too much or too little. They had abandoned the Phocians, and at the same time they resigned the voice which they should, and could, have had in the political settlement of northern Greece.

As it was clear that Philip could not trust Athens, owing to the attitude of Demosthenes, he was constrained to act in conjunction with her enemy, Thebes. The cities of western Boeotia, which had been held by the Phocians, were restored to the Boeotian confederacy. The doom of the Phocians was decided by the Amphictionic Council which was now convoked. The Phocians were deprived of their place in the Amphictionic body; and all their cities (with the exception of Abae) were broken up into villages, so that they might not again be a danger to Delphi. They were obliged to undertake to pay back, by instalments of sixty talents a year, the value of the treasures which they had taken from the sanctuary. The place which Phocis vacated in the Council was transferred to Macedonia, in recognition of Philip's services.

An occasion offered itself to Philip almost immediately to display publicly to the assembled Greek world the position of leadership which he had thus won. It so happened that the celebration of the Pythian games fell in the year of the Peace. Athens sulked; she sent no deputy to the Amphictionic meeting which elected Philip president for the festival, no delegates to the festival itself. A great tide of anti-Macedonian feeling had set in, which made Demosthenes henceforward her most influential counsellor. Yet neither Demosthenes nor Eubulus knew the needs of Athens

or of Greece. The only man of the day who really grasped the situation was the nonagenarian Isocrates. He explained in an open letter to Philip the futility of perpetuating a number of small sovereign states. The time had come to unite Greece, and to dispose of the superfluous population who went about as roving mercenaries by a great act of colonisation. And he called upon Philip to lead forth the hosts of Hellas against the barbarian and win a new world.

SECT. 6. Interval of Peace and Preparations for War (346-1 B.C.).—Having gained for Macedonia the coveted place in the religious league of Greece, Philip spent the next year or two in improving his small navy, in settling the administration of Thessaly, and in acquiring influence in the Peloponnesus. The Thessalian cities elected the Macedonian king as their *archon*, and he set four governors over the four great divisions of the country. South of the Corinthian isthmus, his negotiations gained him the adhesion of Messenia and Megalopolis, Elis and Argos. Nor did Philip yet despair of achieving his chief aim, the conciliation of Athens. The veteran Eubulus was in favour of friendly relations; so were Aeschines and Philocrates; and so was the incorruptible soldier Phocion. This notable person was marked among his contemporaries as an honest man, superior to all temptations of money; and, since the Athenians always prized this superhuman integrity which few of them attempted to practise, they elected him forty-five times as strategos, though in military capacity he was no more than a respectable sergeant. But his strong common-sense, which was impervious to oratory, and his exceptional probity made him an useful member of his party.

There was one man in Athens who was firmly resolved that the Peace should be a mere interval preparatory to war. Demosthenes spent the time in inflaming the wrath of his countrymen against Philip and in seeking to ruin

his political antagonists. He went on a mission to the Peloponnesian cities, and his oratory occasioned an embassy from Pella to remonstrate. In reply to this embassy, the Second Philippic was delivered, inculcating the baseless view that Philip desired and purposed to destroy Athens. His follower Hypereides impeached Philocrates, whose name was specially associated with the Peace. Philocrates fled, and was condemned to death in absence. Demosthenes then indicted Aeschines, and the result was one of the most famous political trials of antiquity. Each orator published his speech "on the malversation of the embassy," and both survive as the documents from which a historian must unravel, out of a mass of lies and distortions of fact, the story of the Peace of Philocrates. There is no evidence that Aeschines received bribes to vote against his convictions; for although he probably received money, the policy which he supported was also that of Eubulus and Phocion, men of the highest character. Nevertheless, he barely escaped. 344 B.C.

The league which it was the dream of Demosthenes to form against Macedonia was made possible by events in Epirus. Owing to his marriage with an Epirot princess, it naturally devolved upon Philip to intervene in the struggles for the Epirot throne which followed her father's death. He espoused the cause of her brother Alexander against her uncle, marched into the country, and established Alexander in the sovereignty. Epirus would now become dependent on Macedonia, and Philip saw in it a road to the Corinthian Gulf and a means of reaching Greece on the western side. His evident designs alarmed all the western peoples, and not only Ambracia, Acarnania, and Achaea, but Corcyra also, sought the alliance of Athens.

Philip, however, judged that the time had not come for further advances on this side, and some recent movements of Cersobleptes decided him to turn now to one of the

greatest tasks which were imposed upon the expander of
342-I B.C. Macedonia—the subjugation of Thrace. His campaign lasted ten months, and he spent a winter in the field in that wintry land, suffering from sickness as well as from the cold; for in war Philip never spared himself either hardship or danger. The Thracian king was dethroned, and his kingdom became a tributary province. This conquest threatened nearly and seriously the position of Athens at the gates of the Black Sea. Demosthenes induced Athens to send a few ships and mercenaries under a swashbuckler named Diopceithes, to protect her interests in the Chersonese. There had been some disputes with Cardia, and Diopceithes lost no time in attacking Cardia. Now Cardia had been expressly recognised as an ally of Philip in the Peace, and thus the action of Diopceithes was a violation of the Peace. Philip remonstrated. Their admiral was so manifestly in the wrong that the Athenians were prepared to disown his conduct, but Demosthenes saved his tool and persuaded the people to sustain Diopceithes. He followed
341 B.C. up his speech on the Chersonese question, which scored this success, by a loud call to war—the harangue known as the Third Philippic.

Envoys were sent here and there to raise the alarm. Demosthenes himself proceeded to the Propontis and succeeded in detaching Byzantium and Perinthus from the Macedonian alliance. At the same time Athenian troops were sent into Euboea; the governments in Oreus and Eretria, which were under the influence of Philip, were overthrown, and these cities joined an independent Euboeic league. All these acts of hostility were committed without an overt breach of the Peace between Athens and Philip. But the secession of Perinthus and Byzantium was a blow which Philip was not prepared to take with equanimity. When he had settled his Thracian province, he began the siege of Perinthus by land and sea. Athens remained

inactive, till the king suddenly raised the siege of Perinthus and marched against Byzantium, hoping to capture it by the unexpectedness of his attack. Athens could no longer hold aloof when the key of the Bosphorus was in peril. A squadron under Chares was sent to help Byzantium, and Phocion presently followed with a second fleet. Other help had come from Rhodes and Chios, and Philip was compelled to withdraw into Thrace. Demosthenes received a public vote of thanks from the Athenian people.

340 B.C.

But the naval power of Athens should have made itself more immediately and effectively felt, for the Macedonian fleet was insignificant. The reason was that the group-system on which the ships were furnished worked badly. Demosthenes had long ago desired to reform this system, which had been in force for seventeen years. The 1200 richest citizens were liable to the trierarchy—each trireme being charged on a small group, of which each member contributed the same proportion of the expense. If a large number of ships were required, the group might consist of five persons; if a small, of fifteen. This system bore hardly on the poorer members of the partnership, who had to pay the same amount as the richer, and some were ruined by the burden. But the great mischief was that these poorer members were often unable to pay their quota in time, and consequently the completion of the triremes was delayed. The influence of Demosthenes was now so enormous that he was able, in the face of bitter opposition from the wealthy class, to introduce a new law, by which the cost of furnishing the ships should fall on each citizen in proportion to his property. Thus a citizen whose property was rated as exceeding thirty talents would henceforward, instead of having to pay one-fifth or perhaps one-fifteenths of the cost of a single trireme, be obliged to furnish three triremes and a boat. Nor was this all. He actually persuaded the Athenians to adopt a measure which he had pre-

viously hinted at, and devote the Festival Fund to military purposes.

SECT. 7. **Battle of Chaeronea.**—Philip had now no choice. The irreconcilable Demosthenes, who before the siege of Byzantium was merely an agitator, now directed affairs at Athens, and with amazing vigour. War was inevitable; and the whole hope of Demosthenes lay in alliance with Thebes. Athenian and Theban troops together might successfully resist a Macedonian invasion.

The invasion soon came, and through a curious occasion. During the recent Sacred War, the Athenians had set up again their offering dedicated after the battle of Plataea, which bore the inscription, "From the spoils of the Persians and Thebans, who fought together against the Greeks." The Thebans, glad of an excuse to revenge the ancient and standing insult, accused the Athenians of sacrilege for re-dedicating a gift while Delphi was held by the sacrilegious Phocians. The charge was brought in the Amphictionic Council by the Locrians of Amphissa, but Aeschines met it by another. The Locrians themselves had cultivated part of the "accursed field," once the land of Crisa; and, on the motion of Aeschines, the Amphictions and the Delphians marched to lay waste the unlawful cultivation. They were attacked by the Locrians, a second sacrilege. But Demosthenes, jealous of a success gained by Aeschines, prevented Athens taking part in the Sacred War which was declared against Amphissa, and Thebes also stood aloof, as the Amphissians had brought this trouble on themselves by serving her interest. The Amphictions then, not being strong enough, invited Philip to be leader in this religious quarrel.

Philip did not delay a moment. Advancing through the defile of Thermopylae into northern Phocis, he seized and refortified the dismantled city of Elatea. The purpose of this action was to protect himself in the rear against

Boeotia, and preserve his communications with Thermopylae while he was operating against Amphissa. But while he halted at Elatea, he sent ambassadors to explore the intentions of Thebes. He declared that he intended to invade Attica, and called upon the Thebans to join him in the invasion, or, if they would not do this, to give his army a free passage through Boeotia.

In Athens, when the news came that the Macedonian army was at Elatea, the city was filled with consternation for a night and a day, and these anxious hours have become famous in history through the genius of the orator Demosthenes, who in later years recalled to the people the scene and their own emotions by a picturesque description which no orator has surpassed. On the advice of Demosthenes, the Athenians dispatched ten envoys to Thebes; everything depended on detaching Thebes from the Macedonian alliance. The envoys, of whom Demosthenes was one, were instructed to make concessions and exact none. The Athenians were ready to pay two-thirds of the expenses of the war; they abandoned their claim to Oropus, and they recognised the Boeotian dominion of Thebes. By these concessions they secured the alliance of Thebes, and Demosthenes achieved the consummation to which his policy had been directed for many years.

Philip captured Amphissa and Naupactus. Then he turned back to carry the war into Boeotia, and when he entered the great western gate of that country close to Chaeronea, he found the army of the allies guarding the way to Thebes and prepared to give him battle. He had 30,000 foot soldiers and 2000 horse, perhaps slightly outnumbering his foes.

Their line extended over about three and a half miles, Aug. 338
the left wing resting on Chaeronea and the right on the river Cephissus. The Theban hoplites, with the Sacred Band in front, were assigned the right, which was esteemed B.C.

the post of honour. In the centre were ranged the troops of the lesser allies—Achaeans, Corinthians, Phocians, and others. On the left stood the Athenians under three generals—Chares, Lysicles, and Stratocles, of whom Chares was a respectable soldier with considerable experience and no talent, while the other two were incompetent. Demosthenes himself was serving as a hoplite in the ranks.

We can form a general notion of the tactics of Philip. The most formidable part of the adverse array was the Theban infantry; and accordingly he posted on his own left wing the phalanx, with its more open order and long pikes. On the flank of this wing he placed his heavy cavalry, to ride down upon the Thebans when the phalanx had worn them out. The cavalry was commanded by Alexander, now a lad of eighteen. The right wing was comparatively weak, and Philip planned that it should gradually give way before the attack of the Athenians, and draw them on, so as to divide them from their allies. This plan of holding back the right wing reminds us of the tactics of Epaminondas; but the use of cavalry to decide the combat is the characteristic feature of Philip's battles.

The Athenians pressed forward, fondly fancying that they were pressing to victory, and Stratocles in the flush of success cried, "On to Macedonia!" But in the meantime the Thebans had been broken by Alexander's horsemen: their leader had fallen, and the comrades of the Sacred Lochos were making a last hopeless stand. Philip could now spare some of his Macedonian footmen, and he moved them so as to take the Athenians in flank and rear. Against the assaults of these trained troops the Athenians were helpless. One thousand were slain, two thousand captured, and the rest ran, Demosthenes running with the fleetest. But the Sacred Band did not flee. They fought till they fell, and it is their heroism which has won for the battle of Chaeronea its glory as a struggle for liberty.

The statement that Greek liberty perished on the plain of Chaeronea is misleading. Whenever a Greek state became supreme, that supremacy entailed the depression of some states and the dependency or subjection of others. But Macedon was regarded in Hellas as an outsider. This was a feeling which the southern Greeks entertained even in regard to Thessaly; and Macedonia, politically and historically as well as geographically, was some steps further away than Thessaly. And, in the second place, Macedonian supremacy was the triumph of an absolute monarchy over free commonwealths, so that the submission of the Greek states to Macedon's king might be rhetorically branded as an enslavement to a tyrant. For these reasons the tidings of Chaeronea sent a new kind of thrill through Greece.

SECT. 8. The Synedrion of the Greeks. Philip's Death.—Philip treated Thebes harshly. He punished by death or confiscation his leading opponents; he established a Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea, and broke up the Boeotian league, giving all the cities their independence, and restoring the dismantled towns of Orchomenus and Plataea. But his dealing with Athens was usually lenient. The truth was that Athens did not lie defenceless at his feet. The sea-power of Athens saved her, and not less, perhaps, the respect which Philip always felt for her intellectual eminence. Now, at last, by unexpected leniency, he might win what he had always striven for, the moral and material support of Athens. And in Athens the policy of Demosthenes had failed, and all desired to recover the 2000 captives and avert an invasion of Attic soil. Philip offered to restore all the prisoners without ransom and not to march into Attica. The Athenians on their side were to dissolve what remained of their Confederacy, and join the new Hellenic union which Philip proposed to organise. In regard to territory, Oropus was to be given to Athens, but

the Chersonesus was to be surrendered to Macedonia. On these terms peace was concluded.

It was now necessary for Macedonia to win the recognition of her supremacy from the Peloponnesian states. Philip marched himself into Peloponnesus, and met with no resistance. Sparta alone refused to submit, and suffered at the hands of Philip what she had before suffered at the hands of Epaminondas—the devastation of Laconia and the diminution of her territory. Having thus displayed his arms and power in the south, the Macedonian king invited all the Greek states within Thermopylae to send delegates to a congress at Corinth; and, with the sole exception of Sparta, all the states obeyed.

It was a Federal congress: the first assembly of an Hellenic Confederacy, of which the place of meeting was to be Corinth, and Macedonia the head. The aim of the Confederacy was understood from the first; but it would seem that it was not till the second meeting, a year later, 337 B.C. that Philip announced his resolve to make war upon Persia, in behalf of Greece and her gods, to liberate the Greek cities of Asia, and to punish the barbarians for the acts of sacrilege which their forefathers had wrought in the days of Xerxes. It was the formal announcement that a new act in the eternal struggle between Europe and Asia was about to begin. The federal gathering voted for the war and elected Philip general with supreme powers. It was arranged what contingents in men or ships each city should contribute to the Panhellenic army; the Athenians undertook to send a considerable fleet.

But the new league did not unite the Greeks in the sense in which Isocrates hoped for their union. There was no zeal for the aims of the northern power, no faith in her as the guide and leader of Greece. The interests of the Greek communities remained as isolated and particular as ever. The peace which the league stipulated could not be main-

tained without some military stations in the midst of the country ; and Philip established three Macedonian garrisons at important points : at Ambracia to watch the west, at Corinth to hold the Peloponnesus in check, and at Chalcis to control north-eastern Greece.

In the spring after the congress his preparations for 336 B. C. war were nearly complete, and he sent forward an advance force under Parmenio and other generals to secure the passage of the Hellespont and win a footing in the Troad and Bithynia. The rest of the army was soon to follow under his own command. But Philip, as a frank Corinthian friend told him, had filled his own house with division and bitterness. A Macedonian king was not expected to be faithful to his wife ; but the proud and stormy princess whom he had wedded was impatient of his open infidelities. Nor was her own virtue deemed above suspicion, and it was even whispered that Alexander was not Philip's son. The crisis came when Philip fell in love with a Macedonian maiden of too high a station to become his concubine—Cleopatra, the niece of his general Attalus. Yielding to his passion, he put Olympias away and celebrated his second marriage. At the wedding feast, Attalus, bold with wine, invited the nobles to pray the gods for a *legitimate* heir to the throne. Alexander flung his drinking-cup in the face of the man who had insulted his mother, and Philip started up, drawing his sword to transpierce his son. But he reeled and fell, and Alexander jeered, "Behold the man who would pass from Europe to Asia, and trips in passing from couch to couch !" Pella was no longer the place for Alexander. He took the divorced queen to Epirus, and withdrew himself to the hills of Lyncestis, until Philip invited him to return. But the birth of a son to Cleopatra made Alexander's succession seem imperilled. Philip's most urgent desire was to avoid a breach with the powerful king of Epirus, the brother of the injured Olympias. To this end he offered

him his daughter in wedlock, and the marriage was to be celebrated with great pomp in Pella, on the eve of Philip's departure for Asia. But Olympias was made of the stuff which does not hesitate at crime, and a tool was easily found. A certain Pausanias, an obscure man of no merit, had been grossly wronged by Attalus, and was madly incensed against the king, who refused to do him justice. On the wedding day, as Philip, in solemn procession, entered the theatre a little in advance of his guards, Pausanias rushed forward with a Celtic dagger and laid him a corpse at the gate. The assassin was caught and killed, but the true assassin was Olympias.

To none of the world's great rulers has history done less justice than to Philip. The overwhelming greatness of a son greater than himself has overshadowed him and drawn men's eyes to achievements which could never have been wrought but for Philip's lifetime of toil. In the second place, we depend for our knowledge of Philip's work almost entirely on the Athenian orators, and especially on Demosthenes, whose main object was to misrepresent the king. Thus through chance, through the malignant eloquence of his opponent, who has held the ears of posterity, and through the very results of his own deeds, the maker and expander of Macedonia, the conqueror of Thrace and Greece, has hardly held his due place in the history of the world. The work of Alexander is the most authentic testimony to the work of Philip.

It is part of the injustice to Philip that the history of Greece during his reign has so often been treated as little more than a biography of Demosthenes. Only his political opponents would deny that Demosthenes was the most eloquent of orators and the most patriotic of citizens. But that oratory in which he excelled was one of the curses of Greek politics. The art of persuasive speech is indispensable in a free commonwealth, and, when it is wielded by a

statesman or a general,—a Pericles, a Cleon, or a Xenophon,—is a noble as well as useful instrument. But once it ceases to be a merely auxiliary art, it becomes dangerous and hurtful. This is what happened at Athens. Orators took the place of statesmen, and Demosthenes was the most eminent of the class. They could all formulate striking phrases of profound political wisdom; but their school-taught lore did not carry them far against the craft of the Macedonian statesman. The men of mighty words were as children in the hands of the man of mighty deeds.



FIG. 80.—Gold coin of Philippi. Obverse: head of Heracles. Reverse: tripod; palm above; Phrygian cap [legend: ΦΙΛΙΠΠΙΩΝ].



FIG. 81.—Coin of Opuntian Locrians (reverse). Ajax, son of Oileus, charging spear: [legend: ΟΠΟΝΤΙΑΝ].

CHAPTER XVII

THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA

Summer, 336 B.C. SECT. I. **Alexander in Greece and Thrace.**—On his accession to the throne of Macedon, Alexander found himself menaced by enemies on all sides. The members of the Confederacy of Corinth, the tributary peoples of the province of Thrace, the inveterately hostile Illyrians, all saw in the death of Philip an opportunity, not to be missed, for undoing his work; and in Asia, Attalus, the father of Cleopatra, espoused the claim of Cleopatra's infant son. Alexander encountered these perils one after another, and overcame them all.

First of all, he turned to Greece, where Athens had hailed the news of Philip's death with undisguised joy, and at the instance of Demosthenes had passed a decree in honour of his murderer's memory. Ambracia expelled her Macedonian garrison, and Thebes attempted to expel hers. Of far greater importance was the insurrection of Thessaly, for the Thessalian cavalry was an invaluable adjunct to the Macedonian army.

Alexander advanced to the defile of Tempe, but found it strongly held by the Thessalians. Cutting steps up the steep side of Ossa he made a new path for himself over the mountain and descended into the plain of the Peneus behind his enemy. Not a drop of blood was shed. A Thessalian assembly elected Alexander to the archonship,

and he guaranteed to the communities of the land the same rights and privileges which they had enjoyed under his father. At Thermopylae the young king was recognised by the amphictiony, and as he marched southward not a hand was raised against him ; he had swooped down so quickly



FIG. 82.--Alexander the Great (British Museum).

that nothing was ready to resist. The Athenians sent a repentant embassy ; and the Congress of the Confederacy ^{336 B.C.} met at Corinth to elect Alexander general in his father's place.

Alexander was chosen supreme general of the Greeks for the invasion of Asia ; and it was as head of Hellas, descendant and successor of Achilles, rather than as Macedonian king, that he desired to go forth against Persia.

The contingents which the Greek states furnished as members of the league were small, yet the vote, however perfunctory, which elected him leader of the Greeks, was the fitting prelude to the expansion of Hellas and the diffusion of Hellenic civilisation, which destiny had chosen him to accomplish. He was thus formally recognised as what he in fullest verity was, the representative of Greece.

Meanwhile some domestic dangers had been cleared violently out of his path. His stepmother, her father, and her child had all been done away with. Attalus had been murdered in Asia, in accordance with the king's commands. But Alexander was not responsible for the death of Cleopatra and her infant. This was the work of Olympias, who, thirsty for revenge, caused the child to be slaughtered in its mother's lap, and forced Cleopatra to hang herself by her own belt.

There were symptoms of disquietude in Thrace; there were signs of a storm brewing in the Illyrian quarter; and it would have been impossible for the young king to invade Asia, with Thrace ready to revolt in his rear, and Macedonia exposed to attack from the west. Accordingly he spent
335 B. C. the spring of the following year in subduing unruly tribes in northern Thrace. As he marched homewards news reached him that the Illyrians were on the frontier, and by a swift march met and defeated them near Pelion.

Even as the tidings of the Illyrian danger had reached him before he left Thrace, so now, while he was still in the heart of Illyria, the news came that Thebes had rebelled.

As the patriots had often prayed for the death of Philip, so now they longed for the death of his youthful son. Rumours soon spread that the wish was fulfilled. Alexander was reported to have been slain in Thrace; and the Theban fugitives in Athens hastened to return to their native city and incite it to shake off the Macedonian yoke. Two captains of the garrison were caught outside the Cadmea

and murdered, and the Thebans then proceeded to blockade the citadel. Greece responded to the Theban leading. The hopes of the patriots ran high; the fall of the Cadmea seemed inevitable.

Suddenly a report was whispered in Thebes that a Macedonian army was encamped a few miles away at Onchestus. As Alexander was dead, it could only be Antipater—so the Theban leaders assured the alarmed people. But it was indeed the king Alexander. In less than two weeks he had marched from Pelion to Onchestus, and on the next day he stood before the walls of Thebes. Alexander waited to give the Thebans time to make submission, but they attacked first. Next day, a skirmish led to a general assault. The city was taken and a merciless butchery began. Six thousand lives were taken before Alexander stayed the slaughter. On the next day he summoned the Confederates of Corinth to decide the fate of the rebellious city. The sentence was that the city should be levelled with the dust and her land divided among the Confederates; that the inhabitants should be sold into bondage; and that the Cadmean citadel should be occupied by a garrison. The severe doom was carried out; and among the ruined habitations only one solitary house stood, the house of Pindar, which Alexander expressly spared.

Sept. 335
B.C.

The Boeotian cities were at length delivered from the yoke of their imperious mistress; and the fall of Thebes promptly checked all other movements in Greece. When the news reached Athens, which a few days before had voted aid to Thebes, the festival of the Mysteries was interrupted, and in a hurried meeting of the Assembly it was resolved, on the proposal of Demades, to send an embassy to congratulate Alexander. Alexander demanded—and it was a fair demand—that Demosthenes and Lycurgus and the other anti-Macedonian agitators should be delivered to him. But it was decided that Demades

should accompany another embassy and beg that the offenders might be left to the justice of the Athenian people. Alexander, still anxious to show every consideration to Athens, withdrew his demand, insisting only on the banishment of the adventurer Charidemus.

With the fall of Thebes Alexander's campaigns in Europe came to an end. The rest of his life was spent in Asia. The European campaigns, though they filled little more than a year, and though they seem of small account by the side of his triumphs in the east, were brilliant and important enough to have won historical fame for any general.

SECT. 2. Preparations for Alexander's Persian Expedition. Condition of Persia.—Having spent the winter in making his military preparations and setting in order the affairs of his kingdom for a long absence, 334 B.C. Alexander set forth in spring for the conquest of Persia. His purpose was to conquer the Persian kingdom, to dethrone the Great King and take his place. To carry out this design the first thing needful was to secure Thrace in the rear, and that had been done already. In the conquest itself there were three stages. The first step was the conquest of Asia Minor; the second was the conquest of Syria and Egypt; and these two conquests, preliminary to the advance on Babylon and Susa, would mean not merely acquisitions of territory, but strategic bases for further conquest.

To secure Macedonia during his absence, Alexander was obliged to leave a large portion of his army behind him. The government was entrusted to his father's minister, Antipater. It is said that the king before his departure divided all his royal domains and forests and revenues among his friends; and, when Perdicas asked what was left for himself, he replied, Hope. Then Perdicas, rejecting his own portion, exclaimed, "We

who go forth to fight with you need share only in your hope."

The Persian empire was weak and loosely knit, and it was governed now by a feeble monarch. Artaxerxes Ochus, who had displayed more strength than his predecessors, was assassinated; and after two or three years of confusion the throne passed to a distant member of the Achaemenid house, Darius Codomannus. If Darius had been able and experienced in war, he had some enormous advantages. In the first place, he had the advantage in the sheer weight of human bodies. In the second place, the Great King commanded untold wealth. In the third place, he had a navy which controlled the sea-board of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. And fourthly, although there was no centralisation or unity in the vast empire, there was, for that very reason, little or no national discontent in the provinces. But multitudes were useless without a leader, and money could not create brains. Moreover Persia was behind the age in the art of warfare. The only lesson which the day of Cunaxa had taught her was to hire mercenary Greeks. 338 B.C

The strength of the army which Alexander led forth against Persia is said to have been 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, thus preserving the large proportion of cavalry to infantry, which was one of the chief novelties of Philip's military establishment. We had seen how Philip organised the national army of Macedonia, in the chief divisions of the phalanx, the light infantry or hypaspists, and the heavy cavalry. Alexander led to Asia six regiments of the phalanx, and in the great engagements which decided the fate of Persia these formed the centre of his array. They were supported by Greek hoplites both mercenary and confederate. The hypaspists, led by Nicanor, son of Parmenio, had their station on the right wing. Philotas, another son of Parmenio, was commander of the heavy cavalry, in eight squadrons. This Macedonian cavalry was

always placed on the right, while on the left rode the splendid Thessalian cavalry. Both the right and the left wings were strengthened by light troops, horse and foot, accoutred according to their national habit, from Thrace, Paeonia, and other countries of the Illyrian peninsula.

SECT. 3. **Conquest of Asia Minor.**—The fleet transported the army from Sestus to Abydus, while Alexander himself sailed across to the "Harbour of the Achaeans." The first to leap upon the Mysian strand, he crossed the plain of Troy and went up to the hill of Ilion. It is said that he dedicated his own panoply in the shrine, and took down from the wall some ancient armour, preserved there as relics of the Trojan war. He sacrificed to Priam to avert his anger from one of the race of Neoptolemus; he crowned the tomb of Achilles his ancestor; and his bosom-friend Hephaestion cast a garland upon the grave of Patroclus, the beloved of Achilles. These solemnities on the hill of Troy are significant as revealing the spirit which the young king carried into his enterprise.

Meanwhile the satraps of the Great King had formed an army of about 40,000 men to defend Asia Minor. Darius committed the characteristic blunder of a Persian monarch, and consigned the army to the joint command of a number of generals, including Memnon, the Rhodian, and several of the western satraps. The Persian commanders were jealous of the Greek, and against his advice they decided to risk a battle at once. Accordingly they advanced to the plain of Adrastea, through which the river Granicus flows into the Propontis, and posted themselves on the steep left bank of the stream, so as to hinder the enemy from crossing. They had made the curious disposition of placing their cavalry along the river bank and the Greek hoplites on the slopes behind. As cavalry in attack has a great advantage over cavalry in defence, Alexander saw that the victory could best be won by throw-

ing his own squadrons against the hostile line. Drawing up his army in the usual way, with the six regiments of the phalanx in the centre, entrusting the left wing to Parmenio and commanding the right himself, he first sent across the river his light cavalry to keep the extreme left of the enemy engaged, and then led his heavy Macedonian cavalry against the Persian centre. Alexander himself was in the thickest of the fight, dealing wounds and receiving blows. After a sharp mellay on the steep banks, the Persian cavalry was broken and put to flight. The phalanx then advanced across the river against the Greek hoplites in the background, while the victorious cavalry cut them up on the flanks.

This victory was very far from laying Asia Minor at the conqueror's feet. There were strong places, which must be taken one by one—strong places on the coast, which could be supported by the powerful Persian fleet. Of all things, the help of the Athenian navy would have best bested Alexander now, and he did not yet despair. After the skirmish of the Granicus, when he divided the spoil, he sent 300 Persian panoplies to Athens, as an offering to Athena on the Acropolis, with this dedication: "Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks (except the Lacedaemonians), from the barbarians of Asia." But Athens had no zeal for the cause of the Greeks and Alexander against the barbarians. May-June,
334 B. C.

The victor marched southward to occupy Lydia and Sardis. The citadel was strong, but it now passed with its treasures unresistingly into the hands of the Greek conqueror. For this prompt submission the Lydians received their freedom. Parmenio's brother, Asander, was appointed satrap of Lydia, and Alexander turned to deal with the Ionian cities. Here the democrats welcomed the Greek deliverer; but the oligarchs supported the Persian cause, and wherever they were in power, admitted Persian

garrisons. In Ephesus, on the approach of Alexander's army, the people began to massacre the oligarchs. Alexander pacified these troubles and established a democratic constitution. The next stage in his advance was Miletus, and here for the first time he encountered resistance. As soon as he captured it, he disbanded his fleet, and proceeded to blockade the sea by seizing all the strong places on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. The execution of this design occupied him for the next two years, but it brought with it the conquest of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt.

As for Asia Minor, the next and the hardest task was the reduction of Caria and the capture of Halicarnassus. The remnant of the host which fled from the Granicus, and the Rhodian Memnon himself, had rallied here. The Great King had now entrusted to Memnon the general command of the fleet and the coasts, and Memnon had dug a deep fosse round Halicarnassus and furnished the place with food for a long siege. Alexander filled up the moat and brought his towers and engines against the walls. A breach was made on the north-east side, but Alexander, who hoped to induce the town to surrender, forbore to order an attack, and more than once called back his men from storming. At length Memnon saw that the prospect of holding out longer was hopeless, and he determined to withdraw the garrison to the royal fortress on the island in the harbour. He fired the city at night before he withdrew, and the place was in flames when the Macedonians entered.

The cold season was approaching, and Alexander divided his army into two bodies, one of which he sent under Parmenio to winter in Lydia, while he advanced himself with the other into Lycia. He gave leave to a few young officers who had been recently wedded to return home, charging them with the duty of bringing reinforcements.

Alexander met with no resistance from the cities of the Lycian League, and he left the constitution of the Confederacy intact. He advanced along the coast of Pamphylia, and turning inland from Perge, fought his way through the Pisidian hills. He descended to Celaenae, the strong and lofty citadel of the Phrygian satrapy, and leaving a garrison there, he marched on to Gordion on the Sangarius, the capital of the ancient kingdom of Phrygia.

At Gordion, the appointed mustering-place, Alexander's army reunited, and new troops arrived from Macedonia to 333 B.C. replace those who had been left to garrison the subjugated



FIG. 83.—Silver coin of Tarsus. Obverse: enthroned Zeus [Aramaic legend: Baal Tars]. Reverse: lion [obscure legend].

countries and cities. On the citadel of Gordion stood the remains of the royal palaces of Gordius and Midas, and Alexander went up the hill to see the chariot of Gordius and the famous knot which fastened the yoke. Cord of the bark of a cornel-tree was tied in a knot which artfully concealed the ends, and there was an oracle that he who should loose it would rule over Asia. Alexander vainly attempted to untie it, and then drawing his sword cut the knot and so fulfilled the oracle. From Gordion Alexander marched by Ancyra into Cappadocia, and thence southward to Tyana and the Cilician gates, which he seized by surprise, and moved so rapidly on Tarsus that the satrap Arsames fled without striking a blow.

Here a misadventure happened which well-nigh changed the course of history. After a long ride under a burning sun, the king, bathing in the cool waters of the Cydnus, caught a chill which resulted in violent fever, and his physicians despaired of his life. But Philip of Acarnania recommended a certain purgative. As he was preparing the draught in the king's tent, a letter was placed in Alexander's hands, alleging that Darius had bribed Philip to poison his master. Alexander, taking the cup, gave Philip the letter to read, and, while Philip read, Alexander swallowed the medicine. His confidence was justified, and under the treatment he soon recovered.

SECT. 4. **Battle of Issus.**—The Great King had already crossed the Euphrates at the head of a vast host. Alexander did not hurry to the encounter, but sending forward Parmenio with part of the army to secure the passes from Cilicia into Syria, he himself turned to subdue the hillfolk of western Cilicia. He then returned eastward, and advanced to Issus under Mount Amanus. Darius was on the other side of the mountains, on ground which was highly favourable for deploying his host. There were two roads from Issus into Syria. One led directly over difficult mountain-passes, while the other wound along the coast to Myriandros and then crossed Mount Amanus. The second road, along which we formerly accompanied Cyrus and Xenophon, was now chosen by Alexander. Leaving his sick at Issus, he marched forward to Myriandros, but was detained there by a violent storm. The Great King expected every day to see Alexander descending from the mountains; and when he came not, owing to the delays in Cilicia, it was thought that he did not venture to desert the coast. Accordingly Darius and his nobles decided to seek Alexander. The Persian army crossed the northern passes of Amanus, thus coming between Alexander and his base. Reaching Issus, they tortured and put to death the sick who

had been left behind. Alexander cannot be blamed for this disaster, for he could not foresee that his enemies would abandon the open position in which their numerical superiority would tell for a confined place where the movements of a multitude would be cramped. To Alexander the tidings that Darius was at Issus were too good to be true, and he sent a boat to reconnoitre. When he was assured that the enemy had thus played into his hands, he marched back from Myriandros through the sea-gates into the little plain of Issus.

The plain of Issus is cut in two by the stream of the Pinarus. Here, as at the Granicus, it fell to Alexander to attack the Persians, who had themselves no plan of attack; and here as there the Persians were defended by the natural entrenchment of a steep-banked river. The Macedonian columns defiled into the plain at dawn, and when Darius learned that they were approaching he threw across the river squadrons of cavalry and light troops to cover the rest of the army while it arrayed itself for battle. The whole front was composed of hoplites, including 30,000 Greek mercenaries; the left wing touched the lower slopes of the mountains and curved round, following the line of the hill, so as to face the flank of the enemy's right wing. When the array was formed, the cavalry was recalled to the north of the river, and posted on the right wing, near the sea, where the ground was best adapted for cavalry movements.

Oct. 333
B.C.

Alexander advanced, his army drawn up on the usual plan, the phalanx in the centre, the hypaspists on the right. In order to meet the danger which threatened the flank and rear of his right wing from the Persian forces on the slope of the mountain, he placed a column of light troops on the extreme right, to form a second front. As in the engagement on the Granicus, the attack was to be made by the heavy cavalry on the left centre of the enemy's line.

But it was a far more serious and formidable venture, since Darius had 30,000 Greek mercenaries who knew how to stand and to fight. And if Alexander was defeated, his retreat was cut off.




FIG. 84.

The Persian left did not sustain Alexander's onset at the head of his cavalry. The phalanx followed more slowly, and in crossing the stream and climbing the steep bank the line became dislocated, especially at one spot, and the Greek hoplites pressed them hard on the river-brink. If

the phalanx had been driven back, Alexander's victorious right wing would have been exposed on the flank and the battle lost; but the phalangites stood their ground obstinately, until the hypaspists were free to come to their help by taking their adversaries in the flank. Meanwhile Alexander's attack had been directed upon the spot where the Great King himself stood in his war-chariot, surrounded by a guard of Persian nobles. There was a furious mellay, in which Alexander was wounded in the leg. Then Darius turned his chariot and fled, and this was the signal for an universal flight on the left. On the sea side the Persian cavalry crossed the river and carried all before them; but in the midst of their success the cry that the king was fleeing made them waver, and they were soon riding wildly back, pursued by the Thessalians. The whole Persian host was now rushing northward towards the passes of Amanus, and thousands fell beneath the swords of their pursuers. Darius did not tarry; he forgot even his mother and his wife who were in the camp at Issus; and when he reached the mountain he left his chariot, his shield, and his royal cloak behind him, and mounting a swift mare rode for dear life.

Having pursued the Great King till nightfall, Alexander returned to the Persian camp. He supped in the tent of Darius, and, hearing the wailing of women from a tent hard by, he learned that it was the mother and wife and children of the fugitive king. They had been told that Alexander had returned with the shield and cloak of Darius, and supposing that their lord was dead, had broken out into lamentation. Alexander sent one of his companions to comfort them with the assurance that Darius lived, and that they would receive all the respect due to royal ladies; for Alexander had no personal enmity against Darius. No act of Alexander, perhaps, astonished his contemporaries more than this generous treatment of the family of his royal rival.

A city, which still retains the name of Alexander, was built in commemoration of the battle, at the northern end of the sea-gates. The road was now open into Syria. Just as the small fight on the Granicus had cleared the way for the acquisition of Asia Minor, so the fight on the Pinaros cleared the way for the conquest of Syria and Egypt. The rest of the work would consist in tedious sieges. But the victory of Issus had, beyond its immediate results, immense importance through the prestige which it conferred on the victor. He had defeated an army ten times as great as his own, led by the Great King in person; he had captured the mother of the Great King, and his wife and his children. Darius himself made the first overtures to the conqueror. He wrote a letter, in which he complained that Alexander was an unprovoked aggressor, begged that he would send back the royal captives, and professed willingness to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance. Such a condescending appeal required a stern reply. "I have overcome in battle," wrote Alexander, "first thy generals and satraps, and now thyself and thine host, and possess thy land, through the grace of the gods. I am lord of all Asia, and therefore do thou come to me. If thou art afraid of being evilly entreated, send some of thy friends to receive sufficient guarantees. Thou hast only to come to me to ask and receive thy mother and wife and children, and whatever else thou mayest desire. And for the future, whenever thou sendest, send to me as to the Great King of Asia, and do not write as to an equal, but tell me whatever thy need be, as to one who is lord of all that is thine. But if thou disputest the kingdom, then wait and fight for it again, and do not flee; for I will march against thee wherever thou mayest be."

SECT. 5. **Conquest of Syria.**—After Issus, Alexander might have pursued Darius into the heart of Persia, and

crushed him before he could collect another army. He showed his greatness by proceeding in a more systematic manner. As Asia Minor had to be subdued before Syria and Egypt could be won, so Syria and Egypt had to be subjugated before he attempted to conquer Mesopotamia. And in Syria his most important objective was the Phœnician towns. These cities—Tyre, Sidon, and Aradus—had never stood together, and Sidon, having revolted, was destroyed by Ochus. Now Aradus and Byblus, which replaced Sidon, submitted at once to Alexander, while Tyre held out.

Alexander advanced southward towards Tyre. But the



FIG. 85.—Silver coin of Sidon (? 374-62 B.C.). Obverse: galley in front of city wall; below two lions. Reverse: king and charioteer in chariot; below goat (incuse).

men of Tyre felt secure on their island rock, which was protected by eighty ships, apart from a squadron which was absent in the Aegean, and they refused to "receive either Persian or Macedonian into the city." To subdue Tyre was an absolute necessity, as Alexander explained to a council. It was not safe to advance to Egypt, or to pursue Darius, while the Persians were lords of the sea; and the only way of wresting their sea-power from them was to capture Tyre, the most important naval station on the coast; once Tyre fell, the Phœnician fleet, which was the most numerous and strongest part of the Persian navy, would come over to Macedon, for the rowers would not

row or the men fight when they had no habitations to row or fight for. The reduction of Cyprus and Egypt would




FIG. 86.

Walker & Boutall sc.

then follow without trouble. Alexander grasped and never let go the fact that Tyre was the key to the whole situation.

But the siege of Tyre was perhaps the hardest military

task that Alexander's genius ever encountered. The city, Jan. July girt by huge walls, stood on an island across a sound of 332 B.C. more than half a mile in width. On the side which faced the mainland were the two harbours: the northern or Sidonian harbour with a narrow mouth, and the southern or Egyptian. For an enemy, vastly inferior at sea, there was only one way to set about the siege. Those thousand yards of water must be bridged over and the isle annexed to the mainland. Without hesitation Alexander began the building of the causeway. The first part of the work was easy, for the water was shallow; but when the mole



FIG. 87.—Silver coin of Tyre (331 B.C.). Obverse: Melkart with bow on sea-horse; waves; dolphin. Reverse: Owl with crook and flail (Egyptian emblems of royalty).

approached the island, the strait deepened, and the difficulties of the task began. Triremes issued from the havens to shoot missiles at the workers. To protect them Alexander erected two towers on the causeway, and mounted engines on the towers to reply to the missiles from the galleys. He attached to these wooden towers curtains of leather to screen both towers and workmen from the projectiles which were hurled from the city-walls. But the men of Tyre were ingenious. They constructed a fire-ship filled with dry wood and inflammables, and choosing a day on which a favourable wind blew, they towed it close to the dam and set it on fire. The device succeeded; the burning vessel soon wrapt the towers and all the engines in flames. Alexander then widened the causeway

throughout its whole length, so that it could accommodate more towers and engines, before he attempted to complete it. He saw that it would be needful to support his operations from the causeway by operations from shipboard; and he went to Sidon to bring up a few galleys which were stationed there. But at this moment the squadrons of Aradus and Byblus, which were acting in the Aegean, learning that their cities had submitted to Alexander, left the fleet and sailed to Sidon. The adhesion of the kings of Cyprus presently followed, and reinforced the fleet at Sidon by 120 ships. With a fleet of about 250 triremes at his command, Alexander was now far stronger at sea than the merchants of Tyre.

During the siege Alexander received an embassy from the Great King, offering an immense ransom for the captives of the royal house, and the surrender of all the lands west of the Euphrates; proposing also that Alexander should marry the daughter of Darius and become his ally. The message was discussed in a council, and Parmenio said that if he were Alexander he would accept the terms. "And I," said the king, "would accept them if I were Parmenio."

From Sidon Alexander bore down upon Tyre with his whole fleet, hoping to entice the Tyrians into an engagement. When the fleet hove in sight, the men of Tyre, seeing that they had no chance against so many, drew up their triremes in close array to block the mouths of their harbours. Alexander set the Cyprian vessels on the north side of the mole to blockade the Sidonian harbour, and the Phoenician on the south side to blockade the Egyptian harbour. It was opposite this harbour, on the mainland, that his own pavilion was placed.

The mole had now been carried up to the island, and all was ready for a grand attack on the eastern wall. Some of the engines were placed on the mole, others on transport

ships or superannuated galleys. But little impression was made on the wall, which on this side was 150 feet high and enormously thick; and the besieged replied to the attack with volleys of fiery missiles from powerful engines, which were mounted on their lofty battlements. All attacks on this wall failed; but in a sally made to surprise the Cyprian squadron, the Tyrians after a moment of success had their fleet completely put out of further action. Finally the efforts of the besiegers were united upon the south side near the Egyptian harbour. Here at length a bit of the wall was torn down, and though the Tyrians easily repelled the attack, it showed Alexander the weak spot, and two days later he prepared a grand and supreme assault.

The vessels with the siege-engines were set to work at the southern wall, while two triremes waited hard by, one filled with hypaspists under Admetus, the other with a phalanx regiment, ready as soon as the wall yielded to hurl their crews into the breach. Ships were stationed in front of the two havens, to force their way in at a favourable moment, and the rest of the fleet, manned with light troops and furnished with engines, were disposed at various points round the island, to embarrass and bewilder the besieged and hinder them from concentrating at the main point of attack. A wide breach was made, the two triremes were rowed up to the spot, the bridges were lowered, and the hypaspists, Admetus at their head, first mounted the wall. Admetus was pierced with a lance, but Alexander took his place, and drove back the Tyrians from the breach. Tower after tower was captured; soon all the southern wall was in the hands of the Macedonians. But the city had already been entered from other points. The chains of both the Sidonian and the Egyptian harbours had been burst by the Cyprian and Phoenician squadrons; the Tyrian ships had been disabled; and the troops had

pressed into the town. Eight thousand inhabitants are said to have been slain, and the rest, about 30,000, were sold into slavery, with the exception of the king, Azemilco.

The fall of Tyre gave Alexander Syria and Egypt and the naval supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. The communities of Syria and Palestine, that had not submitted, like Damascus, after the victory of Issus, submitted now after the capture of Tyre, and he encountered no resistance in his southern march to Egypt, until he came to the great frontier stronghold, Gaza, the city of the Philistines.

Gaza had been committed by Darius to the care of Batis, a trusty eunuch, and had been well furnished with provisions for a long siege. Batis refused to surrender, trusting in the strength of the fortifications, but Alexander could not leave such an important post on the line from Damascus to Egypt in the hands of the enemy, and after a siege of several weeks, during which he was wounded in the shoulder by a dart from a catapult, the place was taken and became a Macedonian fortress.

Oct.-Nov.
332 B.C.

SECT. 6. Conquest of Egypt.—Egypt was now absolutely cut off from Persia; Alexander had only to march in. The Persian satrap thought only of making his submission and winning the conqueror's grace. In Memphis, the capital of the Pharaohs, where he was probably proclaimed king, Alexander sacrificed to Apis and the other native gods, and thereby won the goodwill of the people.

From Memphis he sailed down the river to Canopus, and took a step which, alone, would have made his name memorable for ever. He chose the ground, east of Rhacotis, between Lake Mareotis and the sea, as the site of a new city, over against the island of Pharos, famous in Homeric song, and soon to become more famous still as the place of the first lighthouse, one of the seven wonders of the world. The king is said to have himself traced out the ground-plan of *Alexandria*. He joined the mainland

(?) Jan.
331 B.C.

with the island by a causeway seven stades (nearly a mile) in length, and thus formed two harbours. The subsequent history of Alexandria, which has held its position as a port for more than 2000 years, proves that its founder had a true eye in choosing the site of the most famous of his new cities. Alexandria was intended to take the place of Tyre as the commercial centre of Western Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, throwing the trade of the world into a port where Greeks would encounter no Phoenician rivalry.

In the official style of the Egyptian monarchy the Pharaohs were sons of Ammon, and as the successor of the Pharaohs Alexander assumed the same title. It was therefore necessary in order to regulate his position that an official assurance should be given by Ammon himself that Alexander was his son. To obtain this Alexander undertook a journey to the oracular sanctuary of Ammon in the oasis of Siwah. And this motive is alone sufficient to explain the expedition. But it may well be that in Alexander's mind there was a vague notion that there was something divine about his own origin. Proceeding along the coast to Parætonion, he was there met by envoys who conveyed the submission of Cyrene. By this acquisition the western frontier of the Macedonian empire extended to the border of the Carthaginian sphere of rule.

Alexander then struck across the desert to visit that Egyptian temple which was most famous in the Greek world, the temple as it was always called of Zeus Ammon. It is said that Alexander told no man what he asked the god or what the god replied, save only that the answer pleased him.

SECT. 7. **Battle of Gaugamela, and Conquest of**



FIG. 32.—Coin of Cyrene (obverse). Head of Zeus Ammon; olive spray.

Babylonia.—The new lord of Egypt and Syria returned with the spring to Tyre. The whole coastland was now in his possession, and he controlled the sea; the time had come to advance into the heart of the Persian empire. Having spent some months in the Phoenician city, he set forth at the head of 40,000 infantry and 7000 horse, and reached Thapsacus on Euphrates at the beginning of August. The objective of Alexander was Babylon. He chose the road across the north of Mesopotamia and down the Tigris on its eastern bank. From some Persian scouts who were captured it was ascertained that Darius, with a yet larger multitude than that which had succumbed at Issus, was on the other side of the river, determined to contest the passage. Alexander crossed the Tigris, not at Nineveh, the usual place of crossing, but higher up at Bezabde. On the same night the moon went into eclipse, and men anxiously sought in the phenomenon a portent.

Sept. 20,
331 B.C.

Marching southward for some days, Alexander found Darius encamped in a plain near Gaugamela on the river Bumōdus. The numbers of the army were reported at 1,000,000 foot and 40,000 horse. Before the battle the night was spent by the Persians under arms, for their camp was unfortified, and they feared a night attack. And a night attack was recommended by Parmenio, but Alexander preferred to trust the issue to his own generalship and the superior discipline of his troops. He said to Parmenio, "I do not steal victory," and under the gallantry of this reply he concealed, in his usual manner, the prudence and policy of his resolve. A victory over the Persian host, won in the open field in the light of day, would have a far greater effect in establishing his prestige in Asia.

The Great King, according to wont, was in the *centre* of the Persian array, surrounded by his kinsfolk and his Persian bodyguard. On either side of them were Greek

mercenaries, Indian auxiliaries with a few elephants, and Carians whose ancestors had been settled in Upper Asia. The centre was strengthened and deepened by a second line. On the *left* were men from Susa, from the Caspian, from Arachosia and Bactria, covered by 100 scythe-armed chariots and Bactrian and Scythian cavalry. On the *right* were Hyrcanians and Parthians, the Medes and dwellers in Mesopotamia, with other Caucasian folks.

Against this host, of which the cavalry alone is said to have been as numerous as all the infantry of the enemy, Alexander descended the hill in the morning. On his *left* wing—commanded as usual by Parmenio—were the cavalry of the Thessalian and confederate Greeks; in the *centre* the six regiments of the phalanx; and on the *right*, the hypaspists, and the eight squadrons of the Companions, the royal squadron of Clitus being at the extreme right. Covering the right wing were some light troops, spear-throwers and archers. The line was far outflanked on both sides by the enemy, and the danger which Alexander had most to fear, as at the battle of Issus, was that of being attacked in rear or flank; only that here both wings were in peril. He sought to meet these contingencies by forming behind each wing a second line, which, by facing round a quarter or half circle, could meet an attack on flank or rear.

As he advanced, Alexander and his right wing were opposite to the centre of the enemy's line, and he was outflanked by the whole length of the enemy's left. He therefore bore obliquely to the right, and, even when the Scythian horsemen riding forward came into contact with his own light troops, he continued to move his squadrons of heavy cavalry in the same direction. The Macedonians were thus moving off the ground, which had been levelled for the scythe-chariots, and Darius ordered a flank charge to check them. Alexander's Greek mercenaries with diffi-

culty held off the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry, and meanwhile the scythed cars were loosed upon the Macedonian ranks. But the archers shot down horses and drivers, and the hypaspists, opening their order, let the chariots rattle harmlessly by.

The whole Persian line was now advancing to attack, and Alexander was waiting for the moment to deliver his cavalry charge. He had to send his mounted pikemen to the help of the light cavalry, who were being hard pressed on the right by the Scythians and Bactrians; and as a counter-check to this reinforcement, squadrons of Persian cavalry were dispatched to the assistance of their fellows. By the withdrawal of these squadrons a gap was caused in the left Persian wing, and into this gap Alexander plunged at the head of his cavalry column and split the line in two. Thus the left side of the enemy's centre was exposed, and turning obliquely Alexander charged into its ranks. Meanwhile the bristling phalanx was moving forward and was soon engaged in close combat with another part of the Persian centre. The storm of battle burst with wildest fury round the spot where the Persian king was trembling, and what befell at Issus befell again at Gaugamela. The Great King turned his chariot and fled. His Persians fled with him, and swept along in their flight the troops who had been posted in the rear.

Meanwhile Parmenio was hard bested. The troops of the extreme Persian right had attacked his cavalry in the flank or rear. Parmenio sped a messenger entreating aid, and Alexander desisted from the pursuit of his fleeing rival. Riding back with his Companions, he encountered a large body of cavalry, Persians, Parthians, and Indians, in full retreat, but in orderly array. A desperate conflict ensued—perhaps the most fearful in the whole battle. Sixty of the Companions fell, but Alexander was again victorious and rode on to the help of Parmenio. But Parmenio no longer

needed his help. Not the least achievement of this day of great deeds was the brilliant fighting of the Thessalian cavalry, who not only sustained the battle against the odds which had wrung from Parmenio the cry for aid, but in the end routed their foemen before Alexander could reach the spot. The battle was won, and the fate of the Persian empire was decided.

Alexander lost not a moment in resuming the chase which he had abandoned, and, riding eastward throughout the night on the tracks of the Persian king, he reached Arbela on the morrow. But he did not take the king. Darius fled into the highlands of Media, and Ariobarzanes with a host of the routed army hastened southward to Persia. Alexander pursued his way to Babylon.

Alexander seems to have expected that the men of Babylon, trusting in their mighty walls, would have offered resistance. He was disappointed. When he approached the city, with his army arrayed for action, the gates opened and the Babylonians streamed out, led by their priests and their chief men. The satrap Mazaeus, who had fought bravely in the recent battle, surrendered the city and citadel. In Babylonia, Alexander followed the same policy which he had already followed in Egypt. He appeared as the protector of the national religions which had been depressed and slighted by the Persian fire-worshippers. He rebuilt the Babylonian temples which had been destroyed, and above all he commanded the restoration of the marvellous temple of Bel, standing on its eight towers, on which the rage of Xerxes had vented itself when he returned from the rout of Salamis. The Persian Mazaeus was retained in his post as satrap of Babylonia.

Oct. 331
B.C.

SECT. 8. Conquest of Susiana and Persis.—Having rested his army, the conqueror advanced south-eastward to Susa, the summer residence of the Persian court. In the citadel he found enormous treasures of gold and silver

Dec. 331
B.C.

and purple. Among other precious things at Susa was the sculptured group of the tyrant-slayers, Harmodius and Aristogiton, which Xerxes had carried off from Athens; and Alexander had the pleasure of sending back to its home this historical monument, now more precious than ever.

Though it was mid-winter, Alexander soon left Susa. There were immense treasures still in the palaces of Cyrus and Darius in the heart of the Persian highlands, and these were guarded not only by the difficulties of the mountainous approaches, but by the army which Ariobarzanes had rescued from the overthrow of Gaugamela. It was no easy task. The storming of the "Persian Gates," defended by Ariobarzanes, was one of the most arduous tasks that Alexander ever accomplished, yet the pass was carried by a surprise march through snow-clad mountains.

The royal palaces of Persia, to which Alexander now hurried with the utmost speed, stood in the valley of Mervdasht, fertile then but desolate at the [present day, and close to the city of Istachr, which the Persians deemed the oldest city in the world. This cradle of the Persian kingdom, to which, city and palace together, the Greeks gave the name of *Persepolis*, was "the richest of all the cities under the sun." It is said that 120,000 talents were found in the treasury; an army of mules and camels were required to remove the spoils.

330 B. C. But the most famous incident connected with the four months' sojourn at Persepolis is the conflagration of the palace of Xerxes. The story is that one night when Alexander and his companions had drunk deep at a royal festival, Thais, an Attic courtesan, flung out among the tipsy carousers the idea of burning down the house of the malignant foe who had burned the temples of Greece. The mad words of the woman inspired a wild frenzy, and whirled the revellers forth, armed with torches. Alexander




FIG. 89.—Propylaea of Xerxes, at Persepolis.

hurled the first brand, and the cedar woodwork of the palace was soon in flames. But before the fire had done its work the king's head was cool, and he commanded the fire to be quenched.

SECT. 9. **Death of Darius.**—In the meantime King Darius remained in Ecbatana, surrounded by the adherents who were faithful to him. Media was defensible; he had a large army from the northern satrapies; and he had Bactria as a retreat, if retreat he must. The spring was advanced when Alexander left Persis for Ecbatana. He made all speed, when the news reached him by the way, that Darius was at Ecbatana with a large army, prepared to fight. But when he drew nigh to the city, he found that Darius had flown eastward. At Ecbatana Alexander paid off the Thessalian troops and the other Greek confederates; but any who chose to enrol themselves anew might stay, and not a few stayed.

With the main part of the army Alexander hurried on, merciless to men and steeds, bent on the capture of Darius. But meanwhile doom was stealing upon the Persian monarch by another way. His followers were beginning to suspect that ill-luck dogged him, and when he proposed to stay and risk another battle instead of continuing his retreat to Bactria, none were willing except the remnant of Greek mercenaries. Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, was a kinsman of the king, and it was felt by many that he might be able to raise up again the Achaemenian house, which Darius had been unable to sustain. Darius was seized in the night, and hurried on as a prisoner along the road to Bactria. This event disbanded his army. The Greek mercenaries went off northwards into the Caspian mountains, and many of the Persians turned back to find pardon and grace with Alexander. When he learned that his old rival was a prisoner and that Bessus was now his antagonist, Alexander resolved on a swift and hot pursuit.

Leaving the main body of the army to come slowly after, he set forth at once with his cavalry and some light foot, and sped the whole night through, not resting till next day at noon, and then another evening and night at the same breathless speed. Sunrise saw him at Thara, where the Great King had been put in chains. It was ascertained that Bessus and his fellows intended to surrender Darius if the pursuers were pressed. The pursuers rode on throughout another night; men and horses were dropping with fatigue. At noon they came to a village where the pursued had halted the day before, and Alexander learned that they intended to force a march in the night. He asked the people if there was no short way, and was told that there was a short way, but it was waterless. Alexander instantly dismounted five hundred of his horsemen and gave their steeds to the officers and the strongest men of the infantry who were with him. With these he started in the evening, and having ridden about forty-five miles came up with the enemy at break of day. Bessus and his fellow-conspirators bade their prisoner mount a horse; and when Darius refused, they stabbed him and left him in his litter. The litter-mules strayed about half a mile from the road down a side valley, where they were found at a spring by a Macedonian who had come to slake his thirst. The Great King was near his last gasp. He had the solace of a cup of water in his supreme moments and thanked the Macedonian soldier by a sign. Alexander viewed the body, and is related to have thrown his own cloak over it in pity. It was part of his fair luck that he found Darius dead; for if he had taken him alive, he would not have put him to death, and such a captive would have been a perpetual embarrassment. He sent the corpse with all honour to the queen-mother, and the last of the Achaemenian kings was buried with his forefathers at Persepolis.

July, 330
B.C.

SECT. 10. Spirit of Alexander's Policy as Lord of

Asia.—From the very beginning Alexander had shown to the conquered provinces a tolerance which was not only prompted by generosity but based on political wisdom. He had permitted each country to retain its national institutions, insisting only on the division of power. Under the Persian kingdom the satrap was usually sole governor, controlling not only the civil administration, but the treasury and the troops. Alexander in most cases committed only the internal administration to the governor, and appointed beside him, and independent of his authority, a financial officer and a military commander. This division of authority was a security against rebellion.

But the Macedonian king had set forth as a champion of Greeks against mere barbarians, as a leader of Europeans against effeminate Asiatics. All the Greeks and Macedonians who followed him regarded the east as a world to be plundered, and the orientals as inferiors meant by nature to be their own slaves. But, as Alexander advanced, his view expanded, and he began to transcend the familiar distinction of Greek and barbarian. He formed the notion of an empire, both European and Asiatic, in which the Asiatics should not be dominated by the European invaders, but Europeans and Asiatics alike should be ruled on an equality by a monarch, indifferent to the distinction of Greek and barbarian and looked upon as their own king by Persians as well as by Macedonians. The idea begins to show itself after the battle of Gaugamela. Some of the eastern provinces are entrusted to Persian satraps, for example Babylonia to Mazaeus, and the court of Alexander ceases to be purely European. With oriental courtiers, the forms of an oriental court are also gradually introduced; the Asiatics prostrate themselves before the lord of Asia; and presently Alexander adopts the dress of a Persian king at court ceremonies, in order to appear less a foreigner in the eyes of his eastern subjects.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST

SECT. I. **Hyrkania, Areia, Bactria, Sogdiana.**—The murderers of Darius fled—Bessus to Bactria, Nabarzanes to Hyrcania. Alexander could not pursue Bessus while Nabarzanes was behind him in the Caspian region, and therefore his first movement was to cross the Elburz chain of mountains which separate the south Caspian shores from Parthia, and subdue the lands of the Tapuri and Mardi. The Persian officers who had retreated into these regions submitted, and were received with favour; the life of Nabarzanes was spared. The Greek mercenaries who had found refuge in the Tapurian mountains capitulated. All who had entered the Persian service, before the Syne-drion of Corinth had pledged Greece to the cause of Macedon, were released; the rest were compelled to serve in the Macedonian army. Alexander sent orders to Parmenio to go forth from Ecbatana and take possession of the Cadusian territory on the south-western side of the Caspian. He himself, having rested a fortnight at Zadracarta and held athletic games, marched eastward to Susia, a town in the north of Areia, and was met there by Sati-barzanes, governor of Areia, who was confirmed in his satrapy. Here the news arrived that Bessus had assumed the style of Great King with the name of Artaxerxes, and was wearing his turban "erect." Alexander started at once

on the road to Bactria. But he had not gone far when he was overtaken by the news that Satibarzanes had revolted behind him. Hurrying back in forced marches with a part of his army, Alexander appeared before Artocoana, the capital of Areia, in two days. There was little resistance, and the conqueror marched southwards to Drangiana. His road can hardly be doubtful—the road which leads by Herat into Seistan. And it is probable that Herat is the site of the city which Alexander founded to be the capital and stronghold of the new province, Alexandria of the Areians. The submission of Drangiana was made without a blow.

At Prophthasia, the capital of the Drangian land, it came to Alexander's ears that Philotas, the son of Parmenio, was conspiring against his life. The king called an assembly of the Macedonians and stated the charges against the general. Philotas admitted that he had known of a plot to murder Alexander and said nothing about it; but this was only one of the charges against him. The Macedonians found Philotas guilty, and he was pierced by their javelins. The son dead, it seemed dangerous to let the father live, whether he was involved or not in the treasonable designs of Philotas. A messenger was dispatched with all speed to Media, bearing commands to some of the captains of Parmenio's army to put the old general to death. It was an arbitrary act of precaution against merely suspected disloyalty; there seem to have been no proofs against Parmenio, and there was certainly no trial.

In the meantime Alexander, instead of retracing his steps and following the route to Bactria, resolved to fetch a circle. Marching through Afghanistan, subduing it as he went, he would cross the Hindu-Kush mountains and descend on the plain of the Oxus from the east. First he advanced southwards to secure Seistan and the north-

western regions of Baluchistan, then known as Gedrosia, wintering among the Ariaspae, a peaceful and friendly people whom the Greeks called "Benefactors." A Gedrosian satrapy was constituted with its capital at Pura. When spring came, Alexander pushed north-eastward up the valley of the Halmand. The chief city which he founded in Arachosia was probably on the site of Candahar, which seems to be a corruption of its name, Alexandria. The way led on over the mountains, past Ghazni, into the valley of the upper waters of the Cabul River, and Alexander came to the foot of the high range of the Hindu-Kush. The whole massive complex of mountains which diverge from the roof of the world, dividing southern from central, eastern from western Asia—the Pamirs, the Hindu-Kush, and the Himalayas—were grouped by the Greeks under the general name of Caucasus. But the Hindu-Kush was distinguished by the special name of Paropanisus, while the Himalayas were called the Imaus. At the foot of the Hindu-Kush he spent the winter, and founded another Alexandria to secure this region, somewhere to the north of Cabul; it was distinguished as Alexandria of the Caucasus. The crossing of the Caucasus, undertaken in the early spring, was an achievement which seems to have fallen little short of Hannibal's passage of the Alps. The soldiers had to content themselves with raw meat and the herb of silphion as a substitute for bread. At length they reached Drapsaca, high up on the northern slope—the frontier fortress of Bactria. Having rested his way-worn army, Alexander went down by the stronghold of Aornus into the plain and marched to Bactra, now Balkh.

The pretender, Bessus Artaxerxes, had stripped and wasted eastern Bactria up to the foot of the mountains, for the purpose of checking the progress of the invading army; but he fled across the Oxus when Alexander drew near. Another province was added without a blow to the Mace-

329 B.C.

donian empire. Alexander lost no time in pursuing the fugitive into Sogdiana. This is the country which lies between the streams of the Oxus and the Jaxartes. It was called Sogdiana from the river Sogd, which loses itself in the sands of the desert before it approaches the waters of the Oxus. Bessus had burned his boats, and when Alexander, after a weary march of two or three days through the hot desert, arrived at the banks of the Oxus, he was forced to transport his army by the primitive vehicle of skins, which the natives of Central Asia still use. Alexander's soldiers, however, instead of inflating the sheepskins with air, stuffed them with rushes. They crossed the river at Kilif and advanced to Maracanda, easily recognised as Samarcand.

The Sogdian allies of Bessus, thinking to save their country, sent a message offering to surrender the usurper. The king sent Ptolemy, son of Lagus, with 6000 men to secure Bessus. By Alexander's orders he was placed, naked and fettered, on the right side of the road by which the army was marching. He was then scourged and sent to Bactra to await his doom.

But Alexander did not arrest his march; he had made up his mind to annex Sogdiana. Not the Oxus but the Jaxartes was to be the northern limit of his empire. Having seized and garrisoned Samarcand, the army pushed on north-eastward by the unalterable road which nature has marked out. The road reaches the Jaxartes where that river issues from the chilly vale of Fergana and deflects its course to flow through the steppes. It was a point of the highest importance; for Fergana forms the vestibule of the great gate of communication between south-western Asia and China—the pass over the Tian-shan mountains, which descends on the other side into the land of Kashgar. Here

328 B.C. Alexander, with strategic insight, resolved to fix the limit of his empire, and on the banks of the river he founded a

new city which was known as Alexandria Eschaté (the Ultimate), which is now Khodjend.

The conqueror, judging from the ease with which he had come and conquered Arachosia and Bactria, seems not to have conceived that it might be otherwise beyond the Oxus. But as he was designing his new city, Alexander received the news that the Sogdians were up in arms behind him, and the garrison of Samarcand was besieged in the citadel. A message had gone forth into the western wastes, and the Massagetae and other Scythian tribes were flocking to drive out the intruder. It was a dangerous moment for Alexander. He first turned to recover the Sogdian fortresses, and in two days he had taken and burned five of them; the others capitulated, and the inhabitants of all these places were led in chains to take part in peopling the new Alexandria.

The next task should have been the relief of Samarcand, but Alexander found himself confronted by a new danger. The Scythians were pouring down to the banks of the Jaxartes, ready to cross the stream and harass the Macedonians in the rear. It was impossible to move until they had been repelled and the passage of the river secured. The walls of Alexandria Eschaté were hastily constructed of unburnt clay and the place made fit for habitation in the short space of twenty days. Meanwhile the northern bank was lined by the noisy and jeering hordes of the barbarians, and Alexander determined to cross the river. Bringing up his missile-engines to the shore, he dismayed the shepherds, who, when stones and darts began to fall among them from such a distance and unhorsed one of their champions, retreated some distance from the bank. The army seized the moment to cross; the Scythians were routed, and Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, pursued them far into the steppes. Then, relieving Samarcand by a forced desert march, the king swept on to Sogdiana, ravaging the land;

then marching south-westward to the Oxus, he crossed into western Bactria and spent the winter at Zariaspa.

At Zariaspa, Bessus was formally tried for the murder of Darius, and was condemned to have his nose and ears cut off and be taken to Ecbatana to die on the cross. ^{327 B.C.} The Greeks, like ourselves, regarded mutilation as a barbarous punishment, but Alexander saw that he must meet the orientals on their own ground; he must become their king in their own way. The surest means of planting Hellenism in their midst was to begin by taking account sympathetically of their prejudices. Alexander therefore assumed the state of Great King, surrounded himself with Eastern forms and pomp, exacted self-abasement in his presence from oriental subjects, and adopted the maxim that the king's person was divine. He was the successor of Darius, and it was therefore an act of deliberate policy that he punished the king-slayer in Eastern fashion.

The misfortune was that Alexander's assumption of oriental state and the favour which he showed to the Persians were highly unpopular with the Macedonians. Though they were attached to their king, and proud of the conquests which they had helped him to achieve, they felt that he was no longer the same to them as when he had led them to victory at the Granicus. His exaltation over obeisant orientals had changed him, and the execution of his trusted general Parmenio was felt to be significant of the change.

These feelings of discontent accidentally found a mouth-piece about this time. Rebellious movements in Sogdiana brought Alexander over the Oxus again before the winter was over, and he spent some time at Samarcand. ^{327 B.C.} One of the most unfortunate consequences of the long-protracted sojourn in the regions of the Oxus was the increase of drunkenness in the army. The excessively dry atmosphere in summer produces an intolerable and frequent thirst;

and it was inevitable that the Macedonians should slake it by wine, if they would not sicken themselves by the bad water of the country. Alexander's potations became deep and habitual from this time forth. One night in the fortress of Samarcand the carouse lasted far into the night. Greek men of letters, who accompanied the army, sang the praises of Alexander, exalting him above the Dioscuri, whose feast he was celebrating on this day. Clitus, his foster-brother, flushed with wine, suddenly sprang up to denounce the blasphemy, and, once he had begun, the current of his feelings swept him on. It was to the Macedonians, he said—to men like Parmenio and Philotas—that Alexander owed his victories; he himself had saved Alexander's life at the Granicus. Alexander started to his feet and called in Macedonian for his hypaspists; none obeyed his drunken orders; Ptolemy and other banqueters forced Clitus out of the hall, while others tried to restrain the king. But presently Clitus made his way back and shouted from the doorway some insulting verses of Euripides, signifying that the army does the work and the general reaps the glory. The king leapt up, snatched a spear from the hand of a guardsman, and transfixed his foster-brother. An agony of remorse followed. For three days the murderer lay in his tent, without sleep or food, cursing himself as the assassin of his friends.

There were more hostilities in western Bactria and western Sogdiana, until at last, overawed by Alexander's success, the Scythians, in order to win his favour, slew Spitamenes, their chief leader. It only remained to reduce the rugged south-eastern regions of Sogdiana. The Sogdian Rock, which commands the pass into these regions, was occupied by Oxyartes, and a band of Macedonian soldiers captured it by an arduous night-climb. Among the captives was Roxane, the daughter of Oxyartes; and the love of Alexander was attracted by the beauty and

manners of the Sogdian maiden. Notwithstanding the adverse comment which such a condescension would excite among the proud Macedonians, he resolved to make her his wife, and, on his return to Bactra, he celebrated the nuptials—a union of Asia and Europe.

About this time an attempt seems to have been made to render uniform the court ceremonial, and enforce upon the Macedonians the obeisances demanded from Persian nobles. Callisthenes, nephew of Aristotle, who was composing a history of Alexander's campaigns, was prominent in opposing the change, and fell into disfavour. One of his duties was to educate the pages, the noble Macedonian youths who attended on the king's person; and over some of these Callisthenes had great influence. One day at a boar-hunt a page named Hermolaus committed the indiscretion of forestalling the king in slaying the beast; and for this breach of etiquette he was flogged and deprived of his horse. Smarting under the dishonour, Hermolaus plotted with some of his comrades to slay Alexander in his sleep. But the plot was betrayed. The conspirators were arrested, and put to death by the sentence of the whole army. Callisthenes was hanged on the charge of being an accomplice.

Before the end of summer, Alexander bade farewell to Bactria and set forth to the conquest of India. In three years since the death of Darius, the western conqueror had subdued Afghanistan, and cast his yoke over the herdsmen of the north as far as the river Jaxartes. He was the first European invader and conqueror of the regions beyond the Oxus, anticipating by more than two thousand years Russia's recent conquests. His next enterprise forestalled our own conquest of north-western India.

SECT. 2. **The Conquest of India.**—In returning to Afghanistan, Alexander seems to have followed the main road from Balkh to Cabul, which, if he had not refounded,

he had at all events renamed, Nicaea. Here he stayed till the middle of November, preparing for further advance. He had left a large detachment of his army in Bactria, but he had enrolled a still larger force—30,000—of the Asiatics of those regions. The host with which he was now to descend upon India must have been at least twice as numerous as the army with which he had crossed the Hellespont seven years before.

During these years Alexander's camp was his court and capital, the political centre of his empire,—a vast city rolling along over mountain and river through Central Asia. Men of all trades and callings were there: craftsmen of every kind, engineers, physicians, and seers; cheapmen and money-changers; literary men, poets, musicians, athletes, jesters; secretaries, clerks, court attendants; a host of women and slaves. A Court Diary was regularly kept—in imitation of the court journal of Persia—by Eumenes of Cardia, who conducted the king's political correspondence.

Alexander had no idea of the shape or extent of the Indian peninsula, and his notion of the Indian conquest was probably confined to the basins of the Cophen (R. Cabul) and the Indus. The stories that were told about the wonders of India excited the curiosity of the Greek invaders. It was a land of righteous folks, of strange beasts and plants, of surpassing wealth in gold and gems. It was supposed to be the ultimate country on the eastern side of the world, bounded by Ocean's stream.

327 B.C. At this time north-western India was occupied by a number of small principalities. The northern districts of the land between the Indus and the Hydaspes (R. Jhelum) were ruled by Omphis, whose capital was at Taxila near the Indus. His brother Abisares was the ruler of Hazara and the adjacent parts of Cashmir. Beyond the Hydaspes was the powerful kingdom of Porus, who held sway as far as the Acesines, which we know as the Chenab, the next of the




FIG. 91.

"Five Rivers." East of the Chenab, in the lands of the Ravee and the Bēas, were other small principalities, and also free "kingless" peoples, who owned no master. These states had no tendency to unity or combination. An invader, therefore, had no common resistance to fear; and he could be assured that many would welcome him out of hatred for their neighbours. The prince of Taxila paid homage to Alexander at Nicaea, and promised his aid in subduing India.

Alexander's direct road from the high plain of Cabul into the Punjab lay along the right bank of the Cophen or Cabul River, through the great gate of the Khyber Pass. But it was impossible to advance to the Indus without securing his communications, and for this purpose it was needful to subjugate the river-valleys to the left of the Cabul, among the huge Western spurs of the Himalaya mountains.

For the purposes of this campaign Alexander divided his army. Hephaestion advanced by the Khyber Pass, with orders to construct a bridge across the Indus. The king, with the rest of the army, including the light troops, plunged into the difficult country north of the river; and the winter was spent in warfare with the hardy hill-folks in the district of the Kunar, in remote Chitral, and in the Panjkar and Swat valleys. After this severe winter campaign the army rested on the west bank of the Indus until spring had begun, and then, with the solemnity of games and sacrifices, crossed the river to Taxila, whose prince and other lesser princes met Alexander with obsequious pomp. A new satrapy, embracing the lands west of the Indus, was now established and entrusted to Philip, son of Machatas; Macedonian garrisons were placed in Taxila and some other places east of the Indus, and Philip was charged with the general command of these troops. This shows the drift of Alexander's policy. The Indus was to be the

eastern boundary of his direct sway ; beyond the Indus, he purposed to create no new provinces, but only to form a system of protected states.

Alexander then marched to the Hydaspes. Prince Porus ^{326 B.C.} having gathered an army from thirty to forty thousand strong, was encamped on the left bank of the river, to contest the crossing. After a march, which was made slow and toilsome by the heavy tropical rain, the invaders encamped on the right bank of the river, and saw the lines of Porus on the opposite shore, protected by a multitude of elephants. It was useless to think of crossing in the face of this host ; for the horses, who could not endure the smell and noise of the elephants, would certainly have been drowned ; and the men would have found it almost impossible to land, amid showers of darts, on the slimy, treacherous edge of the stream. All the fords in the neighbourhood were watched. Alexander adopted measures to deceive and puzzle the enemy. Each night the Macedonian camp was in motion as if for crossing ; each night the Indians stood long hours in the wind and rain. Alexander meanwhile was maturing a plan which he was able to carry out when he had put Porus off his guard.

About sixteen miles upwards from the camp the Hydaspes makes a bend westward, and opposite the jutting angle a thickly-wooded island rose amid the stream, while a dense wood covered the right shore. Here Alexander determined to cross. He caused the boats to be conveyed thither in pieces and remade in the shelter of the wood ; he had prepared skins stuffed with straw. When the time came he led a portion of his troops to the wooded promontory, marching at a considerable distance from the river in order to avoid the observation of the enemy. A sufficient force was left to guard the camp under the command of Craterus. The king arrived at the appointed spot later in the evening, and throughout the wet stormy night he directed the pre-

parations for passing the swollen stream. Before dawn the passage began. Alexander led the way in a barque of thirty oars, and the island was safely passed; but land was hardly reached before they were descried by Indian scouts. At last the whole force was safely landed on the bank, and Alexander ordered his men for the coming battle—the third of the three great battles of his life. It was to be won without any heavy infantry; he had with him only 6000 hypaspists, about 4000 light foot, 5000 cavalry, including 1000 Scythian archers. Taking all the cavalry with him he rode rapidly forward towards the camp of Porus.

But Porus was advancing with his main army, having left a small force to guard the river bank against Craterus. When he reached sandy ground, suitable for the movements of his cavalry and war-chariots, he drew up his line of battle. In front of all he arranged two hundred elephants at intervals of 100 feet, and at some distance behind them his infantry, who numbered 20,000 if not more. On the wings he placed his cavalry—perhaps 4000. Alexander waited for the hypaspists to come up, and drew them up opposite to the elephants. It was impossible to attack in front, for neither horse nor foot could venture in between these beasts which stood like towers of defence, the true strength of the Indian army. The only method was to begin by a cavalry attack on the flank; and Seleucus and the other captains of the infantry were bidden not to advance until they saw that both the horse and the foot of the foe were tumbled into confusion by the flank assault. Alexander determined to concentrate his attack on the left wing; perhaps because it was on the river side, and he would be within easier reach of his troops on the other bank. Accordingly he kept all his cavalry on his right wing. One body was entrusted to Coenus, who bore well to the right, and was ready to strike in the rear, and to deal with the body of horse stationed upon the enemy's right

wing, in case they should come round to assist their comrades on the left. The mounted Scythian archers rode straight against the front of the enemy's cavalry—which was still in column formation, not having had time to open out—and harassed it with showers of arrows; while




FIG. 92.

Alexander himself, with the rest of the heavy cavalry, led the charge upon the flank. Porus—who had committed the fatal mistake of allowing the enemy to take the offensive—brought up his remaining squadrons from the right wing as fast as he could. Then Coenus, who had ridden round close to the river-bank, fell upon them in the rear. The Indians had now to form a double front against the

double foe. Alexander seized the moment to press hard upon the adverse squadrons; they swayed backwards and sought shelter behind the elephants. Then those elephant riders who were on this side of the army drove the beasts against the Macedonian horses; and at the same time the Macedonian footmen rushed forward and attacked the animals which were now turned sideways towards them. But the other elephants of the line were driven into the ranks of the hypaspists, and dealt destruction, trampling down and striking furiously. Heartened by the success of the elephants, the Indian cavalry rallied and charged, but beaten back by the Macedonian horse, who were now formed in a serried mass, they again sought shelter behind the elephantine wall. But many of the beasts were now furious with wounds and beyond control; some had lost their riders; and in the mellay they trampled on friends and foes alike. The Indians suffered most, for they were surrounded and confined to the space in which the animals raged; while the Macedonians could attack the animals on side or rear, and then retreat into the open when they turned to charge. At length, when the elephants grew weary and their charges were feebler, Alexander closed in. He gave the order for the hypaspists to advance in close array shield to shield, while he, reforming his squadrons, dashed in from the side. The enemy's cavalry, already weakened and dislocated, could not withstand the double shock and was cut to pieces. The hypaspists rolled in upon the enemy's infantry, who soon broke and fled. Meanwhile the generals on the other side of the river, Craterus and the rest, discovering that fortune was declaring for Alexander, crossed the river without resistance. Porus, who had shown himself a mediocre general but a most valiant soldier, when he saw most of his forces scattered, his elephants lying dead or straying riderless, did not flee—as Darius had twice fled—but remained fighting, seated on

an elephant of commanding height, until he was wounded in the right shoulder, the only part of his body unprotected by mail. Then he turned round and rode away. Alexander, struck with admiration at his prowess, sent messengers who overtook him and induced him to return. The victor, riding out to meet the old prince, was impressed by his stature and beauty, and asked him how he would fain be treated. "Treat me like a king," said Porus. "For my own sake," said Alexander, "I will do that; ask a boon for thy sake." "That," replied Porus, "containeth all."

And Alexander treated his captive royally. He not only gave him back his kingdom, but largely increased its borders. This royal treatment was inspired by deep policy. He could rest the security of his rule beyond the Indus on no better base than the mutual jealousy of two moderately powerful princes. He had made the lord of Taxila as powerful as was safe; the reinstatement of his rival Porus would be the best guarantee for his loyalty. But on either side of the Hydaspes, close to the scene of the battle, two cities were founded, which would serve as garrisons in the subject land. On the right hand, the city of Bucephala, named after Alexander's steed, which died here—probably shortly before the battle—of old age and weariness; on the left, Nicaea, the city of victory.

Leaving Craterus to build the cities, Alexander crossed the Acesines, more than a mile and a half broad, into the territory of a namesake and nephew of Porus, who fled eastward. Alexander left Hephaestion to march southward and subdue the land of the younger Porus, as well as the free communities between the two rivers. The news that the Cathaeans, a free and warlike people, were determined to give him battle, diverted Alexander from the pursuit. He stormed their chief town Sangala, and all their land was likewise placed under the lordship of Porus. Thus of the four river-bounded tracts which compose the Punjab, the

largest, between Indus and Jehlum, belonged to Omphis of Taxila, while the three others, between Jehlum and Bëas, were assigned to Porus.

Alexander now advanced to the Hyphasis, or Bëas, and reached it higher up than the point where it joins the Sutlej. It was destined to be the landmark of his utmost march. He wished to go farther and explore the lands of the Ganges, but an unlooked-for obstacle occurred. The Macedonians were worn out with years of hard campaigning, and weary of this endless rolling on into the unknown. Their numbers had dwindled; the remnant of them were battered and grown old before their time. All yearned back to their homeland in the west. On the banks of the Hyphasis the crisis came; the men resolved to go no farther. At a meeting of the officers which Alexander summoned, Coenus was the spokesman of the general feeling. The king retired to his tent, and for two days refused to see any of his Companions, hoping that their hearts would be softened. But the Macedonians did not relent or go back from their purpose. On the third day, Alexander offered sacrifices preliminary to crossing the river, declaring that he would advance himself; but the victims gave unfavourable signs. Then the king yielded. When his will was made known, the way-worn veterans burst into wild joy; the more part of them shed tears. They crowded round the royal tent, blessing the unconquered king, that he had permitted himself to be conquered for once, by his Macedonians. On the banks of the Hyphasis Alexander erected twelve towering altars to the twelve great gods of Olympus, as a thankoffering for having led him safely within reach of the world's end. For in Alexander's conception the Ganges discharged its waters into the ocean which bounded the earth on the east, as the Atlantic bounded it on the west of the world.

Alexander is often represented as a madman, impelled

by an insatiable lust of conquest for conquest's sake. But if the form and feature of the earth were what he pictured it to be, twenty years would have sufficed to make his empire conterminous with its limits. He might have ruled from the eastern to the western ocean, from the ultimate bounds of Scythia to the shores of Libya; he might have brought to pass in the three continents an universal peace, and dotted the habitable globe with his Greek cities. The advance to the Indus was no mere wanton aggression, but was necessary to establish secure routes for trade with India, which was at the mercy of the wild hill-tribes; and the subjugation of the Punjab was a necessity for securing the Indus frontier. The solid interests of commerce underlay the ambitions of the Macedonian conqueror.

Alexander retraced his steps to the Hydaspes, on his way picking up Hephaestion, who had founded a new city on the banks of the Acesines. On the Hydaspes, Craterus had not only built the two cities at the scene of the great battle, but had also prepared a large fleet of transports, which was to carry part of the army down the river to reach the Indus and the ocean. The fleet was placed under the command of Nearchus; the rest of the army, divided into two parts, marched along either bank, under Hephaestion and Craterus.

As they advanced, the only formidable resistance that they encountered was from the free and warlike tribe of the Malli. Having routed a large host of these Indians, Alexander pursued them to their chief city, which is possibly to be sought near the site of the modern Multan. Here he met with a grave adventure. The city had been easily taken, and the Indians had retreated into the citadel. Two ladders were brought to scale the earthen wall, but it was found hard to place them beneath the shower of missiles from above. Impatient at the delay, Alexander seized a ladder and climbed up under the cover of a

shield. Peucestas, who bore the sacred buckler from the temple of Ilion, and Leonnatus followed, and Abreas ascended the other ladder. When the king reached the battlement, he hurled down or slew the Indians who were posted at that spot. The hypaspists, when they saw their king standing upon the wall, a mark for the whole garrison of the fortress, made a rush for the ladders, and both ladders broke under the weight of the crowd. Only those three—Peucestas, Leonnatus, and Abreas—reached the wall before the ladders broke. His friends implored Alexander to leap down; he answered their cries by leaping down among the enemy. He alighted on his feet. With his back to the wall he stood alone against the throng of foes, who recognised the Great King. With his sword he cut down their leader and some others who ventured to rush at him; he felled two more with stones; and the rest, not daring to approach, pelted him with missiles. Meanwhile his three companions had cleared the wall of its defenders and leapt down to help their king. Abreas fell slain by a dart. Then Alexander himself received a wound in the breast. For a space he stood and fought, but at last sank on his shield fainting through loss of blood. Peucestas stood over him with the holy shield of Troy, Leonnatus guarded him on the other side, until rescue came. Having no ladders, the Macedonians had driven pegs into the wall, and a few had clambered up as best they could and flung themselves down into the fray. Some of these succeeded in opening one of the gates, and then the fort was taken. No man, woman, or child in the place was spared by the infuriated soldiers, who thought that their king was dead. But, though the wound was grave, Alexander recovered. The rumour of his death reached the camp where the main army was waiting at the junction of the Ravee with the Chenab, and it produced deep consternation and despair. Reassuring letters were not be-

lieved; so Alexander caused himself to be carried to the banks of the Ravee and conveyed by water down to the camp. When he drew near, the canopy which sheltered his bed in the stern of the vessel was removed. The soldiers, still doubting, thought it was his corpse they saw, until the barque drew close to the bank and he waved his hand. Then the host shouted for joy. When he was carried ashore, he was lifted for a moment on horseback, that he might be the better seen of all; and then he walked a few steps for their greater reassurance.

This adventure is an extreme case of Alexander's besetting weakness, which has been illustrated in many other of his actions. In the excitement of battle, amid the ring of arms, he was apt to forget his duties as a leader. To have endangered his own safety was a crime against the whole army.

The Malli made a complete submission; and when Alexander had recovered from his wound, the fleet sailed downward, and the Indian tribes submitted, presenting to the conqueror the characteristic products of India—gems, fine draperies, tame lions and tigers. At the place where the united stream of the four lesser rivers joins the mighty flow of the Indus, the foundations were laid of a new Alexandria. The next stage of the southward advance was the capital town of the Sogdi, which lay upon the river. Alexander refounded it as a Greek colony, and built wharfs; it was known as the Sogdian Alexandria, and was destined to be the residence of a southern satrapy which was to extend to the sea-coast. It is impossible to identify the sites of these cities, because the face of the Punjab has completely changed, through the alteration of the courses of its rivers, since the days of Alexander.

The principalities of the rich and populous land of Sind were distinguished from the states of the north by the great political power enjoyed by the Brahmans. Under

the influence of this caste, the princes either defied Alexander or, if they submitted at first, speedily rebelled. Thus it was nearly midsummer when the king reached Patala, near the Indian Ocean. On the tidings of an insurrection in Arachosia, he had dispatched Craterus with a considerable portion of the army to march through the Bolan Pass into southern Afghanistan and put down the revolt. Alexander himself designed to march through Baluchistan, and Craterus was ordered to meet him in Kirman, near the entrance of the Persian Gulf. Another division of the host was to go by sea to the mouth of the Tigris. The king fixed upon Patala to be for the Indian



FIG. 93.—Coin of Alexander. Obverse: head of Heracles, in lion's skin. Reverse: eagle-bearing Zeus, and prow of galley in field [legend: AAEΞANΔPOY].

empire what the most famous of his Alexandrias was for Egypt. He charged Hephaestion with the task of fortifying the citadel and building an ample harbour. Then he sailed southward himself to visit the southern ocean. He sacrificed to Poseidon; he poured drink-offerings from a golden cup to the Nereids and Dioscuri, and to Thetis the mother of his ancestor Achilles, and then hurled the cup into the waves. This ceremony inaugurated his plan of opening a seaway for commerce between the West and the Far East. The enterprise of discovering this seaway was entrusted to Nearchus. Alexander started on his land-march in the early autumn, but Nearchus and the fleet were to wait till October, in order to be helped forward by the eastern monsoons.

SECT. 3. **Alexander's Return to Babylon.**—No enterprise of Alexander was so useless, and none so fatal, as the journey through the desert of Gedrosia, the land which is now known as the Mekran. His guiding motive in choosing this route was to make provisions for the safety of the fleet, to dig wells and store food at certain places along the coast. The march through the Mekran and the voyage of Nearchus were interdependent parts of the same adventure; and so timid were the mariners of those days that the voyage into unknown waters seemed far more formidable than the journey through the waste.

With perhaps thirty thousand men, Alexander passed the mountain wall which protects the Indus delta, and reduced the Oritae to subjection before he descended into the waste of Gedrosia. The army moved painfully through the desert, where it was often almost impossible to step through the deep sinking sand. Alexander himself is said to have trudged on foot and shared all the hardships of the way. At length the waste was crossed; the losses of that terrible Gedrosian journey exceeded the losses of all Alexander's campaigns.

Having rested at Pura, the king proceeded to Kirman, where he was joined by Craterus, who had suppressed the revolt in Arachosia. Presently news arrived that the fleet had reached the Kirman coast, and soon Nearchus arrived at the camp and relieved Alexander's anxiety. They had been weather-bound and had lost three ships; but the king was overjoyed that they had arrived at all. Nearchus was dismissed to complete the voyage by sailing up the Persian Gulf and the Pasitigris River to Susa; Hephæstion was sent to make his way thither along the coast; while Alexander himself marched through the hills by Persepolis and Pasargadae.

It was high time for Alexander to return. There was hardly a satrap, Persian or Macedonian, in any land, who

had not oppressed his province by violence and rapacity. Many satraps were deposed or put to death; and one guilty minister fled at Alexander's approach. This was the treasurer Harpalus, who had squandered his master's money in riotous living at Babylon, and deemed it prudent to move westward. Taking a large sum of money, he went to Cilicia, and hiring a bodyguard of 6000 mercenaries, he lived in royal state at Tarsus. On Alexander's return he fled to Greece, where we shall meet him presently.

Having punished with a stern hand the misrule of his satraps, Macedonian and Persian alike, Alexander began to carry out schemes which he had formed. He had unbarred and unveiled the Orient to the knowledge and commerce of the Mediterranean peoples, but his aim was to do much more than this; it was no less than to fuse Asia and Europe into a homogeneous unity. He devised various means for compassing this object. He proposed to transplant Greeks and Macedonians into Asia, and Asiatics into Europe, as permanent settlers. This plan had indeed been partly realised by the foundation of his numerous mixed cities in the Far East. The second means was the promotion of intermarriages between Persians and Macedonians, and this policy was inaugurated in magnificent fashion at Susa. The king himself espoused Statira, the daughter of Darius; his friend Hephaestion took her sister; and a large number of Macedonian officers wedded the daughters of Persian grandees. Of the general mass of the Macedonians 10,000 are said to have followed the example of their officers and taken Asiatic wives; all those were liberally rewarded by Alexander. It is to be noticed that Alexander, already wedded to the princess of Sogdiana, adopted the polygamous custom of Persia; and he even married another royal lady, Parysatis, daughter of Ochus. These marriages were purely dictated by policy; for Alexander never came under the influence of women.

But the most effective means for bringing the two races together was the institution of military service on a perfect equality. With this purpose in view, Alexander, not long after the death of Darius, had arranged that in all the eastern provinces the native youth should be drilled and disciplined in Macedonian fashion and taught to use the Macedonian weapons. In fact, Hellenic military schools were established in every province, and at the end of five years an army of 30,000 Hellenized barbarians was at the Great King's disposition. At his summons this army gathered at Susa, and its arrival created a natural, though unreasonable, feeling of discontent among the Macedonians, who divined that Alexander aimed at making himself independent of their services. His schemes of transforming the character of his army were also indicated by the enlistment of Persians and other Orientals in the Macedonian cavalry regiments.

Alexander left Susa for Ecbatana in spring. He sailed ^{324 B.C.} down the river Pasitigris to the Persian Gulf, surveyed part of the coast, and sailed up the Tigris, removing the weirs which the Persians had constructed to hinder navigation. The army joined him on the way, and he halted at Opis. Here he held an assembly of the Macedonians, and formally discharged all those—about 10,000 in number—whom old age or wounds had rendered unfit for warfare, promising to make them comfortable for life. The smouldering discontent found a voice now. The cry was raised, "Discharge us all." Alexander leapt down from the platform into the shouting throng; he pointed out thirteen of the most forward rioters, and bade his hypaspists seize them and put them to death. The rest were cowed. Amid a deep silence the king remounted the platform, and in a bitter speech he discharged the whole army. Then he retired into his palace, and on the third day summoned the Persian and Median nobles and appointed them to posts of honour

and trust which had hitherto been filled by Macedonians. The names of the Macedonian regiments were transferred to the new barbarian army. When they heard this, the Macedonians, who still lingered in their quarters, miserable and uncertain whether to go or stay, appeared before the gates of the palace. They laid down their arms submissively and implored admission to the king's presence. Alexander came out, and there was a tearful reconciliation, which was sealed by sacrifices and feasts.

The summer and early winter were spent at the Median capital. Here a sorrow, the greatest that could befall him, befell Alexander. Hephaestion fell ill, languished for seven days, and died. Alexander fasted three days, and the whole empire went into mourning.

Alexander set out for Babylon towards the end of the year, and on his way ambassadors from far lands came to his camp. The Bruttians, Lucanians, and Etruscans, the Carthaginians and the Phoenician colonies of Spain, Celts, Scythians of the Black Sea, Libyans, and Ethiopians had all sent envoys to court the friendship of the monarch who seemed already to be lord of half the earth.

SECT. 4. Preparations for an Arabian Expedition. Alexander's Death.—Ever since the successful voyage of Nearchus, Alexander was bent on the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia. His eastern empire was not complete so long as this peninsula lay outside it. The possession of this country of sand, however, was only an incident in the grand range of his plans. His visit to India and the voyage of Nearchus had given him new ideas; he had risen to the conception of making the southern ocean another great commercial sea like the Mediterranean. He hoped to establish a regular trade-route from the Indus to the Tigris and Euphrates, and thence to the canals which connected the Nile with the Red Sea. Alexander destined Babylon to be the capital of his

empire, and doubtless it was a wise choice. But its character was now to be transformed. It was to become a naval station and a centre of maritime commerce. Alexander set about the digging of a great harbour, with room for a thousand keels.

All was in readiness at length for the expedition to the south. On a day in early June a royal banquet was given in honour of Nearchus and his seamen, shortly about to start on their oceanic voyage. Two nights of carousal ended in a fever which held him for six days, while the expedition's departure was postponed for another and yet another day. Then his condition grew worse, and he was carried back to the palace, where he won a little sleep, but the fever did not abate. When his officers came to him they found him speechless; the disease became more violent, and a rumour spread among the Macedonian soldiers that Alexander was dead. They rushed clamouring to the door of the palace, and the bodyguards were forced to admit them. One by one they filed past the bed of their young king, but he could not speak to them; he could only greet each by slightly raising his head and signing with his eyes. Peucestas and some others of the Companions passed the night in the temple of Serapis and asked the god whether they should convey the sick man into the temple, if haply he might be cured there by divine help. A voice warned them not to bring him, but to let him remain where he lay. He died on a June evening, before the thirty-third year of his age was fully told.

His sudden death was no freak of fate or fortune; it was a natural consequence of his character and his deeds. Into thirteen years he had compressed the energies of many lifetimes. Sparing of himself neither in battle nor at the symposion, he was doomed to die young.

SECT. 5. **Greece under Macedonia.**—The tide of the world's history swept us away from the shores of

Greece; we could not pause to see what was happening in the little states which were looking with mixed emotions at the spectacle of their own civilisation making its way over the earth. Alexander's victory at the gates of Issus and his ensuing supremacy by sea had taught many of the Greeks the lesson of caution; the Confederacy of the Isthmus had sent congratulations and a golden crown to the conqueror; and when, a twelvemonth later, the Spartan king Agis renewed the war against Macedonia, he got no help or countenance outside the Peloponnesus. Agis induced the Arcadians, except Megalopolis, the Achaeans, and the Eleians, to join him; and the chief object of the allies was to capture Megalopolis. Antipater, as soon as the situation in Thrace set him free, marched southward to the relief of Megalopolis, and easily crushed the allies in a battle fought hard by. Agis fell fighting, and there was no further resistance.

331 B.C.

So long as Darius lived, many of the Greeks cherished secret hopes that fortune might yet turn. But on the news of his death such hopes expired, and it was not till Alexander's return from India that anything happened to trouble the peace.

For Athens the twelve years between the fall of Thebes and the death of Alexander were an interval of singular well-being. The conduct of public affairs was in the hands of the two most honourable statesmen of the day, Phocion and Lycurgus; and Demosthenes was sufficiently clear-sighted not to embarrass, but, when needful, to support, the policy of peace. Phocion probably did not grudge him the signal triumph which he won over his old rival, Aeschines; for this triumph had only a personal, and not a political, significance. Ctesiphon had proposed to honour Demosthenes, both for his general services to the state and especially for his liberality in contributing from his private purse towards the repair of the city-walls, by

crowning him publicly in the theatre with a crown of ^{330 B.C.} gold. The Council passed a resolution to this effect; but Aeschines lodged an accusation against the proposer, on the ground that the motion violated the *Graphé Paranómōn*. In a speech of the highest ability Aeschines reviewed the public career of Demosthenes, to prove that he was a traitor and responsible for all the disasters of Athens. The reply of Demosthenes, a masterpiece of splendid oratory, captivated the judges; and Aeschines, not winning one-fifth part of their votes, left Athens and disappeared from politics.

The Macedonian empire had not yet lasted long enough to turn the traffic of the Mediterranean into new channels, and Athens still enjoyed great commercial prosperity. Although peace was her professed policy, she did not neglect to make provision, in case opportunity should come round, for regaining her sovereignty on sea. Money was spent on the navy, which is said to have been increased to well-nigh 400 galleys, and on new ship-sheds. The man who was mainly responsible for this naval expenditure was Lycurgus. In recent years considerable changes had been made in the constitution of the financial offices. Eubulus had administered as the president of the Theoric Fund. But now we find the control of the expenditure in the hands of a Minister of the Public Revenue, who was elected by the people and held office for four years, from one Panathenaic festival to another. Lycurgus held this post. The post practically included the functions of a minister of public works, and the ministry of Lycurgus was distinguished by building enterprises. He constructed the Panathenaic stadion on the southern bank of the Ilissus. He rebuilt the Lycean gymnasium, where in these years the philosopher Aristotle used to take his morning and evening "walks," teaching his "peripatetic" disciples. But the most memorable work of Lycurgus was the

reconstruction of the theatre of Dionysus. It was he who built the rows of marble benches, climbing up the steep side of the Acropolis, as we see them to-day.

Thus Athens discreetly attended to her material well-being, and courted the favour of the gods, and the only distress which befell her was a dearth of corn. But on the return of Alexander to Susa, two things happened which imperilled the tranquillity of Greece. Alexander promised the Greek exiles—there were more than 20,000 of them—to procure their return to their native cities. 324 B.C. He sent Nicanor to the great congregation of Hellas at the Olympian festival, to order the states to receive back their banished citizens. Only two states objected—Athens and Aetolia; and they objected because, if the edict were enforced, they would be robbed of ill-gotten gains. The Aetolians had possessed themselves of Oeniadae and driven out its Acarnanian owners. The position of Athens in Samos was similar; the Samians would now be restored to their own lands, and the Athenian settlers would have to go. Both Athens and Aetolia were prepared to resist.

SECT. 6. The Episode of Harpalus and the Greek Revolt.—Meanwhile an incident had happened which might induce some of the patriots to hope that Alexander's empire rested on slippery foundations. Harpalus had arrived off the coast of Attica with 5000 talents, a body of mercenaries, and thirty ships. He had come to excite a revolt against his master. Refused admission with his force, he came alone to Athens with a sum of about 700 talents. After a while messages arrived both from Macedonia and from Philoxenus, Alexander's financial minister in western Asia, demanding his surrender. The Athenians, on the proposal of Demosthenes, adopted a clever device. They arrested Harpalus, seizing his treasure, and said that they would surrender him to officers expressly sent by Alexander, but declined to give him

up to Philoxenus or Antipater. Harpalus escaped, and was shortly afterwards murdered by one of his fellow-adventurers.

The stolen money was deposited in the Acropolis, under the charge of specially-appointed commissioners, of whom Demosthenes was one. Suddenly it was discovered that only 350 talents were actually in the Acropolis. Charges immediately circulated against the influential politicians, that the other 350 talents had been received in bribes by them before the money was deposited in the citadel. The court of Areopagus satisfied themselves that a number of leading statesmen had received considerable sums. Demosthenes appeared in their report as the recipient of twenty talents. He confessed the misdemeanor himself, and sought to excuse it by the subterfuge that he had taken it to repay himself for twenty talents which he had advanced to the Theoric Fund. But why should he repay himself, without any authorisation, out of Alexander's money, for a debt owed him by the Athenian state? The charges against Demosthenes were twofold: he had taken money, and he had culpably omitted to report the amount of the deposit and the neglect of those who were set to guard it. He was condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents. Unable to pay it, he was imprisoned, but presently effected his escape.


If Alexander had lived, the Athenians might have persuaded him to let them remain in occupation of Samos; for he was always disposed to be lenient to Athens. When the tidings of his death came, men almost refused to credit it; the orator Demades forcibly said, "If he were indeed dead, the whole world would have smelt of his corpse." It did not seem rash to strike for freedom in the unsettled condition of things after his death. Athens revolted from Macedonia; she was joined by 323 B. C. Aetolia and many states in northern Greece, and she

secured the services of a band of 8000 discharged mercenaries who had just returned from Alexander's army. One of their captains, the Athenian, Leosthenes, occupied Thermopylae, and near that pass the united Greeks gained a slight advantage over Antipater, who had marched southward as soon as he could gather his troops together. No state in north Greece except Boeotia remained true to Macedonia. The regent shut himself in the strong hill-city of Lamia, which stands over against the pass of Thermopylae under a spur of Othrys; and here he was besieged during the winter by Leosthenes. These successes had gained some adherents to the cause in the Peloponnesus; and, if the Greeks had been stronger at sea, that cause might have triumphed, at least for a while. In spring the arrival of Leonnatus, governor of Helle-spontine Phrygia, at the head of an army, raised the siege of Lamia. The Greeks marched into Thessaly to meet the new army before it united with Antipater; a battle was fought, in which Leonnatus was wounded to death. Antipater arrived the next day, and, joining forces with the defeated army, withdrew into Macedonia, to await Craterus, who was approaching from the east. When 322 B.C. Craterus arrived, they entered Thessaly together, and in an engagement at Crannon, in which the losses on both sides were light, the Macedonians had a slight advantage. This battle apparently decided the war, but the true cause which hindered the Greeks from continuing the struggle was not the insignificant defeat at Crannon, but the want of unity among themselves, the want of a leader whom they entirely trusted. They were forced to make terms singly, each state on its own behoof.

Athens submitted when Antipater advanced into Boeotia and prepared to invade Attica. She paid dearly for her attempt to win back her power. Antipater like Alexander had no soft place in his heart for the memories

and traditions of Athens. He saw only that, unless strong and stern measures were taken, Macedonia would not be safe against a repetition of the rising which he had suppressed. He therefore imposed three conditions, which Phocion and Demades were obliged to accept: that the democratic constitution should be modified by a property qualification; that a Macedonian garrison should be lodged in Munychia; and that the agitators, Demosthenes, Hypereides, and their friends, should be surrendered.

Demosthenes had exerted eloquence in gaining support for the cause of the allies in the Peloponnesus, and his efforts had been rewarded by his recall to Athens. As soon as the city had submitted, he and the other orators fled. Hypereides with two companions sought refuge in the temple of Aeacus at Aegina, whence they were taken to Antipater and put to death. Demosthenes fled to the temple of Poseidon in the island of Calauria. When the messengers of Antipater appeared and summoned him Oct. 322 B.C. forth, he swallowed poison, which he had concealed, according to one story, in a pen, and was thus delivered from falling into the hands of the executioner.



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

B.C.

3000 (or 3500)	Early period of Aegean civilisation ; stone and copper age.
-2000	
2000-1000	Later period of Aegean civilisation ; bronze age (" Mycenaean " in wider sense).
1600-1100	Limits of Sixth (Homeric) City of Troy. Bloom of Mycenae.
1300-1000	Achaean colonisation. Fall of Troy. Beginnings of Ionian colonisation. Dorian conquest of Eastern Peloponnesus. Beginnings of Epic poetry.
1000-900	Continuation of Ionian colonisation. Dorian colonisation of Asia Minor. Invention of the Greek Alphabet.
900-800	" Homer " of Chios composes the <i>Iliad</i> . Beginnings of the city-state.
800-700	Rise of aristocracies throughout Greece. Beginnings of Greek colonisation.
[776	[Traditional date of First Olympiad.
735	" " foundation of Naxos (Sicily).
734	" " " Corcyra.
734	" " " Syracuse.
728	" " " Catane and Leontini.
721	" " " Sybaris.
707	" " " Taras.
703]	" " " Croton.
709	King Sargon of Assyria sets up stêlê in Cyprus.
c. 700	Hesiod.
683-2	List of annual archons at Athens begins.
[668	Traditional date of battle of Hysiae, in which Argos defeats Sparta.

- B.C.
- 664 Traditional date of ancient sea-battle of Corinth with Coreyra.]
- 660 Foundation of Byzantium.
- 650-600 Age of lawgivers in Greece.
Rise of tyrannies in Ionia. Foundation of tyrannies in Sicyon, Corinth, and Megara.
- c. 632 Cylon attempts to seize tyranny at Athens.
- 630-600 Approximate limits of Spartan conquest of Messenia.
- c. 621 Legislation of Dracon at Athens.
- c. 600 Sappho and Alcaeus flourish at Mytilene.
Periander tyrant of Corinth.
- 594-3 Archonship of Solon. *Seisachtheia*.
- 593-1 (?) Continuation of Solon's legislation.
- 590-89 Sacred War against Crisa.
Cleisthenes of Sicyon flourishes.
- c. 570 Athenian conquest of Salamis.
- 560 Croesus succeeds to throne of Lydia.
- c. 560-50 War of Sparta with Tegea.
- 561-60 Pisistratus seizes tyranny.
- 556-5 First exile of Pisistratus.
- 550-49 ? Restoration of Pisistratus ; and his second exile.
- 546 Cyrus king of Persia conquers Lydia, and captures Sardis.
- 546-5 Persian conquest of Asiatic Greeks.
- 540-39 Second restoration of Pisistratus.
- 528-7 Death of Pisistratus.
- 526 Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, abandons alliance with Amasis and joins Persia.
- 525 Persian conquest of Egypt.
- 522 Death of Cambyses king of Persia.
- 521 Accession of Darius.
- 514 Conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton.
- c. 512 First European expedition of Darius : conquest of Thrace.
- 510 Fall of the Pisistratid tyranny. Spartans in Attica.
- 508-7 Archonship of Isagoras. Spartans under Cleomenes invade Attica ; besieged in the Acropolis. Beginning of reforms of Cleisthenes.
- 506 Athenians defeat (1) Boeotians, (2) Chalcidians : acquire Chalcidian plain.
- 499 Outbreak of Ionic revolt.
- c. 498 Athens at war with Aegina.
- c. 497 Ionians and allies at Sardis : burning of Sardis.
- 496 (?) Revolt of Thrace ; Scythians drive Miltiades from Chersonese.

- B.C.
 494 Battle of Lade ; Persians capture Miletus.
 c. 494 Battle of Sêpeia (Spartans under Cleomenes defeat Argives).
 492 Mardonius subdues Thrace and Macedonia.
 c. 491 Gelon becomes tyrant of Gela.
 490 Expedition of the Persians under Datis of Greece. Destruction of Eretria. Battle of Marathon.
 489 Expedition of Miltiades to Paros.
 487 War of Athens with Aegina.
 487-6 Archons begin to be appointed by lot. Strategoi supersede the Polemarch.
 486-5 Egypt revolts against Persia.
 485 Death of Darius. Accession of Xerxes.
 484-3 Persia recovers control of Egypt.
 483 Persians hew canal through Mount Athos.
 482 Ostracism of Aristides.
 Increase of Athenian fleet.
 481 Xerxes comes down to Sardis.
 480 Spring : Athens recalls ostracised citizens.
 August : Xerxes enters Greece. Battles of Artemisium and Thermopylae.
 September : Battle of Salamis.
 Carthaginians invade Sicily. Battle of Himera.
 479 Mardonius in Attica. August : Battle of Plataea ; and battle of Mycale. Ionians revolt from Persia.
 478 Athenians capture Sestos.
 Death of Gelon : his brother Hieron succeeds to his power.
 478-7 Foundation of Confederacy of Delos (winter).
 478-6 Fortification of Athens.
 477-6 Pausanias at Byzantium ; driven out by Cimon.
 476-5 Cimon captures Eion.
 474-3 Cimon conquers Scyrus.
 472-1 Athenians reduce Carystus. Ostracism of Themistocles.
 471-70 Flight of Themistocles.
 c. 469 Revolt and reduction of Naxos.
 468 Carian and Lycian expedition of Cimon.
 Battle of the Eurymedon.
 467 Death of Hieron.
 465 Revolt of Thasos.
 464 Earthquake at Sparta. Revolt of helots. Siege of Ithome.
 Accession of Artaxerxes to throne of Persia.
 463-1 Ephialtes influential at Athens. The Areopagus deprived of its powers.

B.C.

- 462-60 Pay introduced at Athens for the judges of the heliea.
Influence of Pericles begins.
- 461 Ostracism of Cimon.
- 461-60 Alliance of Athens and Argos.
- 459 Athens wins Megara. Long Walls of Megara built. Athenian expedition to Egypt.
Capture of Ithome. Messenians settled at Naupactus.
Capture of Memphis.
- 458 Building of Long Walls of Athens.
- 457 Lacedaemonian expedition to Phocis and Boeotia. Battle of Tanagra.
Athenian conquest of Boeotia (battle of Oenophyta; autumn).
- 457-6 Athenian conquest of Aegina.
- 456-5 Expedition of Tolmides to Corinthian Gulf.
- 454 Catastrophe of Egyptian expedition.
- 454-3 Treasury of confederacy of Delos transferred from Delos to Athens.
- 452-1 Thirty years' Peace between Argos and Lacedaemon. Five years' Truce between Athenians and Peloponnesians.
- 450-49 Cimon in Cyprus. Death of Cimon.
- 448 Peace with Persia. Sacred war. Athens invites the Greeks to restore the temples.
- 447 Athens loses Boeotia (battle of Coronea). Cleruchies sent to the Chersonese, Euboea, etc.
- 447-6 Revolt and reduction of Euboea. Athens loses Megara.
- 446-5 Thirty years' Peace between Athens and Peloponnesians.
- 442 Ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias.
- 440 Revolt of Samos, and Byzantium.
- 439 Reduction of Samos.
- 436-5 Sedition at Epidamnus.
- 435 Sea-victory of Corcyra over Corinth (spring).
- 433 Defensive alliance of Athens with Corcyra. Battle of Sybota (autumn).
- 433-2 Revolt of Potidaea (winter).
- 432 The "Megarian decree" passed at Athens (autumn).
- 432-1 Assemblies at Sparta decide on war.
- 431 *First year of the Peloponnesian War.*—Theban attack on Plataea (March). First Peloponnesian invasion of Attica (May). Athens expels Aeginetans from Aegina.
- 430 *Second year of the War.*—Outbreak of plague at Athens. Second invasion of Attica. Pericles deposed from strategia,

B.C.

- tried, fined, and reappointed strategos. Phormio operates in the west: captures Amphiloehian Argos. Surrender of Potidaea.
- 429 *Third year of the War.*—Peloponnesians besiege Plataea. Sea-victories of Phormio. Death of Pericles (autumn).
- 428 *Fourth year of the War.*—Third invasion of Attica. Revolt of Mytilene.
- 427 *Fifth year of the War.*—Fourth invasion of Attica. Surrender of Mytilene. Surrender of Plataea. Civil war breaks out in Corcyra.
- 426 *Sixth year of the War.*
- 425 *Seventh year of the War.*—Fifth invasion of Attica. Occupation of Pylos; and capture of Spartans in Sphacteria. Triumph of the democracy in Corcyra.
- 424 *Eighth year of the War.*—Athens captures Nisaea, with the Long Walls of Megara, and Cythera. Athenian invasion of Boeotia; battle of Delion. Brasidas in Thrace. Revolt of Acanthus, Amphipolis, and other cities. Banishment of Thucydides, the historian.
- 423 *Ninth year of the War.*—Negotiations for peace. One year's truce (March). Leontini annexed by Syracuse.
- 422 *Tenth year of the War.*—Battle of Amphipolis. Peace negotiations.
- 421 Peace of Nicias (March). *Peace of Aristophanes.*
- 421-20 Defensive alliance between Athens and Sparta.
- 420 Spartan alliance with Boeotia (Feb.). Alliance of Athens with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea (c. April). Olympic games; victory of Alcibiades in chariot-race.
- 418 Battle of Mantinea. Argos forms alliance with Sparta.
- 417 Ostracism of Hyperbolus.
- 416 Conquest of Melos. Embassy of Segesta to Athens.
- 415 Mutilation of the Hermae at Athens. Athenian expedition to Sicily. Recall of Alcibiades.
- 414 Siege of Syracuse. Gylippus arrives in Sicily.
- 413 Spartans occupy Decelea. Second Athenian expedition to Sicily. Great battle in the Syracusan Harbour (Sept. 9). Disaster of the Athenians.
- 412 Revolt of Athenian allies. Treaty of Miletus (between Sparta and Persia). Alcibiades leaves Sparta.
- 411 Assembly at Colonus and provision made for a new Constitution (May). Council of Four Hundred comes into office (early in June), and governs till September.

B.C.

- Revolt of Euboea (Sept.). Four Hundred overthrown and Polity established (Sept.). Battle of Cynossema.
- 410 Battle of Cyzicus. Restoration of Democracy at Athens.
- 409 Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Destruction of Selinus and Himera.
- 408 Athens recovers Chalcedon and Byzantium.
- 406 Battle of Arginusae. Trial of the Generals (c. November).
- 405 Lysander navarch. Cyrus called to Susa. Battle of Aegospotami (end of summer).
Dionysius becomes tyrant of Syracuse; and makes peace with Carthage.
- 404 Surrender of Athens. Long Walls pulled down (April).
Rule of the Thirty. Thrasybulus seizes Phyle (Dec.).
- 403 Thrasybulus seizes Piraeus. Battle of Munychia. Fall of Thirty (Sept.).
- 401 Expedition of Cyrus. Battle of Cunaxa (summer).
- 399 Death of Socrates.
- 396 First campaign of Agesilaus in Phrygia (autumn).
- 395 Campaign of Agesilaus in Lydia. Death of Tissaphernes.
Second campaign of Agesilaus in Phrygia. Battle of Haliartus and death of Lysander.
- 395-4 Confederation of Athens, Thebes, etc., against Sparta.
- 394 Battle of Corinth (July). Battle of Cnidus (Aug.). Battle of Coronea (Aug.).
- 390 Iphicrates gains a victory over Spartan hoplites.
- 387-6 The King's Peace.
- 382 Spartans seize citadel of Thebes (summer).
- 379-8 Spartans expelled from Theban citadel (winter). Raid of Sphodrias.
- 378 Alliance of Athens with Thebes.
- 378-7 Foundation of Second Athenian Confederacy.
- 377 Boeotia invaded by Agesilaus. Defeat of Phoebeidas. Mausolus becomes satrap of Caria.
- 376 Battle of Naxos.
- 374 Peace between Athens and Sparta.
- 371 Peace of Callias (June). Battle of Leuctra (July).
- 371-69 Foundation of Arcadian League, and of Megalopolis.
- 370 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Rebuilding of Mantinea.
- 370-69 First Boeotian invasion of Peloponnesus.
- 369 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Foundation of Messene (first months). Alliance of Athens and Sparta (spring). Second


- B.C.
- Boeotian invasion of Peloponnesus. First Thessalian expedition of Pelopidas.
- 368 Heraea and Orchomenus join Arcadian League. Congress of Delphi (summer). Tearless Battle. Second Thessalian expedition of Pelopidas, and his captivity.
- 367 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Greek envoys at Susa. Second expedition to rescue Pelopidas. Death of Dionysius I.
- 366 Third Boeotian invasion of Peloponnesus. Alliance of Athens with Arcadia. Death of Lycomedes.
- 365 War breaks out between Arcadia and Elis.
- 364 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Third Thessalian expedition of Pelopidas. Battle of Cynoscephalae. Pisatans celebrate Olympic games; battle in the Altis.
- 363 Timotheus recovers Byzantium.
- 362 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Battle of Mantinea.
- 361-60 Death of Agesilaus (?).
- 358 Victories of Philip over Paeonians and Illyrians.
- 357 Athens recovers the Chersonese and Euboea. Philip captures Amphipolis. Revolt of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes from Athens. Dion returns to Sicily.
- 356 Illyrian victory of Philip. Phocians seize Delphi.
- 356-5 Philip captures Pydna and Potidaea. Birth of Alexander.
- 354 Battle of Neon. Death of Philomelus. Murder of Dion.
- 353 Philip captures Methone. Power of Onomarchus in Thessaly. Eubulus hinders Philip from attacking Phocis. Death of Mausolus.
- 352 Cersobleptes of Thrace submits to Macedon.
- 351 Demosthenes' *First Philippic*.
- 349 Philip reduces Chalcidice. Alliance of Athens with Olynthus. Demosthenes' *Olynthiacs*.
- 348 Euboea acknowledged independent. Philip captures Olynthus.
- 347 First Athenian embassy to Philip (end of year).
- 346 The Peace of Philocrates. Second embassy to Philip (spring). Philip at Thermopylae. The Phocians crushed. Philip presides at Pythian games. Demosthenes' *De Pace*. Second tyranny of Dionysius II.
- 346-5 Demosthenes impeaches Aeschines.
- 345-3 Persia recovers Egypt.
- 344 Demosthenes in the Peloponnesus. His *Second Philippic*. Timoleon sails for Sicily. Battle of Hadranum.
- 342-1 Philip's conquest of Thrace.
- 341 Demosthenes' *On the Chersonese*, and *Third Philippic*.

B.C.

- 339 Thracian expedition of Philip. Amphictions determine to make war on Amphissa.
Battle of the Crimissus.
- 338 Philip descends into Greece. His campaign in Phocis and Locris. Battle of Chaeronea (Aug.).
Philip in the Peloponnesus. Synedrion of Corinth.
- 336 Macedonian forces sent into Asia Minor. Murder of Philip and accession of Alexander (summer).
Alexander's first descent into Greece; his election as general of the Greeks.
- 335 Alexander's campaign in Thrace and Illyria, and his second descent into Greece. Destruction of Thebes (Oct.). Accession of Darius III. Codomannus.
- 334 Alexander starts on his expedition against Persia (spring).
Battle of the Granicus (Thargelion). Conquest of Lydia. Siege of Miletus. Siege of Halicarnassus.
- 334-3 Conquest of Lycia, Pamphylia, Pisidia.
- 333 Alexander at Gordion. Conquest of Cilicia. Battle of Issus (Nov.).
- 332 Siege of Tyre (Jan.-July). Submission of Syria and Judaea. Siege of Gaza (Oct.). Conquest of Egypt.
- 331 Foundation of Alexandria. Submission of Cyrene. Battle of Gaugamela (Oct. 1). Alexander at Babylon (Oct.); at Susa (Dec.).
- 330 Alexander in Persis (Jan.-April); at Ecbatana. Death of Darius (July). Conquest of Hyrcania, Areia, and Drangiana. Foundation of Alexandria Areion and Prophthasia. Execution of Philotas and Parmenio.
Aeschines' Against Ctesiphon and *Demosthenes' On the Crown*.
- 330-29 Alexander winters in Drangiana.
- 329 Partial submission of Gedrosia. Conquest of Arachosia. Foundation of the Arachosian Alexandria.
- 329-8 Alexander winters in the Cabul region. Foundation of Alexandria under Caucasus.
- 328 Alexander comes to the Hindu-Kush; conquers Bactria and Sogdiana. Foundation of Alexandria Eschate.
- 328-7 Alexander winters at Zariaspa.
- 327 Alexander at Samarcand (first months); murder of Clitus. Conquest of eastern Sogdiana.
Alexander marries Roxane. Conspiracy of the pages and execution of Callisthenes.

B.C.

- 327 Alexander recrosses the Hindu-Kush, and prepares for Indian expedition.
- 327-6 Winter campaigns in the Kunar, Chitral, and Swat regions.
- 326 Alexander crosses the Indus. Battle of the Hydaspes. Conquest of the Punjab.
- 325 Conquest of the Malli. Foundation of towns on the Lower Indus. Alexander sails in the Indian Ocean. His march through Gedrosia (Aug.-Oct.). Voyage of Nearchus (Oct.-Dec.).
- 324 Macedonian mutiny at Opis. Alexander at Ecbatana. Death of Hephaestion. Harpalus in Greece (spring).
- 323 Alexander at Babylon. Funeral of Hephaestion (May). Death of Alexander (June 13). Greece revolts against Macedonia.
- 322 Battle of Crannon. Change of the Athenian Constitution. Death of Demosthenes (Oct.).



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